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1. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert— “33AA Conduct relevant to designation (1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in— (a) transnational repression; (b) abusive lawfare; (c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity; (d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d). (2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against— (a) a person in the United Kingdom; (b) a United Kingdom national; (c) a person resident in the United Kingdom; (d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or (e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d). (3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to— (a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion; (b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas; (c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction; (d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes; (e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms; (f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and (g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f). (4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to— (a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work; (b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity; (c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or (d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power. (5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power. (6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of— (a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018; (b) asset-freezing measures; (c) trade sanctions; (d) export controls; (e) immigration restrictions; (f) public procurement restrictions; or (g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. (7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.” This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.

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2. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit. The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill. Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn. I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe. On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on. The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

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3. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us. Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason. On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had. Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them. I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible. In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point. The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group. Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets? The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

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4. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   The Minister gives the example of a diplomat, and she is right that our diplomats in Tehran will need to engage with the IRGC—it is nonsense to suggest that they would not be able to do so—but that is why there is a specific exception for that in the Bill. Proposed new section 17A(5) refers to a person who “acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).” As I have mentioned, I am concerned that that means that anyone who is a traitor and works for the civil service would have protections under any circumstances, but it means that we do not need that additional threshold, because diplomats are already specifically protected in the Bill at another point.

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5. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   I fully recognise the Minister’s point that she is trying to align the provisions with those in the National Security Act, but as per my argument earlier, let us improve the National Security Act while we are at it. The Minister says that the question is whether she is minded to make the change; I say she should be minded to. If someone actively assists or materially benefits from a hostile state while committing treason, it is absolutely right that they should get a tougher sentence than that for just flying a flag or supporting a hostile state. Those acts are still heinous, but a far worse crime has been committed. I ask the Minister to consider making the change when the Bill is in the Lords.

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6. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to want this. However, there is already a requirement under law for Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to review all terrorism legislation and related legislation, including the National Security Act 2023—which this would fall under—every single year, and to report back to Parliament. Hopefully the hon. Gentleman will be reassured that this is already covered in law, and that there is a specific requirement.

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7. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Offences relating to designated bodies Amendment proposed: 3, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.—(Alicia Kearns.) This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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8. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   The Bill asks how our country confronts the greatest threat it faces: states that behave like terrorists. We support the Bill, and have today set out its weaknesses—the places where, as drafted, it is found wanting. We tabled 13 amendments and new clauses, with not one designed to delay the Bill, not one designed to wreck it and, tonight, not one accepted—not a clause, not a line, not one additional defence for our country. There are two ways for a Government to show their contempt for the House: they may deny it time or deny it influence. They may rush this House or overrule it. This Government have chosen both.

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9. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   National Security (State Threats) Bill

   I am not sure that anyone has disputed that Jonathan Hall backs the Bill. I had a lengthy call with him to discuss the gaps in the Bill, which I am sure the hon. Gentleman has not had. I will not share a private conversation, but I encourage the hon. Gentleman to have a similar call with Jonathan Hall to discuss those gaps. We are here in this place to find the gaps while they can still be mended. That is the whole of our purpose, but we were not permitted to fulfil it today because scrutiny was declined. I have to admit that it feels like our suggestions were not even given due consideration. So I must tell the House what in the Bill now leaves this Chamber unaltered. The sponsor remains more gently treated in law than the proxies that it arms. The world’s largest sponsor of terrorism keeps a protection denied to its terrorist proxies. The self-directed actor—the lone individual that our terrorism law learned to tackle, at great and terrible cost, two decades ago—will fall through a gap that we were forbidden to close. Britain may be used as a base from which to plot against our friends in Dublin, Berlin or Brussels, or even those in Hong Kong and Tehran. The flag of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may still be flown, lawfully, on a British street, glorifying every threat against our Jewish communities that the regime has directed here. [Interruption.] The Minister may say, “Not necessarily,” but she specifically ruled out our amendment on the basis that we should not prevent members of the Iranian diplomatic corps from wearing uniforms here. The Bill does not apply to members of the diplomatic corps; it applies specifically to UK persons. That is therefore still the case and there is no protection against seeing those flags walked past Jewish people’s homes. In Committee, I asked the Government how we look the people the regime has hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of the hunter is still welcome on our streets. Tonight, I have no answer to offer them. A law passed in good faith but built wrongly fails as surely as one that is passed in bad faith. When a prosecution comes, it will turn not on the speeches given today, the Government’s good intentions or our warnings, but on what a defendant did. When that day comes and there is a gap that was identified in this House today that could have been closed in an afternoon, let the record show that it could have been mended. The Bill now passes to the other place, and I have every confidence that their lordships will give it the scrutiny it deserves. We will not oppose the Bill tonight. We will support it, not because it delivers the full protections it should, but because a flawed shield is still a shield of some form and the men and women that the Bill is designed to protect cannot be left with nothing. We support it, having placed on the record of this House what was refused and whose hand refused it. The threat we face is patient, it is ruthless and it will not be deterred by a law that we were too rushed to finish and that the Government were too proud to mend. I have supported this Bill at every stage, and it is because of that that I lament what the Bill could have been and that the House was given a single afternoon to try to get it right. I hope this Bill is as watertight as the Government assert, but if they wish to be absolute and to remove risk or ambiguities, we ask those in the other place to shut down any risk that the shield this aims to be might let even one traitor succeed in harming our nation. I hope they will do that on the basis of the way we have put forward our amendments: in the national interest.

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10. 17 Jun 2026·Parliament·Alberto Costa

    Steel Tariffs

    We have talked about large and small businesses being affected, but my constituent Joe, who is a sales director in an SME likely to be affected, is deeply concerned about his livelihood. I have a very simple question for the Minister: if he is taking on board industry feedback, will he publish detailed information on safeguard quota allocations and anticipated utilisation rates before those measures come into place on 1 July?

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11. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Victoria Atkins

    Thames Water

    First, I echo the Secretary of State’s comments in remembrance of her dear colleague Jo Cox. Her loss was felt across the House and across party political lines, and I send all of our very best wishes to her loved ones and friends. I thank you, Mr Speaker, and I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of her statement and for a briefing call on this announcement. As you know, I have been trying for months to coax the Secretary of State to the Dispatch Box to explain major events within her portfolio, from the Government’s EU handover negotiations to their lack of support for farmers. Finally, she emerges into the light. We all assumed that it would be to announce progress towards resolving the many issues facing Thames Water and its customers; instead, it is to make a statement about a letter to the regulator. There is nothing new in this statement—no change in the situation of Thames Water, and still no certainty for billpayers. Thames Water has repeatedly failed its customers and the environment with a record of pollution, leakage and chronic under-investment. The latest figures lay this bare. The company is responsible for around a third of the nation’s worst pollution incidents, even as billpayers face steep increases in their bills. These are not abstract failures; untreated sewage has been poured into the rivers and chalk streams that local communities cherish, while customers are asked to pay more for less. The priority now must be a financial arrangement that keeps the company afloat and protects billpayers and taxpayers. While the Secretary of State’s Government are in chaos, paralysed by the Prime Minister’s weakness and the Mayor of Greater Manchester’s leadership ambitions, Thames Water continues to fail. If no deal is reached, Thames Water could collapse—again, at enormous cost to taxpayers. The Secretary of State has said that she does not want a scenario where customers “pick up the bill for the company’s failures”, but when the Conservatives tried to amend the Water (Special Measures) Act to prevent consumers from being on the hook in the event of a company going into special administration and tried to impose a lending ratio limit on water companies to prevent this situation from happening again, Labour voted it down. Why? I also remember that under the former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Streatham and Croydon North (Steve Reed), an investor pulled out of a previous rescue deal, partly due to political risk—in other words, the former Secretary of State had talked himself out of a deal. How is the current Secretary of State avoiding the failures of the now Secretary of State for Housing? There are those who are urging nationalisation, a word that is thrown around carelessly by Labour Back Benchers and by Reform—in fact, I think I heard it just now. None of them ever explains that nationalisation would be extremely expensive, potentially costing the taxpayer up to £20 billion. For those who are wondering what that means, it is roughly equivalent to the defence funding shortfall we have heard so much about in recent days. However, there are reasonable concerns about how Thames Water’s failures will be managed during the Government’s restructuring of the sector and the abolition of Ofwat, so can the Secretary of State please confirm that the existing penalty regime will not be downgraded or diluted, which has been briefed to the newspapers? What safeguards will be put in place to ensure Thames Water remains fully responsible for its environmental and operational failures? How will the Government ensure that billpayers are not left bearing the cost of past mismanagement, and have they offered or begun any process to recommend an alternative deal? Ministers have still not explained how investment in the sector will actually be paid for. Indeed, the Secretary of State’s predecessor had to admit that so-called private water industry investment is in reality paid for by higher bills, and the Secretary of State has repeated that today. Families already struggling with the cost of living should not become the safety net for a company that rewarded its executives while letting its infrastructure crumble. This is an important moment for the Government to show that they can balance financial stability with strong regulatory oversight and put accountability and the interests of billpayers and the environment at the heart of water reform. The Government must now deliver on the big promises they made during the election for the water sector. Public trust in the water industry is already at rock bottom.

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12. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Julian Lewis

    Thames Water

    It is tempting to say that there is a particularly bad smell about this company, but that would be a statement of the obvious. Although I am not normally a friend of nationalisation, I have a feeling that this company is on a one-way journey to bankruptcy. Am I right in presuming that if that point ever arose, there would be no question of compensating shareholders for a bankrupt company that eventually had to be taken over by the state?

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13. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Jeremy Wright

    Community Hospitals

    Order. I thank the hon. Lady for opening the debate, and remind all Back-Bench colleagues who wish to speak that they should continue to bob—not right now, but as the debate continues—so that I know they want to speak. I am hoping we can avoid any time limits this morning. We have five Back Benchers wishing to contribute, and if they limit themselves to about seven or eight minutes each, we should be fine.

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14. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Jeremy Wright

    Community Hospitals

    I am grateful to all Back-Bench contributors to the debate. We now move to the Front-Bench speeches, beginning with the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

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15. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Jeremy Hunt

    Social Media Disinformation

    In 2017 there was appalling ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, and Facebook was used to recruit civilian death squads. Atrocities continue to this day. The UK holds the pen on Myanmar at the UN. At the General Assembly this year, will the Foreign Secretary hold a high-level meeting to look at this issue and shine a spotlight on the human rights abuses that continue to this day in Myanmar?

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16. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Iain Duncan Smith

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    The hon. Lady was very prescient then, and it has got worse since. There was lots of talk under the previous Administration about Downing Street cars being searched for IOTs. We know about the huge imports from bad actors, such as China and other countries—that is really what we should be worried about. Many of them contain kill switches, which would devastate some of our industry, such as energy. That would be a disaster. She is right to have raised the issue and to continue to raise it.

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17. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Iain Duncan Smith

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    It is always a great honour to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), who talks common sense most of the time she gets up, which may be one of the reasons why she is still on the Back Benches. If we listened more to those who know something about things, rather than talking as though we know things, and saying things that are invariably wrong, we in Parliament would obviously be better off. The greatest threat we face is that bad actors out there are using this level of technology to get across to countries such as the UK. This is not a party political point, because both Governments have failed to face up to it to the degree that they should have—that is why this Bill is welcome, but it is not everything, as the hon. Lady says—but we think that we can treat the bad actors as though they were normal actors in a commercial sense. However, China is using slave labour to undercut markets and regularly puts IOTs into cars. It gets away with it because we think that we need China more than it needs us. That is the big problem. The hon. Lady is right to raise it, and I congratulate her for again making an excellent speech. I will in due course beg to move my amendment on anti-refoulement, because although this is a good Bill, some bits are missing and others have been skated over. This is one area about which we will come, again and again, to regret that we had not done more. The issue is British citizens abroad ending up under the rule of Governments that do not believe in the concept of freedom before the law, in a fair trial as part of that process, or in habeas corpus, which is an English common law right that has gone around the world. The amendment seeks to prohibit data sharing with jurisdictions that cannot guarantee a fair trial. It maintains the current legal approach, which generally restricts the sharing of sensitive information outside the EU. Currently, information sharing of a type enabled by proposed new regulation 6, which is in clause 18, is prohibited outside the EU. The proposed new regulation is therefore weaker than what is going on in the European Union. Sadly, it paves the way for such sharing, rather than restricting it. The amendment therefore seeks to prohibit information sharing with places where the Secretary of State believes that a fair trial simply cannot be obtained. It would require the Secretary of State to consult civil society and human rights experts to identify jurisdictions—this would apply universally and not just to China, although China is a big player in this—where the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, with all decisions subject to mandatory annual reports to Parliament. That is important: Parliament should be part of this and make decisions about whether it agrees with the Government. Beijing is a good example. It has frequently used seemingly legitimate criminal complaints to target dissidents. Proposed new regulation 6, if unamended, therefore raises transnational repression risks rather than solving them. The amendment is necessary to close that loophole in the Bill, which currently fails to anticipate politically motivated requests from such totalitarian states. I often say that we should stop speaking about countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as authoritarian states. They are not authoritarian states; they are totalitarian states. Why do I say that? Because everything in those countries is owned and run by the state. Authoritarian states are often dictatorships, but they are not the same thing as totalitarian states. They are brutal and nasty, but totalitarianism is a complete system. This is about totalitarian states. Proposed new regulation 6 is predicated upon helping other Governments obtain justice. The argument of my amendment 3 is that—quite apart from the transnational repression risks—justice as we understand it cannot be served in a country where essentially there is no rule of law, no right to a fair trial, and a judicial system that serves the party. As I often say, it is a matter of pride that perhaps the greatest gift this country has given to the world is the concept of freedom in the face of the law. That is the point I made earlier: habeas corpus came from English common law and dominates so much of the free world’s thinking. It was not until the 1970s that some countries in Europe actually practised habeas corpus, so it was not just the case that it was produced by Britain; it was also owned by many other countries. That is what is at risk here, and we should be the greatest defenders of that right to a fair trial anywhere in the world. Let us take a few of these countries as examples for why amendment 3 is needed. Let us look at China. Requests were made by authoritarian states—totalitarian states in this case—regarding Interpol notices, as has been the recent pattern, and this happens a lot. The People’s Republic of China and other countries have a troubling recent history of very significant transnational repression, hounding dissidents in the UK and cloaking their political persecution in superficially legitimate criminal charges. The PRC is not alone in requesting information on political opponents in the UK, and it does it a lot. We can confidently speculate that China will make requests of the UK almost immediately should the Bill be passed. Let me look at the single biggest case that confronts us in China at the moment: that of Jimmy Lai. He is a British citizen. I cannot tell you, Madam Deputy Speaker, how endlessly in debates, even under the previous Administration, we had to fight to get the Government to state that he is a British citizen, not a dual nationality citizen. He is a British citizen, is proud to be British, has been British all his life and has only ever owned a British passport—he has never been a Chinese citizen with a Chinese passport. The special rapporteur on torture, Alice Jill Edwards, in her 2024 and 2025 reports, specifically flagged concerns that evidence obtained through torture is still widely admitted in Chinese courts. She also expressed concerns in late 2024 regarding the case of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, noting that evidence allegedly secured through torture in mainland China was and is being used in the trial. On 15 November 2024, the United Nations working group on arbitrary detention published its opinion that Jimmy Lai is “unlawfully and arbitrarily detained” and called for his immediate release. The proposed new regulation will not go far enough and therefore does not deal with this, and that is what my amendment 3 is all about. On the risk of extradition to China from safe third countries, currently the UK does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, and it has suspended its bilateral extradition treaty with Hong Kong—something that many of us were calling out for at the time in 2020. In 2025, proposed changes to the Extradition Act 2003 would allow co-operation between UK and Hong Kong authorities on a “case-by-case ad hoc basis”. The trouble with that is that it begins to open the door. The risk of sharing NIS data is not confined to the physical removal of individuals; it also poses a profound threat to national security and the safety of the diaspora within the UK—how often have we heard about that? These totalitarian states not only seek to extradite dissidents, they seek to silence them through transnational repression and to compromise the UK’s own digital resilience. Sharing NIS data with an adversarial jurisdiction is akin to providing a road map for a state-sponsored cyber-attack. For dissidents and human rights defenders living in the UK, NIS data can be used to demonise and de-anonymise their activity. This information is frequently used to identify and harass family members remaining in their home country, to conduct targeted phishing and surveillance against the individual’s private devices, and to coerce the individual into becoming an informant under the threat of criminal charges based on the shared technical data. Let me deal with another case: that of Ryan Cornelius in the United Arab Emirates. Ryan Cornelius is a British citizen who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for 18 years, despite well-documented evidence of an unfair trial and inhuman treatment. Ryan’s detention has been found to be arbitrary by the UN working group on arbitrary detention. His case arose from a high-profile financial dispute involving loans connected to a major Dubai development project. Although he and his associates had reportedly complied with restructuring agreements with Dubai Islamic Bank, he was arrested without warning, transferred by plain-clothed officers to a police facility, where he was held incommunicado, denied access to a lawyer and subjected to aggressive interrogation. During this time, he was coerced into signing documents in Arabic—a language he does not understand—under the false premise that this would give him his release.

    Hansard source
18. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Iain Duncan Smith

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I am not quite certain that I understand the Minister’s reasons for why he cannot accept my amendment, tweak it or work with it in the other place. The reality is that with this Bill, we are opening the door in a way that we would not have otherwise done to the use of information that may predicate a failure for some British citizen sitting in a country where the rule of law does not protect them in the courts. The Government are taking a risk of making it worse, not better. While the Minister agrees to some degree with the principle of what I am saying, surely this is the time to put it right in the Bill.

    Hansard source
19. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Sir Andrew Mitchell

    Ebola Outbreaks

    Thank you, Mr Speaker, for your wonderful words about Jo Cox and for the brilliant debate we had last Thursday as the main business of the House. Following acknowledgment by the Development Minister, the noble Baroness Chapman, that Labour’s horrific development and aid cuts undermine the response to the Ebola crisis, and that funding is only 5% of the help provided for the last Ebola emergency a decade ago, will the Government make it clear that these pandemics cross borders and are a serious danger to all of us unless they are contained? Is that not the essence of the case for international development?

    Hansard source
20. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Simon Hoare

    West Bank: Settler Activity

    I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s use of the term “settler terrorism”. She is absolutely right; the phrase “settler violence” does not do justice to what is happening. She will be aware that settler terrorism is often enabled and encouraged, or at best a blind eye is turned, by both the Israeli police and the IDF. She will know the damage perpetrated by that terrorist activity. If Israel wishes to remain the villa in the jungle it has always wished to be, can she at least remind her Israeli Government counterparts of the importance of the rule of law and the separation of the duties of the IDF and the police when it comes to protecting the citizens of both Israel and Palestine?

    Hansard source
21. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Priti Patel

    UK-US Relationship

    I echo your sombre words about Jo Cox, Mr Speaker. Her memory and her family are in our thoughts today. The United Kingdom’s long-standing strategic, security, defence and intelligence relationship with the United States is crucial for us and for our allies. Can the Foreign Secretary tell us what role Britain has played in the negotiations between the United States and the middle east in relation to Iran, given our historic links to partners in the region? Have the Government seen the US-Iran agreement, and what is Britain’s role in shaping future foreign policy and the security architecture in the middle east?

    Hansard source
22. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Priti Patel

    Violence against Women and Girls

    What steps are being taken to investigate Daesh fighters who have returned to Britain and prosecute them for their crimes, including sexual violence and rape against the Yazidis and others? Given the importance of ensuring that there is accountability and reform of institutions to root out the risk of exploitation from the UN, charities and even the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what is the Government’s response to the suspension of Karim Khan from the International Criminal Court for allegations of sexual misconduct?

    Hansard source
23. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Priti Patel

    Topical Questions

    China’s human rights record is appalling. Did the Foreign Secretary know, while she was enjoying the hospitality of the Chinese Communist party earlier this month, that Chinese slave labour is being used to supply solar panels across UK schools and hospitals to meet Labour’s net zero targets? How has the Foreign Secretary allowed this to happen, and does she think it is acceptable for her Government to be turning a blind eye to Chinese slave labour and these awful human rights abuses?

    Hansard source
24. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Priti Patel

    Topical Questions

    The Foreign Secretary will know that a secret camera was found in an office block where the plans for the Chinese spy hub super-embassy were approved. No one knows yet where the camera came from, but it raises serious questions for the Government about their approval of this Chinese spy embassy. Can she say whether this act of foreign espionage will be investigated, and does this incident not once again highlight why China must be placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

    Hansard source
25. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Peter Fortune

    Draft Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) (Amendment) Order 2026

    My intervention is about the age for access being lowered to eight years old. Perhaps the Minister could reassure us on what assessment has been done of safeguarding. That would make me very happy.

    Hansard source
26. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Peter Fortune

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I recognise the importance of sovereignty, but there are real challenges. How can we deal with the prevalence of, for example, Taiwanese chips in our tech market?

    Hansard source
27. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Peter Fortune

    Isle of Wight Dementia Patients: Discharge to Mainland Care Homes

    The hon. Gentleman is giving a typically excellent and passionate speech. No person living with dementia should be removed from their family or support network. Does he agree that as the NHS is restructured, there needs to be a proper focus on outcomes for dementia sufferers right across the country?

    Hansard source
28. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Isle of Wight Dementia Patients: Discharge to Mainland Care Homes

    I did not have time to congratulate the Minister, a fellow Brummie, on her promotion. It is good to see those from Birmingham here in the Chamber. Question put and agreed to.

    Hansard source
29. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Thames Water

    What assurances can the Government give my constituents across Bexley that the £88 million of investment that is under way in our community to secure our fresh drinking water supply for the next 50 years is not derailed by this Government announcement, which means further uncertainty for Thames Water and its customers?

    Hansard source
30. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

    Russian Oil Sales

    We pay tribute to our armed forces for their courage and bravery in boarding and seizing the Russian shadow fleet vessel at the weekend. We also welcome the further sanctions announced today, including those targeting the shadow fleet. We urge the Government to put pressure on those who buy and refine Russian oil, as the freedom of Ukraine depends on cutting off the funds that finance Putin’s illegal war. Given the urgency on the battlefields of Ukraine and the inflated revenue Putin has recently had from Russian oil, does the Minister think that the situation can wait until 2027 for the introduction of the ban on Russian-originated diesel and jet fuel imports?

    Hansard source
31. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

    Russian Oil Sales

    We both agree that this is important. While Putin uses globally inflated oil prices to fund his war machine, our own defence investment plan is in tatters. The former Defence Secretary’s shocking resignation letter said that the Prime Minister was “unable”, and the Chancellor “unwilling”, to provide the funding for the defence investment plan. That is absolutely damning. Astonishingly, the very next day the Government announced £4.5 billion to paint 10,000 new zebra crossings. Given that the FCDO made a big cut to its own budget to fund defence last year, does the Minister share my anger that other Departments are refusing to contribute to keep our country safe?

    Hansard source
32. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    Topical Questions

    Last month, along with other members of the all-party parliamentary group on Gibraltar, I visited the Rock in order to assess responses to the proposed treaty at first hand. Will the Minister give us an update? When does he anticipate that the treaty will be finalised?

    Hansard source
33. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Mark Garnier

    Draft Pensions (Abolition of Lifetime Allowance Charge etc) Regulations 2026

    I was going to bang on with a very long and intelligent speech, but in the interests of brevity and keeping everybody happy, I will not. I am delighted that the Minister is introducing legislation relating to the glorious regime of the strong and stable Conservative Government of 2020 and the 2023 Budget. This policy was slightly bonkers. We need to do everything we can to encourage people to save and not put a cap on their savings. I am tempted to go on about salary sacrifice, but I will spare the Minister the embarrassment of reminding him about that. We will certainly not oppose these regulations.

    Hansard source
34. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Julia Lopez

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I thank Members across the House for their contributions to this Bill over many months and for their relentless scrutiny. I have never known a Minister to be in such a rush, with three hours of protected time left. I am grateful to officials both in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and in Parliament for their hard work in getting this legislation to its final stage. I particularly recognise the hard work of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) and his team in providing such top-notch scrutiny of the Bill during its passage through the House. The Opposition have remained at all times supportive of the principles behind the Bill. It was the previous Government who recognised the need to increase cyber-resilience standards for critical digital infrastructure and services, including managed service providers and data centres. It is welcome that those entities—which are so vital to the functioning of the economy, public services and our daily lives—are now covered. However, I said on Second Reading that opportunities to legislate in this area are few and far between, and we need to ask two questions to assess whether this law is fit for purpose: will it work, and is it enough? There was already an urgent need to strengthen our cyber-defences. However, AI is equipping hostile states, criminal gangs and opportunists alike with tools capable of eroding our national defences at speed and at scale, in ways that will affect businesses, the public sector and our infrastructure. It is right that Parliament legislates to raise the collective security bar, but the nature of the cyber-security risks that necessitated this Bill have developed rapidly as we have been taking it through this House. That demonstrates the difficulties we all face as legislators in dealing with the constantly shifting sands of the digital age. We may need to be ready to return to this subject sooner than we had hoped. It is right that critical digital infrastructure such as data centres will fall within the scope of regulation, but we need to recognise that no security measures or standards are 100% effective. Government and businesses need to ensure that essential data and workloads are stored and processed in a way that keeps them secure and operational even when they are under attack. Resilience is key—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ apparent targeting of Amazon Web Services sites in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain earlier this year has shown that digital infrastructure is becoming a prime target in times of conflict. It would be irresponsible to assume that these facilities will not also be targets for cyber-warfare, which is why we have to look closely at concentration of risk, our overall resilience, and any leverage we can build in maintaining access to the best technology going forward. From work on the security of our telecoms infrastructure to scrutiny of the platforms on which critical Government services run, we must now be thinking extremely carefully about our procurement of digital technology. A further significant development since this Bill was introduced is the rapid advance of AI systems capable of identifying cyber-vulnerabilities, particularly in poorly protected legacy IT across Government and public services, including the NHS. It highlights the urgent need to address the Government’s extensive legacy estate, which is especially exposed to exploitation. Nothing in the Bill addresses that need, yet the Government are creating a broader digital architecture for hackers to attack through their plan for Government-issued digital IDs. If public trust is to be restored, especially after the Government’s abortive attempt to introduce mandatory ID last year—still, I fear, a risk by the back door—such systems must always remain both optional and secure. It is therefore concerning that the Public Accounts Committee felt compelled to write to the permanent secretary at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology in April to criticise the lack of urgency in reviewing legacy IT equipment, given both the sensitivity of the data involved and the scale of the cyber-risk. Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge set out one of the most significant threats that this Bill fails to address: the intensifying cyber-security risk posed by the Chinese Communist party and its affiliates. It is regrettable that the Government have, for a second time, voted down amendments that would have compelled the Secretary of State to create a register of hostile state actors threatening the cyber-security of essential networks and information systems. Those concerns are not restricted to Conservative Members, which is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) attracted cross-party support. The risks posed by cellular IOT modules have been set out expertly in the Chamber today. IOT modules supplied by Chinese manufacturers are now embedded in nearly all internet-connectable products and devices, from smart TVs to electric cars. They can be used to intercept data and track locations, and can even be controlled remotely. The scale of the cyber and physical security threat from IOT modules is the tip of the iceberg, with components that can be used for espionage or cyber-attacks or disabled remotely woven into countless aspects of our critical national infrastructure. This is an issue that is not going away. In summary, although this Bill is necessary and goes some way towards enhancing our cyber-resilience in critical areas, it will not be enough in isolation. It heaps all the burden on the private sector, yet it would have been insufficient to prevent the Jaguar Land Rover incident. It does not address public sector vulnerabilities, and it falls far short of meeting the moment that the now former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), lamented that this Government were missing in their approach to our collective defence and security. It speaks to this Government’s continued inability to grapple with and address the red lights that are now flashing on the national dashboard. The “corrosive complacency” that Lord Robertson called out in the Government’s approach to investment in defence can also be seen here, in the Government’s ongoing refusal to address the urgent threat to our national cyber-security caused by our reliance on technology and components from nations that have demonstrably malign intent. We are living with the uncomfortable reality that the end of history was a dangerous illusion; one that has led to us gradually outsourcing our critical industries to our geopolitical rivals and competitors, only to have their wares sold back to us in the form of latent time bombs. That is why this legislation, which we support, can only be a discrete tool in addressing a much wider challenge. Cyber-security is no longer a niche compliance exercise; it is about protecting the fundamental economic and defence interests of our nation. That is why I suspect we will be returning to cyber issues in this House before too long, and with greater urgency.

    Hansard source
35. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Health Bill (First sitting)

    Q HSSIB is obviously an investigator and CQC is obviously a regulator—two different roles. I suspect there was a good reason why you were asked how the CQC can be investigated by a body that becomes part of it. Are you aware that the Air Accidents Investigation Branch and the UK Civil Aviation Authority are separate? If you are, why should that fundamental separation, which benefits air passenger safety, not apply to the safety of patients in the NHS? Dr Dash: Yes, I am aware. The analogy is continually made—and it has been made several times—and to be honest, 20 years ago, I would have shared the view that healthcare was similar to airlines. Indeed, I did quite a lot of talks about that at the time. However, the more I have looked into it, the more I think there are limits to that analogy. We are running out of time and this is a much longer conversation, but if I look at the specific examples that people bring up from the airline industry, it is about spotting some very specific things. An example was used at the Health and Social Care Committee about spotting a bolt that is not working properly. The equivalent of that within the NHS is actually something like the MHRA, which is separate. If we spot a drug, an anaesthetic machine or a cardiac device that is not working properly, that is for the MHRA, which is separate from the CQC. The CQC is there to be the independent regulator of the quality of care more generally, which is more the space that HSSIB has been in. HSSIB has been looking at things like the use of digital triage in general practice and corridor care, and it has done some work on surgical safety and so on. All of that is part of a bigger landscape of quality of care, which the CQC is responsible for. The more that I looked at this issue and the more I spoke to people, I became less sure that it is analogous to the airline industry. It is much broader and more complex, and certainly the airline industry does not have 150 different regulators and quasi-regulators.

    Hansard source
36. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Health Bill (First sitting)

    Q If responsibility for managing and safeguarding the single patient record is to sit with general practice, if that is what the Government want, can you tell us, Kay Keane, as chair of the Institute of General Practice Management, what the implication would be for workload, and particularly workforce, in practice management? Kay Keane: I think it is impossible, really, for me to understand that. It is a large part of our job already. As Dr Dickson said, we act as a small business. We do all the things that any other small business does, so being able to manage that record on top of that would take a huge amount of investment into general practice. I would argue that maybe the investment into general practice should not be on data, but should be in the wider workforce. We are really good at looking after our data now. We care about it, we hold it close to the care of the patient and we share it only when appropriate, but in our view to then be the data controller of other information is too much and is unmanageable for a general practice to do. Equally, our data is very personal to us, and we want to keep hold of that. We do not want our patients worrying about the stories that they tell us, so a model where we feed into something else and have responsibility for the bit that it is fed into sits more comfortably with the Institute of General Practice Management. Dr Dickson: I do not have much to add to that. The devil is in the detail of where it sits and how we reassure patients that we are trusted with their data—that we are sharing what they have given us appropriately for their health, but not for spurious reasons. I think people’s understanding is that we share an awful lot more than we do, so there is a gap. People perceive that we are going to overshare, whereas actually this will allow us to come up to the level that we should be at.

    Hansard source
37. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Health Bill (First sitting)

    Q The safe space principle is arguably under threat by the merging of HSSIB and the CQC. From the evidence you gave to the Health and Social Care Committee, I understand your argument that if you get rid of the independence of HSSIB, staff members who have witnessed wrongdoing and unsafe practices will not feel there is anywhere they can go, when they feel compelled to disclose things they see, where there is no consequence to them. Can you just comment on that? Sir Jeremy Hunt: Maybe I should just clarify, because I think Dr Dash referred to those comments. The CQC is incredibly important to hospitals and GP surgeries because it gives them a rating—“outstanding”, “good”, “requires improvement” or “inadequate”—and they really care about that. If a staff member is talking openly to HSSIB about a failure of governance in their organisation, and that is the same organisation that could decide whether they get stripped of their “outstanding” rating and downgraded to “good” or “requires improvement”, my concern is that some people may worry and say, “Maybe I shouldn’t be open, because this could affect my hospital’s rating.” Obviously, I would always want staff members to be completely open with HSSIB, but we have to be really careful that people still have confidence in the safe space function if this merger goes ahead.

    Hansard source
38. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Health Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Professor Croisdale-Appleby, the local healthwatch on the Isle of Wight has proven invaluable in amplifying patient voice, gathering patient experience and helping those who are democratically elected—MPs and councillors—to hold health leaders to account. My concern about that function being folded into the ICB is that the ICB has often been on the sharp end of critical analysis by Healthwatch, and so the ICB will end up marking its own homework. We will lose the critical voice that has, I am sure, led to better decision making. How can we possibly resolve that fundamental issue, if Healthwatch is folded into ICBs? Professor Croisdale-Appleby: You make a pivotal and focused point. The independence is vital, not just because of the quality of what Healthwatch produces, but because of the confidence that it gives people that they are speaking to an independent organisation. In the background, some communities distrust being critical about the care that they receive in case it rebounds on them. If the same organisation is responsible for marking its own homework, as you put it, that problem will be much greater than it has been in the past. In terms of what to do about it, I think that you stick to some basic principles. If we are moving forward positively, we have got to be locally driven. We must reach out to communities. They will not reach into us; we have to reach out to those communities and the individuals within them. I mentioned the value of qualitative evidence. It is not always easy for big institutions to go through all the work of evaluating qualitative work. It is easy to look at quantitative statistics, but the patient voice must be highly visible and central to policymaking. That was the basic idea behind the Bill: it would be about the patient and the patient voice, putting the patient right at the centre of the multiple discourses. As my colleagues have said, we should be totally transparent about priorities, impact and holding people to account. If all five of those principles are followed, it will work. If they are not followed, it will not.

    Hansard source
39. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Health Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Hospital pressures on the Isle of Wight are particularly severe, and part of the way of dealing with so-called corridor care is for the hospital and local authority to look at discharging some frail patients to the mainland, including those living with dementia, which is plainly not a solution by anyone’s normal interpretation. Is there anything in this Bill, notwithstanding that it does not deal with the fundamental problems of social care, not only that can help to resolve those sorts of situations, but that could help to resolve them if it went a little further? I am looking for opportunities to use the Bill to try to do a little more in and around discharge and social care. Sir Andrew Dilnot: That is a very good question, to which I do not have a very immediate answer. Well, I do have an immediate answer, which is that, as far as I can see, it is nothing very substantial. The single patient record offers some prospects here, and it is terribly important for people receiving social care, which again reflects how much longer we are living. There is much more multiple morbidity now. Many of the people who can and are benefiting from social care will have quite complicated medical experiences and histories. That is the kind of group that could particularly benefit from a single patient record, so that we are not having inappropriate prescription and so on. That is going to help, but it will be a second-order issue. Let me be very blunt. There are two fundamental challenges facing the social care system. The first is that the means-tested bit of it, where we say, “If you don’t have any resources of your own, the state will look after you,” must be a minimum for any humane society. Essentially every year for at least the last decade, the Treasury has announced emergency funding for that in year. That money then does not get spent well. Honestly, if you are announcing an emergency package every year for 10 years, it is not an emergency package. You should wake up, pay attention, have a mature response and fund that system properly. That is the minimum. The second is that the only big risk we all face that is not pooled is social care. Our risk of healthcare is pooled by the state, our risk of having a car accident or our house burning down is pooled by private insurance. This is the one risk that is not pooled, and the reason is that the state does not, and the private sector cannot. The reason the private sector cannot is that it is too far ahead for a private insurance market to deal with it, so only the state can pool the risk. If there is any area where the case for social insurance is absolutely clear, it is social care; the case is even more powerful in social care than it is in health. At the moment we have a situation where often people will feel that the best thing that can happen to them, if they think they might have a social care need, is that they die before too long. It is a bit like standing in the middle of the road with a lorry driving towards you and hoping that the best thing that might happen is that you die before it hits you. That is not a good way to be running any kind of society or country. Those challenges—the lack of adequate funding of the means-tested system and the lack of any risk pooling for the population as a whole—lead directly to the kind of experience that you are describing in the Isle of Wight, where there is simply excess demand and so we are trying to ship people across to the mainland. It is a reflection of the fundamental challenges that we have ignored for 35 years.

    Hansard source
40. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Jack Rankin

    Lifelong Learning: “University of the Air” White Paper

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I thank the hon. Member for Southport (Patrick Hurley) for securing this debate, and for sharing with us his personal journey to becoming an Open University graduate and the opportunities that higher education opened up for him. In his remarks, the passion of his political world view shone through, and though the very nature of my sitting on the Conservative Benches might mean we have some differences, I am a Lancashire man from working-class stock, and I agree with him forcibly that education should be available to all and applied with hard work—that is the most powerful action for social mobility. I pay tribute to my honourable Unionist friends from Ulster, the hon. Members for South Antrim (Robin Swann) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon), for their contributions. They eloquently made points about skills beyond education and the wider personal growth available to people who attend the Open University, and particularly how important the Open University is in Northern Ireland. The two examples of the women’s centres made it clear that the Open University’s accessibility has been transformational to some of those young ladies’ lives. The hon. Member for Strangford also made an interesting point about UCAS, which I was not aware of, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister says in response to that. This year marks 60 years since Harold Wilson’s Government published the “University of the Air” White Paper, which, seeking to capitalise on the advances in television and radio programme learning, set out plans for an Open University to provide higher and further education for those unable to take advantage of courses in existing colleges and universities. Envisioned as a way to tackle pressure on university and college places following the post-second world war baby boom by providing home study to university and higher technical standards, the plan for the “University of the Air” was to provide high-quality education to more adults through television and radio lectures, correspondence courses, residential courses and tutorials, and study groups at community centres. Those ideas formed the basis of what we know today as the Open University. Like the hon. Member for Southport, I pay tribute to the late Baroness Lee of Asheridge, Jennie Lee, who was instrumental in setting up the Open University, for all her work to promote lifelong learning. When it first opened to students in 1971, the Open University offered 25,000 places. Today, it has provided courses to more than 2.3 million people. It is clear that the Open University’s flexibility helps make adult education and lifelong learning a reality for thousands who might not otherwise be able to access traditional campus-based study. Last academic year, 67% of Open University students worked full or part-time during their studies. That speaks to a culture of ambition and opportunity that lifelong learning helps to cultivate. More than just statistics, we can see the real impact of the Open University and lifelong learning in the individual stories of those whose lives it has transformed. I know how transformative lifelong learning can be from my own early childhood memories. My first memories were of my parents going to night school—in their instance, further education—on alternate evenings; my father got his electrical qualifications, and my mother got her accountancy qualifications. They set up a small business that was transformational for mine and my brother’s life. Many others accessing the Open University, whether they be working parents, people with caring responsibilities or simply adults looking to grasp the opportunities that, for whatever reason, were not available or accessible to them when they left school, have benefited from the empowerment that comes from being able to take their education and their future into their own hands. I also want to recognise just how hard-working and motivated many adult learners are, and the courage it must take to return to education later in life. As we heard during the debate, the ways in which learning can change lives, and the things that many people who have sought out training or upskilling go on to achieve, are truly extraordinary. The previous Government were clear about the value of adult education. I am proud of the Conservatives’ record, which included introducing the apprenticeship levy, skills bootcamps and free courses for jobs. Together, those initiatives have helped to give adults opportunities to learn the skills that employers are looking for, which will lead them to better jobs, better wellbeing and better opportunities for the future. The Conservatives also welcome the upcoming launch of the lifelong learning entitlement, which I understand will be available for courses from January 2027. Although the Minister may wish to take some credit for it, the LLE was put forward by the previous Government to give adults a loan entitlement of up to four years of post-18 education to use over their lifetime. Crucially, the previous Government envisaged the LLE for a whole range of adult education, including full courses at higher technical and degree level, and new modular funding. I am glad that the first of the new modular courses will be launching next year. Raising awareness of the new overhaul of post-18 education funding will be crucial if we are to ensure that it can help unlock learning for as many adults as possible. I therefore ask the Minister how his Department is raising awareness of the new funding options that will soon be available for post-18 education. How does he plan to attract learners who might not have traditionally sought out lifelong learning and training opportunities? The current Government say that they are committed to increasing funding for adult education. However, since entering office, they have instead cut the adult skills budget by 6%. Industry was rightly shocked, calling it a “shortsighted” move that will undermine economic growth, set back organisations and learners, and undermine trust in the Government’s vision for the country. Key sectors in our economy are calling for growth in adult education, not cutbacks. I turn to lifelong learning in other forms, including apprenticeships. Although, as demonstrated today, we all know that a high-quality university degree can set someone on the path to success and that higher education plays an important role in lifelong learning, it would be wrong not to acknowledge that it is not the case for every course. It is frankly a scandal that too many traditional university courses do not deliver jobs in the industry that they claim to serve. Some courses will draw people in with the promise of a stable and fulfilling career but deliver nothing but mounting debt and a dead end. That is why, if we really want to support lifelong learning, we must be honest about the real issue of funnelling young people and adults into courses that do not get them the jobs that they are seeking and do not allow them to repay their loans. It is also why we must ensure that quality apprenticeships are a real choice at age 18 and beyond, and a viable, equally esteemed alternative to university. We have a serious skills shortage. Nearly half of vacancies in the construction sector and skilled trades are the result of skills shortages. As has been discussed, the Opposition are concerned by the Government’s decision to withdraw public funding for level 7 apprenticeships, cutting support for the highest-level apprenticeships that provide vital routes for adult learners into skilled careers such as nursing. It is a major blow to social mobility for adult learners, shutting out talent from disadvantaged backgrounds and taking opportunities away from adult learners. Not only will culling level 7 apprenticeships hurt employers, but it is destabilising for university providers. It will hit institutions that have tried to open up opportunities for those who traditionally do not go to university, including, of course, the Open University. Since the announcement last year, what engagement has the Minister had with institutions, including the Open University, about the impact of axing level 7 apprenticeships? For much of the last 30 years, our approach to higher education has hinged on the underlying assumption that successfully completing a traditional university degree is one of the best ways to boost a person’s opportunities in life. Young people and adults who pay tens of thousands of pounds to complete their degree, whether up front or through repayments, rightly and reasonably expect that it will boost their job prospects and income. If we really want to encourage lifelong learning, we must ensure that issues with low-quality and dead-end traditional degrees are addressed. A more flexible option may be part of the solution. Lifelong learning should be for everyone. Whether that is someone taking on a new qualification to advance their career or pursuing a high-quality university degree as an adult, the empowerment and opportunity that comes from learning is truly life changing. The Open University has played an important role in opening up opportunities for millions of adults. The Government must be prepared to address the serious issues that exist with both the current welfare system and low-value university courses to ensure that those who invest in education at whatever stage in their life are rewarded with the opportunities they deserve.

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