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1. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 137, in schedule 5, page 102, line 2, at end insert “including the club’s official charity.” This amendment would make clear that the activities of a football club’s official charity can be counted towards it meeting the corporate governance code. It is a pleasure to speak in favour of the amendment. The Bill as drafted does not specify that the activities of these charities—often known as community trusts—count when taking into account actions taken by the club in relation to meeting the corporate governance code, so I start by asking the Minister why the Bill does not contain explicit recognition, in the governance reporting requirements, of the work done by community trusts. I would appreciate it if she could pick that up in her comments. As both the shadow Minister for sport and the Member of Parliament for Old Bexley and Sidcup, I am in a fortunate position: I get to see week in, week out how sport, and football in particular, can transform lives. I also get to see what that looks like in practice, not just in headlines or strategies, but on the ground—in local parks, youth centres and school halls across my constituency. I know that other Members will have similar experiences in their own. In my constituency, we are lucky to benefit from the extraordinary work undertaken by Charlton Athletic Community Trust. It is no exaggeration to say that CACT, if we want to call it that—I do not really like that wording—has become one of the most respected and impactful community foundations affiliated with a professional football club anywhere in the country. It often wins awards at national level for that work. Its work extends far beyond the pitch and well beyond the borough of Greenwich, where the training ground and the stadium—the Valley—are located, and deep into my borough of Bexley, the wider south-east London area, and Kent. In fact, Charlton have been delivering services and support in Bexley for well over a decade. Charlton’s community trust delivers youth services on behalf of Bexley council. It provides safe spaces and structured activities that help young people to develop skills, build confidence and stay on the right path. In today’s world, where young people, as most Members would recognise, face growing pressures and limited opportunity, that kind of work is more vital than ever. Although Charlton are not a Premier League side just yet, one of the flagship initiatives that it runs is the Premier League Kicks programme, which operates across the borough in areas such as Thamesmead, Slade Green and Erith—places where young people often face the dual challenge of limited opportunities and exposure to risks—as well as in my area of Old Bexley, Sidcup and Welling. The Kicks sessions are free weekly football sessions, but they are about much more than just sport. They take place in safe and welcoming environments and are led by trained staff. Young people aged between eight and 18 can build confidence, learn leadership skills and receive mentoring from positive role models—often young adults who were once participants in the scheme. What makes the Kicks programme in Bexley particularly valuable is its consistency and partnership working. Sessions are delivered year round in collaboration with the police, youth services and local schools. This is not a one-off scheme or a publicity stunt. It is part of a broader, integrated approach to youth engagement and early intervention that genuinely helps to steer young people away from things such as crime and towards the opportunities that football presents. Charlton’s work goes far wider than just youth engagement, although I have seen that recently at Hurstmere school in my constituency and when Charlton brought the Premier League trophy to a local park. It was incredible to see the reactions of young football fans to the trophy. Just remember not to touch it—a mistake that I made on the day, and I was rightly told off. In Bexley, Charlton are a contracted delivery partner for the council’s early help youth services—statutory support that has been delivered to a high professional standard for many years. Importantly, the trust has developed deep and lasting partnerships in Bexley and Greenwich, not only with the local authority, but with the NHS, local schools, the police and the voluntary sector. That joined-up approach is what makes its work sustainable and successful. As I said, I am sure that many other clubs around the country are doing such work.

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2. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

   Thank you for your guidance, Sir Jeremy. You will be pleased to know that I am coming on to why my example is relevant to the amendment. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dartford for raising the example of Dartford football club—a rival of one of my other local clubs, Welling United, which also do great work in the community. In the light of your words, Sir Jeremy, I will move on to the amendment. Clubs do such amazing work around the country, and the amendment would ensure that that is recognised properly in the Bill. I hope the Minister agrees that work that such community trusts are delivering around the country, particularly in youth engagement, public health and crime prevention, should form part of a club’s social responsibility and how it is reported. Why does that matter in the context of the Bill? Because we are legislating for a new governance framework for football, and the Government have decided that this Bill must reflect football clubs’ wider social responsibilities and recognise the real value of institutions such as the trusts, which deliver on the responsibilities in practice. As the Bill is drafted, there is a risk that such work will be seen as separate from clubs’ corporate governance responsibility, and there is a risk that a club will have to wind up its charitable organisation—God forbid—and bring it fully in-house to meet the requirements of the Bill. Allowing a club’s charities or community trusts to count towards that will allow the good work to continue growing while trusts benefit from their charitable status. The Bill is a slight own goal, but I believe the drafting can be corrected. We believe it represents a missed opportunity for communities across the country, and our amendment would correct that by making it clear that clubs can include the work of their associated community trusts as part of how they meet their governance targets. That does not mean giving clubs an easy ride or allowing them to paper over poor performance elsewhere, but it does mean taking a more holistic, grounded approach to what good governance looks like in the real world. When we are considering how best to shape football regulation, I believe the example set out by the Charlton trust should give us something to aim for across the country and across the football pyramid. It shows what football at its best can do when it is rooted firmly in its community and takes its social obligations seriously. Charlton Athletic may not be in the Premier League at the moment—give them another season—but through the community trust, they are leading the way in community impact. I understand that it is up for another national award this year. That is why I believe the amendment is not only proportionate and practical, but in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. If we are serious about building a more sustainable and responsible football pyramid, we must also be serious about recognising clubs that take their community obligations very seriously, not through a statement of intent but through long-standing, properly resourced partnerships. In Bexley, it does not matter whether you are an Addick yourself; you can come along to a Premier League Kicks session and be part of something bigger. The same is true of neighbouring Millwall, who do lots of great work in the Lewisham borough. We want this to be more than a box-ticking exercise. There is a real risk that clubs will scale back some of that work if it is brought under the scope of the Government’s regulator. I am sure the Minister would agree that that would be an unintended consequence. Does she agree that allowing clubs to include their trusts’ work in their corporate governance statements would incentivise long-term investment in high-quality community programmes, rather than short-term or superficial schemes? We hope that any new regulatory framework, including the establishment of the Government’s regulator, will recognise and protect the kind of local partnership work that I have described today. Will the Minister therefore tell us whether she believes that when it assesses a club’s performance, the regulator will be equipped to distinguish between high-impact, properly evaluated community work, such as I have described, and less substantive activity? Will she issue guidance that the regulator must have regard to outreach delivered through a club’s trust when assessing corporate governance? The Chair adjourned the Committee without question put (Standing Order No. 88.)

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3. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   It is a privilege to speak again under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate you and the city of Hull on the Challenge cup victory at the weekend, which probably does not please Mr Speaker on his birthday, but such is sport. Moving back to football, before the lunch break, I explained why the Opposition felt the need for amendment 137. It is a technical amendment that would make it very clear that the official charities and trusts of the clubs would count towards the corporate governance structure. I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and appreciate the feedback that she has given. However, we would still like to see the amendment made to provide clarity to clubs, so we will press it to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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4. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 131, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert— “Agents fees 11A (1) An agents fees condition is a condition requiring a club employing an agent to cap their fees. (2) The agents fee cap will be set by Regulations subject to approval by both Houses.” My amendment proposes that clubs regulated by the Government’s new regulator should be required to cap the fees paid to agents, because, as many fans know, an ever-increasing amount of money is leaving the football pyramid to agents. The level of the proposed cap would be set through regulations, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and determined following consultation with clubs and leagues. Let me set out why we believe the measure is necessary—not as an attack on agents or their role in the game, but as a proportionate, reasonable step towards a more sustainable, transparent and responsible football ecosystem. If we are serious about football reform and safeguarding the long-term financial health of clubs up and down the pyramid, we must be prepared to tackle the excesses and distortions that have taken root in the sport. Few are more obvious or pressing than the spiralling sums paid to agents. According to the Football Association, in the year from February 2024 to February 2025, Premier League clubs alone paid more than £409 million in agent fees and intermediaries. That is more than the total broadcast revenue of a number of Championship clubs in 2022-23; or more than double the commercial revenue of several clubs for that season; or almost three times the matchday revenue of a number of Championship clubs in the same season. This is not wages or transfer fees, nor is it investment in the matchday experience for fans—it is money paid out purely for representation costs, often for work done on both sides of a deal. To put that into context, it is more than the entire annual income of many Championship clubs combined, and this is not just a Premier League problem. Although the sums are relatively smaller further down the pyramid, the pressures are arguably even more acute for clubs with less budget. My amendment seeks to introduce a straightforward principle—that there should be a fair and proportionate limit on the fees that clubs can pay to agents, and that the limit should be set by regulations made by the Secretary of State subject to affirmative procedure. This would help to ensure full parliamentary oversight and allow future Governments to adjust the cap based on changing market conditions, evidence from the Government’s regulator and broader economic factors in football. There is already a strong precedent for this kind of intervention. For example, FIFA’s agent regulations now attempt to impose limits on the commissions payable to clubs and players alike, but those rules remain subject to legal challenge and uneven enforcement across jurisdictions. In the absence of effective international enforcement, there is an opportunity for this to be included in the scope of the Government’s regulator as a core part of the financial sustainability of English football.

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5. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   I discussed that consideration with a number of people in the game before we tabled the amendment. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the French, who already cap agents’ fees at 10%. With this amendment, we are not seeking to say what the level should be—that should be determined by the game in consultation—but we are looking for the game to help to set the cap at a level that does not have the impact that he talks about. But it is a fair challenge. We must remember that the Bill is fundamentally about sustainability. Financial discipline is not just a boardroom concern, but a matter of public trust. Football clubs are more than private enterprises, as we have discussed. They are community institutions. They are the social glue in towns such as Bury, Scunthorpe and Southend, all of which have suffered financial distress in recent years. The idea that hundreds of millions of pounds can leave the game each year in opaque payments to third-party agents while clubs struggle to pay wages, maintain facilities or invest in their academies is becoming increasingly indefensible. Let us be clear: no one is saying that agents do not have a role. Many provide important professional services, such as legal advice, contract negotiation and logistical support, but the current system lacks transparency, consistency and limits. There are countless examples of agents receiving commissions from both buying and selling clubs on the same deal—a structure that would raise red flags in other regulated industries as a clear conflict of interest. Without a cap, there is little to stop the agents’ arms race escalating even further. Clubs are forced to pay inflated fees just to stay competitive in the transfer market. In some cases, they are backed into a corner by players who will not sign unless their representative is paid what they demand. That imbalance needs to be addressed, not with heavy-handed bans, but with clear, enforceable limits that ensure agent fees are grounded in reality and tied to the financial position of the English football pyramid. My amendment would allow for the cap to adapt over time, either up or down, depending on the financial context of the day. This debate also has a clear moral dimension. Football fans—the lifeblood of the game—see money flooding out of the system into offshore accounts while ticket prices rise, lower-league clubs fall into administration, as we have heard, and local facilities are left to deteriorate without needed investment. What message are we sending to those communities if we continue to turn a blind eye to this major issue? The problem is not new. Lord Sugar famously described agents as “ten percenters” during his time as chairman of Tottenham Hotspur. However, in recent years, that 10% has crept up; we now see cases in which agents walk away with fees amounting to 15% or even 20% of a transfer value, and in some instances with fixed payments that are totally unrelated to the value or complexity of the deal. That is not healthy, efficient or sustainable, and it is not a good use of fans’ hard-earned money. This amendment is about putting the interests of clubs, fans and the wider game first. In fact, we believe that clubs in the lower leagues would stand to benefit the most. Although some clubs in the top flight can absorb these costs through commercial revenues or broadcast income, those further down the pyramid often spend a disproportionate amount of their limited budgets on agents. That creates a vicious cycle: less money for youth development, community outreach and infrastructure, and more dependence on short-term deals brokered by intermediaries. By capping agent fees, we would take a meaningful step towards ending that cycle. We could help clubs plan more prudently, negotiate more confidently and operate on a fairer playing field. In doing so, we would strengthen the whole system, from the grassroots to the elite. Let us not forget that the purpose of the Government’s regulator is not to micro-manage football, but to restore public confidence and ensure long-term stability. Agent fees are a glaring blind spot in the current model. If we are willing to regulate ownership tests, financial reporting and fan engagement, surely we must also be willing to act on a financial outflow that directly threatens the viability of many clubs. This is a proportionate, sensible and timely amendment. It allows the Government to tackle one of the most visible and controversial financial issues in football; it helps preserve flexibility; it respects Parliament; and, most importantly, it places the interests of our clubs, fans and communities above those of unregulated market actors. We have an opportunity to help reshape the financial culture of English football for the better. Introducing a cap on agents’ fees is not only a necessary reform, but the right thing to do.

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6. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and acknowledge a number of the points that she made. The purpose behind the amendment was to have the discussion about the impact of fees on the game. I accept some of her points about the international nature of the transfer market. I would like to continue discussing this with her and the regulator once in situ, because I think there is something we can do here, either formally or informally, to move the game along so that it stops losing so much money to agents’ fees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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7. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator. Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed? If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size? Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states: “The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”. However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence. We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.

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8. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 22, page 14, line 35, leave out subsection (a). This amendment prevents the IFR from being able to set licence conditions relating to internal controls.

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9. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

   Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

   I rise to speak on clause 22 of this important Bill, which provides the Independent Football Regulator with powers to attach, amend and remove discretionary licence conditions for individual football clubs. At face value, this clause offers the regulator flexibility to respond to particular risks or circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, as with all regulatory discretion, the true implications lie in how such powers may evolve over time, be interpreted, or be expanded. In this Committee, it is our role to ensure that what begins as a sensible framework for tailored intervention does not become the thin end of a wedge that risks overreach, centralisation and, ultimately, the erosion of club autonomy. I believe strongly that English football does need reform in certain areas, but I also believe in restraint, clarity of purpose and fidelity to the principle that football clubs, however commercial they may have become, are civic institutions first and foremost. They belong to their communities, not to Whitehall, not to arm’s length bodies, and certainly not to ministerial discretion. Clause 22, as drafted, gives the Independent Football Regulator a wide and open-ended ability to impose additional conditions on individual clubs—conditions that are not part of the baseline threshold requirements in the Bill, but which the regulator may, in its own judgment, decide are appropriate. We should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which such powers might be necessary. For example, where a club has narrowly avoided insolvency, has a particularly opaque ownership structure, or is operating under unusual financial pressures, the regulator may wish to impose temporary conditions to help safeguard the public interest, protect creditors or ensure better transparency. That flexibility has its place. However, it must be anchored in the principles of proportionality, accountability and predictability. It is for that reason that I want to speak to three amendments that have been tabled in my name, each of which I believe would help materially improve the Bill by preventing mission creep, protecting the distinct role of the leagues, and ensuring that Parliament, not the Executive, retains the ultimate authority over the scope of regulation. The first amendment would prevent the regulator from imposing discretionary conditions relating to a club’s internal controls—that is, the systems and procedures by which a club governs itself, monitors risks, approves spending and safeguards assets. These are matters properly for the board of directors, who have legal duties under company law, are accountable to shareholders and fans, and must answer to independent auditors. To allow the regulator to second guess those internal arrangements and dictate how a club structures its finance team or risk-management processes would be a significant intrusion into corporate governance territory. Let us be clear: there is a distinction between requiring that a club has adequate systems and mandating the precise nature of those systems. The former is reasonable; the latter, we believe, is excessive. We must also be mindful of the danger that the regulator could, perhaps with good intentions, begin to substitute its own preferred model of governance over the perfectly legitimate models that clubs themselves decide to adopt. For example, what works for a large Premier League club with international operations may not be appropriate or affordable for a League Two club or a community-owned side. Discretionary licensing conditions must not become a one-size-fits-all instrument that penalises innovation, tradition or diversity in club structures. I support this amendment because it would help ringfence those areas of internal decision making that are rightly matters for the club’s board—subject to transparency and good practice but not for centralised prescription. The second amendment that I have tabled would prevent the regulator from imposing licensing conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. Amendment 108 would prevent the regulator from imposing licence conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. This is a fundamental issue. English football operates within a competitive ecosystem, as we have discussed. Decisions about how much to invest in players, infrastructure, academies or commercial operations are matters of strategic importance for clubs. They should be driven by ambition, fan demand and commercial opportunity, not by the regulator’s view of what is appropriate spending. We must not fall into the trap of conflating good financial regulation with financial central planning. The role of the Independent Football Regulator should be to monitor solvency, ensure robust business plans, enforce transparency and intervene when there are clear risks of harm. It is not the regulator’s job, and it should never become its job, to determine how much a club is allowed to spend. There is a world of difference between assessing whether spending is sustainable and attempting to control outright the volume of that spending. Let us remember that the leagues themselves already impose cost controls. The Premier League has profit and sustainability rules. The English Football League enforces squad salary caps and financial fair play frameworks, and now has the new financial review panel. The regulator is not meant to replace those roles. It is not a shadow competition authority, nor should it seek to override club investment decisions, which often have complex justifications and long-term returns. Amendment 108 would help to ensure that the regulator cannot use its discretionary power to micromanage investment levels. Such a step would go beyond the spirit and the letter of what the Bill intends to achieve. The goal is to protect clubs from existential risk, not to homogenise them or stifle ambition. Amendment 109 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of discretionary licence conditions by regulation. This is not a technical point; it goes to the constitutional heart of the Bill. The Independent Football Regulator must be just that: independent. Its scope, duties and powers must be defined by Parliament and subject to oversight. We cannot accept a model in which future Secretaries of State, by regulation and with minimal scrutiny, can expand the areas the regulator may interfere with. That would allow a future Government of any colour to alter the regulatory perimeter at will. Today, it might be internal controls; tomorrow, it might be club ticket pricing, political messaging or hiring policies. The clause must be narrowed to ensure that any expansion of discretionary licence conditions comes through primary legislation that is debated and approved by both Houses. Regulatory stability is vital not only for clubs but for fans, leagues and the broader football economy. Clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues, need to be able to plan over multiple seasons. Uncertainty about what new regulatory burdens might be imposed, or fears that the regime could be altered mid-season by ministerial decree, will have a chilling effect on investment, sponsorship and ambition. Regulation must be predictable and principled, not politicised or ever-shifting. Amendment 109 would safeguard its integrity. Clause 22 presents a risk of regulatory overreach, however well-intentioned it may be. The amendments would not strip the regulator of useful tools. They would simply place guardrails around its discretion and ensure that decisions of fundamental importance to club governance, financial independence and regulatory scope remain where they belong: with clubs, fans and Parliament. We need a regulator that enforces minimum standards, upholds transparency and ensures financial resilience. What we do not need is a regulator that micromanages club affairs or displaces the judgment of boards and owners. Football clubs must remain free to compete, to innovate and to fail or succeed on their own merits—within a fair framework, yes, but not under constant intervention. The amendments reinforce that principle. They are not ideological; they are practical, measured and consistent with the values that underpin the Bill. I urge the Committee to support them and, in doing so, to send a clear signal that we are legislating not to control football but to support it firmly, fairly and with the long-term interests of the game at heart.

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10. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    I will repeat my arguments, but I listened carefully to the Minister’s response and we remain concerned about various aspects of the clause. That is why we tabled not just one, but three amendments, to try to put some safeguards and guardrails around future powers of the IFR, as I said. Fundamentally, we believe that the ultimate responsibility for managing clubs should be that of the clubs themselves, while engaging with the fans, and we fear that without some of our amendments, the IFR will be too involved with the day-to-day running of clubs. That is why we tabled the amendments. We listened carefully to the Minister, but I am afraid that we are not fully satisfied, so we will press them to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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11. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant. Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated. The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made? Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks. Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful. Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.

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12. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    That is exactly my concern. In trying to tailor the conditions that we are discussing, there is a risk of inadvertently impacting the ability of clubs to compete on a fair and level playing field. I am concerned that that should not happen inadvertently, as the regulator evolves. That is why I keep pushing for more parliamentary oversight, so that we understand the risks. At the end of the day, fans will not forgive us as Members of this House if this goes wrong. I do not believe in any shape or form that the Government are aiming deliberately to get it wrong—I say that openly—but I fear that there will be unintended consequences, and that is the broader point that we have been trying to make in a number of the Committee’s debates.

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13. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for explaining the objectives behind the amendment, which is aimed at preventing individuals with a record of human rights abuses from owning a club. My question for the hon. Member is about new clause 8(2)(b), which states that “the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).” In other words, it will have discretion to determine whether such conduct constitutes human rights abuses. Given we are talking about a football regulator, the obvious question to ask is about what qualifications the regulator would need to make such a decision. What information could they rely on? Would we be looking for Government involvement in that, given that that would probably provide the intellectual experience required? Does the hon. Member for Cheltenham think it might improve the new clause to include a route of appeal against such a decision, as a matter of natural justice, so we are seen to give individuals the right of appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly classified?

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14. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club. Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do. Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.

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15. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible. I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.

    Hansard source
16. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee. The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first. What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership? Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club. It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable? Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions. There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario? Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine? Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.

    Hansard source
17. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced. The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”? The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that “Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”. That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that “new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality” also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified. The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations? If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime. Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified “as soon as reasonably practicable” after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach. Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong. Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations. We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion. Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33. Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means? What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA. I would appreciate a response to that point today. Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners? Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers? Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account. The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important. There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective. It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.

    Hansard source
18. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    Residents in Bexley village in my constituency—it is one of London’s outer villages—are particularly concerned about the erosion of their green areas around the village. Does my hon. Friend share my concern and surprise that, when the outer London green belt issue was discussed in the London Assembly last week, Reform backed Mayor Khan in building over the green belt? Reform backed Khan against the interests of Bexley residents.

    Hansard source
19. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Gagan Mohindra

    Rooftop Solar Power

    Grand Union Community Energy in my constituency is a non-profit community group that has done excellent work in Kings Langley to raise funding to install solar panels on the roofs of local schools, developments and car parks. It also educates local residents on how they can utilise community energy to reduce energy bills, which we have all seen rise under this Government. What steps are being taken across Government to ensure that community projects such as Grand Union Community Energy are implemented more widely?

    Hansard source
20. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

    Net Zero Transition: Rural Economies

    In the spirit of trying to get as many birthday wishes into one Hansard record as possible, Mr Speaker, from one part of the greatest county in the country to another, I wish you a very happy birthday. In the context of the dash to net zero, rural economies can also be damaged by the infrastructure that is being put in. The Morgan and Morecambe wind farm cabling corridor and substations will cause damage to rural businesses over 20 miles along the cabling route, including disruption caused during the construction stage. What efforts is the Minister making to assess cases in which the infrastructure that is being put in place does more damage to rural economies than it benefits them?

    Hansard source
21. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

    I have spoken on a number of occasions in recent weeks about recognition of Palestine, and I put on record again that I think we should proceed with it. Certainly, a vote in this House, as was suggested a moment ago, would strengthen the Government’s position and, I would have thought, be helpful in international negotiations. The Minister mentioned four other countries that have sanctioned the two Ministers today. Is he anticipating that further countries will follow suit, and what negotiations are taking place to achieve that goal?

    Hansard source
22. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mark Pritchard

    Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

    I welcome the Minister’s statement, but can he tell the House whether he thinks these sanctions will save a single Palestinian life? If he will forgive me, ahead of the Palestinian recognition summit—rather than the two-state solution summit; maybe that was a slip of the tongue by the Minister—next week in New York, some observers looking at today’s statement might be suspicious that there is a cynical coincidence in its timing. Can he reassure the House, and all those who are very concerned about this issue, that the United Kingdom Government have not done some grubby deal behind the scenes with the American Administration, trading today’s set of sanctions for saying no to recognition in New York next week?

    Hansard source
23. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

    The Minister mentioned the two criteria of the business plan and the personnel statement. I thought from our discussions last week that giving the regulator any form of information that the regulator so requested was an additional condition.

    Hansard source
24. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

    I am sure that the Minister realises that one of the variants in a club’s business plan is whether its matches are selected for being televised. It is an incredibly haphazard process and difficult to predict, because they are decided within season. What guidance will the Minister give, as the appointer of the regulator, as to reasonable assumptions in the business plan regarding expected television revenue in season?

    Hansard source
25. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

    Does my hon. Friend agree that his amendment is very much in the spirit of football? We have seen many injury time winners, when all the odds are stacked against a club, but in the dying moments they manage to rescue an almost impossible situation. So it is not only in the spirit of fairness, but in the spirit of football.

    Hansard source
26. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

    Has the hon. Gentleman considered that, essentially, we are talking about the state seizing someone’s assets and giving them to someone else? If a club falls into administration, the administrator is governed by a very strict set of laws in terms of treating all creditors fairly. Is he not concerned that this power could fly in the face of existing powers for the administration of companies?

    Hansard source
27. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

    My understanding of the Bill is that under those circumstances, they would lose their licence to operate.

    Hansard source
28. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

    It is a great pleasure to appear before you for the first time, Dr Murrison. I do not want to detain the Committee too long, but I have a couple of questions. Obviously, I am familiar with this legislation, having served at the Home Office. We should be under no illusion: the powers that we are extending today are actually very intrusive. While the Minister is absolutely right, for example, that there is not a single murder in this country that is not solved without this kind of data, the extension of these powers to the organisations named in the regulations is broadly what was predicted by critics of the Investigatory Powers Bill when it was introduced in 2016. Slowly but surely, they said, everybody would grab these powers just in case they needed them. As Members of Parliament, whose job it is to balance the rights of the public against the Government’s ability to intrude on them, we need to think carefully about whether what we are doing today is proportionate. My first question, which troubled me when I was at the Home Office, is about the internal conflict for the commissioner. The way that the Act is drawn, the commissioner both authorises and supervises. Although the commissioner is responsible to Parliament and produces reports to it, I am not entirely sure that the commissioner should effectively be both judge and jury on whether an organisation should have authorisation and therefore, presumably, whether its internal structures for controlling and managing the data are satisfactory. One would have thought that in normal circumstances there would be some separate authorisation system that was then assessed to be adequate by the commissioner. That conflict causes me some problems, and I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on it. My second question is about the use case, which was raised by both the hon. Member for South West Devon and the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam. It seems odd that some ambulance services are saying, “We don’t actually need this,” but others are saying that they do. What is special about the East Midlands ambulance service that means it needs to retain this power? It would be interesting to understand the use cases for all these organisations. For example, why is location and time data for telephone communications useful to the Intellectual Property Office? I do not quite see it myself. I might be missing something—I am not an expert in intellectual property—but it would be helpful to see the use case that I presume it made to the commissioner for the authorisation. Has that been published? The guidance states that there has been a consultation with the commissioner. I presume that the consultation has been published, although I have not been able to find it. If it has, does it contain information about how the commissioner tested the use cases? Has the commissioner tested the proportionality—that is what we are making a judgment on here—of the case made by each organisation? Are there real examples that Members can look at and say, for example, “Okay, we understand that East Midlands needs it because it is particularly prone to fraud in which this kind of data is useful for prevention and detection, but the other ambulance services aren’t”? Similarly, for the other organisations, I can see why location data would matter for DVSA, but I have never heard of the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team. I do not know what it does; I would love to know. It would be great if either now or afterwards we could get some information on what it feels like in the real world so Members can make a proportionate judgment, albeit after the fact. On authorisation levels, the Minister said that there is no requirement because the organisations are all going for authorisation direct from the IPC, but in the regulations, in the column that is amended in the legislation, it gives authorisations at particular levels. For example, it states that in the East Midlands ambulance service, a duty manager of an ambulance control room is able to authorise a request. In the Department for Business and Trade, “so far as relating to the Insolvency Service” it specifies: “Grade 7 in the Investigation and Enforcement Services Directorate”. Will the Minister explain why he is happy with that level of internal organisation? To me it feels a little low that a request so intrusive and, in certain circumstances, speculative could be authorised by a no doubt hard-working and dedicated duty manager of an ambulance control room, rather than somebody who we might imagine was part of a senior management team of an organisation who is able to take a strategic view about whether a request was proportionate. As I say, I understand the need for the legislation. It was introduced in 2016 in my first year in the House; I was not the Minister at the time, but obviously I voted for it. It seemed to be the right kind of construct, but we always knew the day would come when we expanded it. The undertaking given then by the Government was that MPs would exercise their judgment about the proportionality of these organisations beyond the police, counter-terrorism and normal enforcement organisations that were really the primary targets of the legislation.

    Hansard source
29. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

    I guess what we are asking is why these four did not respond. Was there communication with them to say, “We haven’t heard from you. Should you have responded? Have you missed it? Is it in the pile?” Six have made the case that they have never used the powers. Four have not responded—I would guess they have not used the powers either but just did not respond. How far did the investigation go? From our point of view, it would be interesting to understand why Birmingham objected. What is the real-life case for which an ambulance service needs this data? Make it live for us, Minister. Give us a story that we can tell our constituents.

    Hansard source
30. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

    I do not want to cast any aspersions on Brian Leveson, whom I know well—not least because he was educated at the same school as I was; obviously, a little before. The challenge is about proportionality. We all acknowledge the importance of such evidence if we are dealing with serious criminality, violence or terrorism—as I said, 100% of murders are solved with the use of this data—but I guess my concern starts when the powers stray into matters that are primarily commercial, for example. The Intellectual Property Office deals essentially with commercial matters—disputes about patents and intellectual property, and possible fraud thereabouts. It is unlikely that anybody will go to prison as a result of the operation of the Intellectual Property Office, although they might pay a big fine or compensation to somebody. I guess the issue is where the line is between criminality, violence, terrorism or serious and organised crime, and more commercial matters. Take the Driving and Vehicle Standards Agency: it may be a crime under DVSA regulations to do x, y or z, but the British public would not put that up there with terrorism. That is the proportionality that we are asking about: whether we are straying too far. The Government obviously do not think so, which is why they have put the regulations forward, but I ask the Minister whether he has satisfied himself about the point I am making. I am sorry to make this slightly long intervention, but my prediction is that we will be here again in 12 months’ time. Suddenly all sorts of organisations will be saying, “D’you know what? It might be useful to have a bit of a fishing trip—we just don’t know. Let’s see if we can persuade the Minister whether, once he has put the Intellectual Property Office in, we can be in as well.”

    Hansard source
31. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

    The Minister has laid out with some passion the dystopian hell that Gaza has become and the unfolding and ongoing disaster in the west bank. Why, then, as many Members have asked, has he done the absolute bare minimum? We all know in this House, after the previous rounds of sanctions, that there will be absolutely no difference on the ground for the Palestinians. I said last week—I am sorry to be cynical about it—that I thought the House was being played. My confident prediction now, given this announcement, is that recognition, which was being advertised for the conference next week, is off the table. Can the Minister tell me that I am wrong?

    Hansard source
32. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Kevin Hollinrake

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    May I thank the Minister for all his hard work? He is an incredibly decent and polite man. He may be misguided at times, but we cannot agree on everything. I thank him and his team for all their work, and I thank my shadow ministerial team who did a fantastic job of subjecting the Bill to line-by-line scrutiny, the other Front-Bench teams, the Committee and the Clerks. I also thank hon. and right hon. Members from across the House for their contributions. We are told that this Bill is about accelerating house building, unleashing growth and meeting a national target of 1.5 million homes in England alone in this Parliament. On the face of it, those aims are worthy, but what price are we prepared to pay for the Deputy Prime Minister’s ambition? Make no mistake: what is being proposed could fundamentally and irrevocably alter the character of our towns, our villages, and the green and pleasant land that makes Britain what it is. This is not an attack on new homes—I am unashamedly pro-business and pro-development. Unlike the Secretary of State, the Minister and half the Cabinet, I have never objected to a housing development in my constituency. Let me be clear: we need homes. We need homes for first-time buyers, for young families, for key workers and for the next generation, but we need the right homes in the right places, shaped by the right principles. Instead, we are being offered a top-down model driven by arbitrary targets and central diktat. The result is soulless settlements, identikit developments and rows of uninspiring concrete boxes that bear no relation to the history, the heritage or the hopes of the communities they are built in. Crucially, in the Government’s “centralising zeal”—as the excellent shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley (Paul Holmes), calls it—local voices are being sidelined. Local councillors, and those who live in, love and understand their communities best, are being cut out of the process, with their role reduced and their judgment overlooked. The individual has been subordinated to being a cog in the machine. The Bill in its current form is not just flawed, but dangerous. It risks eroding trust in the planning system and widening the gulf between the Government and the governed. The Bill must be considered in conjunction with the changes to the national planning policy framework. The Government’s approach of shifting housing targets from urban areas to rural areas is cynical and economically illiterate. While I welcome the restoration of mandatory targets in principle, raising targets by up to 400% in rural areas while simultaneously reducing them by over 11% in London, 30% in Birmingham and Newcastle, and over 50% in Coventry is unfair and wrong-headed. Their grey belt policy—presented as a few disused garage forecourts and wasteland in green belts—is a con. What they have actually done is remove important protections that prevent villages from merging into nearby villages and towns. Of course, there is also the matter of the environment. Anyone who cares about our natural world knows that once a habitat is destroyed, a woodland torn up or a biodiverse landscape bulldozed, no cheque can bring it back. There is zero confidence on this side of the House that Natural England can successfully mitigate the significant environmental harms that will ensue through the environmental delivery plans. That is why we propose that they be delivered locally through local or strategic plans. The truth is that we cannot concrete our way to community, we cannot meet our housing needs by overriding the very people we are building for, and we cannot call it progress if the Bill leaves our countryside degraded and our communities disempowered.

    Hansard source
33. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Kevin Hollinrake

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, and the failures of the London Mayor to build more houses are well documented. What is perhaps not a surprise is that Reform would take the further step of supporting the London Mayor in the pursuit of Labour votes. We have grave concerns about the enhanced compulsory purchase order powers for councils, mayors and even Natural England, without hope value or market value. This undermines one of the most important principles of our economy: property rights. Not only is this unfair, but it will face legal challenge after legal challenge in the courts. During the passage of the Bill, we attempted to work with the Government to make sensible changes to make it fit for purpose, but to no avail. Let us not be seduced by false choices. We do not have to choose between development and democracy, between homes and heritage, or between ambition and accountability. We can build and we must build, but we must do so in a way that listens, respects and safeguards. I urge the Government, yes, to be ambitious, but also to think again. They should rethink the Bill, and restore the local voice and reinstate environmental protections. Let us chart a path to progress that honours our need for homes, our obligation to communities and to the environment, and our duty to future generations. In its current form, we cannot support this Bill.

    Hansard source
34. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Joy Morrissey

    Grid Capacity

    Happy birthday, Mr Speaker. We need to ensure that the technology that we import to increase grid capacity is secure. US officials recently found kill switches in Chinese-made components for solar farms. The Conservatives have been clear about the security risks that China poses in our energy supply chain, so will the Secretary of State confirm whether he discussed that issue in his recent meeting with Chinese officials? If not, why not?

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35. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·John Lamont

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    I will speak to the amendments relating to compulsory purchase powers, and to my new clause 128. I note that much of the Bill and most of the clauses will not affect Scotland, but, unusually for a planning Bill, there are components that do affect it. Before I talk about the detail of my concerns about compulsory purchase powers, I want to set out a little of the context, and say why the issue is exercising so many of my constituents. I am privileged to represent the Scottish Borders—the place I call home. It is undoubtedly one of the most beautiful parts of the United Kingdom, but it is under attack. The net-zero-at-all-costs agenda of this UK Labour Government, backed by the SNP in Edinburgh, is causing huge concern to my constituents. Massive pylons, solar farms, wind farms and battery storage units are ruining the Scottish Borders as we know them, and compulsory purchase powers are a key part of delivering many of those projects.

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36. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·John Lamont

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    I share my right hon. Friend’s concerns. Ultimately, this is about choices. The choice that this Government and the Scottish Government are making is whether we protect our natural environment, and the rural communities that have sustained food production for many years, or turn them into an industrial wasteland. The compulsory purchase powers in the Bill that affect my constituency in Scotland will affect many similar communities in England. My constituents in the Scottish Borders have had their fair share of new developments. In the Scottish Borders, the countryside is where we live. It is not some distant, remote area that is occasionally visited by tourists from Edinburgh or London; it is the place we call home. Compulsory purchase powers must be exercised with appropriate checks and balances in order to protect our communities, whether in Scotland or in other parts of the UK. I now turn specifically to the amendment that stands in my name, new clause 128, which deals with compulsory purchase and the community benefit related to it. We all know that when compulsory purchase takes place, it is difficult and often devastating for those who are directly affected. Too often, though, we fail to recognise the impact on the wider community, especially when it comes to new energy infrastructure. We have to improve the relationship between those affected and those acquiring the land. Compulsory purchase can be a complex and intimidating process.

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37. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·John Lamont

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and I agree with him. I am sure he will speak to those points further when he contributes later. We should be protecting the market value and not doing anything to interfere with the market—not least because if my new clause were accepted, it would improve the community benefit fund, which in turn would benefit the local residents who are directly affected by these types of projects. If the Bill could be improved in this way, it would be better for the people who live in rural communities, such as those in the Scottish Borders. As we saw again yesterday, this UK Labour Government have U-turned a lot over the past few months. I hope they will take this opportunity to listen to right hon. and hon. Members from across the House so that we can protect our beautiful environment, protect nature, and do better for rural communities.

    Hansard source
38. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·John Lamont

    Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does he agree that one of the flaws of the Bill, which his amendments attempt to address, is that it overreaches not only in attacking property rights in this country and interfering with the market, but in taking away key aspects of democratic accountability? That is why so many of our constituents across the United Kingdom are so concerned about what the Bill attempts to do.

    Hansard source
39. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

    Another reason to include the word “badge”, my hon. Friend would presumably agree, is not only that is it technically correct, but it is a word used in football. It is a word that fans use. It is always helpful if legal documents in a Bill can reflect both technical and everyday wording. If the two are the same, that seems like an obvious answer.

    Hansard source
40. 10 Jun 2025·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

    My hon. Friend the shadow Minister sets out his question very well. It sounds as though the situation could get very complicated, especially over time, as the regulator might impose certain conditions on certain clubs and severely distort the market. Does he have any comment on that?

    Hansard source