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1. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   I appreciate what the Minister is saying. The blue threat, or blue and yellow thread, running through the debate is the question of how much needs to be in the primary legislation. The argument from the Conservative side has been that, while some of the Lib Dem amendments are too restrictive, the danger is that the freedom and flexibility at the Government’s end is too loose. I trust the Minister implicitly—but, having seen Ministers on our side come and go, there could be a change within Government or a change of colour of Government, and no Government are bound by the one that went before. I am trying to get the balance right by asking questions around procedure to assess whether some of these things should be in the legislation. I agree that there has to be a balance. That is why the Opposition chose to say 18 months, as opposed to four months; it was to have accountability and safeguards in place and to urge good delivery, but not to curtail the ICBs or clinicians—the people delivering stuff—and make them simply check boxes. I appreciate the Minister’s offer to write to me. I would be grateful for that data, because where we find it will be important in future debates and in his future written or oral statements. I hope he understands that these probes are to make sure that we get the balance right between primary legislation, what is going in the code of practice and what is well intentioned, but could be left to blow in the wind.

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2. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   Further to that point of order, Ms Furniss. To follow up on what the Government Whip, the hon. Member for Coventry North West, said, when a vote was called—although I appreciate that it was not carried on the voices—a number of members of the Committee who have since returned were not present. Ms Furniss, could you speak to the Clerk to clarify at what point the Committee divided? There was a very clear point at which the Adjournment was moved. I appreciate it is your call whether the Question was carried on the voices, but you said that it seemed to have been carried, which implies that the Committee should now adjourn. I appreciate that there are some difficulties.

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3. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   Like me, my hon. Friend has served as a clinician on the frontline. As this point is sometimes lost, can he explain the practicalities of what turning up at a hospital versus actually being admitted means? They are two distinct things. Can he walk us through what the process entails?

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4. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   Amendment 52 would amend clause 5 to introduce an important distinction in the grounds for detention under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, namely on whether a person has the mental capacity or competence to consent to admission. This amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, raises questions that go to the heart of how we balance liberty and protection, autonomy and risk in our mental health system. Under the current Mental Health Act, and indeed under the Bill as drafted, an individual can be detained for assessment if they are experiencing a mental disorder and if serious harm could be caused to themselves or others unless they are detained. There is no distinction based on whether they have the capacity to consent to care. In other words, a person who has full understanding and decision-making ability may still be detained against their will to protect them from themselves. The amendment proposes a change to that approach, so that if someone lacks the capacity to make a decision about admission and treatment, the current protection should apply—they can be detained if they are at risk of harming themselves or others. But if someone has capacity, understands what is happening and what the risks are, and still refuses care, they should be detained only if they pose a risk to others and not just to themselves. I will give a brief example to try to bring that to life. Imagine a young adult, aged 22 and living with long-standing depression. They have attempted suicide in the past, but they now clearly and repeatedly say that they do not want to be admitted. They understand the risks, are coherent, consistent and judged by clinicians to have capacity. Under the Bill as it stands, that person could still technically be detained, but under this amendment they could not unless they pose a risk to someone else. Why does this amendment have merit? There is much in it that is compelling. It puts autonomy at the centre of the mental health framework, which the Committee discussed and agreed on earlier. It aligns more closely with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which already allows people to make unwise decisions so long as they understand what they are doing. It also echoes the principles in the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, which calls for supported decision making over substitute decision making. It could reduce unnecessary or overly paternalistic detentions, especially of people from marginalised groups who are already disproportionally affected by coercive care.

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5. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   I will try to elucidate a little further. We know that some people have fluid capacity, such as those with dementia or depression. How do we ensure that people have safeguards for themselves and the wider community, while respecting their capacity and allowing them to be masters of their own destiny? The Bill literally says that we want to see individual autonomy, and by definition, there is always a balance to be struck. The Bill shifts more to the paternalistic side, which brings some challenges because it could create gaps in protections, as I will explain. There are clinical situations in which a person in mental health crisis—for example, in the early stages of a manic episode or a severe personality disorder crisis—may present with superficial capacity but be at grave risk of harm. Are we confident that clinicians can assess capacity accurately in real time, in often pressured and emergency contexts? Might we inadvertently tie the hands of practitioners trying to prevent suicide or serious self-injury? If capacity becomes the gateway to protection, what support and guidance will be provided to ensure that it applies fairly, consistently and safely? That is important when we talk about detention, because detaining people is one thing; the next thing is how we get them out. To understand that, it is worth focusing on the crucial interaction between the Bill and liberty protection safeguards. It is worth my briefly explaining to the Committee what LPS are, how they evolved and why they matter. Liberty protection safeguards are the new legal framework that replaces the old deprivation of liberty safeguards, or DoLS. DoLS were designed to protect people who lack capacity, but had become widely criticised as complex, slow and limited mainly to hospitals and care homes. In response, the Conservative Government introduced LPS through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019, to simplify the process and extend protections to community settings such as supported living and people’s own homes. Given that we are talking about Darzi’s shift, that is important. With that context, I turn to the key concerns before us today: how the Bill interacts with LPS, especially when individuals move from hospital detention to community care. To illustrate why this matters, let us consider the case of Mrs A. She is a 55-year-old woman with bipolar disorder and mild dementia. She was detained under the Mental Health Act after a severe manic episode put her at risk. While in hospital, the Act governed her detention and treatment. After several months, Mrs A stabilises enough to be discharged, but because of her dementia, she lacks the capacity to consent to her care arrangements in the community. She requires supported living, with 24/7 care, which means that she will continue to be deprived of her liberty, but now in the community. Because she is no longer detained under the Mental Health Act upon discharge, the liberty protection safeguards must authorise the deprivation of liberty in the community. This requires careful consideration. An LPS assessment and best intention decisions are required, and formal authorisation must be in place before she leaves hospital. This transition point is critical, because without clear protocols, Mrs A could find herself deprived of liberty without lawful authorisation—a breach of her human rights. Information sharing between hospital staff, community providers and local authorities may be delayed or incomplete. There may be confusion among professionals about who is responsible for co-ordinating the handover. Training gaps might lead to the inconsistent application of safeguards. The Bill reforms detention in hospitals, but there is some opacity regarding how the handover to LPS in the community will be managed. Will the Bill ensure a seamless transition, with no gaps in safeguards? If it does not, then how will this be provided? Will there be statutory duties to mandate information sharing and co-ordinate reassessments? How will professionals across health and social care be trained to navigate both systems effectively? The Bill rightly aims to reduce inappropriate detentions and enhance patient autonomy in hospital, but protections under LPS in the community must be equally robust to maintain dignity and rights post discharge. How will the Government guarantee parity of safeguards across settings? The Bill also seeks to address disproportionate detention rates among ethnic minorities. We must be equally vigilant that the reforms and the wider LPS regime do not perpetuate inequalities once individuals leave hospital. We therefore need to ask the questions: what monitoring is done and what safeguards will be in place? On detention, I gently ask the Minister to clarify the Government’s plan to manage the vital interface between the Mental Health Act and LPS, even as the Bill stands, to embed clear statutory duties, guidance and accountability to protect all individuals like Mrs A throughout her care journey. What is the Government’s view on distinguishing between those with and without capacity in the context of detention for self-harm risk? Has the Department assessed the clinical and operational implications of requiring real-time capacity judgments before detaining someone at risk to themselves? Will the Government consider a limited override provision in extreme cases where the risk is immediate, catastrophic and the capacity assessment is finely balanced? We will see more of these kinds of cases as we go forward, with more and more people living with the likes of dementia or acquired brain injuries. If the Government do not support the amendment as drafted, might they consider refining the code of practice to provide clear guidance on how capacity, autonomy and right to self are waived? The amendment presents a thoughtful and principled intervention. It is not perfect in my eyes, but it challenges us, rightly, to consider whether our mental health laws strike the right balance between protection and personal freedom. Amendment 53, like its partner on section 2, reflects a growing consensus that the law should better respect the autonomy of people with mental health conditions, especially when they have the capacity to make informed decisions. In introducing a necessary distinction, if someone can truly understand the consequences of refusing treatment and they pose no risk to others, should the state override their decision on their own behalf? The amendment would add a capacity-based distinction into section 3, mirroring the earlier amendment on section 2. Specifically, if a patient lacks capacity to consent to a medical treatment, they may be detained if there is risk of serious harm to themselves or others. If a person has capacity, they may be detained only if there is risk to others. In short, if a person is mentally unwell but understands the consequences of refusing treatment in this case and only poses a risk to themselves, they would not be eligible for detention under this amendment. Imagine a woman with anorexia nervosa who is dangerously underweight, has a good understanding of her condition and the risk, and refuses in-patient treatment. Under the Bill as it stands she can be detained, but under the amendment if she is judged to have capacity and only poses a risk to herself, she could not be detained under section 3. Therefore, there are huge and far-reaching consequences to the amendment. The wider science is moving towards capacity, but it needs to answer some of these questions. Some are even being grappled with now—take the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. This truly cuts to the heart of humanity and I am sure there are varying views not only across the Committee, but across society. Similar questions will arise when it comes to capacity. To that end, the question posed is not simple. In some cases, such as severe anorexia or chronic suicidal tendencies, capacity may be technically present but clinically contested. The stakes could not be higher. The amendment challenges us, and therefore the Government—and rightly so—to ask: are we doing enough to balance liberty and care? Do we have the right clinical tools, legal thresholds and ethical safeguards in place? New clause 24 is on a different but related subject. This Back-Bench amendment relates to the application for admission in respect of patients who are already on hospital grounds but have not yet been formally admitted. This is really important, because it comes down to the ability. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, when it comes to the mechanism this is the day-to-day reality. Someone, just because they turn up in A&E, is not under the care of A&E per se until they are admitted. That is when the clinicians will take control. If they just give their name, at what point do we have that grey area? That is the matter of contention in day-to-day working. Currently, under section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act, applications for detention or admission can be made only in relation to patients who are already admitted to hospital—that is the key part. This leaves a grey area for people who come to hospital voluntarily, perhaps by walking into A&E and seeking help or being brought by an ambulance or the police, but have not yet been formally admitted. The amendment would explicitly allow applications for admission to be made as soon as someone attends or is brought into hospital to seek help, even before formal admission.

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6. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and looked into this issue a bit further. Psychiatry is already looking towards future capacity and trying to bring the two pieces of legislation together. I believe that Scotland has already moved in that direction. We are therefore into the cycle of chasing legislation for something behind us. I appreciate the concerns, but that is why the Government need to be alive to these situations. At the end of the day, the nub of the issue is patients getting caught up between capacity and safety under the Mental Health Act. Does my hon. Friend agree?

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7. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   I am grateful to the Minister for how seriously he is taking this issue, and I agree that there is not necessarily a consensus even within the Opposition. Having the debate is therefore really important. It may be useful to collect data on the number of incidents and where these handovers are. Would the Government commit to that? We would be better able to have this debate, and to decide how much of a problem this is and to work out what the solutions are. Again, I struggle to find data that indicates where this is an issue, but I have spoken to clinicians who I know and colleagues who I have worked with when I have seen it. It happens enough that I was aware of it as a bog-standard GP who has worked in A&E, but it is clearly not rampant and we are not seeing it every single day. Would the Government commit to collecting data on it? If so, in what format would it come?

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8. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

   That would be a very useful piece of data, but I was in fact talking about new clause 24 and the grey area of hospital detentions. That data is probably easier to collect. I specifically ask the Minister to keep in mind the collection of data on those who turn up to A&E but end up having to be taken out of the hospital to be sectioned, for example. That is the nub of the issue and the practicality of what is going on. In a number of incidents, although the law is set in a way that is supposed to be helpful, the interface unfortunately becomes very difficult. The Minister has rightly pointed out that there are different ways to deal with this. The new clause is one such potentially heavy-handed way of dealing with it. At the same time, it comes from the good place of trying to address what clinicians deal with in A&E day in, day out. However, we need some data and some teeth behind that to understand and appreciate how much of a problem it is and to then come up with a solution. I hope that clarifies my question.

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9. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

   I also want to assess the amendment that could potentially have been tabled. The Opposition were struggling to see how it would fit in, and it looks as if there is a crossover with the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Can the Minister set out why he felt that it did not quite fit into this area and how it could be taken forward, so that with cross-party work outside this Committee we can see how we can make it happen?

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10. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I thank the Minister for his collaborative tone on some of the difficult amendments that we have discussed. I will open where the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston (Edward Argar), left us on Second Reading. As he rightly emphasised, the importance of updating the Mental Health Act cannot be overstated. I fully share his view that it was right to take the necessary time to get this legislation right. The cross-party commitment to reform in this area, spanning both previous and current Governments, reflects a shared recognition of the urgent need to modernise our approach to mental health, particularly for those who are most vulnerable. I welcome the Bill’s focus on enhancing patients’ voice and autonomy, including through the expansion of independent advocacy and the shift away from using police and prison cells as a place of safety. Those are positive and overdue steps. At the same time, as my right hon. Friend outlined, the Opposition’s role is to engage rigorously and constructively with the details of the Bill. Over the next few weeks, I look forward to working with colleagues on the Committee to ensure that, for example, the principle of patient choice is embedded not only in policy but in practice, such as through the use of advance choice documents. We will continue to scrutinise the Bill in good faith, proposing improvements where needed, with the aim of delivering the strongest possible protections and outcomes for patients, their families and the community. How we begin a conversation often determines whether it becomes dialogue or dispute, so I hope that the Committee can take a constructive and productive look at what lies ahead of us. I support clause 1, which will rightly update section 118(2B) of the Mental Health Act 1983 and embed a refreshed code of practice at the very heart of the mental health framework. This is not merely a procedural amendment; it is a statement of values, placing humanity, dignity and recovery at the centre of how we treat some of the most vulnerable people in our society, who are profoundly affected by mental health legislation. It is vital that the framework guiding professionals be clear, principled and rooted in respect for individuals. Why do we need these changes? For too long, the Mental Health Act has been criticised as outdated and insufficiently centred on patient autonomy and dignity. Concerns raised by successive independent reviews, clinicians and, crucially, by people with lived experience have pointed to inconsistencies in how decisions are made, which can often result in over-restriction, lack of patient involvement and insufficient therapeutic focus. The independent review of the Mental Health Act, which was published in 2018, made a landmark contribution by recommending the adoption of the four core principles in front of us today: choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and recognition of the person as an individual. These principles are designed to shift the culture and practice towards one that respects autonomy while safeguarding wellbeing and public safety. The historical context is that the Mental Health Act has undergone several amendments since its introduction—notably, in 2007, updates were made to some of the detention criteria and safeguards—but it was clear that the Act remained predominantly paternalistic. The 2018 independent review was a comprehensive, evidence-based re-examination of the entire Act, informed by extensive consultation, including with patients, families and clinicians. It concluded that embedding the principles formally into the law and code of practice was essential to modernise and humanise mental health law. The four key principles—choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and the person as an individual to be treated with dignity—are not abstract ideals. They are the foundations of compassionate, lawful and effective care. They echo the spirit of the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and signal a move away from paternalism and towards genuine co-production of care plans. Involvement ensures that decisions are not made about patients without them. The principle of choice and autonomy reminds us that the mental illness must not be a justification for blanket restrictions. The principle of least restriction challenges us to find community-based alternatives before defaulting to detention. Therapeutic benefit ensures that care is not custodial, but meaningful healing. These principles are what most of us would hope to see for our own family.

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11. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    The hon. Member is absolutely right. The key part is about trying to change not only the legislative framework, but the culture around clinicians and society as a whole. We saw that impact in 1983, we saw it in 2005 with the update on capacity, and we saw it in 2007. Now is the right time to look again at this, and it is well overdue. I am glad that it has taken a while to ensure that the Bill has been thoroughly thought out. As we heard in the House of Lords debate, this is exactly the kind of framework that we need to make sure that society moves forward in a collaborative way that puts the patient at the centre, but also protects the wider community. Given some of the high-profile incidents that we have seen, we must also make sure that relatives, the community and the wider public at large are all protected. As the Minister has rightly highlighted, the core principles must be the default for everyone. Clause 1 therefore represents an important step forward: by requiring the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers to include the four principles explicitly in the code of practice and by making it a legal duty for decision makers to have regard to them, the clause will strengthen the ethical foundation of mental health law. However, we must be honest about the challenges. The success of the principles depends on the culture, not just the codification. Training, supervision and leadership across clinical settings will be essential to bringing the values off the page and into practice. These principles will also require resource backing. We cannot call for the least restrictive or most therapeutic interventions while community mental health services remain as they are. A plan for investment and a timeline for delivery will be imperative, or else we risk embedding principles we cannot fulfil. Members on both sides of the House understand that. I know that the Minister will have to think carefully about setting out a timetable, but it is key. We must also guard against tokenism. We must guard against lofty principles being left unenforced and becoming rhetorical wallpaper. If we are to legislate for these values, we must look for accountability, with regular auditing, patient feedback mechanisms and a duty on the provider to report on how the principles are being upheld. Those are all areas that His Majesty’s Opposition will scrutinise. To that end, I wish to raise several important questions for the Government and the Committee to consider. The first is about enforcement and accountability. How will the Government ensure that decision makers truly have regard to the principles in practice, and is there a robust mechanism for monitoring compliance and addressing breaches? The second question is about balancing conflicts. In some cases, principles may conflict: for example, the imperative to respect patient autonomy may clash with the need to impose restrictions for safety. How does the code intend to guide practitioners to navigate these difficult trade-offs? The third question is about care and interested parties. Although the clause highlights patient involvement, what explicit protections and roles will be afforded to carers and other interested parties, and how will their sometimes divergent perspectives be balanced? The fourth question is about training and resources. Embedding the principles requires more than words on paper. What investments are planned to equip practitioners with the skills and understanding necessary to apply these principles sensitively and consistently? The fifth question is about the timeline and consultation. The explanatory notes mention that the code must be consulted on and presented for scrutiny. What is the proposed timeline for that process, and how will people with lived experience continue to be involved?

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12. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    I agree with the Minister. Does the Department have a rough idea of the timetable for putting in place the code of practice? How long will the consultation need to take? When will it be implemented? How many rounds go with it? How wide is it to be—will it consult across England and Wales, or just in England?

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13. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    The Opposition appreciate the timescale taken to skill-up in this area, but the workforce plan is soon to be announced by the hon. Member’s Government. Has any consideration been made of what the capacity might look like, and of the crossover between having this legislation not quite in place—although likely to happen, upon Royal Assent—and its impact on updating the workforce plan on mental health?

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14. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    The Minister is right that there is shared working. However, part of the problem between devolved nations, such as Scotland and Wales, is that the datasets and definitions of data are often changed. Actually, the comparison of data across the UK can be quite hard to manage. Given that we are talking specifically about mental health, including some of the most at-risk people with the most severe mental health illnesses, will the Government commit to pushing for shared data that is comparable between Scotland and Wales, which we are legislating on in this case, to ensure that there is data transparency, so no one country can hide behind a different comparison or by saying, “We are looking at apples and pears”?

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15. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    I entirely agree, and I hope that data is and will be shared. The question is about the definitions and standards, such as those used for waiting times. We often use the A&E waiting time of four hours. When it comes to the most vulnerable patients who will potentially be on waiting lists, or looking at specific data, if it is categorised differently in Wales, Scotland and England, that makes it very hard to see where best practice is so that it can be shared. That is the Opposition’s concern. I know that both sides of the House have shared that concern in my five years in Parliament. Is there a mechanism to address that issue either in the Bill or in the Minister’s wider portfolio?

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16. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    I rise to speak to amendment 56, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. The amendment proposes to grant the Secretary of State the power to update the definitions of “mental disorder”, “autism”, “learning disability” and “psychiatric disorder” by secondary legislation, subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament. Currently, the Bill sets out fixed definitions of those terms in the primary legislation—the Mental Health Act, as amended. Those definitions can be changed only through further primary legislation. That means that any further change, reflecting new scientific knowledge or evolving clinical consensus, would require a full legislative process. Given that the Act was passed in 1983, and we are here more than 40 years later, I think that the problem is clear.

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17. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    The hon. Member makes a good point. We have had ICD-10 and DSM-5, which aim to codify those disorders. Part of the problem is that someone with Korsakoff syndrome, which is brain damage from alcohol, or with Rett’s disease would potentially come under the scope of these definitions. That makes it very difficult. What about acquired brain injury? That is an emerging field—the House has looked at it and has put a strategy in place. However, there could be problems in the legislation going forward. The amendment is asking, I think, how we scientifically proof the Bill so that we do not need to introduce further primary legislation. That is the question that the Government need to grapple with. As a doctor, I have seen the difficulties and practicalities of these definitions, and of trying to put people in a box. For example, where does Asperger’s fit on the autism scale? What does that look like on the spectrum of conditions? Are we trying to codify that? These are the real, pragmatic problems of putting definitions in place. That means it is all the more important to look at definitions, but, as the hon. Member for Shipley has rightly pointed out, the definitions have already moved on while we have been discussing the Bill. Introducing a mechanism that allows the House to update the legislation in keeping with advances in scientific knowledge is really important. The question is whether this is the right amendment to do that. The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to make updates through regulations—secondary legislation—which would thereby enable a more flexible and responsive approach. Importantly, it requires that any such regulations must be laid before Parliament and approved by both Houses, which maintains parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The potential benefits of this approach are clear. It offers the possibility of allowing the law to evolve and stay aligned with scientific evidence and clinical best practice without undue delay. That could prevent outdated or overly rigid definitions from adversely impacting vulnerable people, and better reflects the complexities of mental health conditions. It would allow the law to keep pace with advances in the scientific understanding of autism, learning disability and mental disorders, without the need for primary legislation. It could help ensure that the definitions remain clinically accurate and relevant, improving how the law is applied and reducing the risk of outdated criteria causing harm or confusion. As the hon. Member for Shipley pointed out, that is part of the problem. As new criteria come up, there is a delay in the uptake of definitions. From my experience in clinical practice, keeping up to date with definitions can sometimes be a challenge. It is part of the personal development plan to make sure there is that understanding, but there is always a drip through as change in practice comes through, along with clinicians being comfortable and happy to use the new definitions. With any new medication, it is important to understand the side effects and the pros and cons of what it is trying to achieve, and to be able to explain that fully so that a patient can consent when taking that medication. The same applies when trying to explain a condition to patients. If there is a change and a new aspect to the way in which a definition is being applied, it is important that we have some flexibility. The affirmative procedure preserves Parliament’s role, offering safeguards against unchecked ministerial power. However, there are some important considerations and potential drawbacks. Definitions of mental health conditions have profound legal and social implications. Delegating this power, even with parliamentary approval, risks politicisation or inconsistent application if regulations are used too frequently or without adequate consultation. Secondary legislation typically receives less parliamentary debate and public scrutiny than primary legislation, even with the affirmative procedure, which may not suffice for such significant changes. There is also a risk that the changes could be made in a reactive or piecemeal way rather than with a coherent legislative framework, potentially leading to legal uncertainty or unintended consequences. Given those points, I have several questions for the Minister. How do the Government propose to keep the legislation updated, given that we are only updating the Mental Health Act now, 40 years on? Do they have a mechanism in mind to ensure that any updates to the definitions are accompanied by robust clinical and expert consultation, while reacting to advances in medical understanding? Would the Government consider a formal review mechanism such as a mandated periodic independent review of the definitions? That could solve the problem of legislation becoming outdated, and put the safeguards in place. If there is a difference in the scientific community, we need to make sure that any changes are broadly in agreement with the direction of travel of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, in considering the need for balanced, flexible and democratic accountability, the Government could introduce a sunset clause on any regulations, so that any changes would be revisited and renewed by primary legislation within a set period, unless Parliament agrees otherwise. Crucially, to my knowledge, there are no standing statutory bodies or panels tasked with reviewing or advising the Government on the legal definitions of mental health conditions. There is an argument that without a dedicated expert body to guide the Secretary of State, we cannot be sure that any changes are robustly evidence-based and clinically sound. Currently, we have the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the royal colleges, the Department of Health and Social Care and the intermittent mental health review bodies, but have the Government considered establishing a formal advisory mechanism to address problems in the future? The Opposition can see the argument both ways, but to govern is to choose, and it would be useful to understand the Minister’s thoughts on this area.

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18. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    The hon. Member is correct about the way in which the world looks at this issue. The problem is that we are sat here debating definitions in legislation that is 40 years old. Will we be here in 40 years debating definitions that have moved on? The amendment suggests that, somehow, we need to try to ensure that legislation is flexible and updated enough, and has the scrutiny and safeguards in place. That relates to not just health, but any part of government that we tend to look at in the House. I wanted to speak to the amendment to probe the Government on how they will safeguard the legislation. I do not have all the answers, but this is important. I do not want to see my successors—the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth from whatever party—sat here debating this issue in 40 years’ time because the definitions that we happen to set today have become outdated and have unintended consequences. That is the balance that I am looking for. I do not see a body across the UK, given that this is UK legislation, that fulfils this role. It could be a transitory role or fully established. A psychiatrist could take it on, or it could come under NICE. With the abolition of NHS England, it could be a new role for the Department of Health to take on. All those are viable vehicles that could potentially look into the definitions. I want to ensure that what we pass in Parliament actually translates into the real world for clinicians, patients and the public. The Opposition can see the argument both ways, as I mentioned. Perhaps it would be useful to have an expert panel, with representatives of clinicians, legal experts and service users to support regulatory updates. I put those questions to the Minister and I look forward to his answers.

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19. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    It is a pleasure to speak to clause 3, which brings forward the vital and long overdue changes to the way our laws treat autism and learning disabilities under the Mental Health Act. The clause responds to a persistent injustice: the inappropriate detention of autistic people and people with learning disabilities in mental health hospitals, often for years at a time, without meaningful therapeutic benefit. Those individuals are not mentally ill, yet they have too often been detained, medicated and restrained as if they were. As the law stands, individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people can be detained both for assessment, under section 2 of the Act, and for treatment, under section 3. Notably, people with learning disabilities may be detained under section 3 when their condition “is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”, whereas that does not currently apply to autistic people. Evidence and reports show that some such detentions can be lengthy and may not always provide therapeutic benefit. That raises concerns about the appropriateness of detention on the basis of disability alone. In my time on the Health and Social Care Committee, we looked specifically at this topic and produced a report, some of which has influenced the Bill. The clause aims to directly address the issue of lengthy detentions for such individuals. For the first time, the law will clearly define autism and learning disability—something that has not happened for 40 years. As science has moved on, legislation must follow. Autism will now be recognised as a “lifelong developmental condition” that affects perception, communication and interaction, and learning disability will be defined as “significant impairment” of intellectual functioning. Supported by schedule 1, the clause seeks to clarify and refine that position by introducing formal definitions of “autism”, “learning disability” and “psychiatric disorder”. Crucially, it removes autism and learning disability as stand-alone grounds for compulsory treatment and detention under section 3. Instead, detention for treatment will be permitted only if a person has a co-occurring psychiatric disorder—that is, a mental disorder other than autism or learning disability. Additionally, the change applies to community treatment orders, meaning that they cannot be applied solely on the basis of autism or a learning disability. However, the Act makes it clear that the changes do not apply to people detained under part 3 of the Act who are within the criminal justice system. For that group, autism and learning disabilities with serious behavioural consequences remain grounds for detention and treatment disorders. The Bill introduces the new term, “psychiatric disorder”, meaning any mental disorder excluding autism or a learning disability. That distinction matters because detention under section 3 of the Act—compulsory admission for treatment—will no longer be permitted solely on the basis of someone being autistic or having a learning disability. From now on, a person may be detained only if they have a co-occurring psychiatric disorder or their learning disability is associated with “serious behavioural consequences”, such as “abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”. That reflects a fundamental shift in the philosophy of the Act from using hospitalisation as a containment tool to ensuring that any detention has a clear clinical and therapeutic purpose. This reform is rooted in the recommendations of the 2018 review of the Mental Health Act, which was led by Professor Simon Wessely, and has been championed by groups such as the National Autistic Society. It represents a more modern understanding, as we currently see things, so there are many positives—it protects people’s rights, preventing detention simply for being different, it promotes community-based care rather than institutionalisation, it modernises the law in line with current clinical understanding and it seeks to end the harm caused by prolonged non-therapeutic hospital stays, which often involving over-medication and restraint. However, I also sound a note of caution: the clause alone will not be enough. There is rightly concern about the provision for robust community services. We risk creating legal protections that are admirable on paper but ineffective in practice. I know that the Minister appreciates this dilemma. If people cannot get the right support in the community, they will still end up in crisis, and possibly still be detained—just under a different part of the law. There are also concerns about ambiguity. The phrase “serious behavioural consequences” may be open to a wide interpretation. Without clear guidance and training, we risk inconsistencies and even potential loopholes that could undermine the intent of this reform. I commend the Government’s intention to protect autistic people and people with learning disabilities from potentially inappropriate detentions, and to ensure that compulsory treatment is targeted to those with mental disorders warranting hospital care. The emphasis on therapeutic benefit and the principle of least restriction aligns well with the human rights standard and the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. However, I have several questions that I hope the Government will be able to address. How will clinicians reliably distinguish between behaviours arising from autism and learning disabilities and behaviours arising from co-occurring psychiatric disorders, given the complexity of presentations in this population? Is there, or will there be, clear guidance and training to support those assessments? For individuals with severe autism or learning disabilities who display challenging behaviours but do not have a diagnoseable psychiatric disorder, what alternative pathways and supports are envisaged to ensure their safety and wellbeing without resorting to detention? On the issue of patients under part 3 of the Bill, I know the Government’s rationale for maintaining broader detention definition criteria, but will there be additional safeguards or oversight to ensure those patients are not subject to unnecessarily prolonged or restrictive detention? The removal of “social functioning” from the definition of learning disability is intended to create a clearer distinction from autism, but could the changes create any unintended legal or clinical ambiguities in practice? The changes could introduce some unintended consequences. Previously, impairments in social function were considered part of the learning disability definition, which helped capture individuals whose social difficulties accompanied intellectual impairments. Without that, there may be legal and clinical uncertainty for people with borderline or overlapping conditions. For example, someone with moderate intellectual impairment and significant social difficulties might no longer clearly fit the learning disability definition. Similarly, autistic individuals with mild intellectual disability who experience social challenges could find their diagnosis and legal status less certain. Those ambiguities risk inconsistent assessments and potential gaps in access to appropriate care unless the Government provide clear guidance to clinicians and tribunals on how to navigate complex presentations. What plans are in place to monitor and evaluate the impact of the changes on detention rates, patient outcomes and the availability of community-based alternatives? In closing, this is an important clause that moves us closer to a system that respects autonomy, delivers appropriate care and upholds the rights of neurodivergent people. But we must be mindful that passing this legislation must not be seen as the end of the job. As the Minister understands, it is the beginning. If we are to drive reform, the Government will need to set out the funding and workforce pathway for the services that will deliver it. We must train professionals, empower families and support voices of lived experience at every level. Only then will clause 3 deliver on its promise not just to change law, but to change lives. I turn to schedule 1. Schedules are an important and yet often overlooked part of the legislative process. It is worth reminding the Committee that a schedule is a part of a Bill’s function, like a detailed appendix. It contains the granular, often technical amendments that give practical and legal effect to the broad principles set out in main clauses. In other words, the clause tells us what Parliament intends to do and schedules show us how it will be done: amending existing statutes, updating definitions and ensuring consistency across legal frameworks. In this Bill, schedule 1 is particularly consequential. It does the heavy lifting of applying the reforms in clause 3 to the existing Mental Health Act 1983, especially with regard to how we treat autism and learning disabilities within the scope of mental health law. Let us be clear that the schedule is not simply technical. It is transformational in what it attempts to do. Where the 1983 Act spoke broadly of mental disorder, schedule 1 now creates a more precise legal category—“relevant disorder”—defined to include psychiatric disorder, autism and learning disability with serious behavioural consequences. That matters enormously. In fact, it is one of the key reasons for the review of this entire piece of legislation. Individuals with autism or learning disabilities have been subject to compulsory powers, including detention, as we have heard, in the absence of any co-occurring mental illness. That is a practice with which the Committee should rightly be uncomfortable. Schedule 1 amends not only the criteria for compulsory admission under section 3, but those for guardianship, community treatment orders, tribunal discharge and even the treatment provisions in part 4 of the Act. This breadth shows that clause 3 is not merely a rhetorical shift; it is being operationalised throughout the entire Act. With such significant implications, the schedule raises serious and legitimate questions that I am sure will form the backbone of the ongoing discussions in Committee over the next few weeks. First, what is the threshold for serious behavioural consequences? Will that be clearly defined? Without precision, we risk substituting one vague standard for another. Secondly, do the transitory provisions offer enough clarity for frontline practitioners, in particular approved mental health professionals and tribunal panels who will be making decisions in grey areas between new and old law? Again, what about the cross-border issue between Wales and England? Thirdly, given the change from mental disorder to psychiatric disorders in some sections but not others, what is the Government’s rationale for that linguistic differentiation? Is there a risk of confusion among legal and clinical practitioners? To clarify—I am happy to share this with the Minister—I went through it and there appear to be a few occasions where the definition was changed, but some areas where it was not. Now, that may be my naïve understanding as a mere shadow Minister, but I would welcome the clarification and I am happy to pass them on to the Clerks to ensure that, if we are going to update the Bill, all parts are updated. Finally, and critically, do we have the workforce, training and services in place to support this cultural and clinical shift away from paternalism towards community-based and rights-respecting alternatives? Schedule 1 shows us that reform is not just about good intentions, but getting the detail right. It is about ensuring the law reflects modern clinical understanding and human dignity. I support the direction of travel, but I gently remind the Minister to ensure that the operational mechanisms of the schedule are tested, clarified and, where necessary, strengthened. We owe that to the individuals and the families for whom we are producing this legislation to improve their lives.

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20. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    I want to expand a little on the practicalities and respond to the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon about local authorities. I declare an interest because Leicestershire is one of the 21 county councils going through a devolution process. About 85% of its budget deals with special educational needs and social care. It is part of an ICB where the mental health team and primary and secondary care come together, but there is oversight from NHS England. With so many moving parts, including the legislation we are putting in place, the budgetary constraints for ICBs, and the fact that we are getting rid of NHS England, there is a real worry among Opposition Members that things could drop through the gap, or more likely, that because we are moving all these things at the same time, we do not decide which is the fixed point that leads where others follow. If we are trying to cut costs in the ICBs, if NHS England is going over the next two years, and if devolution of responsibilities is also happening over the next couple of years with unitary councils forming, we will create a sticky situation for who is actually leading on this issue. At the heart of it are the clinicians and the patients who could fall through the gap. What consideration has been given to the top-down strategy for how to incorporate all that? The Minister has talked about a red thread that runs through it all, but is there a running plan? Different Departments, agencies and areas of the country are involved. They are trying to come together to manage their budgets, legislation and policies. It is a complex situation to work through. The imperative part—the legislation—is almost the easier part to get in place; it is the delivery that is all-important. Can the Minister explain further how those three things tessellate?

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21. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 1 to 7 and 51 to clause 4. I welcome the intention behind the amendments, which aim to enhance the care and treatment review process for people with autism and learning disabilities, particularly by addressing housing and accommodation needs and ensuring that key advocates receive reports. There are positive elements of the amendments that are worth highlighting. I understand the good intent of including housing and accommodation considerations explicitly in reviews, as it recognises that a person’s living situation is often central to their wellbeing and recovery. Additionally, ensuring that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive reports promptly promotes transparency and patient advocacy. Shortening the review intervals from 12 to six months could lead to more responsive care planning. However, I have some significant reservations about the statutory implications of blurring housing, for example, so directly with the care and treatment review process. Housing is traditionally managed under separate statutory frameworks from health and social care, so to embed housing as a statutory element within these reviews risks creating confusion about which agency holds responsibility and may expose health bodies or commissioners to legal obligations that they are neither funded nor structured for. I have a few questions for the Liberal Democrats. In their eyes, how would the Government ensure clarity over the statutory duties applied to housing recommendations arising from the reviews? Would that not risk delaying or complicating discharges if housing issues became a statutory sticking point within health-led care reviews? Moreover, housing provision often depends on local authorities and housing departments that have their own complex eligibility criteria and resourcing constraints. Are we confident that ICBs and responsible commissioners would be able to co-ordinate effectively across these boundaries, especially given the patchwork of funding and powers in play?

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22. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    Those are exactly the kind of practical questions that we really need to think about when we definitively put into legislation what that would look like. My constituency now has several boundaries across the borders with Warwickshire and Staffordshire, which causes problems when it comes to deciding who will look after what. On the criteria, my hon. Friend raises another point: will there be a regulatory fight or even infighting between the ICB and the local authorities to determine whose criteria cover what, and who trumps who? To top that off—I raised this matter with the Minister earlier—I would be interested to understand how the Liberal Democrats would deal with that problem, given that the Government are pushing through their devolution agenda. We have already heard about the complexity of everything tessellating together. That makes it very interesting, to put it politely, to consider how it would work in practice. On the related point of the duty imposed on ICBs and local authorities to have regard to review recommendations, I note that amendment 7 would insert the phrase “have a duty to carry out”. I have concerns in this area too, which I will raise in later comments, but let me explain a little further. The aim is to address accountability, but the Liberal Democrats’ solution would change the provision from “must have regard to” to “have a duty to carry out”. There is an important distinction here: a duty to “have regard to” requires that recommendations may be properly considered and responded to but does not legally compel implementation; a duty to carry out, however, would impose a legal obligation to act on every recommendation, regardless of feasibility, availability or agreement. That raises a crucial question: if the Government intend to hold ICBs to account for meeting those needs, how would they ensure that the necessary resources, powers and accountabilities for the mechanisms are in place? What oversight would the Liberal Democrats establish to guarantee not just consideration but effective delivery, and how would conflicts be resolved where recommendations are impractical, or local capacity is lacking? Perhaps a more balanced approach would be to strengthen the duty to respond with clear timelines and a requirement for transparency about decisions, while investing in cross-sector co-ordination mechanisms and adequately resourcing local authorities and housing providers. We could provide statutory guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities, and enhanced oversight to monitor outcomes, rather than simply prescribing an inflexible duty to implement. In essence, a duty to respond means that the responsible body, whether an integrated care body or the local authority, must formally consider and reply to the recommendations arising from the care and treatment review. It does not legally compel it to carry out every single recommendation, but it requires the body to explain what it will and will not implement, and why it cannot implement a recommendation. That promotes transparency and accountability without creating unrealistic legal obligations. For example, an ICB might say, “We will implement recommendations 1, 3 and 5 within six months, but recommendation 2 is not feasible due to current resource constraint.” That kind of structured response is both practical and responsible.

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23. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    Thinking that through, how does my hon. Friend feel that existing statutory requirements to provide accommodation will balance out if we provide another statutory requirement on accommodation in these plans? Does he worry, as I do, about creating a risk, for example, of pitting someone with severe learning disabilities against a homeless person if there is resource rationing thanks to the practicalities of how many houses we have? Members throughout the House agree that we need to build more houses, but until that happens, such local authorities have the resources issue.

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24. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

    Would my hon. Friend speculate on a question that I hope will be answered by the hon. Member for Winchester? It is about the evidence base behind choosing six months instead of 12. GPs would do learning disability reviews every year, for example, and it is an annual thing with asthma and in similar areas. Is the hon. Member for Winchester aware of an evidence base for why it should be six months? There may not be one—often these can be arbitrary, in terms of just giving a clinical judgment—but I wonder whether there is a specific reason for choosing to reduce the period between reviews to six months.

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25. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

    Nuclear Power: Investment

    Happy birthday, Mr Speaker. Energy security is important, so I welcome this investment in nuclear. One more small modular reactor can power a million homes using just two football pitches-worth of land, while solar needs 2,000 acres of good-quality farmland to power 50,000 homes. Will the right hon. Gentleman consider the importance of food security as well as energy security, reconsider the use of good-quality farmland for solar, and concentrate instead on producing nuclear?

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26. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    It feels like we are going from “Groundhog Day” to “Lost in Translation” because the Government clearly are not getting the message. Today I will try something different and tell the House a story—the story of this debate: A story was read in the deep dark wood, AI saw the book, and the book looked good. “Where are you heading to, original tome? Come here with me, and I’ll give you a home.” “That’s awfully sweet of you, but no, I’m meeting my author, and they say where I go. Now I like you, and I don’t want to cause strife But they made me with love and words shaped by life. So if we’re to partner, please do ask them first, To not would be naughty,” he said with lips pursed. Perhaps I owe Julia Donaldson an apology, while also thanking her for the national treasure that is “The Gruffalo”—I look forward to the third book in the series. We did not use AI, which was useless, to draft it, just the skills of one of my team members Jacqui Gracey—human skill, talent and transparency over sources and work. Transparency is fundamental to protect creative endeavours. No one can doubt that the Minister has done his best to demonstrate the enduring nature of the creative spirit in the face of adversity and to avoid committing to a timescale and to legislating on transparency. This week, it is a new parliamentary working group. Last week, it was reviews. Next week, it may even be a citizens’ assembly, but the creative industries are not buying it. Our noble colleagues in the other place are not buying it. Members of Opposition parties, and indeed some Members on his own Benches, are not buying it. They are not buying it because the Government have lost the confidence of their stakeholders that they would bring forward legislation to enact effective and proportionate transparency requirements for AI models in the use of their creative content—AI companies need to buy it. It is this loss of confidence in the Government’s will to take decisive action that means that nothing short of a commitment to bring forward legislation will be enough to allay the fears of the creative industries.

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27. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    What the last Government did not do is release a consultation that had a ministerial foreword to say that the position of copyright was uncertain. What they did not do was say their preferred option was opt-out, which spooked the creative industry and caused all these problems in the first place. It is this Government’s ham-fisted approach that caused so many of the problems that they are now trying and failing to fix. The Government have played a large part in creating this problem.

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28. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. As I said, this is clearly a tricky area to legislate—I have said that at the Dispatch Box and in Committee many times—but what is not helping is the uncertainty that has been created throughout the debate, whether it is the position of copyright law, preferred third options or the status of opt-out, which is how we got into this pickle in the first place.

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29. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    I thank the Chair of the Select Committee, who is also trying to break us out of the groundhog day that we seem to have found ourselves in. The Lords amendment does not fetter the Government’s policy options, nor does it prescribe how proportionate transparency should be achieved. It simply puts a line in the sand for the Government to act on this hugely important issue. To return to the AI and the Gruffalo, So on went the story through the deep dark wood To be loved by its readers, as a good book should. Yet the AI pondered, as it wanted it now. “I’ll simply just scrape it”, the AI did avow. When he was musing, he stumbled across The author reclining on a patch of green moss. They had glasses and notebooks and ideas galore. They had printed five books, but were working on more. Their eyes came to meet—they were in for a fight. Both wanted the story, but who was right? The answer is both, if reasonably sought For content, not stolen, but licensed or bought. Be clear what you’re taking, be transparent and true, And recognise the content and its real value. Then there’s no monster nor bad guy, just an allegorical rhyme And a plea to listen and take action in time.

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30. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    Fossil Fuels

    Happy birthday, Mr Speaker. Change in the language by the UK Government on the Moroccan autonomy plan paves the way for a bright new future between the two kingdoms. Does the Minister therefore feel that the time is right to finally make a decision on the UK-Morocco power project that could potentially add 8% of the UK’s grid requirements and clean energy for the future?

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31. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    Nuclear Power: Investment

    The announcement today is good news as far as it goes, but the baseload that it will provide will not be on tap for many years to come. How does the Secretary of State propose to fill that gap? Will he now look again at the UK-Morocco power project, which needs a decision soon and could be delivering electrons by the turn of the decade? Does the announcement today affect the likely contract for difference and strike prices eventually reached with the proposed operator?

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32. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

    It is a sad day when the UK Government and the Governments of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Norway feel it necessary to sanction Government Ministers in the state of Israel, one of our closest allies, but it is the right thing to do. Can I, however, counsel the Minister, if I may be so presumptuous, against performative politics, and ask him how many mouths will be fed, how much violence against Palestinians in the west bank will be avoided or averted, and how much closer are we to achieving the two-state solution that we all want to see as a result of the action he has announced today?

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33. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·David Mundell

    USAID Funding Pause

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. I declare my interest as co-chair of both the APPG on nutrition for development and the APPG on HIV, AIDS and sexual health. This is a period of great uncertainty, not just because of what has happened in the US, but because of what is happening in the UK. Perhaps this debate is a couple of days early, because when the new Minister for International Development, Baroness Chapman of Darlington, appeared before the International Development Committee, everything was predicated on the spending review. Indeed, the Committee had to send back the Government’s response to our inquiry on hunger and sustainable development goal 2 because there was no substance in the reply, since everything was predicated on the outcome of the spending review. I hope that tomorrow we will get certainty. I do not expect the Minister to be able to advance anything specific today, but it is important that we have that certainty, because uncertainty is one of the worst features affecting our ability to plan and to combat the issues that we face globally. Obviously, the US has contributed enormously to that uncertainty. It is still not clear what is happening in the US, and that is why I welcome the fact that the International Development Committee will soon visit Washington and New York. It will be a fact-finding visit, so that we can ascertain exactly what the approach is, and whether Mr Musk’s departure means anything for how these matters will be dealt with. I do not want to dwell too much on regret about the American situation. I think that we have to move on, as others have said, to a new debate about the future model of development. The Government, through the Minister for International Development, have indicated that that is their view, but again, there have not been many clues as to exactly what that might mean. We have heard about a realignment of existing multilateral organisations; it is not clear to me what that means. What I am clear on is that the UK should continue to contribute significantly to Gavi, the Global Fund and Unitaid, because those are multilateral organisations that deliver on their own specific objectives but also provide a backbone for health services in many poorer countries. Without those interventions, there would not be a health service being offered at all, so it is vital that we continue. Cutting mid-way through programmes is always chaotic. One of the most shocking things that I heard in recent evidence to the International Development Committee was about a US cut during the overwhelming of Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We heard that the radio system, which was operated by volunteers, had to be switched off during that attack. That meant that people could not hear where the attack was coming from and where to go to be safe. I think that everybody who heard that evidence, from the guy who had to do that, understood how hard it was—and it was the direct consequence of a cut. I want to focus on nutrition and give some key facts. A billion women and girls suffer from malnutrition, which impacts their health, productivity and economic futures. Malnutrition is a leading killer, responsible for one in five maternal deaths and nearly half of child deaths under the age of five. Malnutrition costs the global economy more than $1.6 trillion annually in lost productivity and potential. US aid cuts could lead to 1 million children with severe and acute malnutrition losing access to treatment annually. But it can be—and it has been—different. We know that for every $1 invested, $23 is returned to the local economy. Investing in nutrition is not charity, and it is not even the moral thing to do; it is a strategic decision and investment, and the UK, US and other funders should continue to do it. The UK Government are being asked to invest £50 million in the child nutrition fund. The UK has historically been a leader in the funding of child nutrition interventions. In both 2022 and 2023, the UK committed £6 million to the fund, which has high-impact, cost-effective malnutrition solutions. With the funding crisis caused by US cuts, the ask is now £50 million. I hope that on the IDC’s visit to the US, we will find out more about what is happening with HIV/AIDS, because there are competing suggestions about whether the US will return to funding. The hon. Member for Norwich North (Alice Macdonald) alluded to women and girls; one of the most important messages we have to get across is that in sub-Saharan Africa, it is women and girls who are most affected by HIV, and it is important to continue funding there. I also agree with the hon. Member about the importance of science and innovation as we move forward in this new development world. I had the opportunity to visit the John Innes Centre outside Norwich, as well as Rothamsted Research in Harpenden, where a huge amount of research is going ahead. The research and scientific leadership that the UK can offer might be the replacement for the financial leadership we offered in the past.

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34. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·David Mundell

    USAID Funding Pause

    I welcome the hon. Lady’s comments. It is very important we emphasise that it is women and girls who will be most affected by those cuts. It is not those stereotypes sometimes presented by some in the US who are affected; it is women and girls.

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35. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·David Mundell

    Nuclear Power: Investment

    As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on nuclear energy, and having championed the nuclear industry for 20 years in this Parliament, even when it was not popular on either side of the House, I very much welcome today’s announcement, because I have seen over 60 years in my constituency the economic impact of the Chapelcross nuclear power station. Returning to the subject of Scotland, we see the SNP’s intransigence, which is costing Scotland jobs on the nuclear front. Will the Secretary of State ensure that if we will not have nuclear power stations, we can at least have jobs in the supply chain?

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36. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dame Caroline Dinenage

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    There seems to be mass amnesia breaking out across the Chamber because the last Government did do something on this: they set up a working group between AI companies and the creative industries.

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37. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dame Caroline Dinenage

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    No, the AI companies walked away. We are almost at risk of recreating history by this Government wanting to set up exactly the same working group and thinking that by doing the same thing again, the outcome will somehow be different.

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38. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Dame Caroline Dinenage

    Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

    First, I thank the Secretary of State for sending our Committee a letter on Friday evening setting out the Government’s intentions for AI and copyright. Reflecting what the Chair of the Liaison Committee, the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), said, both the nature of the letter and the method with which it was received were almost symbolic of how this whole process has been conducted from beginning to end. It was fairly haphazard and chaotic, and it was not entirely clear what the Secretary of State or the Minister intend to happen next, but I am grateful to the Minister for his offer to have a chat to talk us through it. Specifically, the Secretary of State and the Minister set out their amendments to the Bill and a plan to set up this parliamentary working group, and we would like to know a lot more about that. I understand exactly what the Government are trying to do: they are trying to placate peers and bring the Data (Use and Access) Bill to a conclusion, as the Minister says. The problem is that they are still not engaging with the fundamental existential issue, which is the concerns expressed by people across the creative industries. The Government’s amendment would expedite the economic impact assessment of the options in the AI copyright consultation. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee and the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee jointly wrote about that in February. Another amendment would expand the scope of the report to include training outside the UK and enforcement, which obviously should have happened from the start. The amendments are all welcome, but they miss the point of the creative industries’ concern that their work and intellectual property are being exploited wholesale, without permission, without payment and without practical means of recourse and redress. I note that the Minister told the House on 14 May: “I do not think that what is on the amendment paper today would deliver anything now.”—[Official Report, 14 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 417.] The Government giving themselves nine months rather than 12 to conclude what we already know—that their favoured consultation option is completely unworkable—is much less likely to deliver quickly the kind of transparency and enforcement for creators than the amendments proposed in the other place. The Secretary of State’s letter also mentions that the Government intend to set up a parliamentary working group to ensure that “Parliament has a voice directly into DSIT throughout this process”. The big fear is that this working group will simply be a channel through which the Government will report back on their own engagement with AI developers and rights holders. The Government instead need to be listening to the concerns of Parliament and industry stakeholders. Maybe then they will realise that this stakeholder engagement exercise between rights holders and AI developers has been tried before, as I said earlier, including in the last Parliament. It was scrutinised at the time by the Committee I chair, and each time things have got nowhere. Talks have collapsed because the status quo suits rogue developers acting in bad faith. They think they have nothing to lose by looting the work and value of our creators and our rights holders. If the Government press on with this working group, we will of course engage and do what we can to support, but let us call it what it is: a distraction technique to divert attention away from the fact that the Government have got themselves into a terrible pickle over this legislation. They started a consultation on AI and copyright when they already had stated a preferred outcome, and they have been cloth-eared to the legitimate concerns of the world-leading creative industries for month after month. They have been virtually dragged kicking and screaming to this position now, where they bring forward a couple of tiny amendments. They have been gaslighting Members of all parties and at both ends of this building who have attempted to draw attention to the situation. They have been somehow pitting our world-leading creative industries against AI, almost presenting them as luddites who are allergic to innovation and technology, when actually these are some of the most groundbreaking and innovative sectors out there. They are using AI every single day to produce world-beating pieces of creative content. The very nature of how the Government have conducted this legislation pits our creative industries against AI, and that is deeply unfair. It is all not good enough. This is simply a thinly veiled attempt to kick the can down the road—and if kicking the can down the road were an Olympic sport, the Minister would have to add “sport” to his portfolio. If he thinks that any of us are fooled by this, or that it will quieten those who want to stand up for our world-leading creative industries and against the existential threat that they face, he has another think coming.

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39. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    Order. It might be helpful if I emphasised that we are not here to relitigate yesterday’s debate; we are here to debate the amendments that have been tabled today. I am sure the hon. Member will restrict his comments to that.

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40. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    Order. The hon. Lady will have the opportunity to contribute later. Interventions really do need to be shorter than this.

    Hansard source