Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
11,990 spoken contributions under 12 words (interjections such as “Will the hon. Member give way?”) are hidden. Show them
- Hansard source
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
It is great to have you back in the Chair today, Mrs Barker. I am speaking today in support of new clauses 25, 26 and 27, which I tabled and which address the issues faced by non-statutory first responder organisations. As we know, people suffering from modern slavery cannot self-refer themselves into the national referral mechanism. These new clauses are a vital part of making sure that we fulfil our duties towards victims of modern slavery. We have designated statutory and non-statutory organisations that are known as first responders. Those organisations have a duty to refer potential survivors of trafficking and modern slavery into the NRM when they identify indicators of trafficking that suggest somebody may be a potential victim of trafficking or modern slavery. However, the number of non-statutory first responders in the UK has not kept up with the increasing demand for referrals into the NRM. We know that the percentage of referrals from non-statutory first responder organisations is dropping. That does not mean a lack of demand, but rather a lack of capacity; it means that the number of non-statutory first responders has not kept up with the increasing demand for references into the national referral mechanism. I believe that the Government need to take action on this, hence these new clauses. Non-statutory first responders play an absolutely crucial role in the identification and support of survivors. Many organisations that support potential victims report <span id="533" class="column-number" data-column-number="533"></span>that many survivors are afraid of public authorities, the statutory first responders. They worry that the statutory first responders will, for example, prioritise criminal investigations over the survivor’s safety and that these FROs might have information-sharing policies with other Government agencies, as we have discussed when debating earlier amendments. These organisations find that their service users are better served with referrals made by non-statutory first responders. We can see in the evidence that the data suggests that referrals made by non-statutory first responders are more likely to get positive decisions in the NRM. That suggests higher quality service and referrals, along with support to gather the evidence provided about potential victims and getting those people properly referred in to the support that they need. Between the second quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, referrals made by non-statutory first responder organisations received a positive reasonable grounds decision in 81% of cases. The rate of positive decisions for referrals by local authorities was 73%, while it was 62% for police referrals and just 47% for the other Government agencies. That suggests a lack of capacity in those organisations, but also systemic issues around collecting evidence and making the appropriate support available so that the right disclosures can be made. Higher-quality referrals of the kind made by non-statutory first responders also make the job of NRM decision makers easier and faster. Their work leads to a more efficient use of the public purse as they cut down on the need for reconsiderations. However, many of these organisations report a lack of capacity, which in some cases leads to potential victims being turned away. In many cases, potential victims have also given up looking for a non-statutory first responder at that point. As an MP, I am not a first responder of any kind, but in my casework I have had people come to me with indicators of modern slavery, and I found it hard to find the right first responder organisation and to reassure that person that they would be able to get hold of them. For my casework, I would love to have more non-statutory first responders available in my area. The evidence underscores the urgent need to increase the number of non-statutory first responders through an open tender and transparent application process to deal with increased demand for referrals, reduce the postcode lottery in access to support for survivors of modern slavery, and reduce the stigma around referrals. That is the ultimate call of new clause 25: to hold a review to look for new non-statutory first responder organisations. I have also tabled new clause 26, which asks for a review of training for first responder organisations. We need high-quality and specialised training for first responders. That is integral to successful victim identification and would ensure better quality and more efficient decision making. Statutory and non-statutory first responder organisations and non-first responder organisations have said that there are serious gaps in first responder training provision. In fact, many officers in statutory first responder organisations are unaware that they are first responders, which means that Home <span id="534" class="column-number" data-column-number="534"></span>Office toolkits and information hubs alone are ineffective. My new clause would ask for a review of the quantity, quality and content of training, ensure that such training reaches the organisations who need it, and make a report on the review available to the Houses of Parliament. New clause 27 would, again, tackle the issues that I have outlined. It asks for a review of the resourcing of non-statutory first responder organisations. The capacity issues faced by first responders highlight their lack of resources to make enough referrals to keep up with the increased number of survivors who need them. First responders do not receive dedicated funding to discharge their responsibilities, which can significantly affect their capacity to fulfil their role effectively. In practice, it can limit their ability to allocate specialist staff, undertake first responder duties and ensure sufficient staffing levels to meet demand and to respond to the people referred to them and other organisations that raise cases with them. Accordingly, there have been many calls for the further allocation of resources to non-statutory first responders and the need to enable survivors to access identification and support through the NRM. We are asking for a review of current resourcing for first responders, to get some evidence of the scale and impact of this issue, identify gaps in capacity of service provision and assess how that affects the identification of and support for potential victims. Such a review would also help to determine what actions, resources or structural changes are needed to address those gaps and ensure that first responders are able to discharge their responsibilities effectively. It would also ensure that we, as a country, are discharging our duties towards the victims and survivors of modern slavery.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I appreciate the detail in the Minister’s response, and I am content to withdraw the new clause. However, I would very much like the points around resourcing to be tackled, and I do not think that that was covered in the Minister’s response. She might agree to write to us with more about the resourcing of non-statutory first responders and the future plans for it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>Clause, by leave, withdrawn.</em> New Clause 28 IIAA: publication of data “(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the publication of data relating to the work of the IIAA. (2) The data required by this section must be updated and published at least every three months. (3) The data to be published under this section must include— (a) the number of appeals submitted to the IIAA; (b) the number of decisions made by the IIAA; (c) the outcomes of decisions made by the IIAA; (d) the proportion of people submitting appeals to the IIAA who had legal representation; (e) the number of appeals waiting to be processed by the IIAA; (f) the length of time taken for a decision to be made on an appeal by the IIAA; (g) the number of appeals that were withdrawn before being heard by the IIAA; (h) the number of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6; and (i) the outcomes of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6. (4) The data published must, where possible, be broken down by— (a) the type of appeal; (b) the nationality of the person submitting the appeal; (c) the gender of the person submitting the appeal; and (d) the age of the person submitting the appeal.”—<em>(Siân Berry.)</em> <em>This new clause would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter (as is the case for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal), of data relating to the work of the IIAA.</em> <em>Brought up, and read the First time.</em> <em>Question put, </em>That the clause be read a Second time.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
The purpose of my new clauses is to ensure that the Government stop using artificial intelligence systems to shape life-changing—and, in some cases, life-or-death—decisions about people’s protection, liberty and removal until they can show that they are lawful, accurate and open to challenge. This debate is not solely about the future, because that goes on in the present: the Home Office already deploys two AI tools in asylum casework. The asylum policy search tool has operated since July 2025, and the asylum case summarisation tool was rolled out to all decision makers in April 2026. Both tools use OpenAI’s GPT-4.<span id="549" class="column-number" data-column-number="549"></span> According to the Department’s own impact assessment, those tools summarise around 17,500 asylum cases every month, including interviews in which people share traumatic experiences relating to torture, persecution, their sexuality, faith and politics. A machine condenses those detailed accounts into the summary, which a decision maker reads before deciding whether that person will be sent back. That is the human cost at stake. The Home Office and the Minister need to deal with those issues—particularly the legality of that practice. The Home Office ignored its own AI playbook when introducing those tools. Neither is listed on the algorithmic transparency register, there is no independent audit and testing of the policy search tool has now stopped altogether. As far as I can see, the Government’s only justification for using those tools is speed, rather than quality or someone’s human right to have their evidence in a life-or-death case considered in full by another human. When the cost of an error is a person being returned to danger, speed is not a safeguard and does not equal justice. Parliament must not accept a system that cannot show its working or justify its decisions. The Minister must deal with those points if she wishes to dismiss the new clauses. New clause 37 is simple, but it is also comprehensive and precise. It says that no decision with a legal or a similarly significant effect on a person and relating to protection, leave detention, removal, support or trafficking may be made by, or with the help of, an AI system that processes their personal data. Subsection (3) makes it clear that any “summary, transcript, translation,” or “search result” generated by AI and given to a decision maker counts as assistance. A human who reads a machine’s summary of an interview is already seeing the case through the filter of that machine. If the summary omits a detail that shows an account’s credibility, the decision maker may never know to look for it. That is unacceptable when a person’s life or freedom is at stake. Subsection (6) matters, as the immigration exemption in the Data Protection Act 2018 currently lets the Home Office set aside people’s data rights. That subsection ensures that the exemption cannot be used to involve AI in those decisions. New clause 38 protects the data itself. Asylum interviews hold the most sensitive information that the state collects, about health, sexuality, religion, political opinion, criminal allegations and details of children. The Department’s own impact assessment for the ACS and APS tools ticks every one of those categories. People give that information to claim protection; they do not give it to train commercial AI. New clause 38 would set out that the data may not be used to build, train or test AI systems, and that suppliers must not keep or reuse it. Subsection (3) closes an obvious loophole. An asylum account does not stop being personal just because the name is removed. In so many cases, the story itself identifies the person because of the detail that must be included. The impact assessment for the asylum case summarisation tool records that no other party is involved in processing and names no processer, even though the model is supplied by OpenAI and is hosted on Microsoft’s Azure platform. Parliament is entitled to know what those contracts say. New clause 38 would put the answer to that beyond doubt. <span id="550" class="column-number" data-column-number="550"></span> Relatedly, I am also concerned about the appeals systems set up by schedule 3 and clause 13, which we have debated. Under the new appeals authority, if an adjudicator cannot see whether AI shaped the decision under appeal, the appeal cannot correct it. Changes need to be made to schedule 3 to require the Home Office to say, in every appeal, whether AI was used in the original decision, and to produce any output that was relied on. The legislation, through amendments that I hope the Government will introduce, needs to state that an adjudicator may not use AI to decide an appeal, judge credibility or write reasons. Credibility is a human judgment about a human being, and such decisions are about people’s human rights. To ensure that the conditions stay that way, restrictions on AI must be added to the Bill.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
The Minister mentions speed and consistency, but I am worried about quality and bias. Given that AI is trained on what is currently on the internet, and given the biases that exist in society, is she confident that credibility decisions and recommendations will not be subject to racial or gender bias, for example?
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
As I said in my speech, the impact assessment for the summarisation tool states that no other party is involved in the processing of people’s personal data. I think the Minister has confirmed that data is passed back into OpenAI and Microsoft systems for training by the tools. Would she be prepared to put that in writing for us so that we can look at it again?
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I am afraid that I am not convinced that the Home Office has the right protections in place under current law or through the Bill. I detect that the Minister is not completely sure of the grounds that she has given for dismissing the new clauses, or that safeguards are in place for privacy and the most sensitive personal data in current and future use of AI. I suspect that I have made the Minister think more about this today, so I hope that she will seek further information and consider introducing further measures to the Bill in its next stages. For now, pending further debate, I am happy not to press these two new clauses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>Clause</em><em>, by leave, withdrawn.</em> New Clause 39 Further provisions relating to the prevention of slavery and human trafficking in organisations and value chains “After section 54 (transparency in supply chains etc) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, insert— <em>‘54A Duty to prevent slavery and human trafficking in organisations and value chains <span id="554" class="column-number" data-column-number="554"></span></em> (1) A relevant organisation must take reasonable and proportionate steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking arising or occurring in— (a) its own operations; (b) the operations of any franchisee or subsidiary undertaking; and (c) the operations, products or services of any person in its supply or value chain or other business relationship. (2) In determining what are to be considered reasonable and proportionate steps for the purposes of this section, regard must be given to guidance issued by the Secretary of State under this section. (3) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on what are to be considered reasonable and proportionate steps for the purposes of this section within 12 months of passing of this Act. (4) The Secretary of State must by regulations designate an enforcement authority with responsibility for ensuring that relevant organisations comply with the requirements of this section. (5) The enforcement authority may, where it is satisfied that a relevant organisation has failed to comply with any of the requirements of this section— (a) issue a public censure notice; (b) require the organisation to take specified compliance, prevention, restoration or remediation steps within a specified period; (c) require the organisation to compensate any persons adversely affected by the noncompliance; (d) impose a monetary penalty of up to 5% of the organisation’s global turnover; (e) exclude the organisation from participation in public procurement procedures for a period determined by the Secretary of State. (6) For the purposes of this section— “relevant organisation” means— (a) a body corporate or partnership, wherever incorporated or formed, which carries on a business or part of a business in the United Kingdom, supplies goods or services, and has, inclusive of any subsidiary undertaking, total turnover of £36 million or more; (b) a public undertaking within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Procurement Act 2023; “value chain” includes all activities undertaken by any entity during the lifecycle of a good or service upstream and downstream of the commercial organisation, including but not limited to material sourcing, processing, production, manufacturing, development, sale, warehousing, logistics, marketing, finance, use and end of life disposal. <em>54B Responsibility for slavery or human trafficking in organisations and value chains</em> (1) Where slavery or human trafficking occurs or is identified in the supply or value chains of a relevant organisation (“O”), O is responsible for such slavery or human trafficking if— (a) any activity of O causes or contributes to the occurrence of the slavery or human trafficking, or (b) the occurrence of slavery or human trafficking is directly linked to O’s operations, products or services by O’s business relationships. (2) O is not responsible for the slavery or human trafficking if it is proved that O had taken reasonable and proportionate steps under section 54A. (3) Where O is responsible for slavery or human trafficking, O commits an offence.<span id="555" class="column-number" data-column-number="555"></span> (4) Where an offence under subsection (3) is committed with the consent or connivance of a director, manager, partner or other senior officer of O, that person also commits the offence. (5) A party guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a) in the case of a relevant organisation, and any director, manager, partner or other senior officer of that organisation who commits an offence under subsection (4), to an unlimited fine; (b) in the case of an individual— (i) on summary conviction, to an unlimited fine, with such a fine being proportionate to the degree to which they were responsible for slavery or human trafficking; (ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years, or to an unlimited fine, or to both. (6) A person adversely affected by any slavery or human trafficking for which a relevant organisation is alleged to be responsible may bring civil proceedings against that organisation, whether or not criminal proceedings have been commenced or concluded in respect of the same conduct. (7) Civil proceedings under this section may be brought by the person who claims to have been adversely affected by slavery or human trafficking (a “victim”), the Secretary of State, or any person acting on behalf of a victim. (8) For the purposes of this section, “relevant organisation” has the meaning given in section 54A.’”—<em>(Blake Stephenson.)</em> <em>This new clause would require organisations to take steps to prevent slavery and human trafficking in their operations, and make organisations or individuals responsible for slavery or human trafficking liable to fines or imprisonment unless they have taken reasonable steps to prevent it.</em> <em>Brought up, and read the First time.</em>
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixteenth sitting)
I beg to move amendment 69, in clause 50, page 52, line 1, at end insert— “(1A) Where any provision of this Act includes a power to make regulations and such provision or regulations would affect— (a) the identification of victims of slavery and human trafficking in Scotland, (b) the provision of support to victims of slavery and human trafficking in Scotland, or (c) any duties on Scottish public authorities relating to tackling slavery and human trafficking in Scotland, the Secretary of State must consult with and receive consent from Scottish Ministers before making such regulations.” <em>This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with and receive consent from Scottish Ministers before making regulations relating to slavery and human trafficking which affect Scotland.</em>
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixteenth sitting)
It is great to have you finishing up the Committee for us, Dr Murrison. I have tabled amendment 69 in relation to clause 50 and part 1. That area of the Bill gives the Secretary of State quite broad power to make regulations that are consequential to the Bill. As it stands, the Bill has quite a range of implications for Scottish trafficking laws and how they are carried out. The amendment aims to ensure that the Government receive consent from Scottish Ministers before introducing regulations affecting slavery and human trafficking. The amendment refers in particular to clause 11, which creates a new legal procedure for claim notices requiring people to notify the Home Office of any reasons or grounds for why they should be allowed to enter, remain or not be removed from the UK. In that respect, the Bill tries to shift the burden of responsibility on to survivors by creating the obligation to treat a failure to disclose relevant details at the earliest opportunity as damaging to one’s credibility. The way things are looked at in Scottish law seem to be different from the English approach. This kind of restrictive approach to vulnerable groups seeking sanctuary in the UK seems to contradict the commitments in Scotland to the UN refugee convention and the UK’s obligations under the inter-agency co-ordination group against trafficking. Those obligations require victim identification procedures to take into account the possibility of trauma, coercion and subsequent delayed disclosure. The amendment would help by forcing the Government to look again at how clause 11 might interfere with the <span id="645" class="column-number" data-column-number="645"></span>obligation placed on Scottish Ministers via the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 to provide support to victims of trafficking. Section 9 of that Act requires Scottish Ministers to secure necessary support and assistance for adult victims of human trafficking, and gives Scottish Ministers their own statutory duty. That duty is triggered by a reasonable grounds decision. The new credibility penalty in clause 11 seems therefore to conflict with the statutory framework established by the 2015 Act and with the approach enshrined within it—a fundamental human rights approach to believing survivors. That statutory inconsistency between the two provisions poses a question of how reserved powers within the Bill and devolved functions will interact. Consideration must be given to the Bill’s implications for those devolved powers, particularly in relation to trafficking frameworks, and to whether the Bill’s provisions can be enacted without undermining existing statutory duties in Scotland. I worked with the Scottish Refugee Council on the amendment. It recommends that Scotland should maintain its greater flexibility to provide secure immigration status for trafficking survivors, and its goals of supporting recovery and reducing the risk of re-trafficking. To do that, the Bill should explicitly protect the operation of the 2015 Act and preserve Scottish Ministers’ discretion to provide support. The amendment is therefore needed to ensure that UK immigration measures do not impede the fulfilment of devolved duties on trafficking. Although I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote, I hope that the Government will look again and discuss this matter further with Scottish Ministers before the Bill’s final stages.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixteenth sitting)
I echo some of the comments from other hon. Members on the Committee and thank the Minister for engaging with the many amendments I have tabled to the Bill, because I think they are necessary. I believe that the Bill does not reflect the long-held British value of welcoming refugees, which is still the view of the majority of people in our country. I do not think that obstructive and unfair processes, damaging attitudes and downgrading human rights will stop the criminal gangs or the boats, or tackle the lack of safe routes, which feeds the market for that kind of organised crime. However, I believe that we have had a constructive debate about many of these things, and Parliament will hopefully convince the Minister and the Home Secretary to think again. I also very much appreciate the excellent chairing that we have had. Finally, I want to thank the many different charities, grassroots support networks, non-governmental organisations and independent experts who have helped and supported the scrutiny I have given to the Bill, not least the Refugee Council—an amazing organisation that rightly essentially won “The Traitors” last week, after Romesh Ranganathan gave his well-deserved prize money to support their work. May they long continue to be faithful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. <em>Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.</em> <em>Amendment made: </em>134, in clause 50, page 52, line 10, leave out paragraph (b) and insert— “(b) regulations under section (Core protection: amendments) which amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation (within the meaning of that section);”.—<em>(Anna Turley.)</em> <em>This amendment is consequential on NC36. The effect of it would be that regulations made under the power in the new clause inserted by NC36 would be subject to the affirmative procedure if they amended primary legislation, and otherwise subject to the negative procedure.</em> <em>Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.</em> Clause 51 Extent <em>Amendment made: </em>127, in clause 51, page 52, line 21, at end insert— “(3) Paragraph 21 of Schedule 1 (and section 1(3) so far as relating to that paragraph) also extends to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories within the meaning of the British Nationality Act 1981 (see section 50(1) of that Act).<span id="650" class="column-number" data-column-number="650"></span> (4) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide— (a) for any of the provisions of this Act to extend, with or without modification, to the Isle of Man, and (b) for any of the provisions of Parts 3 and 4, and this Part so far as relating to Parts 3 and 4, to extend, with or without modification, to the Bailiwick of Guernsey. (5) A power under any provision listed in subsection (6) may be exercised— (a) so as to extend (with or without modification) to the Isle of Man any amendment or repeal made by or under this Act of any part of an Act to which the provision listed in subsection (6) relates; (b) so as to extend (with or without modification) to the Bailiwick of Jersey any amendment or repeal made by or under Part 2 or 5 of this Act of any part of an Act to which the provision listed in subsection (6) relates; (c) so as to extend (with or without modification) to the Bailiwick of Guernsey any amendment or repeal made by or under Part 2, 3 or 4 of this Act of any part of an Act to which the provision listed in subsection (6) relates. (6) Those provisions are— (a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971; (b) section 9(3) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997; (c) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; (d) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; (e) section 49(3) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004; (f) section 63(3) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; (g) section 60(4) of the UK Borders Act 2007; (h) section 60(6) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015; (i) section 95(5) of the Immigration Act 2016; (j) section 86(4) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022; (k) section 64(4) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.”—<em>(Anna Turley.)</em> <em>This amendment provides for the consequential amendment of the British Nationality Act 1981 in paragraph 21 of Schedule 1 to the Bill to extend to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories. The amendment also provides powers for other provisions of the Bill to be extended to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.</em> <em>Clause 51, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.</em> Clause 52 Commencement <em>Amendments made: </em>128, in clause 52, page 52, line 23, leave out “(5)” and insert “(5B)”. <em>This amendment is consequential on amendments 129 and 136.</em> Government amendment 47, in clause 52, page 52, line 30, at end insert— “(ba) section (Liability to deportation of certain residents despite section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971);”. <em>This amendment would mean that the new clause inserted by NC5 would come into force on Royal Assent.</em> Government amendment 135, in clause 52, page 52, line 37, leave out paragraph (a). <em>This amendment would change the way in which Part 3 (core protection) is commenced, so that instead of it commencing automatically two months after Royal Assent it would be commenced by regulations.</em><span id="651" class="column-number" data-column-number="651"></span> Government amendment 129, in clause 52, page 53, line 7, at end insert— “(5A) Section (Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner) comes into force at the time when paragraphs 9 and 14 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 come fully into force.” <em>This amendment makes provision about the commencement of the new clause inserted by amendment NC33.</em> Government amendment 136, in clause 52, page 53, line 7, at end insert— “(5B) In Schedule (Core protection: amendments)— (a) paragraph 9(c) comes into force at the same time as paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 11 to the Immigration Act 2016; (b) paragraph 28 comes into force at the same time as section 59(3) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 comes fully into force; (c) paragraph 51 comes into force at the same time section 135 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 comes into force.” <em>This amendment would delay the commencement of three amendments made by the new Schedule inserted by NS1, so that they come into force only when provisions being amended are brought into force.</em> Government amendment 46, in clause 52, page 53, line 25, at end insert— “(11) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under subsection (1) that bring Part 1 into force. <span id="652" class="column-number" data-column-number="652"></span> (12) Before making rules under subsection (11), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals. (13) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (11) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—<em>(Anna Turley.)</em> <em>This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with the commencement of the powers of the IIAA. This may be especially needed if commencement regulations make the kind of provision mentioned in clause 52(8). (See also amendment 43.)</em> <em>Clause 52, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.</em> <em>Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.</em>
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
My hon. Friend makes a compelling point. Once a company gets a road licence, it should not just be left to run it indefinitely, without any checks. A review every five years would force the regulator to consider the facts, including whether drivers are getting value for money and whether tolls are pushing extra traffic on to surrounding local streets. Publishing those findings would keep the operators accountable to the public.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
We are generally in agreement that it is essential that both transparency and cost control sit at the heart of this framework. Drivers and local businesses deserve to know exactly what they are being asked to pay before any tolling arrangements are introduced. We cannot expect motorists to accept potentially significant and unexpected costs without first having a clear understanding of what those charges will be, and how they will be determined.<span id="108" class="column-number" data-column-number="108"></span> Amendment 72 is about ensuring proper scrutiny before decisions are made and effectively locked in. By requiring licence conditions and proposed toll levels to be published before the Act comes into effect, Parliament has the opportunity to examine the arrangements and understand the potential impact on roads users and motorists. Ultimately, people deserve transparency, accountability and certainty. We must ensure that the interests of drivers and local businesses in all our constituencies are properly protected, and that no one is left facing unexpected costs without having had the opportunity to understand them.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
The British people are fair, but what they cannot stand is people who break the rules getting the same as or better than people who do not. To be fair to the Home Secretary, there are measures in the Bill that we welcome, but time and again it identifies the right problem but stops short of a solution. Nowhere is that clearer than on human rights law. New clause 41 says that for immigration, asylum and deportation law, the Human Rights Act 1998 would have no effect. Our laws would mean what Parliament wrote. No officer, court or tribunal could act on a Strasbourg interim measure unless a Minister of the Crown decides that the UK should comply. New clause 60 would make part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002—the article 8 code—final. Courts would not be able to reinterpret its words, and a decision made in line with it would not be unlawful just because it clashes with article 8. Let me say why we tabled the new clauses. This is not about being against human rights. The Conservatives believe in the rule of law and protecting people from persecution, but the rule of law means laws made by this Parliament, applied as this Parliament intended. Over the past 25 years, the Human Rights Act has given the courts the job of reading words into immigration law that Parliament did not put there, and the effect has been to move the most important decision that any <span id="560" class="column-number" data-column-number="560"></span>country makes—about who gets to stay—away from the people the public can vote out. That matters for democratic consent. When people see a foreign criminal who abused children remain here because a judge felt that removing him could impact his family, they do not blame the judge; they blame all of us—Members of every party. They conclude that their votes do not change anything and that politicians are powerless or do not care. That corrodes trust in the whole system and hands a gift to those who want to tear it down rather than fix it. Our motivation is to restore the simple principle that Ministers decide, Parliament holds them to account, and the public holds Parliament to account at the ballot box. There is a fairness point, too. The protections in our law should exist for the people who need them most: the genuine refugee and the victim of trafficking. Every time those protections are stretched to cover a convicted criminal, they lose their legitimacy, and it becomes harder to defend them. Why do we need them? Because of some of the cases we have seen. In February last year, a Pakistani man convicted of child sex offences was allowed to stay in this country because a tribunal judge decided that deporting him would be unduly harsh on his family, even though the law already restricted his access to them. When the Home Office appealed, the upper tribunal called that ruling contrary to the evidence, plainly wrong and rationally insupportable, and sent it back to be heard again. A convicted child sex offender used his own children’s family life as a shield, and it took an appeal just to get the case reheard. That was not a one-off. A Zimbabwean paedophile was due to be deported in 2021, but a judge blocked it. Why? Because, among other things, his criminal record for child sex offences meant he was likely to face hostility from the authorities if he went home. Let that sink in: the very crimes that should have guaranteed his removal became part of the reason he could stay. Most people in this country would find that not just wrong but upside down. A law that turns a conviction for abusing children into a shield against deportation is a law this Parliament has a duty to change. In 2014, this House put part 5A into law to stop exactly that sort of outcome; 12 years later, the Government are back amending the same sections through clauses 18 to 20 of this Bill. Why? Because the courts keep reading our laws through the Human Rights Act and finding exceptions that Parliament never meant. The Law Society told this Committee that the Government’s new definition of family life is a big narrowing of article 8. Fine, but if the Minister wants those words to survive their first trip to court, she needs new clause 60. Look at Rochdale. Adil Khan and Qari Abdul Rauf were members of the grooming gang convicted in 2012 of sexual offences against young girls. Rauf trafficked a 15-year-old girl for sex. They were stripped of their British citizenship. Then they spent seven years fighting deportation on article 8 grounds, while living in Rochdale near their victims. They finally lost in 2022. This summer, the Government were still in talks with Pakistan about removing them, and the Home Office has not said whether either has gone. Seven years of article 8 litigation for men who did that to children just is not acceptable. <span id="561" class="column-number" data-column-number="561"></span> Look at Reading. Khairi Saadallah’s asylum claim was refused. He had a string of convictions. The inquest heard that he had killed people in Libya before he came here, yet for years he was in limbo, refused but not removed, because of the risk on return to Libya. In June 2020, he murdered three men. The coroner found their deaths were “probably avoidable”. Remember, too, June 2022, when a rule 39 indication issued late in the evening by a judge whose name was not then disclosed grounded a removal flight already on the runway. Under new clause 41, that decision would rest with a Minister, answerable to this House. None of this is new to the House. The Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 said that it was for a Minister of the Crown, not the courts, to decide whether to comply with a Strasbourg interim measure. Parliament passed it. This Government repealed it in full through the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, which received Royal Assent last December. The question for the Minister is not whether this can be done; it is why her Government chose to undo it. Meanwhile, at the end of June, 21,294 foreign offenders due for deportation were living in our communities, up more than 2,000 in a year. If the Minister agrees that Parliament should decide who stays in this country, she should support the new clauses, and I commend them to the Committee.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
Together, these four clauses would mean that people who come here illegally are removed, cannot block that removal with last-minute claims, can never come back lawfully, and can never become British citizens. Take a man who lands on a beach in Kent on 1 December 2026, having paid a smuggling gang with no visa and no permission, and having come from France, a safe country. Under new clause 42, he meets all three conditions. He needed leave and did not have it; he entered without permission; and he arrived after 30 June 2026, the day this Bill was introduced. The Home Secretary had to remove him to his own country or a safe third country. He claimed asylum; under new clause 43, that claim would be inadmissible, there would be no appeal and a modern slavery claim or judicial review would not stop the duty either. If he later applied for a visa, new clause 55 would say never, and new clause 56 would say that he could never become a British citizen. The message to the next person on the beach in northern France would change from, “Get across, and you will probably stay,” to, “Get across, and you will be sent back for good.”
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
Does the Minister think that fewer than one in 10 of those people who arrive illegally being removed is the right thing? Does she believe that people who arrive illegally should be able to go on to become British citizens?
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. We can pass all the laws we like, but if nobody carries out the removals, nothing changes. New clause 44 would require the Home Secretary to set up a dedicated UK removals force within six months. Its job would be clear: remove foreign offenders, illegal entrants, visa overstayers, failed asylum seekers and illegal workers and return them to their home country or a safe third country, and work with the police and use facial recognition and shared biometric data to find people with no right to be here. I will give the Government credit: returns have gone up, but let us be clear where much of that capacity came from. Most returns of small boat arrivals since 2018 have been to Albania under the returns arrangement the last Government agreed. The Government inherited that and built on it, which is fair enough, but let us look under the bonnet. In the year to June 2026, there were 9,669 enforced returns. Voluntary returns passed 30,000, many paid up to £3,000 to go, and nearly half of those who took up the scheme last year were Brazilians. Would the Committee believe it? How many of those people would have gone anyway? Paying people to leave is not enforcement. Now look at the size of the job. The Home Office made 116,000 initial asylum decisions last year, with a grant rate of 38%—tens of thousands of refusals. More than 21,000 foreign offenders are living in the community awaiting deportation, and fewer than 6,000 foreign offenders were returned in the year. Failure to remove has a human cost. Emad al-Swealmeen had his asylum appeal dismissed in 2015, and he was not removed. Six years later, he detonated a home-made bomb in a taxi outside Liverpool women’s hospital. Khairi Saadallah was refused, convicted, and left in limbo for years before he murdered three men in Reading. Ahmed Alid’s claim was refused, and three years later, he was still in Home Office housing in Hartlepool when he killed Terence Carney. Why have we tabled the new clause? Because a law that is not enforced is worse than no law at all. It tells people that the rules are for show. Every time a refused asylum seeker, a visa overstayer or a foreign offender stays on with no consequences, it sends a signal around the world that the UK is a soft touch and it tells the public at home that the system has given up. We want enforcement to be a priority, with its own leadership, budget and accountability to this House, so that Ministers can be asked a straight question, “How many have they removed?”, and they have to give a straight answer. Right now, removals are spread across immigration enforcement, escort contractors and the police, who all have other priorities. The new clause would create one body with one mission and the resources and powers to do the job. That is how we would stop a refused claim turning into permanent residence by default. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
This group of new clauses is about ending the endless cycle of claims, appeals and challenges. New clause 46 would set four simple rules: someone should make all their claims at once; they should back them with real, checkable evidence; they should not contradict what they have said; and there is only one appeal. Later claims are inadmissible unless something has genuinely changed in someone’s home country, and claims based on how someone has behaved since arriving are disregarded. New clause 54 makes the Home Secretary’s decision final, with no possibility for judicial review, except where she has acted outside her legal powers. That builds on what Parliament has already done. The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 introduced evidence notices and told decision makers to give minimal weight to evidence produced late without good reason. This Government kept that Act. New clause 46 takes the same principle to its logical conclusion: if something was not raised at the start, and nothing has changed at home, it does not get raised at all. Three cases show why that should be so. Abdul Ezedi raised his conversion to Christianity only on his third attempt. The Home Office warned he was using religion for his own ends; he could not answer basic questions about the faith. A judge granted him asylum anyway. In January ’24, he attacked a mother and two little girls with a corrosive substance in Clapham. Emad al-Swealmeen came here on a visit visa claiming he wanted a holiday, and then claimed asylum as a Syrian. The judge rejected his account in its entirety in 2015. He converted after his appeal rights were exhausted, made a fresh claim under a different name and had yet another appeal outstanding on the day he set off a bomb outside Liverpool Women’s hospital—more than six years after he first lost his case.<span id="577" class="column-number" data-column-number="577"></span> Lawangeen Abdulrahimzai arrived in 2019 claiming to be a 14-year-old orphan. He was in fact an adult who had murdered two people in Serbia with a Kalashnikov on his way here. He was placed with a foster carer and given a place at a school. In March ’22, he stabbed a 21-year-old to death. Under new clause 46, a claim built on a false identity, a false age, a new name or a conversion after arrival would not get off the ground. Under new clause 54, a decision made would stick. That is not harsh; it is how most people assume the system already works. Jamil Ahmed is a Pakistani national living in Scotland. He was convicted in 2008 of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl aged between 13 and 16. In 2013, he was convicted again for the same offence against another girl and for sexually assaulting a teenager, and jailed for three and a half years. He was made subject to a deportation order and lost his appeals twice. After a legal fight lasting the best part of a decade, he finally won at the upper tribunal—on the basis that the reporting of his crimes would put him at risk if he went home. That took nearly 10 years of litigation, but under new clause 54 a decision would have been made. It would have been final, and he would have gone. These new clauses are motivated by a simple belief that a fair system is a final system. Endless litigation does not serve genuine refugees. It leaves them waiting in the same queue as those gaming the process, sometimes for years, unable to get on with their lives. It also does not serve the taxpayer, who picks up the bill for the hotel, the support, the lawyers and the tribunal, and it does not serve justice, because a decision that can be reopened again and again is not really a decision at all. We should get it right first time, give people one fair appeal, and then let the answer stand. That is how every other part of public life works, and asylum should be no different. The system is drowning. More than 90,000 asylum appeals are waiting, each taking around 61 weeks. The Institute for Fiscal Studies found that there were nearly 330,000 open cases across our tribunals earlier this year. Furthermore, the Government already accept the principle of finality. Clause 1 has an ouster clause for the new appeals body. If finality is right for that body, will the Minister tell the Committee why it is wrong for the Home Secretary? I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. New clause 47 is one line long, and would abolish legal aid for applications or claims about a person’s immigration status or right to be in the UK. Immigration and asylum legal aid cost £59 million in 2024-25, which paid for more than 64,000 pieces of work. The Government have since added a £20 million-a-year uplift to the fees. Under this Government, more taxpayer money goes to immigration litigation, not less. Let me put it simply: a family in Stockton who cannot get legal aid for a dispute with their employer or for most family court cases are entitled to ask why it is there for someone who came here illegally to fight their removal. Since 2012, legal aid has been taken away from large parts of civil law for British citizens, and immigration should not be the exception. It shapes behaviour: more than 90,000 asylum appeals are waiting, and more than a third of asylum appeals are withdrawn before they are even heard. When someone else is paying, there is very little cost to having a go. We have already heard about what endless rounds of claims and appeals can lead to. Our motivation is about priorities. Every pound of public money has to be justified. Right now, families across the country are being asked to tighten their belts. When budgets are stretched, the public expect legal aid to go first to British citizens who are facing eviction, domestic abuse or the loss of their children before it goes to funding challenge after challenge against removal. This is not about denying anyone their day in court, but about deciding who the taxpayer should pay for and being honest about it. This new clause would save money, cut last-minute challenges and put the British taxpayer first. I think most people would say that that is not an unreasonable expectation. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
- Hansard source
Social Housing Bill (Fifth sitting)
On new clause 63, does the Minister agree that, before we worry about electric vehicle charging points, the new developments must have enough parking spaces? As it is, I suspect that hon. Members’ postbags are full due to new developments coming forward without enough parking spaces, even before electric vehicle charging points are put in as well.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
I am listening to the Minister talking about taking people out of hotels, which of course we all support and want the Government to be successful at. Can she provide any justification, because I cannot see one, for housing a large number—more than 1,000 asylum seekers or refugees—in a community that is smaller? How can that ever be right? It does not even matter that those people are refugees and are not from this country—1,000 extra people on the side of a smaller settlement seems to me crazy. It seems to be something that should not be able to happen.
- Hansard source
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixteenth sitting)
Listening to the shadow Minister throughout the day, it is revealing just how deficient the Bill is in tackling the fundamental problems with immigration and asylum policy. Even if the Government do not agree with our new clauses, I invite the Minister—perhaps I should have intervened on her at some point—to address a wider point the shadow Minister is making: how do we deal with all these issues that are simply not addressed in this legislation or anywhere else where the Government say they are acting?
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Let us see if we can rise to the Minister’s challenge of maintaining this morning’s quality of debate. Amendment 49, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, essentially requires the ORR to review each licence at least every five years and to publish that review. The review would include compliance, user satisfaction, value for money, financial performance and resilience, toll returns and—continuing a theme of some of the amendments we discussed this morning and that flows through the entire Bill—the effects on surrounding roads off the trunk road network and the strategic road network that are the feeders to the new infrastructure: the lower Thames crossing and potentially others that the Bill enables. I put it to the Committee and particularly to the Minister: why should a long-term licence not be subject to a mandatory review period published at least every five years, although I am open to other suggestions on the period? This is something that will impact motorists from across the whole country, particularly in the case of the lower Thames crossing. The hon. Member for Dartford has already expressed concerns about the impact on local roads. If a licence is granted for much longer than that—and I cannot see how it would not be, in order to bring realistic commercial payback under the tolling arrangements—what if it is a complete disaster? What if things do not pan out as everyone expects them to? We do not want things to go wrong, but let us face it: sometimes they do. Often they do not go wrong due to any eventuality that has been foreseen. We would not have done it in the first place if there was a plan that saw things going wrong. But when things do go wrong, we need clear answers from those accountable to those paying the tolls on these roads, and indeed to the Government who will have set up the scheme in the first place. That goes in many respects to the conditions that the Minister spoke to in clause 6 around timely notice. I gently say to the Minister: yes, it is important for an operator to get timely notice of any change, whether that is termination of a licence as it comes up to its expiration or an extension, but what is missing in clause 6 is anything that addresses the point about things going wrong. What if the Government need to step in and salvage a pretty horrendous situation that we might conceive of in future?
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. He is right that there are measures in clause 11 that would address that issue, but we are currently discussing clauses 5 and 6, and the Minister’s <span id="101" class="column-number" data-column-number="101"></span>comments reflected the fact that clause 6 only refers to extensions of a licence as opposed to reviews of a licence. I cannot imagine that any of us, whatever walk of political life we find ourselves in at any one moment, would not want to have a statutory review period, so that all of us can question whether a contract is working as well as we want it to. Frankly, there are many projects I can think of that I wish we had had review periods for in the past, because we might have been able to pick up things that were going the wrong way. If the Minister and the Government do not wish to have a five-year review period, I would welcome suggestions about what sort of review period would be acceptable to them. If they do not want a review period at all, there needs to be a pretty good case for that.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
My hon. Friend makes the case incredibly well. This discussion is about transparency; it is about openness. It is about saying to those who in the future might receive a licence to run the lower Thames crossing or any other piece of road infrastructure that might be financed through this model that they are still accountable to the public and to the Government, be that the current Government or any future Government. Such reviews will give us transparency and a clear light on what is going on, so that—to go back to the earlier debate today—any future schemes, which no one can name yet, that might be financed under the scheme created by the Bill could be improved upon by reviews of the operation of the lower Thames crossing in the future. Let us not put a date on when it will actually get built; every state project ends up being built more slowly than originally intended. But five years into the operation of the lower Thames crossing, why would all of us collectively—as parliamentarians or as the general public—not want to know how it was going?
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
My hon. Friend makes some interesting suggestions. I challenge the Government to reflect upon—<em>[</em><em>Interruption.</em><em>]</em> One Government Back Bencher is leaving already, it seems.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
It’s getting closer! <em>[</em><em>Laughter.</em><em>]</em> Maybe the Government can go back and reflect on that, and before Report, when the Bill returns to the whole House, they will have a sensible suggestion or counter-proposal on the table for how we properly monitor and review the operation of these licences.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
The amendment is very clear in saying, “review each licence”. That is not to say, “treat each licence as if they are identical,” because of course as time passes there might be different regulatory set-ups or safety standards that a new licence is granted under. We are very clear that each licence must be reviewed every five years, as opposed to—as I think the Minister is trying to argue—treating them all the same.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I largely wish to comment on amendment 72 in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, but before I do so, I will speak briefly to amendments 39 and 40. The hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage makes a good point about the increased use of local roads that feed vehicles on to new infrastructure, such as the lower Thames crossing, or indeed bring motorists—be they private motorists or haulage operators—off those pieces of new infrastructure. The current modelling that finances local highway authorities—predominantly councils—up and down the land has no mechanism whatsoever for acknowledging the point that the hon. Member makes. When traffic flows are massively increased on an existing road, those surfaces very quickly degrade and start to resemble the surface of the moon. I am sure we all see that in our own constituencies. It something that drives all of our constituents—and me—absolutely potty on a daily basis. I see that in my own constituency, where we have seen a large amount of big infrastructure being built over recent years, such as East West Rail. That happens where compounds are put in for heavy goods and groundworks vehicles. The traction zones where those vehicles are accelerating to pull out, or braking to come in, as they go to site, move earth away and bring aggregate in, very quickly degrade. It makes sense to take into account where an existing local road—one that is owned by a local highway authority and is the responsibility of local council tax payers—is suddenly asked, as they will be in the case of the new lower Thames crossing and potentially other schemes in the future, to be used for infrastructure projects. There should be a flow of funding, either from the licensee or from the Government through the Department for Transport, and ultimately the Treasury, that ensures that council tax payers in local areas are not asked to pick up the bill—as my council has been asked to do for roads broken by HS2 construction—for the construction of the lower Thames crossing and other schemes under the Bill. Indeed, they should not be asked to pick up the bill for the ultimate operation of them, either. I have some sympathy for amendment 39 tabled by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. Amendment 40 is a more problematic proposition. I do not disagree with the sentiment. No one can tell us what the toll on the lower Thames crossing would ultimately be, but we can presume it to be commensurate with the M6 toll, where an average vehicle pays £7 or £8. Therefore, it makes eminent common sense, and is surely reasonable, that someone would be entitled to some sort of compensation, or money back, if they paid the toll but then got snarled up in a traffic jam and just sat in a queue that they could have sat in on the original M6 anyway. I have sat in a jam on that road many times over my life. The problem with the proposition that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage has put forward is how that would be determined. With trains, delay repay is very <span id="106" class="column-number" data-column-number="106"></span>straightforward: what time does the train ultimately pull into the destination station? That is very clear: it is either on time or a number of minutes late. Certainly, since Chiltern Railways was nationalised, I have been on late trains from my constituency every single day, but that is beside the point. However, how is that level of delay really determined in a private vehicle? Everyone’s journey will be slightly different. What is to stop someone from deliberately driving slowly in order to avoid paying the full toll, artificially making their journey seem longer? Is it for the ORR to determine whether someone has had a longer than usual journey? How will they determine that without—and I do not want to sound all conspiracy theorist—some level of state snooping on people’s exact movements in order to determine how long that journey actually took them?
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I am sure that the Italian model works well to make the number of minutes delayed commensurate to the compensation paid, but he himself acknowledges that he does not know the manner in which it is determined. I would be happy to work with the hon. Gentleman to look at options—
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
There are no coalitions here. There is only one audition going for the next general election, and it will not be looking toward our side of the House. If there is a sensible solution that does not involve state snooping on our motorists as they use this new infrastructure, the principle that someone has paid their money and should expect a quick journey time is a fundamentally good one, and it should apply. Amendment 72 would prevent the Bill from coming into force until after the Secretary of State has published a report that sets out the proposed licence conditions, including—this is the $64,000 question, though I hope not literally—tolling arrangements. Throughout the debates so far, a number of questions have been asked about that. I understand the technical nature of the answers, but bluntly, that does not cut it with our constituents. No one can answer how much it will actually cost motorists to use the lower Thames crossing or how the tolling mechanism will be regulated to give clear, <span id="107" class="column-number" data-column-number="107"></span>unambiguous rules about how a toll must be set and if there will be any caps on it, so that drivers, motorists, private cars and hauliers alike can have confidence in what is coming. That is simply what amendment 72 seeks to do. The public should know how tolls will be set and how any increases—an equally important point—will be approved before the regime starts operating. It is not good enough for the road to be built and for people to then find out that they cannot afford to use it. Why should Parliament commence the Act before those conditions are published? If the Minister can come back with some clear guidance and rules around that, we will be much closer to full-throttled support for what he is trying to do. We want the lower Thames crossing, but we do not want it at a rate that nobody can afford to use.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I genuinely do not think the Minister and I are that far apart, because I do not disagree with anything he has just said about getting the new infrastructure to work in the interests of motorists. Where I think he has perhaps missed the point that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage and I have made is that, in order to get traffic flows on to that new infrastructure, in many cases it is conceivable that local roads will see a much higher level of use than they do today. Therefore does the Minister acknowledge that getting new infrastructure up and running well, in the interests of motorists at a price they can afford, will have an impact on the rest of the road ecosystem, mainly falling on those local authority-owned and financed roads?
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation of these clauses and Government amendment 1. He will be pleased to know that His Majesty’s loyal Opposition do not object to Government amendment 1. We might ask why such an obvious duplication in the Bill was not picked up before it was published, but we will perhaps leave that for another day. Speaking more widely to clauses 8 to 10, though probably more in the realm of clause 8, I would be grateful if the Minister could visualise some of the scheme-specific variations that he spoke of. With only the lower Thames crossing really in anyone’s eye under the provisions of this Bill, can he give us some practical, concrete examples of where such scheme-specific variations may come about, to help the House, the Committee and our constituents to fully understand the scope? Clause 8(2)(a) talks about conditions “relating to the financial resilience of the holder of the licence or otherwise relating to the holder’s financial arrangements”. The Minister directly referred to how much debt a licensee might be allowed to have, under the scheme of a licence. I do not object to that as a core principle, but if it is to be the case that something can be laid down as clearly as how much debt-gearing an operator or licensee is permitted to have, surely it can also be written into any licence not necessarily the exact pounds and pence of what any toll can be, but some sort of ruling that says a toll must be proportionate to, for example, the overall build cost over a certain number of years. Maybe, as we are talking about debt-gearing to build infrastructure <span id="114" class="column-number" data-column-number="114"></span>such as the lower Thames crossing, a licence could say that the toll must not be any more than the total debt divided over how many years the Secretary of State or the ORR deems the licence to cover. That is the most important question flowing through all the amendments and all the debates on this Bill: how much are the tolls actually going to cost people to use these roads? I fully accept that a pounds and pence figure is very difficult to conjure up, but surely clause 8(2)(a) would give us the ability to set the parameters of a toll. If we can set the debt limit, we can surely set limits for the tolls.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I have never been considered a Tory wet, Ms Lewell, but my notes now are, after my acrobatics with them. I particularly apologise to the Hansard reporters when my notes eventually make it to the <em>Official Report</em> at the end of the sitting.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
The Minister suggests an improvement to my notes—I certainly cannot read them any more. I do not think that there is particular disagreement between the official Opposition and the Government on this part of the Bill, so I just want to pose a couple of questions to the Minister on clauses 12 and 13 on the revocation of any licences. Clearly, a licence may well need to be revoked if things are going horribly wrong, or indeed—as the Minister highlighted in his remarks—if there is a national security concern. The first duty of any Government is to keep citizens safe, and given a national security concern, it is absolutely right that there should be the power to revoke a licence.<span id="118" class="column-number" data-column-number="118"></span> What is missing from clauses 12 and 13 is what happens if a licence is revoked, but there is no one out there willing to take it on so that clauses 14 and 15 would come into effect. Who becomes the licensee by default? Is it the Department for Transport? Is it the ORR? Is it someone else? That is not a disagreement with the clauses—they seem relatively comprehensive, and certainly the power given any national security concerns is absolutely right—but who takes over? What if no company wishes to take on that liability—that licence—and the cost of operating the lower Thames crossing or anything else that is granted a licence? We need clarity on that. Although the procedure set out in the clauses is unobjectionable, the net result in some circumstances is not. I hope those circumstances never come to pass, but we must plan for the worst. We need an answer on that point.
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I have a few questions on this group. We have no problem with clause 16. In respect of clause 17, the Minister referenced the setting of speed limits as an example of where functions should be exercisable by persons other than the licence holder—the state, for lack of a better phrase. I do not disagree with the premise—it would be unusual, to say the least, to allow a private company to set speed limits outside our national scheme—but it prompts a question for the whole Bill. Let us say that a scheme is built, and its original consent, set by the appropriate body, is for a 40 mph speed limit. If the licence holder then makes a representation to the appropriate body in conjunction with the local police force or local authority, it could be determined that the scheme should be converted to a variable speed limit road—we are seeing a lot of those popping up across the country. That could involve quite considerable expense, putting up gantries and having repeater signs with changing speed limits. Where does that fit in with some of the other provisions we have debated? Would that be a capacity change? In theory, variable speed limits speed up the overall journey time and manage congestion spots before they appear, by slowing the whole road down for a bit so that there is not a pile-up. Can the Minister assure the Committee that there would be no back door for a licence holder to negotiate with the appropriate bodies to charge a higher toll because of a change to a variable speed limit system?
- Hansard source
Highways (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)
I am happy to explain further. My point is that, with speed limits being set, rightly and properly, by other authorities—there is no disagreement on that point—speed limits could then be used to essentially create new conditions on that road, which could then be used as a springboard to a higher toll or a different set of conditions. The ORR and the licensee could find themselves in a vicious doom loop of disagreement on that point. What I am trying to get across to the Minister is how something that is fundamentally and, I double underline, rightly set by a different authority could become a point of disagreement in the set of licence conditions for any licensee.