5,731 spoken contributions under 12 words (interjections such as “Will the hon. Member give way?”) are hidden. Show them

1. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here. On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

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2. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning. Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive. This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over. Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.

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3. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury? Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

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4. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected. “Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers. Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

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5. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being. That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law. It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view. She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers? The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person? She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation. This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not. This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex, “the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”. We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider “the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented” and “the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”. It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting: “any other matters the court considers relevant.” The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex. There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.

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6. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   As my hon. Friend the shadow Minister pointed out, there are a number of problems that not only arise with what clauses 3 and 4 try to do, but carry over to clause 5, which tries to replicate aspects of jury trials in trials that will not be heard by a jury because a judge has made an allocation decision. The problems with juries seem to be, as the Minister and the Government have articulated, time wasted through swearing in, the unpredictable nature of convening 12 people—with people sometimes dropping out—and the fact they can hear evidence only at certain times of the day, which makes the day for hearing evidence shorter. Of course, none of those things are new; they are things that have always existed with jury trials. Citing issues with juries that have existed since juries began, in order to deal with the more recent issue of backlogs, misses the point. The Government have taken measures to deal with the more recent issues with criminal cases, including the fact that evidence inherently takes longer, although that is the same with evidence that a judge has to consider, and that cases have become more complex because of evidence and technology. That also is true of cases that are heard by a judge only. The Government have made plenty of complaints and shared plenty of views about what they think of the previous Government. They have spoken about under-investment and caps on sitting days, things that they say they have addressed through allocating more sitting days and investing in the legal system. Surely, that is the remedy for their complaints. However, they have not been prepared to spend the time to assess that remedy, to see whether the benefits in reducing the backlog will be felt in the coming months and years. To take an inherent feature of the jury system—the jury itself—as a justification for doing away with it in certain cases because of more recent pressures for other reasons is neither logical nor fair. The problem with simply transferring all the provisions that would ordinarily happen in a jury trial to a trial that is decided by a judge alone, as clause 5 seeks to do, is that there are features of a jury system that cannot simply be replicated by a judge sitting alone. Let us remember that a jury decides the facts. It decides whether something happened and it decides what was in the mind of the defendant at the time in question. That is the preserve of the jury. It is for the judge, even in a jury trial, to decide the law, to direct the jury—where appropriate—and to decide issues of procedure. Some of the procedural issues or arguments about evidence, including about whether evidence is admissible or not, are decided by the judge in the absence of the jury. The jury is sent out of the room. Of course, that can make the whole trial last longer, but there is a very good reason for it. It is because sometimes the arguments that are made—for example, arguments about the admissibility of certain evidence—are in themselves prejudicial to the decision maker of the facts, which is the jury, or prejudicial to the way that they might decide the case. A judge might need to hear the contested evidence, or at least hear what it is about to decide whether it is admissible. A judge might decide that evidence is inadmissible because it is not relevant, or—this is where I go way beyond my legal expertise; I never practised as a criminal lawyer—because it might effectively prejudice the jury. We do not want the jury seeing that evidence, which is why they are out of the room. If the judge rules that the evidence is inadmissible, the jury come back into the room never having seen it, and the trial continues with the jurors’ minds unclouded by inadmissible evidence. However, when the judge is also deciding the facts—that happens, of course in magistrates courts, where the magistrates decide the facts and are guided on the law by a legal professional sitting in front of them—and indeed when a judge is deciding the facts and the law, and procedural issues and issues of the admissibility of evidence, then, if they take separate arguments or separate submissions from the defence and prosecution on whether an item of evidence is admissible or not, and they decide that it is not admissible because it would cloud the judgment of the jury or confuse the issues of the main trial, they effectively have to pretend that they never heard that prejudicial evidence, having decided that it is prejudicial. Judges are trained and professional, and have to do all this anyway in certain cases where a judge decides both—

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7. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   I accept that judges can do all this, and indeed sometimes do all this. Surely, however, the Minister will accept that, given human nature, there is a limit to the extent to which a human being can be so well trained or so professional that they can simply disregard something that they have heard as though they had never heard it. Indeed, that is one reason why we have jury trials. It is also one of the leading reasons why in more complex cases or longer cases—in cases involving murder, or sexual offences, or in all those cases that have to be heard by a jury—we have a jury. It is to separate the decision makers of fact from the decision makers of law and procedure.

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8. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   My hon. Friend the shadow Minister makes a good point, and we will get on to talking about the provisions relating to the family courts. In relation to this particular provision, the family courts are where we have a judge making a decision on very emotive facts and on procedure. But family courts are far more collaborative in nature. A judge’s role is also about straining to find consensus. That is very different from the criminal courts where, ultimately, a judge or a jury, depending on who is hearing the case, has to make a yes-or-no decision on innocence or guilt. That has wide-ranging and profound impacts, which sometimes turn on a knife edge on hard-to-determine evidence. That is different from the family court, where the intention is to try and find consensus, rather than making those decisions. Of course, juries are used in civil courts in some defamation cases. Again, it is where the value judgment on intention—why somebody made a statement about someone and whether they knew it to be false or not—of 12 ordinary people selected at random in this country is better than a judge’s decision making alone. My issue with clause 5 is that it simply sweeps all sorts of provisions in a number of existing clauses of different legislation passed at different times into judge-only trials when those provisions were designed for jury-led trials. Unless I have misunderstood, that seems to have been done through a set of Government amendments and elements of existing law that were not envisaged on the first drafting of the Bill. That possibly demonstrates the slightly rushed and painful nature of how we are having to deal with this legislation, with so many loopholes and gaps in it. I am happy to be discharging my duties, dissecting and scrutinising the Bill. I do not mind how long it takes because that is my job; it is why I am here and I am pleased to be doing it.

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9. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

   I support the position of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. There is a degree of cross-party support on the Opposition Benches; we heard some very good submissions from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, which seems a while ago now. The Government’s position on many of the contentious issues in Committee has been anchored on Sir Brian Leveson’s report—indeed, why would it not be? It is an independent report that the Government commissioned. But they freely depart from his recommendations, seemingly on a whim, without any substantial justification. This is one of those cases. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that magistrates should continue to have sentencing powers only up to a year, and the Government are effectively doubling those sentencing powers. This is about more than just sentencing powers; it fundamentally changes what magistrates courts are for and how our criminal courts are structured. The Crown court, whether sitting with only a judge or with a jury, is for more serious cases, with more serious sanctions, because it is able to deal with levels of complexity, be it in relation to evidence or procedure. We have heard about “rough and ready” justice in the magistrates court. That is not a criticism; it is a way of characterising the absolute foundations of our magistrates courts. They do a huge amount of criminal work in this country, but they are meant to be summary courts; they are meant to be courts that act quickly and do not have the rigour or probity of the Crown courts. That is their particular purpose, and it is therefore right that they have always had limited sentencing powers when it comes to deciding whether to lock someone up. Fines and community orders are the sort of sentences that are far more typical of magistrates courts. Depriving someone of their liberty is a very serious matter. It is one thing to deprive someone of their liberty for months, especially given that such sentences are often reduced—in practice, a year can be reduced to months—but it is another thing to deprive someone of their liberty for two years. That would suddenly make the magistrates courts’ summary-style justice, or rough justice—call it whatever; I do not mean any of those words as a criticism—incredibly inappropriate for the powers that the Government would like them to exercise. The clause therefore does much more than just fiddle with thresholds, or however the Government might want to characterise it—we will soon find out. It fundamentally alters what magistrates courts are for.

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10. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    I recognise evidence, but I give greatest weight to Sir Brian Leveson, the author of the independent report commissioned by the Government. As the hon. Lady knows very well, the youth court is a very different beast, because a different set of principles and rules applies to cross-examination, evidence and so on for people who are of the age of minority. Simply to say that if the youth court can do it, then the magistrates court can do it for people over 18 is a slightly off-the-cuff argument, if I may say so; it does not really have any rigour at all. Allow me to return to my line of argument about magistrates courts. If there is a genuine intention and belief that magistrates should be able to impose sentences of up to two years—as I say, in my view, that fundamentally changes the nature of the court—then that should be met with provisions that make the process in the magistrates court more rigorous. I would not agree with that, but at least it would hang together, show consistency and demonstrate an intention that justice must be delivered in a process that is commensurate with the sanction the state is looking to impose on someone. There is no greater sanction in this country than depriving someone of their liberty and locking them up. In this case, it is more than a threshold argument; the Bill is fundamentally changing what magistrates courts are for, what Crown courts are for, and the difference in procedure between the two.

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11. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    This looks like another entirely reasonable amendment, which looks to mitigate some of the harsher provisions in the changes that will allow magistrates to give sentences of up to two years. A moment ago, I talked about the difference between the more rough and ready justice in the magistrates court and the more rigorous, lengthy and developed procedure, practice and ability to operate in the Crown court. When it comes to deciding the income threshold for whether a defendant qualifies for legal aid, surely the most important thing is not the process or procedure as such, but the harshness of the possible sanction that the state is looking to impose on that person. Rather than looking at the £22,000 income threshold for magistrates courts and £37,500 for Crown courts, we could instead say that, if someone will be sentenced for up to one year, the income threshold is £22,000, and if someone will be sentenced for more than one year, it is £37,500. That is a true statement—that is how it currently stands. We should merely extend that principle, basing the figures on sentencing thresholds rather than on the venue that dishes out that sentence. That would achieve fairness, so that if somebody might be locked up for two years, they have the legal might and can afford the legal advice to defend themselves and articulate a case in a more professional manner. If having a legal professional does not give someone at least the chance of delivering that in a more professional manner, there is plainly little point in the legal profession. That is the rationale, and the Government do not have to apply a different principle at all if they just see the current threshold as applying to a one-year sentence rather than to venue. This delivers again on other amendments, not only from others on these Benches but from the shadow Minister, and it allows the Government to deliver what they want to deliver. It does not run against the principle of what the Government are trying to do, even though Conservative Members have differences of opinion on that. It merely perfects, improves and cures some of the defects and unintended consequences of the Bill. The entire reason that the Bill Committee sits is to seek to do that, but time and again, the Government would prefer to just vote things down and use their majority rather than taking the time to look at provisions that seem to me objectively reasonable.

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12. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    This is a strange venue to ask for an apology for previous Government legislation from an MP who, like me, has been in this place for less than two years. The hon. Gentleman and I were on broadcast media yesterday; that might have been a better venue for him to ask me to apologise, but I would have rejected his invitation at that time, and I will certainly reject it in Committee. This is not about previous Governments’ views or opinions; it is about the views and opinions of this Parliament.

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13. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    Indeed, it is quite interesting that the Government’s benchmark is the previous Government. I do not recall them making that clear at the last election. I will leave it there.

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14. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    The central issue here, as with so much of this, is the impact that a single provision, or a single intention—in this case clause 6—has on other areas of the criminal justice system, and indeed provisions in the Bill. There is a lot of interplay between clauses 6 and 7—we are about to discuss clause 7, so I will save my comments on that for a few minutes’ time. The central issue is the unintended consequence, yes, but also the other provisions that Parliament will not get to debate. In this case, Parliament will not get a proper opportunity to debate the fairness of having magistrates courts sentencing up to two years, because the clause effectively creates a power for the Secretary of State to do that job instead. That is why this Committee is having to debate whether it is right that a summary court should suddenly have the power to sentence someone up to two years. The Government can argue that at least some of the provisions that the Opposition do not agree with are anchored somewhere in Sir Brian Leveson’s report. I would argue that this provision is specifically argued out by Sir Brian Leveson. Indeed, he talked about it being contingent on the magistrates court continuing to have sentencing powers of up to only one year. When the Government appear, in my view, to be doing something that specifically runs against Sir Brian Leveson’s report, rather than is simply absent from it, they need to explain their position. It is not good enough to run the same old arguments. The central argument in all this seems to be efficiency. How much will the Government sacrifice at the altar of efficiency? Efficiency cannot trump all, and certainly not the justice arguments already made by me and others, which I will not repeat. If the Government cannot explain where these provisions have come from, when they run counter to Sir Brian Leveson’s report, they should rightly submit these proposals through a proper procedure so that they can be debated by Parliament, rather than just giving a power to the Secretary of State. As I say, I will restrict my comments to the interplay between clause 6 and clause 7, which restricts the right of appeal. We have already heard some good arguments about legal aid, and it does not do much for the Minister, who is quite exercised by the previous Government’s record on legal aid. This is about not necessarily increased funding for legal aid—she says she is doing that already—but the right to it when the state is trying to lock someone up.

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15. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost. The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

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16. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?

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17. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·James Wild

    Draft Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) (Glasgow 2026 Commonwealth Games) Regulations 2026

    The Exchequer Secretary played his own part in inspiring the next generation of athletes on social media during the recess. The regulations provide a time-limited exemption from income tax for certain non-UK residents working on the Glasgow 2026 Commonwealth games. I am looking forward to the games and to our home athletes bringing home many medals. I also recognise the benefits that such sporting events will bring to Glasgow and more widely. The Opposition have been pushing the Government to recognise the principle that underlies the regulations: the importance of making the UK attractive to globally mobile individuals. Sadly, more broadly, the Government have targeted such individuals through higher taxes. I therefore hope that the regulations represent a change of direction. I have a few points to raise with the Exchequer Secretary. First, on scope, the regulations apply to “accredited persons”: individuals issued with an accreditation badge by Glasgow 2026 Ltd. Estimates say that that will impact around 9,000 non-UK residents. Will he set out what discussions His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has had with or what guidance has been issued to Glasgow 2026 Ltd on who should or should not be accredited for those purposes? Secondly, on timing, the games run from 23 July to 2 August. Why does the exemption run from 16 July to 4 August rather than matching the dates of the games? Thirdly, on avoidance, because trading and professional profits are covered, there could be an incentive to structure contracts so that income is characterised as games-related and performed in the UK within that exemption window. How has HMRC addressed that risk? We will not oppose the regulations, but I would appreciate the Exchequer Secretary’s response to my three questions.

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18. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Gregory Stafford

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    Yesterday’s statement from the Prime Minister should have brought clarity. Instead, it has left this House with more questions than answers. This is not a narrow procedural issue; it goes to the judgment of the Prime Minister. It is a disgrace that he is not here today to answer questions—perhaps the usual excuse that he was not told holds clear. Let me begin with the exchange that I had with the Prime Minister yesterday, which crystallises the problem. On 4 February, the Prime Minister told my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition that the vetting process had disclosed information relating to Epstein. Yesterday, he attempted row back on that by saying that he had conflated vetting and due diligence, before then insisting that he understood the distinction. Those positions cannot comfortably sit together. If he understood the distinction, why did he give an answer that conflated the two? If he did not, why claim certainty at the Dispatch Box? His defence—that due diligence forms part of the wider process—did not answer the question that he was asked at the time. If that is not misleading the House, it is difficult to see what is. That lack of clarity runs through the entire account. The Prime Minister confirmed that, in November 2024, he chose not to follow the clear and obvious advice of his then Cabinet Secretary, Lord Case, to carry out vetting before he appointed Mandelson. Now, the Prime Minister relies instead on a subsequent review by Chris Wormald, which states merely that the approach may be usual—not that it is right. The question remains: why was the advice rejected when it mattered? The Prime Minister’s account of what he knew is equally difficult to reconcile. He says he had confidence that the vetting process had addressed the most serious concerns, yet he also says he had not seen the vetting report. If he had not seen the report, on what basis did his confidence rest? If he was relying on the Cabinet Office due diligence paper, why was that not made clear at the time when he was asked specifically about security vetting? Why was a direct question met with an answer that did not address it at all? The contents of the due diligence paper raise further questions. It highlighted connections to Russian and Chinese interests. It referred to involvement with Sistema, a company embedded in Russia’s industrial and military structures with well-known links to Kremlin-aligned figures. That information was not hidden; it was in the public domain and placed directly before the Prime Minister in December 2024. Why did none of that trigger greater caution and, more importantly, greater action? Most seriously of all, Sir Olly Robbins’s evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee today was consistent with the fact that Mandelson could act in his role and have access to sensitive material before the process had concluded. We also discovered that the Prime Minister’s team tried to put Matthew Doyle, another friend of a known paedophile, into an ambassadorial position. We still have no clear account of who knew what and when, what decisions were taken, where responsibly responsibility lay, or how this situation was allowed to develop. However, I think we understand why: this is about judgment. Time and again, the Prime Minister has shown a willingness to appoint people despite serious concerns about their records: a Transport Secretary with a fraud conviction, an anti-corruption Minister under investigation, a homelessness Minister with a record that raises profound questions, and a Deputy Prime Minister who failed to meet her own tax obligations. In this case, despite personal associations that should have raised the most serious red flags, connections to hostile states, and a long and controversial history in public life, the Prime Minister judged Peter Mandelson to be a suitable candidate for one of the most sensitive ambassadorial roles because of his influence over the Labour party and the Prime Minister himself. This is not a failure of process; it is a failure of judgment. With judgment like that, the Prime Minister is not fit to lead this country for a moment longer.

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19. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Wind Farms: Protected Peatland

    It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and Ilkley (Robbie Moore) on securing this important debate. Since this Labour Government came to power, they have been recklessly zealous in their commitment to net zero targets over all else, not least their willingness to trash our countryside for wind turbines, ground-mounted solar and more, when far less land-intensive energy solutions such as small modular reactors would deliver our energy needs in a much more sympathetic way to our landscape, food security and natural environment. On the one hand, the Government promise to restore our natural environment, while on the other, they open England’s protected peatlands to industrial wind farm development such as Calderdale, which my hon. Friend mentioned in his speech. I wish him luck, and I support him, in his fight against that monstrosity as he sets out to protect his constituents and iconic Brontë country. The consequence is that habitats storing more than 3 billion tonnes of carbon, formed over centuries and millennia, are now exposed to excavation, road building and the foundations of turbines. What do people get in return? They get not a ban, not a firm line, but guidance from the Government that says that deep peat should be “avoided”—a word that is not a prohibition, merely a suggestion. That will create irreparable damage to irreplaceable habitats, and it has been reduced to a footnote in a planning document. In January 2026, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published guidance permitting wind farm development on peatland. The national planning policy framework states that development on irreplaceable habitats, which includes a quarter of England’s peatland, should be refused, yet the Government have chosen just guidance over prohibition. It is shocking but unsurprising of this Labour Government—we find contradictions in their policymaking at every corner. Crucially, the new guidance on construction practices for wind farms on peatland has not even been published yet—the bulldozers may arrive before the policy framework lands. That failure extends beyond one habitat. Peatlands supply more than a quarter of the UK’s drinking water and provide fertile agricultural land and habitats for rare wildlife. The Government’s secondary legislation, which came into effect in December 2025, removed the de facto ban on onshore wind, handing planning consent back to the corridors of Whitehall, rather than local communities. As my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Andrew Bowie) said, that bypasses the consent of local people and empowers the Secretary of State to impose infrastructure irrespective of their concerns. Given that Labour controls the levers of national Government, energy policy and planning guidance simultaneously, that should give us pause for thought: what are they trying to achieve? The Government hold a statutory responsibility to protect irreplaceable habitats, which makes it even more important that they demonstrate visible leadership on this issue, rather than convenient ambiguity. Instead, Energy Ministers tell us that existing protections are sufficient, yet those existing protections have not prevented the guidance from being issued. The Government cannot have it both ways. Over recent years, costs imposed on rural communities by energy infrastructure decisions have grown significantly. With the expansion of the NSIP regime, increases in centrally directed planning consent and innovations in bypassing local democratic oversight, the least that those communities could expect is that their most precious landscapes would be protected. In addition, when the science itself warns against development on peatland, the Government should be able to point to a clear policy to reflect that. The International Union for Conservation of Nature has been unambiguous, stating that “modelling…suggests” that “emissions from the windfarm development on undamaged peatlands…will not”— I repeat, “will not”— “be offset by…the green energy generated.” That is not a fringe position, but the conclusion of the body dedicated to this very question. As ever, I would like to be charitable, but it is hardly surprising that the Government have been slow to draw a firm line when their approach to net zero treats all means as justified by the end.

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20. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Wind Farms: Protected Peatland

    The Conservative party has been very, very clear on that. We believe in decarbonisation, but we need to do it in a way that people can afford and that does not trash our country in the process, in the way that ground-mounted solar and these wind farms do. The points I am making in arguing that damaging untouched peatland ends up causing more environmental damage than the supposed benefits of the wind farms that those who argue for them want to put there should make every Member of the House pause. They should think whether, in getting to decarbonisation, we are not creating more problems than we are solving by simply taking the first technology off the shelf or going for the convenient bit of land that might be available to build this on. It is a totally false economy to go down the rabbit warren of saying, “It looks green, so we must do it,” rather than doing a whole-system analysis, from the manufacture of parts to the destruction of habitat, land and place across our country. That may actually reveal that the results are not as green as they look on the metaphorical packaging. The guidance does little to help the communities living along these landscapes, the wildlife that depends on them, or indeed the climate if carbon storing habitats are destroyed in the name of carbon reduction. In contrast to that inaction, there is a straightforward solution: prohibit wind farm development on protected peatland across our country—full stop. Despite the Secretary of State holding responsibility for both energy and net zero, it is preposterous that no such ban has been enacted. It is either that the Government do not wish to constrain their ambitions or are displaying sheer negligence towards the natural environment they claim to champion. The reality is that this is not an abstract problem. These are living landscapes that once destroyed cannot be recovered on any human timescale. We need the Government to bring forward a clear prohibition—not guidance, balance or nuance deployed as a smokescreen, but a complete ban. Without the will to protect these habitats absolutely, the peatlands will be lost, and with them 3 billion tonnes of stored carbon, a quarter of our drinking water supply and the quiet, irreplaceable richness of the United Kingdom’s upland landscape.

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21. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Hammersmith Bridge

    For the second time this afternoon, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec. I congratulate the hon. Member for Putney (Fleur Anderson) on securing this debate. As the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter) has suggested, it is a bit of a blast from the past for me, having previously served on Hammersmith and Fulham council both as deputy leader and then latterly as leader of the opposition. If only my hon. Friend the Member for Bridlington and The Wolds (Charlie Dewhirst), the right hon. Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy) or the hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Ben Coleman) were here, we could go some way to recreating the Hammersmith town hall council chamber in Westminster Hall this afternoon. Back in 2014, when I was leader of the opposition on Hammersmith and Fulham council, the bridge had restricted access but was not yet fully closed; I think one bus at a time was allowed on at that point, which raised significant concerns. It is very disappointing that, across multiple Governments, we have not been able to resolve the challenges on Hammersmith bridge since then. I note that the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick was quick to boast about Hammersmith and Fulham having the third lowest council tax in the country—if only I knew how it got to that point! It could possibly have been the period between 2006 and 2014 when, under the leadership of my noble friend Lord Greenhalgh, we cut council tax by 20%, taking Hammersmith and Fulham from mid-pack to third lowest in the country, rivalled only by Wandsworth and Westminster at that time. However, since then, Hammersmith and Fulham council has increased council tax on their residents by hundreds of pounds. More gallingly, under Sadiq Khan, the amount claimed by the Mayor of London has increased by over 70%, and what do the residents of Hammersmith and Fulham get for all those increases? A bridge that cars and buses cannot cross. Under a Labour council, a Labour mayor and a Labour Government, the speed of action is slower than a cyclist with a punctured tyre. Ironically, that cyclist would be one of the few people who could actually make use of the bridge in its current state. In January, the Minister stated in a written answer that the taskforce would meet soon. We now understand that it is waiting for submissions to the structures fund. The primary mechanism to bring all the stakeholders together and unblock the problem has not met for a year. Of course, as we have heard eloquently from the hon. Member for Putney and the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), this failure extends beyond Hammersmith and Fulham. It affects the boroughs of Richmond upon Thames, Wandsworth and Hounslow, and it has displaced traffic to areas such as Ealing. Given the Labour party’s control over various forms of Government, it needs to give pause for thought as to what it is actually doing. Of course, Hammersmith and Fulham council—there is no getting around this point—holds the statutory duty to maintain the highway, which makes it even more important that it demonstrates visible leadership and urgency in advancing a funded, deliverable plan for the strengthening phase and full reopening. However, that has not been forthcoming, and the 2026 business plan from TfL makes no mention of Hammersmith bridge. Over the past decade, the costs imposed on motorists in our capital city have grown significantly, with those both inside and outside London facing costs because of decisions made by the Mayor of London: expansions of the ultra low emission zone, increases in the cash cow known as the congestion charge and innovations to find new methods of fining drivers. The least those motorists could expect is infrastructure that works. In addition, when they are unable to use their cars, they should be able to use public transport. However, the closure of the bridge has had a massive impact, curtailing many bus routes, notwithstanding the tube strikes we are enduring today. I would like to be charitable, but I am afraid that it is hardly surprising that the Government have been so slow to act when their recent strategy for integrated transport has little to say about cars in urban areas beyond commenting that “Promoting car and lift sharing should be used to manage congestion”, and that those cars should be electric vehicles, which few people actually want to buy. That attitude does little to help people in Hammersmith and Fulham or those other London boroughs south of the river who need their vehicles in the capital. In contrast to that inaction, Conservative councillors in Hammersmith and Fulham have put forward a temporary solution to the problem. The Secretary of State was the previous deputy Mayor of London for transport, and it is preposterous that a team led by someone with such a background has not convened people to get a plan in place. It must be either that Labour authorities do not want to fix it, or negligence. This problem is not abstract; it is impacting people’s lives. The centre director of Castlenau community centre in Barnes recently told the Evening Standard that “There are lots of people who need to go to Charing Cross Hospital, who are having to undergo stressful journeys and potentially risk not making their appointment in time”, and earlier in the debate, we heard a similar example of people struggling to reach St George’s hospital. We need the Government to bring together those in their party who are responsible to put forward a plan. Sadly, I am afraid that, without the will of the local authority and Transport for London, the bridge will remain closed off for most people.

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22. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Topical Questions

    Can the Foreign Secretary give a guarantee that there is nothing in the so-called reset negotiations with the European Union or the rumoured reset Bill that is incompatible with section 38 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020?

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23. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Middle East: Economic Update

    Prices are going up, and if the Chancellor’s 5p increase in fuel duty between September and next March goes ahead, we will be the European country with the eighth highest fuel duty. Surely this is not the time for that increase. If she wants certainty, the best thing she could do, at that Dispatch Box, is cancel the fuel duty hike.

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24. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Gareth Bacon

    Topical Questions

    I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Point 13 of the first phase of the Gaza peace plan negotiated by the United States is very clear that Hamas must disarm, dismantle their terrorist infrastructure and play no role in Gaza’s future. The Government have expressed support for that and they are right to do so, yet Hamas have been equally clear that they are not going to disarm, and every indication is that they are doing the reverse. What steps will the Government take to ensure that the removal of Hamas and the demilitarisation of Gaza become a reality?

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25. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Esther McVey

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    Following the revelations at the Foreign Affairs Committee today by Oliver Robbins, who said how the Prime Minister had pushed for Peter Mandelson to be appointed and had pushed for his former director of communications, Matthew Doyle, to be appointed as well, though unqualified for the post, does my hon. Friend agree that those are the actions of a Prime Minister concerned not about the national interest but rather his personal interest? Nor are they the actions of a Prime Minister concerned about national security; they are merely the actions of someone concerned about his job security—and particularly in pushing for Peter Mandelson, who is a known national security risk.

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26. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Esther McVey

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    The Prime Minister has clearly said that he was right to sack the senior civil servant Oliver Robbins, so can the Minister guarantee that the Government will contest any employment claim from Sir Oliver Robbins for unfair or constructive dismissal all the way to the employment tribunal, and will not use taxpayer money to pay off this gentleman to avoid that outcome?

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27. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Neil Hudson

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    We have heard a lot from Labour Members today about process, but will the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister please tell my constituents, the House and the country why on earth the Prime Minister appointed Peter Mandelson to be ambassador to the United States?

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28. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Wheelchair Provision: Independent Review Body

    The NRS case is so important. I am keen to understand how the Government are ensuring the ongoing provision and servicing of wheelchairs, given that NRS has gone bust. I have been contacted by constituents who worked at high levels in NRS, and who are concerned that those contracts will not be followed up. Is the hon. Member concerned about that, too?

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29. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Wheelchair Provision: Independent Review Body

    I thank the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Daniel Francis). He is becoming a regular in these Westminster Hall debates, rivalled only by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). It seems that there is a competition to be the one who makes the most representations. On a serious note, last month in the debate on disability equipment provision the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford spoke passionately and movingly about his personal experiences. We should treasure so much, in this House, people bringing their experience to try to make things better for their constituents, their family and the nation. The hon. Member deserves a lot of credit and I thank him for securing this debate. I also thank the all-party parliamentary group for wheelchair users for its work to ensure that wheelchair users are heard, and I thank the Wheelchair Alliance and others who continue to hold this House, Ministers and the Opposition to account on these issues. There is little disagreement in the debate about the nature of the problem. The Government themselves acknowledged last month, in the debate on disability equipment provision, that too many wheelchair users wait too long for the equipment they need, with knock-on consequences for their independence, health and ability to participate fully in daily life. That admission is welcome, but recognition alone is not enough. The question before us is how responsibility, accountability and improvement are to be delivered in practice. On that point, the picture is far less clear. Ministers have been explicit that they do not intend to publish a national strategy for wheelchair services. At the same time, the Government are embarking on a major restructure of the NHS in England. Understandably, that combination raises concerns about where national oversight will sit in the future, how consistency will be ensured and who will ultimately be accountable when services fall short. During last month’s debate on disability equipment, the Minister acknowledged the uncertainty created by the changes, noting that seemingly small gaps in practice or responsibility can have disproportionate impacts on the quality of life of disabled people. That is precisely why clarity matters. As the NHS is reshaped, wheelchair users and their families need to know who is responsible for setting expectations nationally, who is responsible for commissioning locally and who steps in when the system is not working. Without that clarity, there is real risk that the responsibility becomes fragmented and that unacceptable variation goes unchecked. Ministers often rightly point to the role of integrated care boards in commissioning wheelchair services for their local populations, but ICBs are being asked to do a great deal at once—to meet 18-week standards for community services, adopt the best practices set out in the wheelchair quality framework, and now to do so while operating with up to 50% reductions in headcounts and constrained budgets. So it is fair to ask whether those competing pressures risk pushing wheelchair provision further down the list of priorities rather than elevating it to where it should be. Going forward, who will be responsible for overseeing the wheelchair quality framework itself, and how are the Government assessing whether that is genuinely improving outcomes on the ground rather than simply setting aspirations? There are also practical questions that remain unanswered. The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Dr Ahmed), previously undertook to look at the reuse and return of disability equipment, which could have real benefits for patients and for public value. Many will be keen to hear what progress has been made on that work and whether it will form part of a more coherent approach in provision. Finally, I raise the issue of innovation. In my constituency of Hinckley and Bosworth, local businesses have shown how responsive, user-focused solutions can make a real, tangible difference. I mentioned Mounts and More as a primary example last time. As the national structure evolves, innovation like that must be supported rather than stifled. As the Minister responds this morning, wheelchair users and their families are listening carefully. They will want assurances that, amid the structural change, accountability will not be diluted, responsibility will not pass around the system, and there will be clear leadership to ensure faster, fairer access to the equipment that is so fundamental to independent living. I have three questions to the Minister on that basis. First, as NHS England is abolished through an NHS service modernisation Bill, can the Minister set out clearly which body will hold national responsibility for wheelchair service standards and oversight, and how Ministers will be held accountable when or should services for wheelchair users fail across different parts of the country? Secondly, who will be responsible going forward for overseeing and enforcing the wheelchair quality framework? What assessment have the Government made to date as to whether that is making a difference, and how we can have improvements? Thirdly—I touched on this in my intervention—many wheelchair users will have had provision from NRS Healthcare. Given the size and scale of the impact of NRS collapsing, there is real concern about servicing their contracts and making sure their wheelchairs are maintained. What have the Government done and what do they have to say on that topic?

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30. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Wheelchair Provision: Independent Review Body

    Can the Minister just clarify who he sees as responsible for the framework?

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31. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    In the immortal words of the famous film “A Few Good Men”: “‘I want the truth.’ ‘You can’t handle the truth!’” The court goes quiet. That is the moment of realisation that things have moved from process to accountability and responsibility. If hon. Members have not seen the film, it is about two marines who are on trial for killing another. The real story that unravels, however, is whether command can deny any responsibility for the actions that it has set in motion. Here lies the parallel. When subordinates act on the understood direction of authority, where does responsibility ultimately sit? They acted because of someone; it belongs to that person. Let us recount the facts that are not disputed in this House. Lord Mandelson was announced by the Prime Minister as the UK ambassador to the US in December 2024; UK Security Vetting recommended against developed vetting clearance in January 2025; the FCDO overruled that recommendation, enabling the appointment; the Prime Minister stated publicly that due process had been followed; and Sir Olly Robbins, the then permanent secretary, was later dismissed. However, what Robbins told us in the Committee in November 2025 is telling. “By the time we are describing, it was clear the Prime Minister wanted to make his appointment himself. Therefore, I understand the FCDO was informed of his decision and acted on it, and, via the Foreign Secretary, sought and obtained the King’s approval for the appointment. In this case, as Chris explained, the Prime Minister took advice and formed a view himself, and we then acted on that view.” The FCDO is clear: that was not drift; it was acting under direction. The Prime Minister formed that view and the FCDO acted on it—acting on instruction, acting on direction, acting on what the Prime Minister wanted. Yet since then, the Prime Minister has been trying to separate the decision and the consequence. There is the decision, there are the consequences, but we and the public know that we cannot separate the two. If an official acts in the shadow of a settled view, responsibility returns to the source, where the shadow was first cast. Let us draw some more comparisons with the film, because it is quite telling. Colonel Jessep does not issue the written order; the Prime Minister does not personally do the vetting. Subordinates act on a clear command and intent; the FCDO acted on the political intent. The defence by the colonel was that he did not order that; the defence by the Prime Minister was he was not told. The court finds that authority cannot be passive; we in this House say, “Neither can the Prime Minister.” The blame lands on the subordinates, and the same has happened here. In both cases, the controversy does not turn on the mechanics but on where the moral and constitutional responsibility resides. Officials were acting on a settled prime ministerial preference. The Prime Minister cannot have it both ways. He cannot have decisive authority on the way in and plausible deniability on the way out. That is not process; that is power without accountability. If the decision was his, is not the responsibility his? If not, why not, and whose is it then?

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32. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    My hon. Friend is absolutely right. This is the bottom line: the Prime Minister shaped the system by having a settled political decision—one with horrific consequences—despite all the warnings that we have talked about in this House, about Mandelson being fired twice and so on, and now tries to point to the process as the failing. The country is not buying it. The film teaches us this simple lesson: power cannot hide behind those who obey it. Before I finish, I have a message for Labour MPs and will address them directly. To paraphrase Colonel Jessep’s famous speech, the PM neither has the time nor the inclination to explain himself to Back Benchers who rise and sleep under the blanket of the very majority that he provides and then question the manner in which the PM provides it. The PM would rather they say just “thank you” and went on their way. Otherwise, he suggests they pick up a weapon and stand at post. Either way, he does not give a damn about what they are entitled to.

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33. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    My right hon. Friend is very senior and makes an erudite point. We still do not know why the Prime Minister chose Mandelson—he has never said exactly why he did. We can all see the reasons he should not have done.

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34. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

    Accountability starts from the top. We have heard from the FCDO today that the message from No. 10 was to “Get this f***ing done”. That was the political directive and everything else followed suit. That is exactly what Olly Robbins has said. We on the Conservative Benches know the truth. The public want the truth. The only question that remains is whether Labour Back Benchers can handle the truth. Surely if they cannot, they must do something about it.

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35. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

    I am sure we will get to hear from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington shortly. The proposal in clause 3 is being framed as a mere administrative adjustment—a common-sense fix for a system under strain. The Government’s plan to introduce a Crown court bench division, where a judge sits alone without magistrates to decide the fate of those accused of either-way offences, is being sold to the public as a remedy for the backlogs that currently paralyse our courts. But we must be clear from the outset that the crisis in our courts is not the result of the jury system. The backlog, which sees tens of thousands of cases waiting for a hearing, is the result of long-term challenges and the unprecedented impact of covid on our justice system. Eroding a defendant’s right to a trial by their peers is not a fix; it is a fundamental reconfiguration of the English legal system. Across the Bill, we see a pattern emerging: a shift away from what we are clear is the gold standard of justice towards a swift model. The evidence supporting it is dangerously thin, and we must resist the permanent eroding of a right that has stood for hundreds and hundreds of years. The right to a jury trial is often described as fundamental. It is not merely a traditional quirk of our system; it is an important constitutional safeguard. The core of the Government’s plan, as outlined in their impact assessment and the Second Reading briefings, is to remove the right to elect. Currently, if someone is charged with an either-way offence—crimes like theft, assault or certain drug offences—they have a right to choose whether they are tried by a jury in the Crown court or by magistrates. The Government’s plan to strip away that choice in clause 3, under a new bench division model for when the sentence outcome is likely to be three years or less, will remove even the role of lay magistrates from the decision. The briefing provided by the organisation JUSTICE, which I have referred to several times, makes a compelling case against that. JUSTICE points out that the right to elect is a long-standing protection that ensures that a defendant can seek the judgment of a diverse group of citizens when they feel the state’s power is being unfairly applied. By removing that right, we are effectively saying that the state knows better than the citizen how they should be judged. This is not unheard of, as we have talked about before, but clause 3, combined with previous clauses, represents it being done at a scale never seen before. This is a dangerous path. When we move cases from juries to a bench division, we are moving from a system of community participation to a system of professionalised adjudication. The jury is the part of our constitution where the greatest number of ordinary citizens have a direct, hands-on role in the administration of justice. It is the primary way that the public grant their consent to the upholding of criminal law. If we remove the public from the process, we risk the law becoming something done to people, rather than something that belongs to them. The Government’s narrative suggests that a judge-led bench division will be just as fair as a jury, only faster. But it ignores the fundamental and unique aspect of fairness delivered by a jury trial, which they acknowledge by continuing to maintain jury trials for what they describe as the “more serious” offences. A jury is, by definition, balanced. It consists of 12 people from different backgrounds, with different life experiences and different biases, in the crucible of the jury room. Their diversity is its greatest strength; a single judge, no matter how well intentioned, cannot possibly replicate that breadth of perspective. There is also the phenomenon of being case-hardened: when a professional judge or magistrate hears 50 similar cases of theft or assault in a year, there is a natural human tendency to begin seeing patterns rather than individuals. Evidence that might seem fresh or potentially exonerating to a jury can seem like the usual excuse to a professional who has heard it hundreds of times before. Juries bring fresh eyes; they are not jaded by the grind of the system. They are instructed to look only at the facts of the case before them. That is why juries are considered—by the Opposition, at least—to be the gold standard. The evidence submitted to the Committee warns that we lack clarity as to why the Government are so eager to discard this standard. If the jury is the best way to ensure an accurate and fair verdict, the burden of proof for removing it must be exceptionally high. Furthermore, the bench division model threatens to undermine the lay element of our justice system. Originally, as recommended in the Leveson review, the idea was that a judge would sit with two magistrates. That was intended to maintain at least some form of community involvement. However, clause 3 moves towards judge-only trials for many cases, discarding even the judge-plus-two compromise. I will now address the primary argument made by the Minister in her opening remarks. The Government claim that moving to the bench division will significantly reduce the backlog. However, the Institute for Government has produced an insightful analysis, which we have referred to frequently, suggesting that the evidence for those savings is incredibly weak. The IFG points out that the vast majority of Crown court time is not actually spent on the types of trials that the Government want to move to the bench division. The cases being targeted are the less serious ones, which already take up less time than more complex cases such as murder, which will remain subject to jury trial. According to the IFG’s modelling, if judge-only trials are 20% faster than a jury trial, the total impact on the overall Crown court backlog would be a reduction of 2%. When we consider the constitutional cost of us losing, at this unprecedented scale, the right to access a jury, that is simply not sufficient. The backlog is not caused by juries being slow; it is more often caused by ineffective trials that are postponed because witnesses do not show up, because solicitors or barristers are unavailable, or because courtrooms are not fit to operate in. These are systemic failures, and moving a trial from a jury to a judge does not make a witness appear or fix a broken courtroom. The Bill proposes a threshold of cases likely to attract a sentence of up to three years being diverted to the bench division. Predicting a sentence before a trial is never an exact science, and that is something that magistrates actually have more experience of than judges. That unprecedented scenario—without the safeguards that we sought to add through a right of appeal, which the Government rejected—will create huge questions of impartiality and bias. A three-year sentence is not a minor matter. Three years in prison is a life-altering event. It can mean the loss of a home, a career and a family. To suggest that a person facing such a consequence does not deserve what they consider to be the fairest possible trial betrays that principle of fairness in our justice system when the consequences are so severe. There is also the issue of the absence of a sunset clause. If these measures are truly a temporary response to tackle an emergency backlog, they should include a sunset clause that ensures that rights are restored once the crisis has passed. As I have said previously, changes were made during world war two and then reversed when the war was over. The fact that the Government have resisted such a clause suggests that this is not a temporary fix, but a permanent land grab by the state. Once the right to a jury is surrendered for either-way offences, it is highly unlikely that any future Government will be in a position to restore it. We must see the Crown court bench division for what it is: a policy of convenience, not a policy delivering justice. It is a policy that ignores the findings of the IFG, which would require us to focus more heavily on other elements of the system. It is a policy that ignores the warnings from JUSTICE, which highlight the erosion of the defendant’s right to elect and its impact on public confidence and fairness in the judicial system. It is a policy that even ignores the original, more balanced recommendations of the Leveson review, which at least sought to keep lay magistrates involved. We are told that we must modernise and that we must be efficient. The purpose of a criminal trial is not to process cases as quickly as possible; it is to arrive at the truth through a process that the defendant, the victim and the public have trust in. If we allow the Government to erode the jury system in the name of the backlog on this occasion to this extent, we are sending a message that this constitutional right is highly conditional, and that it can be traded away whenever the state finds it too expensive or too cumbersome to maintain. As the Minister frequently points out, lots of countries do without it; “Why shouldn’t we?” will be the next argument. Instead of stripping away rights, the Government should be more focused on the areas that we can all agree on: prisoner transport, early legal advice, more efficient listing, Crown Prosecution Service reviews of cases in the backlog, facilities that work and IT that works. We do not fix a house by tearing it down to its foundations because the roof is leaking; we fix the roof. Jury trials ensure that our laws remain grounded in the common sense of ordinary people. Let us apply some of that common sense to tackling this issue. Common sense will lead us to oppose clause 3.

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36. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

    The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.

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37. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

    We are leaning heavily on the points made by the Criminal Bar Association. The Government seem quite rightly to be extremely concerned about the training of future barristers, but the Criminal Bar Association has made the point that that training often takes place in what the Government are describing as less serious cases. That is where the more junior people get the experience they need to work on the more serious cases. If those cases are not available, how do the Government expect barristers to be trained to the level required to take on the more serious cases with a jury trial?

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38. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    The hon. Member for Wimbledon pointed out that we are talking about a 50% reduction; can the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford tell us the percentage reduction in relation to the points he is making?

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39. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    The threshold that Sir Brian recommended was two years, not three years, and the forum that he recommended was a judge with two magistrates, but we are doing just one judge. The hon. Member should be more careful in making claims about what Sir Brian recommended to support what he is saying, because we are not doing what he recommended.

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40. 21 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

    I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place. Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing. There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress. We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will. We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial. We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.

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