Mike Reader

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Parliament's party history for this member: Labour (4 Jul 2024 – present).

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1. 3 Nov 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (Third sitting)

   It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. Does the hon. Member understand how construction procurement works? National Highways would not have specified a particular fuel type; it would have specified an outcome, and the contractors appointed would have chosen how to meet that. That outcome was set out in the development consent order signed under his Government. Is he suggesting that the Government should interfere in the activities of contractors working on the lower Thames crossing? Given that fuel cost is less than 1% of the Bill cost, does he really think this is an issue we should be focusing on?

   Hansard source
2. 3 Nov 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (Third sitting)

   Is the hon. Member suggesting that we should go back and change the DCO to remove the climate targets? I decided after the evidence session to speak to some planning lawyers, and they told me that that would add at least five years to the delivery of this programme. Is he advocating for stalling the lower Thames crossing for another five years?

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3. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{C540E11D-B5AB-4EF1-91C1-EA47767FFE11}"> </QNum></strong> I want to clarify something, because it is important that we do not speculate. To deliver a scheme under the regulated <span id="9" class="column-number" data-column-number="9"></span>asset base model, it has to have a certain scale and it needs to be developed with that in mind. You said that the model could be used for other schemes. What other projects under development in the Government’s infrastructure pipeline are you referencing? <em><strong>Steve Gooding:</strong></em> I cannot point to anything else in the Government’s programme that specifically lends itself to that case. I have found myself wondering whether, having been announced and dis-announced many times, the Stonehenge tunnel might reappear under something like it as another key link on a longer arterial route, but I do not have a list.

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4. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{E3B15BA1-0324-47F2-B3E1-4FE7BDDFFFF8}"> </QNum></strong> There may not be other schemes. The engineering challenges with the A303 probably outweigh any benefits of using finance through RAB. Could you both set out whether you think independent regulation under this model would give stronger consumer protection, particularly in the light of evidence you have given, Edmund, that the M6 toll and Dartford have perhaps not been managed in the best interests of the public? Will independent regulation be a better solution for taxpayers? <em><strong>Edmund King:</strong></em> I do not know whether there has to be independent regulation, but there should be a greater degree of independence alongside the ORR. The ORR to date has had much more to do with railways than roads. Yes, it is the overseeing body of National Highways, but I think five of the ORR executives are from railway backgrounds and two are from road. It needs to be strengthened there. I still feel that there should be, alongside the ORR, an independent body that looks at things such as the level of tolls and feasibility. If drivers are going to be paying a higher toll to use these crossings, if a crossing is not working for some reason—for example, if there are roadworks or incidents that need clearing up—it should be a two-way process and drivers should get money back. If this really is an independent business model, it has to work both ways. Under this regulated model, you could push it a bit further to give that degree of independence. That might be through the stakeholder group and you would then change how it is reported, but I certainly think it would help. <em><strong>Steve Gooding:</strong></em> The independence is of more importance on the other side of the equation. If the investment world does not have reassurance that tolls will be set at a level that enables it to remunerate its efficient cost, it will be more suspicious. As I have dealt with in my past, historically, the political pressure has been to keep the charges and tolls down. If anything, consumer pressure is greater politically than it is for the regulator. That is why it is important that the regulator has a clear duty on consumer protection, as Mr King and I are saying.

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5. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{0A967DE4-6713-4CA4-9B75-CAEC659B6BCC}"> </QNum></strong> On that point, for the investor to get a return, it is on them to keep tolls at a reasonable level and the road open. It would be counterintuitive for them not to fix roadworks quickly, because they want people to go through to pay the toll, and you do not want to set a high toll if that would put off your users. <em><strong>Steve Gooding:</strong></em> They will certainly want the income—there is no question about that. We are comparing it with the M6 toll—one of very few examples of this in this country—where there is an alternative, free-of-charge <span id="10" class="column-number" data-column-number="10"></span>route. Here, the operating cost for commercial traffic to go around to the west of London, for example, would realistically make that a much less viable alternative.

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6. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{F5B11FA4-A985-45F4-8175-F123D67C32D8}"> </QNum></strong> If tolling is used, what is preferable—a statutory regulator with enforceable licensing conditions, or an unregulated commercial tolling arrangement? <em><strong>Ralph Smyth:</strong></em> We heard a lot about regulation in the previous session. If you look at Ofwat and Ofgem, their income comes from lots of different companies. Whatever you might think of some of the water companies, at least that means diversity of income. You can compare that with the ORR. With nationalisation, now—or soon—all the money will be coming from the Department for Transport. It is similar for much of the road function. That is about National Highways. We are talking about only a very small bit if there is going to be only one toll scheme. If you put yourself in the shoes of an investor, would you be confident that that was an independent regulator if pretty much all its business came from one person—the Secretary of State for Transport?

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7. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{2A2A6A06-580E-43B1-8DCA-D4544232DC50}"> </QNum></strong> My question was not whether the regulator is independent. It was whether, in general, your preference is for a regulated tolling arrangement or an unregulated commercial tolling arrangement. Which is better for the public? <em><strong>Ralph Smyth:</strong></em> I am not sure how much difference there is. The problem is that if you build an expensive road scheme with a regulated model, you can want to make it affordable, but at the end of the day, there will need to be a return for the private investor. There is the theory and then there is the reality that this is not a way of creating new money. It is either going to be paid out of public funds or, if it is going to be a regulated system—as other witnesses have said, many of the roads do not have alternatives, but it is hard to see how a regulator can really make much difference.

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8. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (First sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{018D9F94-1076-491C-81D0-0B46E3D53C33}"> </QNum></strong> For as long as I have known of LTC, although the previous Government perhaps suggested that it would be delivered by public funds, it was always assumed that it would end up going down a public-private <span id="24" class="column-number" data-column-number="24"></span>partnership route. Surely, this model delivers cheaper finance and better certainty for investors. Therefore, under a specific RAB model for the lower Thames crossing, what you suggested about investor uncertainty may not be true. <em><strong>Ralph Smyth:</strong></em> On investor certainty, the problem is that that assumes that traffic will keep growing, but, as I covered in the written evidence TAN submitted to the Committee, the latest ONS forecasts say that from about 2055, the population of the UK will be going down. I heard the Minister say that demand will only increase, but if demand starts to go down, it is a very different picture. That will mean that each user will have to pay more per journey, so it could lock you into higher, unaffordable charges.

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9. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

   Highways (Financing) Bill (Second sitting)

   <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{18CB41F5-0953-469A-8099-6BCCAC8D40BA}"> </QNum></strong> Matt, I think you have already answered my first couple of questions: the legal requirement on climate was set in 2022 in the original direct consent order, and the requirement to use alternative fuels to diesel is not a significant cost driver in a scheme of this scale. However, reflecting on a conversation that you and I have had previously, I was wondering about the cost impact, and the impact on the project generally, of delays caused by uncertainty of finance. Would a Bill like this enable future schemes to have certainty of financing arrangements, and therefore get on site and be delivered more quickly? Is that a fair assumption? <em><strong>Matt Palmer:</strong></em> I think all of us recognise that annualised costs on major projects, especially mega-projects, are very difficult to deal with. They drive perverse cost behaviours, where you are trying to fit into a 12-month <span id="44" class="column-number" data-column-number="44"></span>window, and the Government are currently moving, with the mega-projects piece, towards more of an envelope-type conversation. This is just another extension of that. You end up with a cost envelope that you are working within, with a driven timeframe that you have to deliver to, which then allows the flexibility to execute at the right time—depending on the weather and so on. It is that flex that you need in order to execute efficiently. If you are constraining yourself on cost to a budget every year, which is common, it does drive cost. This model gives you the flex that allows you to drive an efficient construction project.

   Hansard source
10. 29 Oct 2026·Parliament·Mike Reader

    Highways (Financing) Bill (Second sitting)

    <strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{CB9BB7BA-9DAA-4399-AFAE-FCB237356C37}"> </QNum></strong> For those who are concerned that the capital cost of this scheme continues to rise, and it has risen since I was first involved in it many years ago, what mechanisms have you put in place specifically with your contractors to drive down cost in delivery? <em><strong>Matt Palmer:</strong></em> The base cost of the scheme—the cost without inflation—has been fixed since 2020. The great thing about a development consent order is that the scope is fixed. We are still building 52 bridges, 22 km of road and 4.3 km of tunnel. The cost difference between now and previously is essentially driven by inflation. You have got great cost control sat there inside the direct consent order. Our contracts with our contractors then drive to that same scope and control, and there is a pain/gain share: they get into pain if they exceed and they get incentivised to deliver below, which is normal with any project of this scale.

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