Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,731 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

   Ground-mounted Solar Panels: Alternatives

   The hon. Lady makes a really important point. One of the massive delays in deploying solar power is the requirement to achieve planning permission, and I am so pleased that she has brought that up. One of the beauties of floating solar is that if the owner of the reservoir or former quarry will use the electricity themselves, there is no requirement for planning permission. In terms of speed to deployment, return on investment and speed to profit, this is to a certain extent an answer to a maiden’s prayer. We have not yet added in the third element of this battle between food security and energy security: water security. I believe in climate change. I am more sceptical about carbon neutrality within a certain arbitrary timeline, but the fact is that evaporation is a massive issue as the world warms up. One of the stunning and much less vaunted benefits of floating solar is that it reduces evaporation by 70%. Australia is very expensively covering reservoirs in anti-evaporation covers, but those could be floating solar panels. I can sense the mood of the Chamber—hon. Members are very keen for me to list the other benefits, so I will do just that. The first, which we have talked about, is that floating solar comes with none of the opportunity costs of putting solar panels on grade A agricultural land, so we can move the debate on from whether we have to choose between energy security and food security. Secondly, because of the effect on evaporation, floating solar also moves the debate on from the need for water security and energy security. Another stunning benefit is that it is twice as efficient as land-based systems. We would need only half the amount of floating solar as we would need solar covering Lincolnshire or Suffolk agricultural land. Hon. Members who remember their O-level physics will know that the evaporative effect on the underside of the floating solar panel makes it self-cooling, whereas land-based and roof-based systems and those in railway sidings simply get hotter through the working day and become less efficient. “What about the water in these reservoirs? Surely, Lincoln, this can’t be as good as it sounds?” Well, it gets better, especially if the reservoir is to be used for drinking water further downstream. Denuded of heat and light, those things that grow in reservoirs that subsequently have to be filtered out, very expensively, by the water companies cannot grow. It is win-win-win all round. Let us leave 2016, when we were Europe’s leaders, and fast-forward to last year. If ever there was a way to motivate Members of the House of Commons, it is to suggest that the French are beating us at something. Bear in mind the 6.3 MW—enough to power 2,000 homes—on the Queen Elizabeth reservoir. Last year, a plant on a disused quarry in Perthes, France became fully operational. It generates 75 MW. I visited a former dock in Barrow-in-Furness where a 45 MW site is planned. It has to go through planning because BAE Systems will take the electricity. I would relax the permitted development right to include third-party use of the electricity, so that we can realise the benefits and improve the business case of floating solar to entertain the sort of investment it would need. I think there are 570 reservoirs in this country, and there is floating solar on one—the Queen Elizabeth. Ten further projects are planned. We also have innumerable former quarries and unused ports such as at Barrow. The opportunity is huge; we are talking terawatts. If it is realised, floating solar could generate 1% of UK baseload. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) mentioned space. Clearly, that would be phenomenal. Dare I say that it behoves the Government to look at this in a more strategic way than hitherto? They published their long-awaited solar road map. It has about 94 pages, and about half a page and a photo are dedicated to floating solar, which they describe as a “nascent” technology. I hope that I have shown that it is not nascent at all; it has been with us for quite some time. Last August I stood on top of the Golan heights, looking down towards Syria, and saw two enormous reservoirs that were almost completely covered with floating solar panels. We should look to hotter and more arid countries for our sense of where we should take our innovation and technology. My plea to the House and the Government is this: look again at the potential for floating solar. When it comes to energy security, food security and water security, it provides a non-ideological, highly practical solution—a NIHPS—without papering over the beautiful parts of England. By the way, all the reservoirs in my constituency are raised, so this solution comes with none of the visual vandalism of our country being carpeted in solar panels, to which people object so much. The tops of those reservoirs can be seen only by people taking off from or landing at Heathrow. The hon. Member for South Derbyshire (Samantha Niblett) is quite right: nothing is as simple or as perfect as it might first sound. I do not envy her having two grid plug-in points—she will be one of the most popular Members of Parliament going. But if we can, we must examine floating solar in greater detail, because it could, to a certain extent, produce a valuable alternative diversification of our energy supply in a world that is becoming ever more dangerous and insecure.

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2. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

   Ground-mounted Solar Panels: Alternatives

   I am grateful to all hon. Members who have made such powerful contributions. I love the image of the Minister under his bed clothes with a torch reading the Hansard report of my Adjournment debate. I can see the turning point where floating solar went from a nascent technology to one that the Minister wants to drive further and faster. He made a crucial point about how it is all very well to will the ends, but we need to will the ways and means, and not say, “Not in my back yard”. Floating solar is exactly my way of saying to the farmers in Lincolnshire and hon. Members from great agricultural land, “Yes, in my back yard. In fact, on half of London’s drinking water in the four raised reservoirs in Spelthorne, and in across other raised reservoirs across the country.” We can unpick this constant battle between food, water and energy security, and I am grateful to the House for giving me the opportunity to highlight that.

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3. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Lewis Cocking

   Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting)

   When postal voters are notified by their local authority that they are about to drop off the roll, does the Minister agree that they should not always be encouraged to do that online? Some people who have postal votes do not want to make online applications. Does she also agree that they should be sent a fresh application from the council, with a freepost envelope for its return, so that they can keep their postal votes?

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4. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Lewis Cocking

   Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting)

   The hon. Member is speaking about company donations. I am not saying I agree with this, but does she feel that the same logic should apply to trade union donations? If she feels that companies cannot donate, does she still feel that trade unions can?

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5. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

   Ground-mounted Solar Panels: Alternatives

   My hon. Friend is exactly right, and I share her frustration. In my constituency, there is a large area of protected national landscape, the North Wessex downs national park, which is constantly under threat from these kinds of proposals. Does she share my frustration at the lack of imagination shown in the UK? The A303 and the A34 run through my constituency, and there are tens of miles of embankment that could be used for solar panels. That is the approach they take in Germany, the Netherlands and elsewhere, but we never seem to get over the imagination gap about where we could put these things—floating or whatever—that may not be quite so damaging and intrusive. She probably has parts of the M1 in her constituency, which has endless miles of embankment that could be used for solar panels that could power her constituency and mine without harming any visual amenity whatsoever.

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6. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

   Infected Blood Compensation Scheme

   I, too, want to recognise the Minister’s commitment to this cause, which has impacted on so many of us across the House. I have a number of technical questions. First, he says that he wants to bring legislation forward this year. As he knows, delay matters, and the estimate is that one affected person is dying every four days. Can he confirm that the legislation will happen this side of the summer? Secondly, if the legislation is required to change the claim amounts, from when will they be dated? Thirdly, can he confirm that if the small number of claims that have been concluded already were eligible for the increased awards, they could be reopened so that more money may flow to those victims?

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7. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Katie Lam

   Topical Questions

   T9.    The changes that the Government made in January to prioritise British graduates for NHS training places were very welcome indeed, but the current system of random allocation demoralises and disincentivises our brightest graduates, and it causes profound uncertainty for people at the start of their career. Will the Secretary of State consider changing the process, so that those places are instead allocated on merit?

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8. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joy Morrissey

   Knife Crime

   Will the Minister speak to Sadiq Khan and ask him to get a grip on the knife crime epidemic that is plaguing London? Can we increase the stop-and-search powers of the Met police so that they can actually do their job and provide the enforcement that people across London are asking for? My husband was attacked by someone with a knife while he was caring for his mother-in-law, and one of our wonderful members of staff in the Tea Room was attacked in Brixton by someone with a knife just last week. This is a problem across London. My residents want to feel safe. Will the Minister do something to stop the knife crime epidemic that is plaguing London?

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9. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·John Glen

   Infected Blood Compensation Scheme

   Over the past 21 months, the Minister has worked tirelessly to try to build on the consensus across the House on the legislation that I put through on 21 May 2024 in order to make the scheme work, and I pay tribute to the work he has done. He has listened carefully to a whole range of inputs on an extremely complicated problem from a heterogeneous group of individuals, and he has done his level best to respond to the advice and best judgment of professionals, to attend to the range of needs and oversights, and to create pathways. I pay tribute to the work that he has done. He assured the House repeatedly that the money would get out as quickly as possible, and it did get out quickly and move swiftly after that initial process had been resolved. However, given that it cost over £150 million for the public inquiry, let alone the several billions of pounds for the compensation, will he ensure that the proper lessons are learned by the British state, so that not only can such a scandal never happen again but the conduct of public inquiries is as efficient as possible and we can reduce the delays that may have occurred in this situation?

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10. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

    If the situation the courts find themselves in is so obviously caused by the previous Government, why on earth is the hon. Member’s Government scrapping jury trials as a response?

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11. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

    This is an extraordinary exchange. I accept that the hon. Member for Amber Valley is not the official voice of the CPS or of the Labour Government, but her sense of “officialdom knows best” will give ordinary men and women in this country great concerns about these changes. Of course, there are some cases in which there is no victim. There are some cases in which the victim is a person who has been falsely accused. That is why we have a legal system in which the ordinary men and women of this country are judged by their peers. That is the principle that is up for debate here—not some wider official view from a prosecuting organisation, rather than the courts.

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12. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

    rose—

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13. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

    It seems that the Minister has perhaps momentarily forgotten that the entire legal system in this country is tilted in favour of the defendant. The defendant is innocent until the prosecution makes its case, and it cannot just make a good case, because the case has to be beyond reasonable doubt. The whole system is tilted in favour of the defendant, and rightly so. It is slightly strange to hear her use the argument that the defendant should not have freedom and liberty to elect when they are innocent people until convicted—and many of them are never convicted.

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14. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Will the Minister give way?

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15. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I am not sure to what extent it is relevant, but I should probably declare that I used to be a practising solicitor, regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society. The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail. Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea. Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny. The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure. Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final. The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object. The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made. Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption. Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve. We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency. However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.

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16. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I should clarify that I no longer get paid on an hourly rate—I am paid by the taxpayer, as the hon. Gentleman is, on the same terms. I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.

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17. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a slightly strange implication that while jury trials have become more complex over time, due to technology and techniques for examining evidence—obviously a good thing—that somehow does not apply if the trial is in the magistrates court. That is the alarm bell, is it not? Magistrates courts are more capable of dealing with things in summary and they will not examine a case in as much detail and may miss things. That is not a criticism of magistrates and of the magistrates court—that is the system we have designed. When the consequences are less serious and the crime is less serious, the examination and process may be naturally less thorough. That is not a reason to bring cases that today would be heard in the Crown court into the magistrates court without the defendant’s having the right to choose. My hon. Friend articulates that point exactly and represents the concerns that most people have. In the evidence session, we heard that the current court backlog is the result of many things, including lack of investment—the Minister talked today about the lack of investment, and the issues with recruitment and retention, and criticised the previous Government for caps on sitting days—and the effect of the covid pandemic. The Minister and I might disagree on the extent to which that is true, but none of those things should be cured by abolishing jury trials.

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18. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I accept the Minister’s statement to the extent that it is a statement of fact of people’s evidence. To address the issue of taking cases out of one court to give to another, however: that is a small minority of cases. Indeed, that is the argument that the Government make, certainly to their own Back Benchers when they are worried about the Back-Bench view of their proposals: “Don’t worry. Most cases are heard in the magistrates court anyway, and only a tiny percentage are being taken out of the Crown court.” The Government cannot have the argument both ways: when speaking to their own Back Benchers, “Don’t worry, this is not going to be meaningful,” and when speaking to the rest of the world about tackling backlogs, saying that that in itself is a meaningful change.

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19. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Once again, I agree with the shadow Minister. If the Government genuinely want to address the backlog, the answer lies in the other 179 recommendations that Sir Brian Leveson made: increasing sitting days, which the Government have now done in a modest way; improving case management; removing unnecessary adjournments; rebuilding or restructuring the legal profession; sustainable legal aid; and a whole list of recommendations. None of that requires the—in my view—brutal axe taken against the right of election to jury trial. In fact, it is more than a brutal axe; jury trial is just being denied for an either-way offence That is being restricted to the magistrates court. I now turn to what I consider the most serious argument against the clause, which is an uncomfortable one. It has been referred to already in debate on clause 1, but it is relevant to clause 2 as well. The venue to which all relevant cases we are discussing will be diverted is the magistrates court, which produces—measurably, consistently and substantially—worse outcomes for defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds than the Crown court does. That is not a theoretical proposition or a position of advocacy; it is the statistical evidence and the documented finding of researchers, legal practitioners and analysis drawing on Government data. Magistrates courts convict people from ethnic minority backgrounds at rates up to 40% higher than non-ethnic minority defendants. That is not a small or debatable margin; it is a significant consideration. Albeit to make a slightly different point, the hon. Member for Chichester mentioned that if someone has a clean record they would be tried in the magistrates court, but if they had a list of previous offences they may be tried on the same facts in the Crown court, where conviction rates are lower. Having previous convictions therefore puts someone into a venue with lower conviction rates. I am not suggesting that the Government have designed the measure in that way, but it is plainly nonsense and unacceptable for that to come about. The Government need to look at that and amend it. Charities have responded to Sir Brian’s proposals and have provided further granular data. In Crown court jury trials, people of colour are convicted at broadly similar rates to their white counterparts. It is not hard to see why: the principle—the whole idea—behind a decision being made by someone’s peers is that juries reflect the country in which we live. Magistrates and professional judges are predominantly whiter, more educated and more male than the population at large. It is interesting to note, but is not a criticism, that this Committee itself is evidently less diverse not only than juries, but than the population at large. A defendant from an ethnic minority background charged with an either-way offence this week has a right to elect. They can look at the data—thank goodness we have that data—take advice from their legal representatives and make a considered choice about the venue in which they believe they are most likely to receive fair treatment. I would suggest, without quoting evidence, that a number of them elect the Crown court because they believe they will get a fairer trial—because they are more likely to have their fate at least partly decided by someone who shares something of their own background and lived experience. Let me address the Government’s response to this evidence, which has been inadequate. The Lord Chancellor—who, as he has reminded this House, knows the experience of racial disparity personally and profoundly, and has long spoken about it throughout and before his time in this place—has argued that progress is being made. He has cited the figure that 21% of judges now come from an ethnic minority background. I welcome the progress that has been made, particularly in the judicial system, but that still does not compare to the fairness and legal principle of trial by jury. I want to put the constitutional point more plainly. Parliament is being asked to pass a provision that it knows, on the basis of evidence submitted to its own Committee, will produce racially differentiated outcomes. The Government have seen that evidence. Ministers have been questioned on it at length, and the Bill has not been amended to address it, but it must be. If a different Government Department proposed a policy that its own evidence showed would increase adverse outcomes for ethnic minority applicants by, in this case, up to 40%, what would we say? We would say it is discriminatory and grossly unacceptable. We would demand it be withdrawn pending a full equality impact assessment. We would not pass it on a Government Whip. This is the standard I invite the Committee to apply here. The fact that the discrimination operates through an allocation mechanism in the criminal courts, or in some cases through an administrative form, does not change its nature or its effect. The test is the outcome, not the intention. No one is suggesting the Government intend this, but it is the outcome and the outcome is documented. The racial disparity in outcomes does not exist in a vacuum. It is connected causally, not merely coincidentally, to a documented and persistent deficit in judicial diversity. In 2019, 12% of magistrates were from a BME background, which compares to an 18% share of the general population. The magistrates do not reflect the country that they are being asked to judge in the same way as a jury do. I turn to the argument that the legal aid threshold will leave defendants unrepresented when making their plea in sentencing. That is a further systemic consequence of clause 2. The means test for legal aid differs, of course, between the two tiers of court, as we have heard. In the Crown court the threshold is more generous. Defendants in a wider income range qualify for representation at public expense. In the magistrates court the threshold is lower and less generous. Many defendants who would qualify for legal aid in the Crown court may not qualify for it in the magistrates court. Under clause 2, a significant cohort of defendants who previously had a right to elect, and with it the more generous legal aid provision, will find themselves in the magistrates court facing charges and sentencing that could result in a sentence of 18 months, or ultimately 24 months, without adequate legal representation. The Institute for Government has flagged this explicitly. Because of the low-income threshold to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, many more defendants are likely to go unrepresented or under-represented, and an unrepresented defendant in serious criminal proceedings is not a defendant receiving fair justice. There is a cruel irony in the Government’s framing of the issue. Ministers argue that one problem with the current system is that defendants elect a Crown court to delay proceedings and therefore game the system. But why would a defendant in a serious case choose the Crown court? Often precisely because they know that in the Crown court they are more likely to have or to be able to afford a lawyer, and in the magistrates court they may not. The election is not a game. It is part of a system that has stood for a very long time. It is a rational response, in this case, to a legal aid system that is itself under severe pressure.

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20. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I thank the hon. Member for paying attention to my speech and staying with me on this. Fairly obviously, I do not think that the Criminal Bar Association is always right, but I do in this case. The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers. The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions. I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition. Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.

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21. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Of course, the Minister made that point—in her view, this is about thresholds. Whether we want to call it an argument about thresholds, and whichever part of history we want to look at, the Opposition’s fundamental point remains. There is a distinct lack of evidence for this Government’s plans today, set against the range of other provisions that could be, and in some cases have been, introduced. In our view, they have not been given the time to bed in and potentially deliver the savings that the Government want. I accept the hon. Member for Rugby does not accept that, but I think that is the point of contention here.

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22. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I agree with the shadow Minister, and I really have nothing to add—his words stand for themselves.

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23. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point.

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24. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    In an attempt to resolve a debate that is not immediately mine, I will give way to the shadow Minister.

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25. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke. I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—

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26. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Thank you, Ms Butler, and I will of course stick to clause 2. I welcome any challenge that a specific point that I have made does not relate to clause 2. There is possibly a slight lack of clarity across the whole Committee, and I do not profess to be the only expert in the room; indeed, I am not an expert. However, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate that there seems to be a distinct lack of clarity about what clause 2 does. I am not suggesting that the Minister does not know, and I welcome an intervention if she feels that I need to be brought back into scope in this part of the debate. Clause 2 specifically replaces automatic rights with a permission stage. When clauses 2 and 7 are combined, a defendant who believes they have been wrongly convicted must first persuade a Crown court judge that their appeal has sufficient merit before it is even heard. The Government argue that the 41% success rate shows that meritorious appeals will get through, but in my view, that misses the point. The Law Society has identified precisely why the current simple route matters. A significant proportion of defendants in the magistrates court do not have a lawyer. As I have argued, under clause 2 more of them are likely to be unrepresented. Owing to the misalignment of legal aid means testing, an unrepresented defendant who has been wrongly convicted will surely be less likely to know how to draft grounds of appeal. They will not be able to identify legal errors that may appear in magistrates’ reasoning or decisions in the same way. As I understand it, they will also not be able to commission a transcript of proceedings in the same way and construct a submission that meets the permissions test. The permission stage is, in practice, a barrier that falls disproportionately on those least equipped to overcome it. The opposition to the clause is broad and has not been answered. In some cases, the opposition is expert; in others, it comes through lived experience. I will briefly look at the range and weight of expert opposition to the provisions, some of which I have referred to already, because the Committee should understand— I am sure it does—what it is seeking to perhaps have regard to but set aside if it passes clause 2. As we have heard, the Criminal Bar Association represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers. In answer to an earlier intervention, I do not say that the Criminal Bar Association’s word must be final, but it is clearly heavily persuasive, especially on this issue, which has already faced much scrutiny and disagreement from people with particular expertise in the field of criminal justice. As we have heard, its snap survey—so that is individual members, rather than the association—found that around 90% of members are against the proposals.

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27. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I will give way to the Minister.

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28. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I thank the Minister for rather politely encouraging me to come towards the end of my speech. I will finish by addressing the idea that somehow, because something does not happen in Scotland, it must be okay not to happen in England. That plainly has nothing to do with politics or even football—not that I am suggesting the Minister thought it did. I am happy to say, as a proud citizen of the United Kingdom, that I think the English and Welsh legal system is the best in the world. The common-law system is the foundation, it has been adopted all around the world, and is by far the most widely-used legal system. It is possibly our greatest export, along with the English language.

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29. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Joe Robertson

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [Interruption.] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.

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30. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·James Wild

    Hospital Trusts: Performance

    At the Queen Elizabeth hospital in King’s Lynn, nearly half of patients are waiting more than 18 weeks from referral to treatment and the trust is now part of the national improvement programme. Last month’s elective sprint delivered 2,000 additional elective activities, with evening and weekend working. Will the Health Secretary ensure that additional support is provided so that increased level of activity continues in the months to come?

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31. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Draft Energy Prices Act 2022 (Extension of Time Limit) Regulations 2026

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Ms Vaz. I note at the outset that the Opposition will not divide the Committee on this statutory instrument. We do not oppose the principle of reducing the burden of policy costs on household energy bills. However, the fundamental question this statutory instrument raises is one of transparency. Are the public being given an honest account of what the Government’s policies do? Moving some of the renewables obligation funding to be paid from the Exchequer does not eliminate a cost: it relocates it. The £70-odd saving that Ministers claim to be making is still being paid by all our constituents: they are paying it through their tax bill, rather than their energy bills. As Martin Lewis noted, that is the mechanism behind the majority of the advertised £150 saving. That is not nothing, but it is not quite the windfall it is presented as either. The huge subsidies that entitle some windfarm owners to three times the market price of the power they generate still flows to energy developers, all funded by the taxpayer. Crucially, the savings that the Labour Government have put forward do nothing to cut bills for businesses, which are seeing their network costs double thanks to the Government’s net zero policies and are getting no support from their big energy bill package. The regulations extend the section 13 powers of the Energy Prices Act 2022 by a further six months to October 2026. The Government have been clear that primary legislation will follow, and the Minister repeated in his speech this morning, when parliamentary time allows. Well, a King’s Speech is in the diary for next month, so all eyes will be on it to see if that appears. I am sure that the Minister will not be tempted to confirm or deny items in the King’s Speech this morning, but if this is not in it, questions will be asked. That prompts a reasonable question about whether the Minister can offer assurances about the timetable. Does he expect it to be this year, next year or at some point before the next general election? Can he confirm that the extension in the regulations will not become a pattern of repeated deferral? It is right to support measures that ease the cost of living. What is equally important is that the public are given a clear and honest account of how those measures work and who will ultimately foot the bill. As we all know, a very great lady once said that there is no such thing as public money, only taxpayers’ money.

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32. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Greg Smith

    Draft Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2026

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. As the Minister invoked a couple of events in his speech, I will go for a different safety first approach by drawing the Committee’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in relation to Silverstone Circuits Ltd and Ascot racecourse, and to my chairmanship of the all-party parliamentary group on Formula 1 and motorsport. I do not believe that our debate is materially to do with those events, but as the Minister invoked them, I thought it best to draw the Committee’s attention to those points. Aviation safety underpins the whole of our aviation sector, and the necessity of getting it right is of the utmost importance to those in the industry and the public. It is therefore welcome that we have seen continual improvements over the last few decades in the United Kingdom’s overall aviation safety. However, as noted in the CAA’s most recent annual report, the accidents we have seen must serve as a sobering reminder that safety must never be taken for granted. I reference that because the measures we are debating appear to broadly strike a sensible balance between upholding safety and allowing some loosening of existing restrictions. Considering the regulations as one, the fundamental question is about the CAA’s capacity and ability to deal with the changes. Can we be confident that it will maintain the strong standards associated with these rule changes? The alterations proposed to article 71 of the basic regulation appear to promote proportionate deregulatory change, including by opening the possibility of extending exemptions for testing new technologies and for several one-off events. Critically, those changes received support from stakeholders when consulted on by the CAA, and that was followed up in a subsequent consultation to address any concerns. If safety can be maintained, it is clearly welcome to have measures in place that encourage innovation and that could allow air navigation service providers to offer radio assistance for events, which appears to be an upgrade on existing rules. As the Government’s impact assessment notes, that should reduce barriers to entry for businesses in some circumstances, which should be welcomed. However, given the comment that those circumstances must be exceptional for an exemption to be granted, is the Minister able to answer the concerns set out by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that, as these exemptions would be used for day-to-day activities, they are not in fact exceptional? I am not contesting the principle of the regulations, but is the Minister content that the terminology “exceptional” will support the day-to-day activities the CAA believes are safe? Also, has the Department for Transport engaged with the CAA about its capacity to process these applications? Is it comfortable that there is the capacity to do this work? The second element of the regulations, regarding the removal of the criminal sanctions, also deserves consideration. Although the sanctions have never been used, can I get an assurance from the Minister that the CAA believes they would never be used in the future and that the existing rules relating to threshold distances are sufficient to stop unsafe behaviour? We recognise the need for the regulations to be altered, given other changes the CAA is considering, but is there a clear assurance that there will be no reduction in safety because of this change? It is right to support measures that uphold safety, while also allowing the sector greater freedom to participate in activities the CAA believes to be safe. What is paramount, though, is that the regulator continues to ensure that all such activities are safe, so that we can maintain confidence in the British aviation sector, of which I am sure all Members of this House are already rightly proud.

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33. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Graham Stuart

    Cancer Treatment

    May I pursue the point about coastal communities and cancer care? A young dad in Withernsea, a coastal town in my east Yorkshire constituency, went to the doctor repeatedly saying that there was something wrong with him and was repeatedly told that he was fine, before being diagnosed with stage 4 cancer. He survived, but only just. What, in real terms, will happen to ensure that communities such as those in Withernsea can see decent cancer care and proper diagnosis, especially given that, as was pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis), Hull university teaching hospitals NHS trust is one of the worst-performing trusts in the country?

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34. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·George Freeman

    Ground-mounted Solar Panels: Alternatives

    On the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) made, I can say that when I was the Minister for Space, I strongly supported space solar, which is a genuinely exciting British breakthrough. My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) is making a really important point about food security. As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on science and technology in agriculture, I know that we are hugely vulnerable to the geopolitics of the strait of Hormuz and global supply chains more broadly, so we need to do more to support UK agricultural production. In my patch, we have an 8,000-acre solar farm on farmland, which will see good, productive land taken out. This Friday, I am chairing the Central Norfolk Solar Factory Farm Alliance. We are very keen to see solar on reservoirs, motorways, council buildings—on any surfaces we can—but not on good farmland.

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35. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·George Freeman

    Ground-mounted Solar Panels: Alternatives

    On the important point that the hon. Member for South Derbyshire (Samantha Niblett) made about connections, what we are discovering in Norfolk is that the grid connection investment is an open door to much bigger solar applications. We have an 8,000-acre one that I am dealing with today. Land agents tell me that 20,000 acres in Norfolk are now being released because we have the grid connection. Much of that will be good land. The danger is that the connectivity driving the investment means, unfortunately, that the land use argument gets distorted.

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36. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Gareth Davies

    Topical Questions

    In 2022, Grantham saw the opening of one of the country’s first community diagnostic centres; since then, more than 100,000 tests have been completed for the local population. Now, I want the same for the town of Bourne. Will the Minister meet me, so that I can make the case for a new community diagnostic centre in Bourne?

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37. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Edward Argar

    NHS Waiting Lists

    Among the things that can help reduce waiting lists and waiting times is increased use of existing community hospital facilities, such as Melton Mowbray hospital in my constituency. Will the Secretary of State join me in calling on the local ICB and University Hospitals of Leicester NHS trust to invest in moving more services out of inner-city acute settings and into Melton hospital, so that more of my constituents can get the treatments they need nearer to home?

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38. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst

    Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system. It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance. Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction. However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary. New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status. The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time. Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes. Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition. Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction. Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect “as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction” and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority. Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.

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39. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst

    Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence. I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route. I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it. My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment. The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies. This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations. Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended. I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.

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40. 14 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst

    Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?

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