Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme
No, that is not true. The motions of this House are not traditionally regarded as a form of bureaucracy; in fact, in many ways they cut through bureaucracy, because they allow us to get to a democratically ratified decision very quickly and transparently. The trouble comes when decisions are made without that transparency, simplicity and speed of action, which is what we are opposed to. As I have said, the present proposals draw a distinction between policy and procedure, and would mandate the assurance board to act on its own behalf in matters of procedure. Of course, the board contains only one Member of the House of Commons, and as I have said, that person is nominated rather than elected by the House. In other words, the assurance board potentially has wide-ranging and coercive powers, which are to be exercised almost entirely by people who are outside any direct framework of democratic accountability. It potentially has the power to overturn decisions that are ultimately made by an MP’s constituents at the ballot box. The House has rightly been concerned about the exercise of such powers for at least 400 years. The motion, too, draws a distinction between policy and procedure. Of course, contrary to the suggestion that has been made, procedure includes important substantive matters. Indeed, Paul Kernaghan’s review set out an illustrative table of potential changes, which included changing whether somebody may be accompanied to an ICGS interview. As I have pointed out, this is an issue of powers as well as procedure; the assurance board has the ability to empower people who are under review by the ICGS to bring another person along to an interview, or to prevent them from doing so. In turn, this reflects a tacit or explicit policy decision about what may be fair or just under the circumstances. It is not simply a matter of procedure. Mr Kernaghan’s review also included, as an illustration of what he called procedure, changing the timing of when the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards is notified of a misconduct complaint—whether that is before or after an initial assessment. Of course, that too reflects a tacit policy judgment about what a just process would be. Such tacit policy judgments show that there is no hard and fast distinction to be drawn between policy and procedure, and underline that these are not matters for officials—for unelected people—but for Members of this House acting through this House. I remind the House that the ICGS sets rules not merely for members of Parliament, but for more than 15,000 passholders, and even—although this is slightly unclear, and in my judgment has not properly been resolved—for tourists and visitors to the Palace of Westminster. It is not accountable to any other body. Today’s decision to reject amendment (e)—of course, we are not moving that amendment, so that will be the decision—will be a one-off decision to give up powers of scrutiny, and it will be hard, if not impossible, to reverse that, once those powers are yielded. This is happening at a time when more and more decisions are being taken by people who are not accountable in any direct, genuinely democratic way, through the emergence of what people have often thought of as a kind of bureaucratic or legal sludge. That is absolutely deplorable. All that we in the Conservative party have said is that any decision of this type that is taken by people who are not Members of Parliament should be placed before this House, in line with its constitutional status and the Bill of Rights 1689. It has always been our procedure in this House not to recognise a superior, let alone a bureaucratic or non-democratically elected superior, and we should not do so on this occasion.