5,779 spoken contributions under 12 words (interjections such as “Will the hon. Member give way?”) are hidden. Show them
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but we do not believe that it necessarily applies to what the amendment seeks to do: to allow the leagues to resolve such issues themselves, rather than the regulator. That is what we are talking about here.
As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on. Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport. The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear. The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA. UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition. Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen. Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards. They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.
Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed: 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3)—(Mr French.) Question put, That the amendment be made.
I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?
The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages. I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?
Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions. I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?
As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?
The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers. Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases? Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources? Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs? Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied? Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation? Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions. Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator. Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation? Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?
Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them. As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively? Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified? Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action? I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts. The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities? The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.
Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?
I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact? We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry. How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?
I am happy to receive a response in writing. Question put and agreed to. Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 10 Reviews Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert “to trigger, or not to trigger,”. This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10. Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out “a committee of the Expert Panel” and insert “the Board”. This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel. Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out “a committee of the Expert Panel” and insert “the Board”. This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel. Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22. This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4. Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out “a committee of the Expert Panel” and insert “the Board”. This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel. Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30. This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10. Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.—(Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10. Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to. Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 84 Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch. The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?
Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?
I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 91, page 74, line 24, leave out subsection (3)(iii).
Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law. The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process. Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions. Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure. Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament. Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs. That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football? My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions. This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles. Such interference has one clear sanction: “the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.” As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational. Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above. By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.
I listened very carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Opposition still have major concerns about the powers afforded to the Secretary of State and what we believe to be appropriate parliamentary oversight. We will press the amendment to a vote.
I am listening very carefully to the Minister’s definition of a conflict of interest. Does she believe that it should be applied to the new chair of the regulator, who has donated to the Labour party?
Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?
I have heard what the Minister just said. Can I clarify that the amendments would make the regulator FOI-able?
I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.
I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. It has been 40 years since alcohol was first banned in view of the pitch. Given the support that lifting the measure has among a number of clubs, the Football Supporters’ Association, and even some Labour MPs, we urge the Government to consider the new clause.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point—I was probably due one of those after five days in Committee—but if we are talking about the interests of fans, we believe that this measure should be considered. Some clubs might want the option; some might want it only in certain areas—for example, excluding family areas of stadiums. We believe that fans, especially those who act responsibly, should be treated as adults. A bit more common sense around how the ban works in the modern age might stop some of the binge drinking that happens before games because fans cannot drink in the stands. We urge the Government to give careful consideration to this option to consult. We are not instructing them to take a definite position, but just to consult.
I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different. The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. We believe that the provisions of new clause 20 are missing from the Bill as drafted. We have debated issues involving clubs, fans and leagues, but there has been little on player welfare. In different debates, we have discussed scheduling and the impact on player welfare of the excessive number of games in different competitions. The perfect example is the club world cup taking place in America. There are also other competing demands on player welfare and the welfare of retired players, as we have discussed. This new clause on player welfare would, within one year of the passing of this Bill, require the Secretary of State to review how to improve the welfare of football players, considering neurodegenerative diseases incurred by heading footballs, the number of games footballers have to play each season—in line with my earlier comments—and the impact on current and former professional footballers’ welfare. It is a straightforward amendment, very much in the spirit of the new duties being asked of the regulator and the leagues going forward. We would therefore be interested in the Minister’s response.
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players. While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Government continue to claim that they wish to expand community diagnostic centres to speed up scanning and treatment of patients and therefore reduce demand on the likes of A&E. If that is the case, why are they cutting the revenue tariffs that were available to the community diagnostic centres under the previous Conservative Government, which has already impacted the financial viability of the CDCs and access for patients?
Opticians are important medical professionals for our community. Unfortunately, when I spoke to the Hertfordshire and West Essex integrated care board, I was told that it will not allow opticians to perform vital services such as treating minor eye injuries, as doing so is deemed too expensive, despite that being the norm in the areas surrounding my constituency. Will the Minister meet me to discuss how we can ensure a fair system across the country, rather than a postcode lottery?
I would like to express my appreciation to all those who have worked on the legislation to develop and shape the policies, whether they be the majority developed under the previous Conservative Government or members of the Bill team, who I am sure have provided helpful assistance to Ministers. As I am sure we will hear today, some of the measures in the Bill are the result of amazing people who have suffered the worst experiences, but who have worked to ensure that others do not have to suffer them in future. In addition, considering the context of the legislation, it is right to pay tribute to the excellent work of police officers across the country. Week in, week out, those serving in our police forces put themselves in harm’s way to keep our streets safe. Those who serve and place themselves in danger cannot be thanked enough. Many people ask themselves whether they would have the bravery to stand up and intervene. Officers across the country do so on a daily basis. Thanks to the efforts of the previous Conservative Government, the police force numbered over 149,000 officers in 2024, with 149,769 recorded in March 2024. This was the highest number of officers, on both full-time equivalent and headcount basis, since comparable records began in March 2003.
I wholeheartedly agree. There are a lot of concerns about the neighbourhood policing guarantee and where the resource comes from: whether it is through specials or volunteers—of course, we want to see more of them—or redeployments. When people ring 999, they want to know that they are going to get the response they expected. They do not want to see that depleted to move officers from one bucket to the next. That has real consequences. The biggest hit to our police force numbers at the moment will be the national insurance rise—the tax that is taxing police off our streets.
I am glad to see all those police officers getting proper training through the hon. Gentleman’s maths teaching. I am glad he has new recruits in his part of the world, but people are concerned about the frontline numbers. The number of police on our streets is a huge concern to the public. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that the funding will not match the Government’s ambitions and falls short of maintaining the existing workforce. And just listen to the Police Federation, which states quite simply: “This Chancellor hasn’t listened to police officers.” Can the Minister confirm that by the end of this Parliament there will be more police officers than were serving in March 2024?
I welcome lots of the measures in the Bill and I hope they will really help our police officers to keep our streets safe, but the police need the resource, funding and support to be out there enforcing the legislation we are putting forward today. I thank the hon. Member for his service—on the Committee as well as in the police force. The House will debate a number of amendments and new clauses today and tomorrow. The Opposition amendments are sensible and aim to improve the Bill, which our constituents would want us to get behind. Amendment 175 relates to the Government’s objective, which we all want to achieve, of reducing knife crime by 50%. We know the untold damage knife crime causes to victims, families and communities across the country. This legislation introduces a new offence: possession of an article with a blade or point, or an offensive weapon, with the intent to use unlawful violence. Let me put that in context. Imagine you are at home in your garden enjoying a nice peaceful afternoon with the kids. Suddenly, our hard-working police officers swoop in on a man walking down the street—a man carrying a knife or offensive weapon who is then proven beyond all reasonable doubt to have planned to use it for violence. He could have been coming for your neighbours, your friends or your family. This is a man who clearly needs to be locked up. Would you want to see him put away for four years or 14 years? In fact, with the sentencing review, whatever he is sentenced to, he is likely to serve significantly less. Who knows how much of that four years he would serve before he could walk back down your street?
I could not agree more. A small minority wreak havoc on our countryside and our streets, and create absolute chaos. That is what this amendment is about: tougher sanctions to divert people from doing such mindless things. The money wasted every year on cleaning up would be better spent on frontline services, such as filling potholes or providing community services. Instead, it is used to clean up after those who have no respect for others or for our natural environment. The most common location for fly-tipping is on pavements and roads, which accounted for 37% of all incidents in 2023-24. The majority—59%—involved small van-sized dumps, or an amount of waste that could easily fit in a car boot. It is therefore logical to conclude that a significant majority of fly-tipping incidents stem from vehicles. Using a vehicle to dump a van full or a boot full of waste should come with real consequences, and the people who do it should feel that in their ability to use their vehicle, as well as through financial penalties. The previous Government increased fines for fly-tipping from £400 to £1,000, but we can go further to deter people from dumping on the doorsteps of others. The amendment would require the Home Secretary to consult on the establishment of a scheme of driving licence penalty points for fly-tippers and those who toss rubbish from vehicles. In Committee, the Minister pledged to engage with DEFRA on this issue. By passing this amendment, we could go further by committing to undertake a consultation to develop a workable and effective scheme. For the benefit of all those who want to be able to enjoy their green spaces, and for our environment and the wildlife that suffers at the hands of fly-tippers and those who toss waste, I urge Members to support the amendment. Let us send a message to the mindless minority who wreak havoc on our green spaces. Before concluding my remarks, I would like to draw the attention of the House to amendments 167, 168, 170 and 171, which, among other Conservative proposals, aim to strengthen respect orders. We have heard the Minister speak both in Committee and in the Chamber of the role these orders can play in tackling antisocial behaviour. The success of the policy will be contingent on its effective enforcement by the police, and on perpetrators being aware that they will face tough sanctions if they breach the orders. I hope the Government will continue to consider these amendments. I draw Members’ attention to these amendments as they are indicative of the constructive approach Conservative Members have taken towards improving the Bill in ways that we believe would benefit the legislation as a whole. I hope that Members across the House will give serious consideration to our amendments and new clauses over the coming two days. The Minister and I have spent more time together than she probably ever envisaged, and I believe we can agree that the Bill contains some sensible and proportionate measures: greater protections for our retail workers, efforts to tackle antisocial behaviour, and more measures to tackle vile and horrendous child exploitation. However, we can work together to go further, and that is what our Opposition amendments seek to do.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship Sir Jeremy. I remind the Committee of my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Unlike the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, I chose my tie with purpose this morning, to celebrate both the fact that this might be the last day of the Bill Committee and also events in Atlanta last night. What we have seen is the thin end of the wedge. I am alive to the arguments about the disparity that parachute payments create in the overall economy of football. However, this Bill is undoubtedly the thin end of the wedge. It will come as no surprise to Members that I am a Conservative, and therefore I think the best form of regulator is competition. We all just ought to watch, because if the regulator has parachute payments within its purview, what is next? It will be agents’ fees, TV rights carve-ups, finishing position bonuses and cut prize money. Seeking to run football as some sort of socialist command economy will come unstuck. I put on record my concern that that is exactly what the Bill seeks to do.