Conservative and Unionist Party MP for Isle of Wight East since (elected).
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| Party | Office | Area | Period | Began | Ended | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | MP | Isle of Wight East | – present | elected | — | Party history |
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I agree that the Government quite like cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps they could do a cost-benefit analysis of the hon. Member’s proposal for a cost-benefit analysis before deciding whether to support it. That is just a suggestion.
Greedy corporate interests have stripped out more than £200 million from our Isle of Wight ferry services in the past 10 years. I am grateful to the Minister for setting up local roundtable meetings, but they are at risk of becoming a talking shop, and the ferry companies do not appear to be taking them seriously. Can he give us an assurance locally that if the ferry companies do not take this opportunity to improve services and reduce prices, the Government will consider taking steps to force their hand?
<Question HRSContentId="{F50F32DD-E4E8-48F7-AE84-35006ACD2DC7}">7. <QuestionText HRSContentId="{9C1065C6-9D31-4AAC-BD17-AFA7A83033D7}">What discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on levels of employment in the oil and gas sector in Scotland.</QuestionText> </Question>
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I will speak briefly about two of the exemptions to requiring someone to make a payment for their asylum support. They have been referred to already; they are in clause 23(6)(a) and (b). Subsection (6)(a) states a person is exempt for the purposes of this section if they “were under 18 at all times at which they received asylum support”. I accept that if someone was a child throughout the entire period they received asylum support, they would be fully exempt, but I think I disagree with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion on an interpretation point. That is the problem with the Bill; it is badly drafted and unclear in places. If someone under the age of 18 was receiving asylum support, then turned 18 and sought it afterwards, they would not be exempt—of course not, because they also received asylum support as an adult—but one would assume that they would not be charged for the portion of time that they had received asylum support while under 18. The Minister needs to clarify that point, but giving clarity in Committee is not sufficient when it is unclear in the legislation. She would do better to clarify it in the legislation.<span id="347" class="column-number" data-column-number="347"></span> The second exemption I want to briefly refer to, as the shadow Minister has, is subsection (6)(b). It gives an exemption to someone who “started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force”. As a counterpoint to what I just said, I do not understand why, if someone received asylum support for a year—let us say; typically it is a lot longer—and day one was before this section came into force, but day two and 364 of the 365 days were after it came into force, they would be exempt from making contributions for their asylum support. They would receive the vast majority of that support after the legislation comes into force, so I would have thought it a fairly obvious pro rata exercise to say that they do not pay for the portion of time they spent receiving support before the law was in place— I take the point that we do not have retrospective law in this country—but they do thereafter. It makes me wonder whether my understanding of the child-becoming-an-adult element is wrong. The Government need to be clear about whether a pro rata approach is being taken when a child becomes an adult. If so, why is that not being applied when someone starts receiving support before the Bill comes into play and continues to receive support after? I hope the Minister can give us some clarity.
It sounds like the Minister is saying that when a child becomes an adult and is still receiving support, they will then be liable to pay for the support they received as a child and it is their choice whether to continue with their asylum application.
I take the point that the scheme should not be applied retrospectively, but let us take the example of student loans: students take out loans on terms that are then changed in the future. If UK students have to deal with that, why should it be any different for asylum provisions?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Dr Murrison. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire has dealt with this point eloquently, but I wish to speak briefly on clause 19 and the Opposition amendments. Obviously, I support what the Government are trying to achieve here, but I think they could go a little further in the drafting. When we talk about public interest, that goes to the heart of the whole issue and problem we have in this country of trying to tackle immigration—in particular, legal immigration and asylum claims. What is in the public interest? The problem is that the system we have has strayed so far from the public interest. Although the clause gives a legal definition, it is also a meaningful way of translating and understanding a political, social, economic and public problem. It is in the public interest that we do all we can to tackle the current volume of asylum and immigration claims. It is not a unanimous position, but very few in Parliament, and very few in the public at large, would disagree with the fundamental point that we need to bring down the level of immigration, asylum claims and illegal boat crossings. On the public interest consideration, the topic of the right to family life picks up from the Committee’s discussion last week. The right to family life stems from the European convention on human rights and is a qualified right, meaning that it does not stand towering above all other considerations. It is my view, and a commonly held view—in fact, a view that was given by the Minister—that the right has strayed too far. Over many years, jurisprudence has allowed an expansive interpretation that has taken the family life core protection to cover a far wider set of circumstances. It is now used as a routine tool by those who wish to remain in the UK when the threat to or infringement of their family life, as a fundamental human right, is not really an issue. Clause 19 is part of the framework that seeks to attack that use.<span id="253" class="column-number" data-column-number="253"></span> We are where we are partly because of a set of legislation—with a convention at its core—made by Parliament over the years, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and other Acts, that has sought to define and in some cases limit, in others not, what we mean by the right to family life and the public interest. Those laws have been unsuccessful in doing that. The intention was there, but the drafting was insufficiently certain—though to some extent that is inherent in all legislating in this place—to ensure that the courts interpret the legislation as narrowly as Parliament intended. The Government have gone some way to try to be restrictive, as they think they have been in this clause, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire points out, some changes to the wording can be made. His amendments 105 and 106 seek to deliver those. The clause states: “No weight should be given”; but stating that no weight must be given would get rid of a door that is ajar to the courts to interpret the clause more expansively. The amendment slams that door by inserting the word “must”, so that there is no leeway for a clever legal argument that “should” gives sufficient leeway for a court effectively to make a decision that runs against what the legislation is trying to deliver. I do not take the view that judges or indeed lawyers—on the whole, as a profession, broadly speaking—should be demonised for making decisions that use loopholes in the law. If this place fails to make the law certain and fails to close those loopholes, the fault comes back to Parliament and the Government who brought the legislation through Parliament. Here is the opportunity to tighten it up—that is the purpose of a Bill Committee: to tighten up wording through the fair scrutiny process. The Opposition’s amendment 106 relates to a measure where the Government were perhaps not trying to completely close the door. It may be something that they deliberately left open. Amendment 106 would change proposed new section 117B(4)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in clause 19(4) of the Bill. I will quote proposed new paragraph 117B(4)(b) for <em>Hansard</em>, though it may appear out of context: “they are in serious breach of a condition attached to their leave to enter or remain.” The Opposition amendment seeks to leave out the word “serious” so that the provision applies to someone simply in breach of a condition. My suspicion is that the Government want to leave a set of breaches of a condition that would not affect someone’s leave to remain. The Opposition’s position is that, if someone has breached a condition, that should mean the fundamental failure of any claim to remain that cites a right to family life. To me, the amendment would provide the certainty needed and deliver on what the public expect of us to tackle a significant problem in this country—the large number of claims that go beyond the original intention behind the right to family life. The problem with leaving the word “serious” in the legislation is that it will be open to the court to make a decision about whether a breach is serious enough. Without any specific guidance or checklist in the legislation, the court will consider seriousness as a relative word or concept in an appellant’s case to not be returned to <span id="254" class="column-number" data-column-number="254"></span>another country. A case could be made based on circumstance that family life is fundamentally important to someone and that sending them home would split up a family. They may paint a picture of the environment at home that could be very alien to us as a free and democratic society. Suddenly, that “serious breach” question might lead a court to conclude that a serious breach in the abstract becomes quite a minimal one when compared with an applicant’s story of hardship. My concern is that the word “serious” will become a flexible term to be interpreted by the court. It will always be measured against the relative hardship of the claimant, who will of course state their case at its strongest in order to leverage the flexibility of the word “serious”. I struggle to see why the Government would not want to add in certainty, unless they particularly want to create an avenue where people can still make the right to family life claim. It would be extraordinary if they did, given all the rationale they have provided for bringing forward this set of provisions and the Bill in the first place. The Minister should be very clear about whether she sees this as a disagreement around drafting, or whether she is seeking—I am sure that she would have a reason for it, though I would disagree with it—to have an avenue of flexibility in the Bill, and why. There is provision in the clause, and rightfully so, for particular circumstances in relation to children. Children are in a very special category because of their dependency and vulnerability. There are a number of situations laid out, but subsection (6) in particular deals with situations where there would be “a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child.” We do not want to see people deported or removed when that would have a significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child. There are protections are built in here. Others may say that this is a particularly draconian provision, but I see some protections there and in paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new subsection (7) that are widely accepted and uncontroversial, and I wanted to draw attention to them.
Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.
Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve. Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can, “(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.” That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on <span id="270" class="column-number" data-column-number="270"></span>the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c). Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve. I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required “unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.” The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction. I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person “has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”. Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean. Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where “the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”. How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but <span id="271" class="column-number" data-column-number="271"></span>there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case. Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision. According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry. Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about “very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.” Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions. The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere. There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as <span id="272" class="column-number" data-column-number="272"></span>we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them. This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years. The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. The Opposition support both sets of regulations. These schemes provide financial support to people facing serious illness and to families who have lost someone. Many of those affected worked in some of the toughest industries. Others were exposed to asbestos through a family member’s work or in the environment around them. The central change is welcome. Both sets of regulations bring the rates paid to dependants into line with those paid to those suffering themselves. Putting them on the same footing is an obvious and fair change. A family’s need for support does not disappear because their loved one died before being able to make a claim. These changes recognise that, and we support them. I will turn first to the regulations on the Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers’ Compensation) Act 1979—or, using the Minister’s helpful language, the 1979 Act scheme. I welcome the practical changes. References to medical boards that no longer exist are being replaced by a reference to an appointed medical practitioner. The regulations also clarify which date is used to determine a person’s age and the payment rate that applies. That should make the rules clearer for claimants and their families. The second set of regulations, on the 2008 Act scheme, concern mesothelioma, a devastating cancer that is linked to asbestos exposure. For those affected and the people caring for them, financial support needs to be accessible and timely. Bringing payments for bereaved dependants into line with those for people living with the disease is an important improvement. Both instruments also clarify what happens when someone makes a claim but dies before payment is made. They provide for payment to the person’s personal representatives—the people responsible for dealing with their estate—once the required legal evidence has been supplied. That clarity is welcome. However, it needs to work in practice for people who are already dealing with bereavement. There are four matters on which I would be grateful for the Minister’s reassurance. First, the explanatory memorandum says that dependants will benefit from the higher basic awards when the existing top-ups are removed. However, the workers’ compensation regulations also remove a tuberculosis-related top-up paid to sufferers themselves. Can the Minister confirm whether anyone in that group could receive less under the new arrangements—and, if so, what protection has been considered?<span id="6" class="column-number" data-column-number="6"></span> Secondly, what steps will the Department take to avoid delays where payment must be made through someone’s estate? The regulations will require evidence of probate, or the equivalent legal authority. What practical support will be available, and how quickly will payments be processed once that evidence is received? Bereaved families should have clear information about what they need to provide and what happens next. Thirdly, how will these changes be communicated? The explanatory memorandum for the workers’ compensation regulations says that “no bespoke guidance is being produced”, although internal instructions for staff will be updated. Will the Department work with specialist nurses, clinicians and support organisations so that eligible people understand what they can claim and how to apply? The organisations closest to patients and their families are often best placed to help them access support. Fourthly, I would like to ask about the transition. Under the workers’ compensation regulations, the changes apply where the person first meets the conditions of entitlement on or after 31 October 2026; under the regulations on the 2008 Act scheme, the increased dependant rates apply where the person suffering dies on or after that date. What consideration has been given to people who fall just before those cut-offs, but whose claims are still outstanding? They may remain entitled under the existing rules but will miss out on the improvements. Can the Minister explain the approach taken and whether any transitional protection was considered? As I said, we support these changes. We want to see them delivered clearly and promptly so that people facing serious illness and families dealing with loss receive the support they are entitled to.