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When I met Big C in King’s Lynn recently, I heard about the anxiety caused; only 52% of local patients are treated within two months, whereas the national average is 71.9%. What action is the Department taking to support the Queen Elizabeth hospital trust in improving its performance for patients?
Inverurie medical practice in my constituency saw its national insurance bill rise by £75,000 thanks to this Government. That has put huge pressure on the practice, which was already operating with one GP for 3,000 patients, which is three times higher than the British Medical Association recommends. When did the Secretary of State last meet the Chancellor to discuss the impact of the NICs rise on GP practices, and what are he and his Department doing about the pressure—
Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. Seven months ago, the NHS 10-year plan promised a maternity taskforce. May I ask the Minister how many times it has met?
The fact that the taskforce has not even met, seven months later, tells us everything we need to know about how urgent and important the Government consider this issue. In Leeds, families are losing faith in the failing maternity services. The Secretary of State said that he takes the matter “extremely seriously”, yet Donna Ockenden—who exposed the failings in Nottingham, has the support of families, and has said that she is ready and willing to lead the inquiry—has not been appointed. If the Minister and the Secretary of State take this issue extremely seriously, why have they not appointed a chair yet?
It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I am generally cautious about borrowing beyond our means, but on every organisation significant costs are sometimes imposed that require capital spending. The general lighthouse authorities have been looking after our seafarers for hundreds of years and do critical work to maintain their safety and welfare. Even though they may no longer have the same number of almshouses to maintain, or responsibilities for mariners’ widows and children to fulfil, they still play an enormous role in maintaining the operational network of aids to navigation around the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is a tremendous legacy of British maritime history, and given the importance of the maritime sector, it is right that the GLAs have the resources they need to ensure safe passage for vessels. In this case, I am aware that the draft order relates to a programme of vessel replacement needed due to many of them reaching the end of their service life. Having working vessels is of course an expense it is necessary to meet if the GLAs are to operate effectively, but can the Minister assure us that the types of vessel procured will be cost effective and that there will be no onerous procurement criteria that could increase costs? I understand that there is no direct provision for UK Government funding, but that the Department for Transport covers the financial risk of the GLAs defaulting on their repayments. As the former maritime Minister said in the debate on the 2024 Order, “This…does not expose the Treasury or the Department, because these are effectively loans to be paid back.”—[Official Report, Fifth Delegated Legislation Committee, 30 October 2024; c. 6.] Although I am sure that the Minister is confident in the GLAs’ ability to manage their finances, in increasing the borrowing limits through 10 statutory instruments, has any assessment been made of the financial security of the organisations? For example, I understand that the minimum general lighthouse fund cash reserves are set at £20 million to cover costs. While the current level is greater than that sum, will the Treasury need to make any changes? Has the Department for Transport engaged with the lighthouse authorities to ascertain their confidence in paying back the borrowing? Has the potential long-term impact on light dues been assessed? Avoiding increases business costs is critical, and I am sure we want to avoid imposing a greater financial burden on shipping businesses. The general lighthouse authorities have centuries of history, illustrating—some might say illuminating—their effectiveness in upholding the safety of mariners. It is essential that the Government act as the steward of this history and ensure that they remain operationally and financial viable.
I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to introduce compulsory labelling of halal and kosher meat and products containing halal and kosher meat; and for connected purposes. This is a Bill about animal welfare, transparency in meat production and consumer choice. It does not seek to ban halal or kosher meat. It seeks to ensure that it is clearly labelled. It is important that consumers have such information so that they can make an informed choice about what they are buying. Currently consumers do not have that information, and many are purchasing and consuming halal and kosher meat without their knowledge and agreement. The unique process of halal and kosher meat requires the animal to have its throat slit. In the case of halal meat, the animal is often stunned before it is killed—although it might not be—and for the shechita killing for kosher meat, there is no pre-stunning. This lack of stunning causes the animal to experience severe pain. An individual concerned about animal welfare would want to know if the animal has been stunned prior to slaughter. Likewise, there are many religious groups who want to know what they are consuming too and whether the meat has been blessed by another religion. In all those cases clear labelling is essential to make an informed choice. Currently, the legislation that regulates animal slaughter is set out in assimilated EU regulation 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing, as well as in the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015. Under these laws, animals must be stunned before they are killed, but exemptions exist for killing without stunning in accordance with specific religious rites. Added to that, there are currently no requirements for such meat to be labelled. What was once an exemption to the accepted stunning process of animals has become a growing part of the UK’s meat market. The Government’s own figures show that of the 1.035 billion animals processed in English and Welsh slaughterhouses in 2024, an estimated 214.6 million were slaughtered to produce halal meat. The analysis shows that the proportion of meat supplied by non-stun slaughter is about four times greater than the proportion of Muslims and Jews in the UK. Although Government guidance is clear that meat that results from non-stun slaughter “must be intended for consumption by Jews or Muslims”, production is clearly going way beyond that, so much so that the UK now exports halal meat. Between 2018 and 2019, there was an almost 700% increase in the volume of sheep meat exported to the United Arab Emirates, all of which is required to be halal. Clearly, without compulsory labelling of non-stunned meat, slaughterhouses have gone down the route of producing more of it. In effect, a two-tier system has been created, whereby some slaughterhouses comply with stunning laws and others do not, citing the religious exemption, though without ever intending to focus their sale on that market. Unfortunately, a driver of the market for non-stunned meat is the fact that a step of the process is removed, meaning that production of non-stunned meat is cheaper. Supermarkets and food outlets can purchase that cheaper meat without ever declaring it to the customer, which is not what was intended by the legislation. We have seen many examples of this over the last 15 years; Britain’s biggest retailers—such as Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Marks & Spencer and Asda—have sold halal or kosher meat without informing the consumer, as have Domino’s, Pizza Hut and KFC. Non-stunned produce is being used by 17 local councils in schools, the majority of which are not Islamic faith schools, without parents or children having the first idea about it. It is also being served in hospitals and local councils. In December, Labour put forward its much-vaunted animal welfare strategy, a document lauded for its aim of “preventing animals suffering unnecessarily”, which included the banning of boiling live lobsters, banning the use of carbon dioxide to stun pigs, and steps to ensure the more humane slaughter of farmed fish. I was surprised and alarmed to see no mention of the more humane slaughter of animals and the labelling of halal and kosher meat. There was a clear opportunity to call for the labelling of halal and kosher meat, but it was missed. Nowhere in Labour’s 12,500-word animal welfare strategy was it mentioned. We often hear in the House that the UK holds the status of a world leader in animal welfare, but such a glaring gap shows that this country can no longer make such a claim. Food and You 2, which is a biannual official statistic survey commissioned by the Food Standards Agency, found that the most common spontaneously expressed food concern in 2024 was “food production method”. In August 2022, almost 99% of respondents to the Government’s call for evidence on labelling for animal welfare said that method-of-slaughter labelling should be introduced. In research from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, 92% of halal consumers state that clear halal certification is important, so is it not time we updated our regulations and demanded that our meat was clearly and fully labelled, so that we know what we are buying and eating? Surely that is what consumer choice is all about, and I would wager that the overwhelming majority of animal lovers in the UK expect the House of Commons to support this Bill today. This Bill will give all consumers assurance that they know how their meat was produced. I urge all Members of the House to support this measure. Question put and agreed to. Ordered, That Esther McVey, Sir Roger Gale, Alberto Costa, Dame Karen Bradley, Sir Edward Leigh, Graham Stringer, Rupert Lowe, Sammy Wilson, Jim Allister, Lee Anderson and Sarah Pochin present the Bill. Esther McVey accordingly presented the Bill. Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 10 July, and to be printed (Bill 386).
I declare an interest as a consultant paediatrician in the NHS. Prevention of ill health is crucial. It is particularly important in children, perhaps most especially when one is trying to prevent ill health in children caused by doctors. I have expressed concerns previously about the puberty blockers trial, as have many in both Houses. The trial has now been paused due to a Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency letter. When were Ministers first aware of that letter and when were they first aware of the concerns described within it?
That is a very interesting answer. Before Christmas, the Secretary of State had confidence in an allegedly vigorous and rigorous process. Fertility preservation techniques have not deteriorated over the last few months. The ages at which children reach the Tanner stages of puberty have not changed over the last few months, but the MHRA’s view has. Why? Given that this is such a scrutinised trial, does that not call into question the MHRA’s wider competence and due diligence? Will the Minister publish the MHRA’s letter from November referred to in the more recent correspondence published on Friday?
On a point of order, Ms McVey. I seek your advice with reference to the debate on clause 43, on 10 February. I draw Members’ attention to my question to the Minister in Hansard about parliamentary scrutiny of directions: “Even where they are redacted because of national security concerns, somebody, or some mechanism of Parliament, will be able to scrutinise them. Can the Minister confirm that?”––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 10 February 2026; c. 212.] The Minister responded: “Yes.” We received a letter over the recess dated 19 February—we are very grateful to the Minister for writing to us—which states something slightly different: “The Government’s default position is that copies of directions will be laid in Parliament, to enable all parliamentarians to scrutinise the Government’s use of…powers. Where this is not possible for national security reasons, alternative options for scrutiny could be used, such as allowing for directions to be read in private reading rooms or briefing individual shadow ministers. As such, we are confident that alternative options are available for scrutiny when directions cannot be laid in Parliament for national security reasons.” “Will” is different from “could” and “are available”. Given that we have moved beyond the debate on clause 43, what options are there for the Minister to either clarify those remarks or correct the record?
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but we have seen over the past six months, especially with the alleged spying incidents in Parliament, the Government’s resistance to recognising the Chinese Communist party as a threat. When it comes to our new clause 3 and concerns over transparency, we have also seen, in the last few weeks, that there are mechanisms—for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee—to ensure the disclosure of documents, while preserving national security. I would therefore like to press new clauses 2 and 3 to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the effect of existing information sharing and analysis centres, with a view to determining whether further such centres should be established. The financial services industry has successful voluntary schemes—the Cyber Defence Alliance, and the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre—which act as hubs for collaboration on all matters relating to the prevention, detection, mitigation and investigation of cyber-threats and criminality impacting members. These organisations provide an essential alerting and co-ordinating role for their members, including providing intelligence and technical support during ongoing incidents. They can assist in building partnerships contextualised to particular sector risks. According to Richard Starnes of the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists, companies “may be competing with one another in their chosen businesses, but they are all in the same boat with regard to being attacked by whatever entities are attacking them.” And he said that if the FS-ISAC were replicated “on an industry-by-industry basis, particularly ones in CNI, that would be helpful. It would also help with information sharing with entities like NCSC and GCHQ.”––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2026; c. 64, Q75-76.]
That information is concerning. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend that information sharing is important when dealing with evolving threats.
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, which is more for the Minister and the Government Whip’s benefit than mine. Properly established ISACs will not only increase real-time awareness of cyber-risks and mitigations, but could also alleviate some of the burden on regulators in terms of sector-specific intelligence analysis. Industry feedback and experience from the adoption of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 indicate that sectoral regulators are unlikely to have the capacity to assist with intelligence sharing in relation to real-time cyber-risks. We know from the sectoral regulators’ oral evidence that building sufficient capacity for effective regulatory oversight is a challenge. Where we have models for sector-led and market-led good practice in hardening cyber-resilience, we should look at how it can be rolled out further. Seeing more of these organisations emerge could even lead to broader adoption beyond NIS-regulated areas to other industries. ISACs have the potential to become integral nodes in improving whole-of-society cyber-resilience, and it is an approach called for by many cyber industry stakeholders. I therefore commend new clause 4.
In response to the Minister’s comments, clause 40 is about a review; it does not provide any direction, other than for the Secretary of State to do their job in reviewing this area. I will press new clause 4 to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The National Audit Office’s 2025 report on cyber-resilience highlighted that Government Departments and agencies are among the weakest links in the UK’s cyber-security ecosystem and lack a credible plan to become cyber-resilient in the short to medium term. The Government play a key role in the management of certain critical national industries, but the continuing cyber-security vulnerabilities in the IT systems used to operate CNI expose the UK to the threat of serious attacks that could undermine national security and the economy. That is not to mention the risk to enormous amounts of highly sensitive data held on Government systems. Dr Sanjana Mehta of ISC2 said in her oral evidence that the Department for Work and Pensions administered £288 billion of benefits over the past year, with more than 23 million people claiming benefits of some kind. That activity involves processing vast amounts of personal, medical and financial data, which presents rich pickings for malicious actors. The feedback from industry stakeholders, many of whom are being asked by the Government to take on onerous security and reporting obligations under this Bill, echoes those concerns regarding Government cyber-immaturity. There is a strong sentiment that the Government should be leading by example, as Chris Anley of the NCC Group commented in the Committee’s oral evidence sessions. In view of the growing risk posed to UK cyber-security by hostile state actors, by their affiliates and by criminal gangs, improving Government cyber-security is urgent. It is clear from the NAO’s findings and other recent reports that Government Departments have lacked the clear goals and necessary accountability to incentivise tackling this significant challenge. In his letter of 19 February to members of the Committee, the Minister said: “Government will be held to equivalent cyber security requirements that we expect of the essential and digital services in scope of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill.” But as matters stand, there are no effective legal mechanisms for accountability to Parliament on increasing Government cyber-resilience to the standards necessary to meet the intensifying threats facing our Government Departments and agencies. New clause 5 would compel the Secretary of State to make yearly reports to Parliament setting out the Government’s progress towards meeting the recommendations of the National Audit Office’s 2025 report on Government cyber-resilience and towards meeting the standards they set themselves in their recent cyber action plan. Where necessary, the Secretary of State would have to account for failures to meet deadlines for implementation and issue a new plan to achieve compliance. In moving this new clause, I am aware of the challenges that successive Governments have faced in driving up cyber-resilience standards. There are serious practical and budgetary obstacles that can impede progress, such as the vast amount of legacy IT equipment that remains in use, which is inherently more vulnerable to attack. Moreover, there is the ongoing problem of recruiting highly skilled cyber-security professionals to work in these roles, given the competition in the recruitment market and constraints on public sector salaries. Illustrative of that challenge is the worrying statistic, cited by Chris Anley of the NCC Group, that “almost a third of cyber-security posts in Government are presently unfilled”.––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2026; c. 24, Q29.] None the less, the Government have now put in place a plan that they consider achievable, and they should be held to account for it. The new clause creates a mechanism for that much-needed accountability.
I agree about the importance of putting things on the record. Since the hon. Member obviously has not been listening to my speech, he can check it out on the record. I acknowledged the challenges in this area—[Interruption.] Does the Government Whip want to intervene, or was she just chuntering? I will continue. Given that the Bill puts quite a burden on the private sector, as we discussed over several sittings before the parliamentary recess, I think it is important that the Government recognise, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it would be pretty shameless not to vote for accountability for themselves while putting it on other people. Let us see how the vote goes. I commend new clause 5 to the Committee.
This new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, would require the Secretary of State to consult and report within one year on whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have sufficient resources and capabilities to meet their statutory obligations. Historical levels of regulatory oversight and enforcement in relation to the NIS regulations 2018 have fallen short of what is necessary to achieve meaningful cyber-resilience across regulated sectors. The second post-implementation review of the NIS regs 2018, conducted in 2022, found that incident reporting on the part of regulated entities was very low, with only 13, 12 and 22 NIS incidents reported in 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively. A review conducted by the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists identified a near total absence of formal financial sanctions under the NIS regulations, with zero confirmed major penalties from 2021 to 2024. The model has not been conducive to effective discharge of regulatory responsibilities, with knock-on effects for cyber-resilience and regulated industries, yet regulators will be expected to oversee a far larger pool of regulated bodies and process a far larger number of incident reports under the Bill’s provisions. It is therefore right for us to scrutinise carefully whether regulators are in a position to meet these obligations. In the evidence sessions, many of my questions to witnesses, including those from Ofgem, Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s Office, focused on their preparations to meet the demands of their expanded roles. It was clear from feedback that although regulators understand what they need to do to prepare, the practical challenges associated with securing sufficient resource are far from resolved. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could clarify his plans to review regulators’ progress and what the key milestones will be to ensure that regulators can discharge their new duties alongside their existing ones when these provisions come into effect.
New clause 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, addresses concerns regarding the capacity of SMEs to comply with their regulatory obligations, should they be brought within the scope of the Bill. That matter has been discussed on several occasions by the Committee. That is only right given that, according to figures provided by NCC Group, SMEs make up over 99% of businesses in the UK but too often lack the skills and budgets to implement proportionate cyber-protections, leaving them particularly exposed. SME cyber assistance schemes akin to the one proposed by the new clause have been rolled out in Scotland on a limited basis and in Australia, where the Government are investing 8 million Australian dollars over three years to provide free person-to-person support for small businesses during and after a cyber-attack. Those schemes have enjoyed some success in hardening cyber-resilience among SMEs that have been able to access them. That can only be welcomed. There is a case for looking more closely at whether regulation is the appropriate first step to address the cyber-resilience of the smallest organisations that might be brought within the scope of regulation, as legal compliance efforts could detract from already pressured operational defence budgets. In giving evidence to the Committee, Jill Broom of techUK called for strategies “such as financial incentives, or…tax credits”––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2026; c. 18, Q20.] to help SMEs improve their cyber-resilience, and techUK has suggested that funding or relief could be applied on a priority basis, with those working within the critical national infrastructure supply chain looked at first. In the light of those considerations, what analysis has the Minister’s Department conducted of the likely return on investment, in terms of sustainability and growth among smaller companies, of a cyber support service for UK SMEs?
New clause 16 would require active board oversight of security and resilience measures and accountability for board members where they fail in those oversight duties, whereas new clause 17 would require regulated entities to carry out proportionate, periodic testing of the security and resilience of their network and information systems, and provide the results to regulatory bodies upon request. On board accountability, as we have already discussed in this Committee, the existing regulatory model under NIS regulations has not been sufficiently effective in driving up cyber-resilience standards to meet emerging threats. Board engagement is a key part of that, but the stat I quoted previously in this Committee indicates that engagement is going in the wrong direction. What assessment has the Minister made of the potential advantages and disadvantages of direct accountability in the adoption of effective cyber-resilience measures, based on a roll-out of the NIS2 regulations? Proportionate testing of systems may be a useful tool in detecting and managing cyber-security risk. What consideration has the Minister’s Department given to how that topic should be approached in the Secretary of State’s code of practice?
I will speak to new clause 19, tabled in my name on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition. The new clause would compel the Secretary of State, within 12 months of Royal Assent, to review the need for a statutory defence, encompassing legitimate cyber-research activities, to criminal offences under clause 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which is about unauthorised access to computer programs. The campaign for reform in this area, CyberUp, has argued that, in its current form, the CMA inadvertently criminalises critical activity such as vulnerability research and threat intelligence, both of which are essential for defending the nation’s digital systems. The new clause would also require the Secretary of State’s review to evaluate whether the creation of such a defence would enable regulated bodies to improve the resilience of their network and information systems via enhanced vulnerability testing and research. New clause 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, relates to the same important topic and would require the Secretary of State to review, and report to Parliament within 12 months of the Bill’s entering into law, whether amending the Computer Misuse Act could improve the resilience of network and information systems. Hon. Members will recall the insightful oral evidence of Professor John Child of the University of Birmingham. Professor Child made a clear and compelling case for the need to amend the Computer Misuse Act to provide statutory defences for legitimate cyber-research—sometimes called ethical hacking activities. Likewise, campaign groups, industry specialists and parliamentarians have all argued that the Computer Misuse Act, which was written before the modern internet, is no longer fit for purpose. At present, the Act fails to distinguish between malicious attackers and cyber professionals acting in the public interest, inadvertently criminalising a large proportion of research that UK cyber-security professionals can carry out to protect UK critical infrastructure and the UK’s technological ecosystem. This means that cyber-security professionals working to defend UK organisations from real-world threats risk prosecution. That has created a chilling effect—talent is being lost, investment is stifled and security gaps are going unidentified. If we are to have true UK cyber-resilience—not just among regulated sectors, but across businesses of all types and throughout society—we need a multifaceted approach. Industry and private sector-led initiatives will play a strong role in that. Professor Child made clear that countries that have implemented more favourable regimes, such as the US and Israel, are benefiting from increased cyber-resilience as a result of cyber-research activity. The Government have acknowledged that reform of the CMA is a pressing issue. Indeed, the Home Office has been reviewing that question for some time. Further, the Minister for Security, the hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), highlighted the urgent need for changes to the law in this area in a recent speech, stating that Government have “heard the criticisms about the Computer Misuse Act, and how it can leave many cyber security experts feeling constrained in the activity that they can undertake.” He went on to say: “These researchers play an important role in increasing the resilience of UK systems, and securing them from…vulnerabilities. We shouldn’t be shutting these people out, we should be welcoming them and their work.” Yet the Home Office has brought forward no specific proposals for reform. Parliament is unlikely to legislate again in the cyber-security domain for some considerable time; we cannot afford to kick the can down the road on this vital issue any longer if we are to have a credible plan for whole-of-society cyber-resilience.
I am a bit unclear about the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The point I was making was that there is legitimate concern that people doing research into this area and doing threat assessments risk prosecution, so, across the whole of our society, that work is not being done. We have heard quite a lot of evidence from cyber campaigns about the benefits that changes to this law would make to the system, which is why we tabled the new clause. I commend new clause 19 to the Committee. I hope the Minister agrees that now is the time to address the issue. I suspect that this will be my last, or penultimate, time speaking to the Committee, so I would like to finish by thanking Members on both sides of the Committee for a fun and, at times, robust debate over the past month. I thank the Chairs, the Clerks and all the teams working on the Bill—and Sophie Thorley from my office, who has done incredible research on the Bill.
We are a responsible Opposition and we are pleased to hear about the work that the Minister and his Department have been doing and about the shared purpose in getting this done and getting it right. Would he give us a bit more detail of the timescales and plans for public consultation? I understand that he has been doing some personal consultation in private, but will there be a public consultation? Given that the reform crosses two Departments, which Department will be taking it forward? What I am really looking for from him is a confirmation at the Dispatch Box that he is personally committed to getting this piece of work over the line during this parliamentary term.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. This is a procedural question. Given that the long title of the Bill is not in the motion, does that mean that the Bill can effectively cover any subject or theme if the Order Paper is seized on that day?
Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Thank you for that clarification, but my understanding is that that is the short title, not the long title. Is it the case that the long title can be used to tag in any related subjects to expand the scope from the narrow one here?
What is clear is that there is a motion on the Order Paper on which Members will presumably be asked to divide in due course. That does not give any detail of the proposed Bill, but the motion on the Order Paper is orderly and it will be up to Members to decide how they wish to vote on that.
I thank the hon. Member for his point of order. The motion on the Order Paper is perfectly orderly, so Members will be invited to vote on that, not on the substance of any Bill that might come on 9 March. I think it is important that the House is clear on that.
The motion is to give consideration to a Bill on the specific matter which has been outlined clearly on the Order Paper: “Protections for children from online harms”. I reassure the hon. Lady that any contribution she chooses to make on that matter would be in order.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point of order, which I anticipated might come at some point. If he checks the Order Paper, he will see that paragraph (1)(d) says very specifically that it has to be a Bill on online services age restrictions that is brought forward on 9 March.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his further point of order. Clarification on that point had best be sought from the Public Bill Office. It is my understanding that any Bill brought forward will have to cover online services age restriction, but I appreciate the distinction that he makes between the long and the short titles.
I thank the hon. Member for his very long point of order—[Interruption.] Yes, he has made the point that he is trying to be helpful. To clarify, first, it is the House’s time not Government time, but the powers given as set out in the motion are as he has outlined them. May I further highlight that it is not without precedent to hold a debate on a motion taking over the Order Paper on a Bill, without the Bill having been published? It last occurred on 6 February 2024 when an Opposition motion was tabled to take over the Order Paper to discuss ministerial severance reform, and that Bill had not yet been published. So it is not without precedent, but the hon. Member is correct in his understanding of what the motion would do were it to be passed by the House. I call the Minister.
Order. The hon. Lady has repeatedly made very long interventions. It was always open to her to attend the opening of the debate and to speak in it.
Order. Could I just be helpful? A lot of help has been needed this afternoon. The Minister has not asked to intervene, and the hon. Lady cannot force him to intervene on her.
As Members will know, the debate has to conclude by 7 o’clock. There are slightly more than 10 people bobbing. I plan to move to the wind-ups at 6.40 pm, which should leave everyone plenty of time.
On the point about information sharing with a view to bolstering resilience, Marks and Spencer reported to me that it was surprised to have received more information from the FBI on the origin and impact of the cyber-attack that it suffered than it received from UK authorities. That should adequately demonstrate why sufficient data sharing is required to underpin our resilience and bolster our strength.
Given that the threshold for a significant impact event will likely be much lower for an SME than for a larger corporation, and while acknowledging and agreeing that SMEs are the backbone of the economy and make up the vast majority of companies that employ people in this country, how does the hon. Gentleman propose to strike the relevant balance between ensuring that SMEs are supported, and at the same time that they are not inundated and overwhelmed as a result of that significant impact threshold likely being much lower for SMEs?
While I agree with the hon. Member, and acknowledge witnesses’ evidence suggesting that cyber-security should be a board-level responsibility, does he share my concern that, given the complexity and technical nature of cyber-security, there is perhaps a risk of, for want of a better phrase, window dressing? It may be that non-competent people without the relevant technical expertise could be reliant on reports issued by other technical staff who do not sit at board level. We have to strike the right balance. Does the hon. Member share that concern, and how does he propose we address that?
Several weeks ago, I received a jaw-dropping email from a local Bromsgrove GP, who told me that a 10-month-old child nearly died after ambulance delays. Worse, the same day, another patient—a 66-year-old driving instructor—suffered a cardiac arrest during a driving lesson and died while being driven to the hospital by his wife. My constituents demand a better service and better response times. What are the Government going to do about this, and will the Secretary of State meet me and the concerned GP who wrote to me to address this issue?
New clause 5 simply asks the Government to commit to reporting back on meeting the milestones they have set themselves for increasing cyber-security standards. Is the Minister confident in the Government’s ability to deliver on their cyber strategy, or is the document not worth the paper it is written on?
The continued use of legacy IT equipment is a particular vulnerability across the Government estate. That will take some time to address entirely, but is there a strategy in place to prioritise the upgrading of this legacy equipment, given that it is one of the greatest areas of exposure?
15. What steps he is taking to increase access to care in the community.