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The Minister said that just because the Bill enables the regulator to consider parachute payments, that does not mean that it will. The Minister is in the unique position of being the person who is going to appoint the football regulator, because the Secretary of State has stood down from that decision. Will the Minister ask the person selected to be the regulator whether they would like to exercise the power—whether “can” will mean “will”?
Could the hon. Gentleman give us some sense of his assessment of how much money the new clause would take out of football?
I am listening with interest to the hon. Member’s comments, but does he think that link to home is diluted for American football or baseball when those leagues play a match in London?
I welcome the hon. Member’s support for the new clause. Does he agree that things have significantly changed since the 1970s? The majority of fan trouble is now fuelled by cocaine, not alcohol. We should reclaim a pie and pint at half-time for good, honest fans.
I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the fact that the new clause is not asking for the ban to be lifted. It is very much in the spirit of what he is saying. It says that there should be a requirement to consult, which seems to be the process that he is advocating, so I do not think it would be out of place in the Bill.
The Minister said that the regulator’s purview is the financial sustainability of clubs, but that that was not in any way related to the number of games that teams play in a single season. Surely they are directly related, because clubs will be tempted to thrash their players in order to generate revenues from television and gate receipts?
One of the ways in which the Secretary of State has reduced the waiting list is by turbocharging the use of the private sector since January, meaning that half a million people have been treated in irreducible spare capacity. Has that experience elicited any learnings that the Secretary of State is able to take into the wider reform agenda for the NHS?
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this morning, Mr Twigg. One of the most basic principles of law enforcement is that no one should escape the consequences of committing a crime, but it is right that we target the most serious offenders first so that enforcement efforts have maximum impact. It is also right that when we ask businesses to take steps to prevent crime from taking place, those steps are proportionate. We therefore support the measures in the draft order. Raising the transaction threshold below which businesses are exempted from money laundering offences will mean that more resources can be spent on tackling the most serious examples of money laundering. Given that, as the Minister said, only 0.1% of all transactions between £1,000 and £3,000 were refused in 2024, it is right that we reduce the burden on enforcement agencies at that level. It is also important, though, that we continue to monitor money laundering at every level. With that in mind, will the Minister please tell us what steps his Department is taking to monitor the impact of these changes on money laundering on transactions below £3,000, and when, if at all, the Government intend to review the threshold again?
T3. The UK is desperately short of doctors, but thousands of applicants will be turned away due to a lack of training places. This is not a situation of the Minister’s making, but he has now been in post for a year. Can he assure us that nobody—no union, no Treasury Minister—will prevent him from doing what needs to be done and lifting the training cap?
I rise to speak against new clauses 1 and 20, which represent rushed changes to our abortion laws of profound consequence not only for the unborn child, but for women themselves. My fear is that, if passed, these new clauses would undermine the ability to prosecute abusive partners who force women into ending a pregnancy, inadvertently lead to more dangerous and highly distressing at-home abortions, and risk reducing the status of an unborn child to a legal non-entity. I also wish to put on record my deep unease about the continued attempts to lasso unrelated legislation with amendments on abortion. Whether or not one supports liberalisation, we should all be able to agree that these amendments represent substantial change to the existing law.
I was also expressing my concerns about other amendments that have been tabled, but I believe the hon. Member is none the less proposing a substantial change that deserves more than a two-hour debate among Back Benchers. As MPs, we are not here simply to express our opinions of an ideal world or even to focus only on highly distressing cases; we are legislators, and no greater legislative duty exists than to make sure that what we do in this House does not lead to unintended consequences in the real world for the most vulnerable. In two hours of debate on a Tuesday afternoon, we are being asked to rewrite a profound boundary in British law that protects the unborn child. That is not responsible lawmaking; it is a procedural ambush. It is telling that not even the promoters of decriminalisation in this House can agree on the form it should take. That ought to make each one of us pause, because it speaks to the challenge of moving beyond principle to real-world application. It is worth our recalling previous efforts to amend Bills in this way and their consequences. The temporary pills-by-post scheme brought in during the crisis of the pandemic was made permanent by an amendment hooked, with little notice, on to an unrelated Bill, and what have we seen since? We have seen women accessing pills under false names and gestational dates, and taking them far beyond the recommended 10-week limit, and viable babies have been lost after late-term abortions. That is not women’s healthcare; it is legal and medical failure.
I am afraid there is simply not enough time. That failure is now being used to justify the loosening of abortion laws still further due to a recent uptick in cases of women being investigated. I have looked carefully at the arguments being pushed for decriminalisation, and with those from the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), I see that the bogeyman of the US right is back. Apparently, unless we agree to these amendments, evangelical religious groups paid for by US cash are going to start rolling back women’s reproductive rights in this country. This is utter nonsense. We are in the UK, and we have a very different and a more balanced national conversation. This is not pro or anti life. It is not extremist to want protections for viable babies, and it is not anti-women to say that coercion or dangerous self-medication should not be outside the reach of the law. We also see the argument made that this is solely a woman’s health issue and nobody but she should have a say over what happens to her body, but that is to ignore a very inconvenient truth that has always stalked the abortion debate: this is not about one body; there are two bodies involved. Like it or not, this House has a duty to consider the rights of a woman against the safety and morality of aborting the unborn viable child without consequence. It is not extreme or anti-women to say that a baby matters too. I accept that new clause 1 does not decriminalise a doctor or third party carrying out an abortion outside existing time limits, but let us step back and ask why we have criminal law at all. It is not simply to punish, but to deter. The former Justice Minister Laura Farris has expressed concerns that the challenge of prosecution for infanticide will become greater. She has also raised similar concerns about prosecuting coercive partners if the termination is no longer a criminal offence.
The shadow Minister is speaking very clearly, and I agree with him on the potential for political interference. Does he also see within the clause any scope for market distortion because of the powers that the regulator has?
I rise to support my amendment 19, which seeks to amend clause 94, which brings in a new law to make spiking or administering a harmful substance an offence. I am grateful for the cross-party support I have received for this amendment from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Green and Independent MPs. The intended law around spiking is a sound one, and it generally has cross-party support—indeed, it was a measure in the previous version of this Bill, brought in under the previous Government. My concern is that it has a defect and that there is a loophole. My amendment seeks to close that by ensuring that spiking by a reckless act is also an offence. Spiking is a hideous, heinous activity that destroys lives. It destroys people’s physical and mental health, and at worst, it kills people. The majority of victims of spiking—74%—are women, and the average age of those being spiked is just 26, but there is no typical spiking incident. The majority involve putting something in a drink, but needle spiking is also on the rise. The most likely place for spiking to happen is in a bar, pub or a club, but it can happen anywhere, including in a supermarket or on the street. Spiking is most commonly thought among members of the public to be motivated by sexual intent or to facilitate a theft, but in Committee we heard from Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK about a very different type of spiking, which is what I think the new law fails to address. It is the rise in spiking that seems to have no particular intent behind it. It is sometimes referred to as prank spiking—spiking for, to quote the Government’s own guidance, seemingly “a bit of fun”. We heard from Colin Mackie about how his son Greg died through suspected spiking of that kind. The Bill criminalises spiking or administering a harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy. I do not accept that every case of spiking fits into that definition. I will give an example of a scenario where recklessness would cover a case of spiking—by the way, I should say that recklessness is a well-trodden principle in criminal law, dating back over 200 years. It is an alternative to intent, so that if the prosecution fails to establish that someone meant to do something, it can alternatively establish that their actions were so reckless that they should be convicted. An example is assault causing actual bodily harm. The prosecution must establish the harm, but it can establish either that someone intended that harm or that they did an act so reckless that harm was bound to follow. It does not matter which it establishes to a jury; it will secure a conviction. It is the same with manslaughter: the prosecution can run a case that although somebody did not intend for someone else to die, their actions were so reckless that they should have known that someone might die, and it can secure a conviction. By the way, in the absence of law on spiking, those two offences are often used, but they are often defective, which is why the Government are bringing in their own spiking law. However, they have failed to replicate the principle of recklessness within it. I will give a hypothetical example. A group of friends go into a bar. Two of them have been taking illegal drugs—they have done it before—and they are enjoying themselves. They say to each other, “That friend in our circle—he needs to loosen up some more. He needs to stop his ridiculous opposition to having a bit of fun by taking these pills. I tell you what: we’ll do him a favour. Let’s not tell him, but let’s slip one of these pills we’ve been taking in his drink so he can loosen up and enjoy the evening like we are.” They go ahead and do that, and of course their friend, very likely, is harmed. He may not have done that drug before, or he may have been taking prescription drugs and the mixture is a cocktail. I am sure the House would intend that those two people had committed a crime, but when they are taken to trial I can see a scenario where their defence will say, “Members of the jury, my clients were foolish. They were silly. They shouldn’t have done it. But they didn’t intend to annoy their friend. They didn’t intend to injure their friend. What they intended to do was have a bit of fun and help him have a bit of fun. It was stupid, but they did not intend it.” How is a jury supposed to convict beyond reasonable doubt on that? Instead, if the prosecution could point to recklessness, it would be able to say, “Members of the jury, we do not care whether what these two people intended would be fun for that friend. It was so obviously reckless to any reasonable person that it must be a crime, and you must convict.” Clause 94 needs that much more wide-ranging, all-encompassing, tried and tested legal principle in it. My amendment would do just that. I thank Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK for bringing that evidence to the Bill Committee, and Stamp Out Spiking, which has also done a huge amount, as well as Members no longer in this place who have been doing a lot of work behind the scenes.
I thank my hon. Friend. I was on the Bill Committee, where a similar amendment was tabled, so I can reference the Minister’s response at that time. I have also had a brief word with the Minister outside this place. The Government’s position seems to be that the type of activity I am describing is covered in the intent to annoy, but I hope that I have made it perfectly clear that all reckless acts are plainly not covered by an intention to annoy. I do not for one minute suggest that the Government wilfully do not want the law to work and to cover all scenarios, but I am left with the impression that they have not sufficiently addressed their mind to the gaping loophole that is staring them in the face. If they do not like my amendment, I urge them to draft an amendment of their own to deal with the issue. If just one person walks free following this law because they were able to convince a jury that their actions were not annoying—but they would have been deemed reckless—that will be a terrible failure of what the Government are trying to do in the Bill. I urge the Minister to think again, and I urge all across the House to vote for the amendment to force the Government’s hand.
I am grateful to the hon. Member, particularly for setting out the case of his constituent, who was here in Westminster yesterday; indeed, I also met her. Does he accept that it is those of us elected in this Chamber who make decisions, and that assurances from officials that cannot be articulated in this House—I am looking for that articulation—are not a good reason not to back my amendment?
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Irrespective of our position on the votes that we have just taken, we have to acknowledge that we have made a major change to abortion law, yet that was on the basis of no evidence sessions, no Committee stage scrutiny, and just 46 minutes of a Back-Bench debate and a winding-up speech by a Minister who refused to take any interventions, when the Chamber was full of one-line debates. If we want to continue like this, can you advise me, Madam Deputy Speaker, on how we can improve our rules, so that we do not have this situation in the future?
In March, the Minister for Care told me that no decision could be taken on a new dental school at the University of East Anglia until the spending review settlement was known. Now that we know it, will he instruct the Office for Students to allocate new training places at the UEA from 2026?
Q A quick question: would you support the publication of sentencing remarks to support transparency, and to enable victims to reflect on what was said in court? Sarah Hammond: Ultimately, that is a matter for the Government. There is clearly an argument for victims to be able to see that justice has been done. It will also potentially help with appeals for unduly lenient sentences if victims are able to access the sentencing remarks, so they can see the basis upon which the sentence has been passed.
Q I have a question for Baroness Newlove, in the first instance. I understand that there are new measures in the Bill that allow you to look into individual cases for the first time. Is that something you broadly welcome, and how do you envisage that working? Baroness Newlove: I broadly welcome it, with a bit of a caveat, as I am the victims’ champion. Currently, I have to explain to every victim who writes in that I cannot get involved in individual cases under the statute. That is not to say that I do not pass on the information to Ministers and ask them to help and support. I am very concerned about how we may class victims under two tiers, and that is what we have to look at—it will not be me, but the future Victims’ Commissioner. I receive hundreds of letters, even in the House of Lords, and I am trying to separate them using three criteria. First, does the correspondence highlight a gap in the policy? That is about a victim’s right to a review, and if it is not right, I raise it with the Minister or the Attorney General. Secondly, does the correspondence highlight a failure to deliver in line with policy? I see cases that seemingly meet the ASB case review threshold, but the local authority has added further obstacles, which does not help. Thirdly, and finally, does the correspondence highlight policy that perverts outcomes for victims? By that, I mean that the court orders compensation, which is deducted from criminal injuries compensation—that is another debate that I will not go into. In some cases—or in the majority of cases, if we are perfectly honest—the victim waits years, because it is a drip feed. If we are looking at funding, there is over £1 billion outstanding in unpaid fines and compensation. I would like the courts to act and get the money off the offender so that it goes to victims, who have to wait too long. Those are the criteria I am looking at. It will take a while, but it is paramount that the Victims’ Commissioner sets guidelines. I hear that line, “Does not look at individual cases”, but my correspondents think I can, and it really hurts me when I have to say that I cannot as Victims’ Commissioner—it is all the jargon and waffle that we do. I ensure that victims truly understand that I will signpost their correspondence to the people in charge. I will show them, and they will get transparency in that way.
I was just going to offer the panel the opportunity to say whether there is anything not in the Bill that they would like to see included.
Q To pick up on this theme, Assistant Chief Constable, the police show all the time that it is possible to move and restrain people legally, do they not? Genna Telfer: Yes.
Q So how is this different? Genna Telfer: It is not; it is exactly the same, but we do not move them easily. If someone does not want to be moved, there is a risk to the people moving them, as well as a risk to the individual. Obviously, we train and we do a lot of work to make sure that that injury is limited, but people do get injured when we try to move someone forcefully, on both sides.
Q The focus of what we are trying to do in this amendment is to put the victims at the heart of it. The police and crime commissioner talked about this potentially turning into—I do not think you used the word “farce”, so I do not want to put that— Clare Moody: I did not, no. I talked about making a spectacle of it.
Yes—sorry. That is why in the amendment we have suggested that victims need to be consulted about what would happen. Obviously that would be a risk, but that should be the victim’s choice. That should not be for the establishment—the criminal justice system or politicians. We should actively say, “This is the potential risk of this. Do you want that to happen?” They should be the people at the heart of our conversation, should they not? Genna Telfer: I think they should be at the heart of the conversation, but I do not think they should be the decision maker. If you have someone who is so violent that it presents a risk, effectively making other people victims—prison officers or whoever—there should be a decision either by the Prison Service or by the judge that, “This is too risky to do, and it is going to cause more problems than it is going to solve.” I accept that we would want to consult the victim and put them at the heart of it, but I do not think they should be the decision maker in that case. Clare Moody: I absolutely echo the point that Genna has made. It is one thing saying that this might be the outcome, and that it depends how the outcome is displayed in terms of what that could look like in a courtroom, but there could be the danger of retraumatising victims if this becomes all about the disruption in the courtroom at the point of sentencing. I think there are real problems with that. Genna Telfer: I do not disagree with the principle of it. I just think it would be very difficult to do.
Q Just to pick up on this point, as well as tabling the extension to 56 days, the Opposition have also taken up the point that the witnesses mentioned about awareness. With amendment 12, we are trying to create an obligation for the Crown Prosecution Service to write to victims within 10 working days. Will that assuage your concerns that the main concern is awareness, rather than the timeframe?
Q As the official Opposition, we have tabled an amendment to increase the force with which the justice system can compel the convicted to come to their sentencing hearings. We are particularly keen to make sure there is a duty to consult the victim or their family, where the victim is deceased. Is that something you would support? Mark Brooks: Yes, in principle. I come back to my point about the importance of making sure victims feel that justice is being done, as well as seeing it being done.
In recent weeks and months in this House, we have become familiar with votes of conscience. The amendments that I shall speak to—new clauses 1, 20 and 106—are also matters of conscience. Although I am responding for his Majesty’s official Opposition, Conservative Members will have free votes, so the views that I express will be my own, and I fully recognise that there may be Conservative colleagues who disagree with me. I recognise that the hon. Members for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi) and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) tabled new clauses 1 and 20 with the very best of intent. I have no doubt that all Members who signed them did so with the objective of supporting and safeguarding the rights of women, and I can unequivocally say that I share those aims, as do my hon. Friends the Members for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez), for Reigate (Rebecca Paul), for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), and for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), who have also spoken. However, I do not believe that new clauses 1 or 20 achieve the safeguarding of women that Members seek. Views on abortion do not have to be absolutist. Being pro-choice is not incompatible with being pro-life when the foetus is at a stage at which it is inherently viable. Believing that women should have autonomy over their bodies does not negate the need for a system that safeguards women from physical and emotional harm. As we have heard, new clause 1 would ensure that pregnant women were not criminalised for accessing an abortion during their pregnancy. It would, however, retain the law relating to the provision of abortion in healthcare settings as it stands. Effectively, a woman in England and Wales would legally be able to abort an unborn child by her own means up to the moment prior to a natural birth, but a healthcare professional would be breaking the law if they tried to help her do so outside the 24-week limit.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. On the one hand, abortion would be decriminalised for women; on the other, restrictions on her ability to access that same procedure in a safe, controlled and supportive setting would remain. We must be careful not to create a law that has unintended and potentially harmful consequences, especially for those it is designed to help, and especially when those who are likely to rely on it are likely to be in a state of stress or distress. New clause 1 raises many questions. Is it tenable to legalise all but full-term abortions in England and Wales, but not in other parts of the UK? What would be the legal implications if a woman in Gretna travelled 10 miles across the border to Carlisle to have an abortion after the 24-week limit that is in place in Scotland? Under new clause 1, how do we monitor such abortions that occur outside a healthcare setting? How do we ensure that mothers’ physical and mental health is protected and supported? And what happens to the once-delivered foetus, if the abortion is outside a healthcare setting? As we have heard, new clause 20 goes further than new clause 1 in many respects, so many of the same concerns apply. New clause 106 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham would mandate an in-person consultation before a pregnant woman was prescribed medication to terminate a pregnancy. This new clause is not about making abortions harder to access. An abortion should, of course, be readily available to those who need and want it, and of course abortion medication should be easily accessible during the appropriate stages of pregnancy, but this new clause is about the safety of the mother and the unborn child. Face-to-face appointments are commonplace for patients with a wide range of medications and conditions, particularly when new medications are being prescribed. A private, in-person consultation allows a doctor to be as sure as they can be that the woman is acting of her own informed free will, and ensures that her mental state is assessed and understood. It also reduces as much as possible the likelihood of medication being misused or abused. Telemedicine, while it has its place, can never be a replacement for the patient-doctor relationship developed during face-to-face appointments. It has serious shortcomings. There have been many cases where abortion medicine has been misused following telemedicine, and there have been many more hospitalisations of women following the use of telemedicine. However, I stress that not all of these cases will be down to misuse; we should all be aware of that. New clause 106 does not attempt to restrict access to abortions, and I would not support it if it did. Instead, it would act as an important safeguard to protect women from emotional trauma and physical harm.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Taking a step back to my hon. Friend’s point about “necessary”, is he concerned, as I am, that it is not clear to those responsible what “necessary” means? We could open ourselves up to potential legal challenges and disputes, which would give lawyers lots of money but would have no benefit for the patients.
I rise to speak to clauses 22 and 23 and to Liberal Democrat new clause 4. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the Opposition support clauses 22 and 23 generally. Clause 22 addresses the concern that community clinicians—essentially, those responsible for overseeing a patient’s care outside hospital—have historically had limited formal input into decisions about community treatment orders, even though they are central to the patient’s ongoing care. It ensures that community clinicians not only are consulted but, in some cases, must provide written agreement before key decisions are made. It aims to improve continuity of care, ensure decisions reflect the realities of community-based treatment, and reduce inappropriate and poorly co-ordinated use of CTOs. The benefits of the clause are obvious, but they are worth restating. Clearly, it improves the continuity of care and ensures that clinicians with direct knowledge of the patient’s community care are involved in those key decisions. It enhances safeguards, adding an additional layer of professional oversight before coercive measures are imposed or suggested. It promotes collaboration by encouraging joint decision making between the hospital-based and community-based clinicians, and it reduces the risk of inappropriate CTOs by ensuring they are used only when genuinely appropriate and supported by those delivering care. However, I ask the Minister to touch on three points. First, requiring a written agreement or consultation could delay urgent decisions if not managed efficiently, so will he explain how, under the clause, any potential delay—a disagreement or just administrative inertia—can be removed to ensure treatment is not delayed? That moves me on to the administrative burden. Clearly, the clause adds a level of complexity and requires more documentation and co-ordination. Although I understand that that is a necessary outcome, I would again be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how to ensure effective and speedy implementation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the ambiguity in the roles of the two clinicians may create confusion or disputes over responsibilities if they are not clearly defined or agreed. My reading of the clause is that there is no such clear definition; will the Minister look to provide one through other agencies, or will he put something into the clause in Committee or later in the Bill’s proceedings? Clause 23, on the conditions of community treatment orders, addresses the concerns that the threshold for imposing conditions on community treatment orders has been too low, allowing conditions that may be clinically unnecessary or overly restrictive. By removing the “appropriate” test, the clause will tighten the legal standard to ensure that only necessary conditions are imposed. Additionally, the clause will empower tribunals to play a more active role in scrutinising CTO conditions by allowing them to recommend that clinicians review specific conditions, even if the patient is not discharged. This reflects the Bill’s broader aim of enhancing patient rights and removing unnecessary restrictions. The clause is a welcome addition. It will ensure that CTO conditions are imposed only when strictly necessary, meaning that there are stronger safeguards, and it will enhance the role of tribunals in protecting patient rights without requiring full discharge. It will reduce clinical overreach by preventing the use of overly broad or vague conditions that may not be clinically justified. However, as with the previous clause, I have some questions. First, the tribunal power is limited in that it can only recommend, not require, the reconsideration of conditions. Is that the intention, or will the Minister strengthen the clause at some point to ensure that the tribunal can require a reconsideration of conditions? If he will not, what issues does he see arising from there not being a reconsideration? Secondly, as I mentioned in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I have a concern about the potential ambiguity in the shift from “appropriate” to “necessary” leading to uncertainty or dispute over interpretation. As we touched on in relation to other clauses, clinicians will need additional guidance or training to apply the revised standard consistently. Where will that revised training and guidance be located, and what is the timeframe for its implementation? We need to ensure that all clinicians are fully trained and ready to use this new power. I will briefly touch on new clause 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, because although I understand that the hon. Member for Winchester may not press it, somebody else might. It would place a general duty on integrated care boards to ensure that services in the community have the necessary level of resource to meet demand such that the provisions of the Bill function as intended, and to assess and report on this every two years. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, the Opposition generally support the overall aims of the new clause, but as ever, there are some issues with the detail, so I have five questions for the hon. Member for Winchester if he responds, or for the Minister to answer in his summing up. First, if we imposed a statutory duty on ICBs to ensure sufficient resources for the CTOs, what mechanisms would there be to monitor and enforce compliance? Secondly, what would be the consequences if an ICB failed to meet this duty? Would there be formal accountability or a sanction process? Thirdly, how would the duty interact with existing NHS budgetary constraints and competing priorities? Would it become a statutory obligation with no clear means of redress if unmet? Fourthly, could the duty set a precedent whereby Parliament mandates resource guarantees without providing additional central funding? Finally, what constitutes “sufficient” resources in the context of the CTOs? Who defines that standard, and it is defined locally or nationally?
I thank my hon. Friend for his comprehensive analysis of the provisions under discussion. Does he understand amendments 54 and 55 to mean that, although there would be a narrowing of who can be chosen as the nominated person, there would still be some flexibility for the child to choose? Does he have any concerns about a situation in which a minor—someone under the age of 16—may, for whatever reason, choose somebody who the health professionals believe is not the most appropriate person, and does he have any sympathy with the idea that, given a parent has responsibility for the child in every other aspect of their life, the parent should have that same responsibility in this context?
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman sees the potential benefit in the amendments standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth gave an example, which I do not think is entirely distanced from reality or possibility, in which a person could well choose someone who is deeply inappropriate. In that situation, the person or people—that is, the parents—who had in every other part of life had responsibility for that child would now potentially not have responsibility for the child, in what is probably the most important part of that responsibility. Does the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh really not have any concerns about that? If he does, does he not support at least the intentions behind those two amendments, if not the exact wording or drafting? If he does accept those intentions, would he like to see the Government table similar amendments, drafted in a way that he would find more appropriate?
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I remember the comments made by the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh, who is chuntering from a sedentary position—I think he disagrees with my hon. Friend’s point. In his reply to my intervention, he made the point that there are situations in which things are the other way round, where those who have parental responsibility are not necessarily the appropriate persons. Does my hon. Friend agree that, on first principles, the parent should have parental responsibility in all areas of life, including the ones that she is talking about, unless there are specific reasons, such as the court decision to which she referred, that suggest that the parent is not the correct person to have responsibility? Surely, in the balance of danger or risk, there is a far greater risk if the nominated person is not a parent than if the nominated person is a parent.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 24 to 28, schedule 2, and the vital amendments 54 and 55 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). Together, those provisions form a crucial pillar of the Bill, which must modernise our framework for the 21st century while not forgetting one of the oldest truths in our social contract: that parents, not the state, bear the first and deepest duty to protect their children. The Bill will reform an Act that has stood in various forms since 1983, and which was itself built on a much older legacy of how this country balances individual liberty with the need, in rare cases, to deprive someone of that liberty for the sake of that person’s safety, or the safety of others. For decades, that balancing act has been shaped by the so-called “nearest relative” rule. However well intentioned that rule was, it has often failed to serve the people it is meant to protect. Patients have found themselves legally represented by estranged parents, distant cousins or an ex-spouse with whom they have had no contact for years. In the worst cases, that has compounded trauma and undermined recovery. Clause 24 will address that problem by giving patients the power to appoint a “nominated person” of their choosing: someone whom they trust, who understands their needs, and who can speak up when they themselves cannot. That is, quite simply, the right approach for modern mental health care. It is grounded in autonomy, and respect for the individual’s right to shape their own care and safeguard their own dignity. Good principles must be matched by good machinery. That is why schedule 2 is not a mere administrative detail, but the backbone of this reform. It sets out, step by step, how a nomination is made, who may be nominated, how conflicts are avoided, and how mistakes are corrected. Under part 1 of schedule 2, a patient must make the appointment in writing. It must be signed and witnessed by “a health or care professional or independent mental health advocate”. That is a safeguard against casual or coerced choices. The nominated person must themselves consent: they are not a passive bystander but an active participant. If the relationship breaks down, the patient may revoke the nomination, or the nominated person may resign. Crucially, the county court may step in to remove or bar a nominated person if that person acts unreasonably, abuses their power, or is clearly unsuitable. Part 2 of proposed new schedule A1 to the Mental Health Act 1983, inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, addresses an issue that we must take seriously: capacity. Not every patient will have the capacity to make the appointment at the moment it matters most. The proposed new schedule therefore provides a fall-back system. A court may appoint a nominated person on the patient’s behalf, or a default can be determined under criteria set by regulation. The court again retains ultimate oversight to resolve disputes or replace a default, if the circumstances require it. It is thoughtful, practical and rights-based lawmaking, and I commend the drafters for getting the balance broadly right. Clauses 25 to 28 will give the nominated person real power. They are not a figurehead. Clause 25 demands that professionals consult the nominated person before applying for detention or guardianship. If the nominated person objects, the professional must provide a report showing why detention is none the less necessary, with a clear risk-based justification. The nominated person can then challenge that decision. Clause 26 shortens the duration of the bar on discharge requests from six months to three. If a nominated person believes that the person no longer needs to be detained, they can press for release sooner and more effectively than before.
I thank the hon. Lady for her point, but I shall continue in the same vein unless I am told to do otherwise. Clause 27 will ensure that when community treatment orders are considered, with all the restrictions they bring, the nominated person’s voice must be heard and an objection must be properly countered with evidence. Clause 28 addresses hospital transfers, recognising that being moved to another hospital can uproot fragile support networks and compound distress. By embedding a consultation duty here, too, the Bill will make it harder for patients to be moved arbitrarily or without explanation. In summary, the clauses and the schedule empower patients, embed transparency and build trust, but they do so through a lens rightly focused on adults—capable, consenting adults who make choices freely. That brings me to my fundamental point: we must be absolutely certain that this approach will not inadvertently erode a bedrock of child protection: that a parent is the default legal protector for their child. For an adult, autonomy means freedom of choice, but for a child, especially one under 16, autonomy must never mean being left alone to navigate a labyrinth of legal forms and healthcare powers without the protection of a parent. That is why I strongly support amendments 54 and 55, which would ensure that for under-16s, parents remain the lawful decision makers and the first safeguard for their child’s welfare. Let us imagine for a moment a vulnerable 14-year-old who, in the confusion and fear of a psychiatric admission, is persuaded by a well-meaning adult—or, worse, someone with a hidden agenda—to appoint them as the nominated person. That child may be separated from their parents—the very people who know the child best and have a legal duty to care for them—while an outsider gains rights to object to treatment or discharge decisions. Once that nomination is made and witnessed, it carries weight in law and could marginalise the very people who brought that child into the world and have a moral and legal duty to protect them. This is not just theoretical. We know from real cases in family courts that unscrupulous individuals can exploit vulnerable young people. The risk that the new system could unintentionally open the door to manipulation must be taken seriously. Let us not be naive about how exploitation works: groomers, traffickers and abusers thrive in grey areas of the law; they will find loopholes and drive a coach and horses through them. If we do not make it crystal clear that no child under 16 can override parental responsibility without a court’s explicit order, we risk creating an invitation for abuse. Can the Minister assure the Committee that no child under 16 will be permitted to override parental responsibility simply by nominating someone else without a full and proper process? Schedule 2 does include fall-back arrangements and eligibility checks, and those are welcome, but unless the law is explicit that only a court can displace a parent’s right to act for their child, those safeguards are not watertight. Amendment 54 addresses a related area, the notification of incidents. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether the law should be strengthened so that all admissions of children and young people for mental health treatment trigger mandatory incident reporting, and whether the timeframes for that reporting are still appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether incident reporting requirements are robust enough for all under-18s in mental health settings. Are all incidents of restraint, seclusion, injury or absconding being reported promptly and comprehensively? If not, what must change? We have seen far too many tragic cases in which harm or abuse in children’s mental health units came to light only after a scandal broke, because the system did not catch it in time. Proper oversight is not an optional extra; it is essential for the trust of families. In my view, a review alone is not enough, so I urge to the Minister to confirm that, if the review finds gaps, the Government will legislate swiftly to close them. In the meantime, what interim steps will be taken to ensure that no child is left unprotected? Amendment 55 is the final safeguard in this suite of amendments. It would allow the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to other laws to implement the Bill cleanly. That is good housekeeping, but it must not become a blank cheque. When it comes to parental rights or child safeguarding, no technical tweak should be done behind closed doors by negative procedure; Parliament must approve it in full daylight, on the record. Will the Minister confirm without ambiguity that any consequential amendment that touches on parental powers or child protections will come before both Houses under the affirmative procedure? To illustrate things in the starkest terms, let me paint one more scenario for this Committee. A 15-year-old girl, already vulnerable, is detained following a self-harm incident. Her parents, distressed but committed, wish to be involved in her care plan and discharge, but in her fragile mental state the child is persuaded by an older friend—perhaps well-meaning, perhaps not—to nominate them instead. That friend, now a legally recognised nominated person, blocks discharge, disagrees with treatment and excludes the parents from updates. The clinicians are caught in a legal tangle. The child is caught in the middle, and the parents must fight in court to reclaim their rightful role. As I said before, that is not a theory; it is the sort of real-life pitfall that sloppy drafting can enable. If we see it coming and fail to stop it, we will have failed as legislators. I wish to be clear that I support clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 because they modernise mental health law for adults in a way that is respectful and empowering. I support amendment 54, because it would strengthen transparency and accountability where children’s lives and safety are at stake. I support amendment 55, because it would keep our statute book coherent, but it must never be misused to erode rights by stealth. Above all, I support the amendments because they ensure that the new nominated person system does not inadvertently weaken the oldest and strongest protection we have, which is the legal responsibility of parents to care for their own child. I urge this Committee to adopt the clauses, the schedule and amendments 54 and 55 as essential guardrails to ensure that what we pass here is not just legally sound, but morally right. Let us modernise this law and strengthen patient voice, but let us never allow a child to lose their parents’ protection by accident or bureaucratic slip. Let us be in no doubt: when the state removes or limits parental rights, it must do so under the strictest scrutiny of a court of law, with evidence tested and the child’s welfare paramount. A signed piece of paper at a bedside should never be enough. That is the dividing line between a humane, modern health system and one that risks creating new injustices in the name of progress. I ask the Minister again: will the Government enshrine in this Bill or elsewhere that parents are the legal representatives for under-16s unless a court directs otherwise? Will he guarantee rigorous checks to prevent the manipulation of young minds at their most vulnerable? Will he commit that any necessary changes found by the incident review under amendment 54 would be acted on without delay? I commend this package of reforms to the Committee, and I trust that the Government will listen carefully to these warnings and act to make the legislation watertight.
I do not know whether the hon. Member for Winchester will press his amendment to a vote, but if he does, would my hon. Friend support the idea of having a pilot roll-out of the system before we go the whole hog, because of all the potential problems that she has highlighted?
I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?
Does my gallant and learned hon. Friend have any information on the current waiting times for tribunals? What does he expect the effect of the changes proposed in these clauses to be on waiting times?
Does my hon. Friend think that if there is a backlog, that could undermine patient rights or clinical progress in some way? How will the tribunal system be able to cope with that increased workload and meet its legal obligations to provide timely tribunals so that patients get the best care?