partytracker.uk — a sourced record of what Britain's political parties say and do, party by party, with every entry linked to a primary source

Showing every spoken contribution, including 12,942 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Yes. Professor Croisdale-Appleby: Fine. The Government’s move to the integrated patient record is absolutely excellent. Most of us have wanted that for a very long time, but we also recognised the IT difficulties in doing it, as well as the question of security. However, as digital has advanced, we have nutcrackers that we did not have before to crack that particular nut. I can but support that move. From the point of view of the things that really matter, the ability of a person to feel that they can tell their story once—not time and again—comes up all the time in our research. With great respect to everyone here, we are very capable of standing up for ourselves and insisting that we get answers, but the people I deal with and have the privilege of representing are often not in that position at all. They are overwhelmed when they are repeatedly asked the same question, often in a language—medicalese, if you like—that they do not really understand and feel threatened by. The single patient record is going to go a long way towards helping with that situation. It is not the complete answer but at least it does the hygiene part, as opposed to the motivator part, very well. Sarah Tilsed: It is an excellent initiative—1as the professor said, we have been calling for it for such a long time—but we really need to consider the consent and data elements. A lot of pieces of work that we have done with patients shows that people are happy with their data being shared for these electronic records, as long as they are transparent and patients know what is being done with their data—that is a really important point. The care.data initiative and general practice data for planning and research—GPDPR—were great, but unfortunately, because they did not have genuine patient involvement right from the beginning, they failed. We need to ensure that the SPR does not fail. In terms of reaching underrepresented or less-heard communities, we need to ensure that we hear from those people straightaway. How do they want this to work? Do they want to know how their data is being used? How can we ensure that people who do not use the NHS app are involved and that their data is being shared? How do we approach people who are understandably very hesitant about digital technology and electronic records?

   Hansard source
2. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Councillor Wright, the Bill will essentially abolish NHS England. Do you have any comments about how that works at the moment in terms of local government? How can we unlock some of the potential in the Bill, with the changes to NHS England, with regard to local government, particularly on health and wellbeing boards and the entire place agenda? Councillor Wright: The main problem the abolition of NHS England has caused is upheaval and uncertainty with our health partners. Many of the health partners at our health and wellbeing board meetings or our place committee meetings are almost saying to us, “I don’t know if I will be here at the next meeting.” Such turmoil in the changeover creates instability from a lack of being able to plan what will happen next. That is one of the challenges that we feel. We are working with our health partners and getting assurances that there will be continuity, but it is quite hard when the person we are working with is changing. We are really excited about neighbourhood health sitting under health and wellbeing boards. We love the idea of neighbourhood health looking at the wider determinants of health and having a very localised health response to the issues that that community needs to help it. One of our anxieties is that a lot of ICBs have become bigger and have less connection with the place. They are also shrinking; I think NHS England is losing 30%— Maria Higson: Larger geography, fewer people! Councillor Wright: Exactly. We have had a letter from our ICB giving us the heads-up that they might not be able to guarantee that they can send the right person to our health and wellbeing committees, which will obviously make it difficult to plan neighbourhood health. The other challenge we find in neighbourhood health is that local authority boundaries might not necessarily match neighbourhood boundaries. I will give an example from Bracknell, where I live. Bracknell is very clearly a neighbourhood, but the south of the borough, which is within the Bracknell Forest council area, probably sits within Bracknell and Wokingham and a little bit within Reading. It will be hard to bring in true neighbourhoods with the current structure, but that is something we are working around, and we are hopeful that we will be able to sort it out.

   Hansard source
3. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q May I come to you, Sally, particularly on social care and the opportunities that might arise from it? Sally Burlington: Health and wellbeing boards will probably become even more important following the removal of local government representation from the ICB. It will be the only place we have NHS and local government partners with the specific statutory responsibility to work together on social care. As others have noted, they are at place level and will therefore be crucial for connecting with the neighbourhood. The other factor that is helpful to note is that there is a huge amount of pressure on systems at the moment, and the cuts to ICBs are having a profound effect on the relationships they have with local government partners. We are hearing from our members that continuing healthcare is a real point of concern, with reviews leading to the withdrawal of that care, placing challenges on local authorities. In that context, making sure that we are supporting health and wellbeing boards to be as effective as possible for neighbourhood health, and in that strategic joining-up role, becomes even more important.

   Hansard source
4. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Can you say a little more about what those opportunities might be, particularly for social care, with better focus on health and wellbeing boards? Sally Burlington: Neighbourhood health is a really important vision that we strongly support. In a way, it is obviously the right thing to do to move services closer to the people they serve and to work very closely with communities. Health and wellbeing boards have an opportunity to drive that neighbourhood health agenda because they are responsible for neighbourhood health planning and have the connection to local government, to the voluntary sector in many cases, and to the NHS. It feels like that is a real space of opportunity to drive neighbourhood health and realise the benefits that it could offer.

   Hansard source
5. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q I will follow on from Dr Johnson’s questions. You have all expressed support for the single patient record, which is great, but that is not universal. Obviously, the Bill has to be enacted for that measure to go forward. It would be helpful to hear about your current experiences in your different areas—older people, maternity and carers. Your examples gave a bit more detail on why not to have this, Ms Abrahams—let us not assume, because although the process of the Bill is to make this happen, we have heard some concerns today from people who do not want that. What is happening in your world that this will help with? Kath Abrahams: Right now, the situation is really tricky and people are being failed in their pregnancy and maternity care. Women report constantly having to retell their story—highly sensitive or traumatic experiences of loss—and that repetition can happen across the early pregnancy unit and maternity services. There is a common misconception that the NHS is one system, so when they find that people in another bit of the system do not know something, that can be really frustrating and annoying, because they assume that it exists. There is also a lack of continuity. A clinician can be completely unaware of a sensitive or traumatic experience that somebody has had, and there can also be genuine dangers in outcomes. We know from the reports into Morecambe Bay, Shrewsbury and Telford that the lack of joined-up sharing of information and good communication between different parts of the system has led to some really difficult outcomes, particularly if somebody also has gestational diabetes, for example, or another condition and they are taking a particular medication that could cause harm to an unborn baby. There are lots of situations in which not having the complete history is preventing people from getting not only really good, compassionate care, but the safe care they need. If someone is in an emergency situation and they are bleeding out, or their baby is not moving as much as they should, there is not time to start from scratch; they might not be in a position to explain what is happening to them and what their history is. They might not even know all the relevant bits of their history. Having that complete record, if it was done really well, would give clinicians the information that would allow them to make really timely decisions. Maternity can often be high risk—I do not need to say that to you; you know that—but these are often fast-moving situations where time is absolutely of the essence. Emily Holzhausen: To build on what I said earlier about the amount of co-ordination and admin that people do, I will just refer to some carers’ words. One said that if they had to phone, they would end up in a long waiting queue or having to travel to the GP in person. There are people juggling work and care, so this has real, everyday impacts on their lives and their time. When I refer to errors, I mean things such as medication errors or diagnosis errors. When you care for someone with very complex conditions, you can have health appointments every week—sometimes twice a week—and it is so hard to stay on top of it. When I say it is so hard, and talk about unpaid carers, we know that caring is a social determinant of health: in itself it is a single factor for poorer health outcomes. We know that 600 people a day give up work to care. We have done a report on the tipping point: what tips carers out of work? One such thing is social care; another is how they are treated in the health system. If we reduce the pressure on carers and put information at their fingertips to help them to manage care, we improve outcomes for everybody: the health and wellbeing of the carer and the safety of the person that they care for. People are trying to do their best in quite a difficult situation. One of our members, Norman Phillips, has talked about that a lot. He was in contact with more than 24 professionals, knitting up care around his wife who had advanced multiple sclerosis and dementia. That is an incredible amount of co-ordination of care. You can see how a single patient record, as it is envisaged in the future, could really help to support people who provide care. It is critical, given that we have an ageing population, that we recognise and support families in what they do. Paul Farmer: I would start by talking about people with long-term conditions. Let us bear in mind that by the time we are 65, 82% of us will have one long-term condition, and half of people aged 70-plus have more than one long-term condition. Most of those long-term conditions are diagnosed within primary care, but of course they have a huge impact on access to secondary care services. For a clinician not to be able to see that whole picture and for the individual to have to explain again and again their physical health issues, and potentially their comorbid mental health issues, creates a huge challenge for people in getting access to the right help and support in a timely manner. I would build on that to think about two areas that particularly affect older people: frailty and dementia. In this context, we know that assessment for frailty can make a big difference to ensuring people receive the right kind of help and support. That should be done in primary care, but often, sadly, people with frailty will present in hospital with a range of conditions. Understanding the frailty assessment score and what help and support is needed is key. For people with dementia and their family carers, having access to the right information for the clinician and for the individual concerned can make a huge difference. A disjointed experience just exacerbates what can often be a very challenging time.

   Hansard source
6. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q My questions around the benefits that you might see have been really well answered, so I will not go back to that issue. Dr Cocker and Dr Imam, in your work on maternity and frailty, what early lessons have you picked up on how this might work for you? Dr Cocker: Having seen the maternity-focused prototype that NHS England developed in the north-west, we learned that it is technically difficult because there are lots of systems. There needs to be a level of interoperability that allows you to pull the data or it is not going to be much use as a reliable system. The other thing was about trying to ensure that we design those systems for the patients most in need. That might be social or medical need, and there are many different facets to that. That was one of the other challenges. A lot of the focus went into trying to determine a set of theoretical patients who were very high need, and ensuring that you have encompassed all those possible needs, so that if you design the systems for those in most need, they will cater for as many people as possible. Dr Imam: To expand on Dr Cocker’s point about the identification of problems, people living with frailty often have multiple under-identified issues. In the prototype we have been shown, the SPR has the potential to analyse the wealth of data on a person and summarise it in a manner that makes sense to the clinician logged into the record. It can also piece together a timeline of what has been happening with a person. As I said earlier, we often follow a manual process to try to understand what has been going on recently for a person. The SPR will not only enable the automation of that process, but give us the ability to know who the key individuals involved in that person’s care are, so when that person is in a crisis or emergency situation, we know exactly who to call and who the last person to touch the patient was. There are other important functions. It is not only about sharing information across an entire pathway and having the whole-system approach that I described—from community to hospital, and vice versa. Importantly, many people living with frailty require multiple different referrals and the involvement of multiple different people in their care. The SPR will be able to streamline some of those processes and make recommendations for certain referrals that a clinician, who, under an earlier version, would have logged into the record, may not have otherwise thought about, so it may even improve outcomes for patients by providing solutions to improve their care that we would not have come up with otherwise.

   Hansard source
7. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Dr Byrne, you talked about the issues around trust, which we absolutely recognise. We hear quite a lot about the work going on to try to get the legislation right technically, but, further to what you have suggested, how would you advise the Government to communicate clearly about the benefits, while understanding people’s concerns about getting a single patient record, should the legislation become law? Dr Byrne: You have to show that you take the risks and people’s concerns seriously, and give a credible analysis of the risks. The key thing is to engage with the risks meaningfully. You should then think about what safeguards you could put into the Bill and future regulations that would actually be effective and be seen as credible, depending on what risks you are trying to address. I know it is difficult to get into the detail on the primary legislation at this stage, not least because you are trying to sequence things when we do not yet know what the SPR will be, which I appreciate is a further constraint. I would suggest that you consider putting in the Bill one particular safeguard relating to secondary purposes. People have concerns around two main things: confidentiality and their privacy, and secondary uses—who might access their data in future, and why and for what purpose, other than for their direct care. Focusing on that second factor, there are lots of things that might come up that you could do in regulations, but right now, I would suggest that you could build in the safeguard of an independent oversight mechanism for how decisions are made on who gets to access the data and why. In that, you can involve public and layperson representation to bring in that consideration of the risks that matter to the public, alongside the potential benefits. That could be helpful for two reasons. First, it would be a safeguard against having any unchecked decision-making power on access, whether now or in future. Secondly, it recognises the reality of human systems and organisations. No one expert or small group of experts, however wise or whatever their integrity, can see the whole picture and have a 360° view of what matters to the public. It would be a meaningful way to give the public agency and representation in that decision making—a meaningful exercise of citizen control, if you like. As humans, we are at our best and our decision making is at its safest and strongest when we get a diversity of perspectives involved—as, indeed, the Committee is doing right now. In this context, that should involve patients and the public. My second point, which is perhaps germane to your wider discussions around the Bill, is that no one organisation can effectively and consistently scrutinise and challenge itself. That goes for questions around data use and access—and wider, as well—in your considerations.

   Hansard source
8. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q It is always good to have a doctor from the NHS supporting managers in the NHS, having been one. I declared my interest earlier that I am a member of Managers in Partnership. We had a lot of change with the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and the Bill seeks to reverse that in terms of the architecture of the NHS. We absolutely appreciate as a Government that that is very difficult for staff working in it. I appreciate that the operating model and so on is coming forward, but could you say a bit about people’s feelings about the Bill? There will be more clarity to the centre and the role of providers is not changing, while the real change is around commissioning functions and, as you said, commissioning support organisations. We heard earlier that everything is being reorganised. That is not true, but there is a big change in the geography and the functions of ICBs and commissioners, and the Secretary of State’s role will clearly be different. What might people’s approach to that be? Jon Restell: Clarity, definitely. No one wants to start with the system that came in in 2011 and 2012. Successive Governments started to correct it almost as soon as it was put in place. I think most people would welcome sorting out the clarity around commissioning there, but I do not think that is the same thing as cutting 50% of those organisations’ staff and running costs. You are clarifying the relationship between the centre and ICBs, commissioning and providers. You still need enough managers with enough skills working in the right system to deliver. That is the nub of what we are doing. For us it is not really about how the Bill will eventually pan out; it is about the cut and how that is being administered by NHS England, the Department and ICBs. The whole system of management is under strain across the health service. You say that providers are not changing but they are also being asked to take out quite significant amounts of management resource. They are merging to form bigger, potentially more centralised units that may be less responsive and less innovative. I think that organisational form is really important, even if the headline of the Bill might tidy up and clarify those relationships, which would be welcome. A point made by a lot of members, particularly those in ICBs, is that they do not think that the model design—where we started with ICBs, then went to regions and we are eventually going to get to the target operating model for the Department—is being done at a time where you can see the proper connections that need to be made between those organisations. When the system is up and running, how well will it work together to share information, share risk and so on? It feels like the Bill is very high level and the detailed design of the organisations is being undertaken in a completely fragmented way. People see that as potentially requiring the next round of reorganisation. You are a former NHS manager, Minister; you know how often reorganisation is reached for as the solution. I genuinely feel that people have got to the point where enough is enough. That kind of continual change will create more and more problems for doing the things that the public actually want to see: innovation, improvement in the quality of service and happier staff—all the things that managers should be focused on, not the merry-go-round of organisational change.

   Hansard source
9. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Karin Smyth

   Health Bill (Second sitting)

   Q As you say, the Bill does not deal with social care, but it is great to have your expertise here. Do you think the Bill should or could have included social care at this stage? Sir Andrew Dilnot: The question of the fine details of how legislation should be passed is certainly outside my skillset, so I have to be agnostic about whether the Bill should have addressed the wider questions of social care. On the question of whether we could address social care or not, the answer is definitely yes. After all, several Governments over the last few years have promised to do so. The former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, when he was the shadow Secretary of State during the election two years ago, promised that he would do it. Such measures have received Royal Assent twice, but they have still not taken place, even though they were promised by the then shadow Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, before he became the Secretary of State. Yes, we definitely could do it. The amounts of money involved, while of course significant, are small relative to the aggregate costs of the NHS or the uplift in spending on the NHS that, with my full support, we have seen in the last couple of years. I think it is a genuine puzzle and a black mark for all of us, including me, that all these years have gone by and we have done nothing. We have a social care system that is supported by millions of wonderful informal carers and about 1.5 million formal carers, benefiting hundreds of thousands of people, but it is creaking under intolerable strain. It really makes no sense to me, and I really do not know why or how we have managed to go for so long without addressing it. We should do so, not only because it is the right thing to do, but because it is now so bad that it is doing direct, instrumental damage to the NHS.

   Hansard source
10. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I start by echoing the thoughts of many Members from across the House, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward). I did not know Jo Cox, but I admired her deeply. As we talk about our country’s resilience, her central message—that there is no deeper route to resilience than through the unity of our country and community—is top of our minds for all of us in this House. It is a pleasure to bring this important Bill back to the House this afternoon. The Bill will increase our cyber-defences and resilience, making the UK an even safer place to live and do business. I thank Members on both sides of the Chamber for their valuable contributions to this debate and for the expertise that they have brought throughout the passage of the Bill. I particularly thank them for their recognition of my core belief: that the central question for our national security and resilience is the question of our technological and AI capabilities. We tested the Bill’s measures carefully before introduction, but we have since listened to feedback. There are a small number of minor, technical drafting improvements, which I will briefly go through. Government amendments 16 and 17 ensure that regulators can ask for the information they need to fulfil their obligations under the NIS regulations. This does not give regulators any new powers; it simply confirms that the current reasons for requesting information under the NIS regulations will still apply under the updated regulations. Government amendments 7 and 8 make changes to align with two information-gathering Government amendments—amendments 16 and 17. Government amendment 11 makes consequential changes following an amendment made in Committee. That amendment enables information sharing between NIS regulators and other public authorities for cyber-matters outside the scope of the NIS regulations. Government amendments 14 and 15 clarify the safeguards for information sharing gateways, and amendments 9, 10, 12 and 13 make the necessary changes to ensure that the rest of the clause is consistent with the change made by amendment 14. Government amendments 18 to 26, to clause 57, allow regulators and the Secretary of State to issue notices related to the powers of direction to nominated representatives of regulated entities. I have also tabled Government amendment 27, which corrects minor drafting errors to ensure the Bill works as intended. Members raised a series of questions, and I will address them thematically. First, the question of scope was raised by new clauses 4, 20, 21, 5, 8 and 9. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, who brings consistent expertise and experience to these questions; the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western); and the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins) and for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick), who tabled amendments on the services and scope of the Bill. All organisations, from high street shops to manufacturing giants, should take steps to increase their cyber-security and resilience. The Government and the National Cyber Security Centre are making sure that the right tools are available for every part of the economy. I am sympathetic to their intent, and in particular with my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) when he talks about the impact of cyber-security incidents on local communities. The Government have committed to reviewing whether new activities need to be brought into the scope of the NIS regulations, but it is essential that any such decision is based on a systematic and specific assessment of carefully considering whether the regulation in these particular parts of statute are the most appropriate response. The NIS regime has been put in place to protect the most essential parts of our economy, often those whose disruption would cause an imminent threat to life. It is focused on a specific set of tests where sectors have little or no alternative service provision in the event of disruption and relates the latest systematic evidence of the threats that each sector faces. In that context, all Government Departments with sectoral responsibility work with their sectors on broader cyber-resilience. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs does so with food, and the Department for Business and Trade does so with retail, automotive and so on. The NCSC also has strong relationships across sectors, actively working with them to share best practice and incident insights, and to strengthen overall resilience, such as by engaging with the British Retail Consortium following incidents affecting the sector last year. The food sector is unique among other critical sectors because of its high levels of diversity. In the analysis underpinning the judgments made in the Bill, there are approximately 20,000 SME food manufacturers in the UK alone, and many more farms, distribution centres, retailers and other types of businesses that form the UK’s food supply chain. Given the lack of a single point of failure, we think there are more proportionate levers to pull, rather than bringing food in scope of the NIS regime. We have made similar judgments about other sectors on the basis of that systematic analysis, as I have shared in Committee and at other stages of the Bill’s consideration.

    Hansard source
11. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I am happy to the write to the Chair of the Select Committee about comparisons with the EU, but the broad thrust is that we have undertaken a specific analysis of whether the burdens of the Bill should apply in a systematic, proportionate and coherent way to sectors. The analysis suggests that food supply is not in scope for the reasons I mentioned—primarily diversity of supply—but I would be delighted to engage with him on the question of why Europe took a different decision. We have based our decision on our analysis here.

    Hansard source
12. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I am going to make some progress but will try to come back to the Chair of the Select Committee shortly. The Government’s cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across Government, including local government. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has taken action to strengthen local authorities’ cyber-resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the cyber assessment framework for local government. In that spirit, I take particularly seriously the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) on supporting capacity even further with centralised capacity support from the Government Digital Service and other parts of cyber-capability in central Government. The joint election security and preparedness unit, also raised by Members, works to protect UK elections and referendums, co-ordinating across Government on response to threats, including cyber-risks. JESP works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections and electoral infrastructure, particularly local authorities. JESP and NCSC regularly engage with political-party representatives as well. The question of a register of foreign powers has been raised in relation to new clauses 14 and 15, tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). New clause 14 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice, for the purpose of exercising powers under part 4 of the Bill. I assure the shadow Minister, as I did in Committee, that the use of those powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence. That includes, where relevant, information about state actors involved in cyber-threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the register would provide to the Secretary of State. New clause 15 would require the Government to report annually on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting the Government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information that cannot be included in the report for national security reasons is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I have made it clear to him, both in Committee and more broadly, that the Government value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. However, we do not consider that the report described in the new clause sits within the ISC’s current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Committee’s memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister. The Government are actively reviewing the Committee’s existing memorandum of understanding and will update the House in due course. New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would require the Government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned, in part or in full, by foreign states, and the risks that they pose. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting an assessment of the ownership structure of every in-scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, and would distract the Government from more effective measures to protect our services.

    Hansard source
13. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    It is rare for me to have a point of divergence with the Chair of the Select Committee, given her experience and expertise. However, on that question I am absolutely not saying that Government support is limited only to the certain number of sectors covered by the Bill. There are a range of other ways in which the Government act to support sectors outside of the scope of the Bill. That is the right thing to do. The scope of this Bill—the only Bill horizontally applicable to large parts of the economy—is systematically and specifically set to sectors that are significant as essential services, sectors where there is the risk of significant disruption and threat to life, and sectors where alternative supply is limited. For those reasons, we have excluded retail. Consideration of the scale of the business is not currently in that rubric, because there are also businesses that are small in scale but very material in life-threatening impact. I hope that is a satisfactory answer. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West for their amendments relating to the risks posed by communications modules made or controlled from outside the UK. Although I am sympathetic to their concerns, the Bill’s approach is intentionally technology and incident-agnostic. Instead of reacting to individual components in isolation, we focus on structural chokepoints and systematic dependencies in this context. There are a range of other levers—investment screening through the National Security and Investment Act 2021; telecoms and cyber data security requirements to protect data and networks; supply chain measures, such as those in the Procurement Act 2023; diversification requirements to reduce dependency and build resilience—all of which are important to respond to the deeply significant concerns raised.

    Hansard source
14. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I will make some further progress. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley for his amendment relating to AI emergencies. I recognise his concerns, as well as those of my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. Technology is evolving rapidly, and Government must be equipped to respond. That is why the Bill grants the Secretary of State the power to direct regulated entities if the compromise of their network and information system, or the threat of it, gives rise to a national security risk. This could, for instance, require an entity to cease using and isolate an AI model. These powers are a backstop to an effective cyber-security regime, enabling Government to act swiftly in the face of unexpected national security threats. They are also designed to be proportionate, recognising the need for stability among regulated entities and the importance of proper accountability. While I share my hon. Friends’ concerns, I encourage them to work with the Government on a systematic range of ways in which we can mitigate the risks they have rightly highlighted.

    Hansard source
15. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley in the first instance and then to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar.

    Hansard source
16. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I would be delighted to.

    Hansard source
17. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    Given the specificity of his question, I will suggest that I come back to my hon. Friend. The broad thrust is that through our investment control legislation and procurement legislation, there are a series of responsibilities on Departments to look at it. [Interruption.] Given your encouragement, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall move on. Finally, I will respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who raised a very important point. The most important thing to say is that I share his diagnosis, although for reasons mostly of technical drafting, I disagree with his prescription—I hope he will take that in the spirit in which it is intended. His amendment risks creating undue uncertainty in law for many other areas where we do not have an explicit requirement. While I share his diagnosis and his objective, I hope that we can work together to consider how best to give it effect, including through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s overseas security and justice mechanisms for information sharing. I thank all hon. Members for their consideration.

    Hansard source
18. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware from a response I recently gave him that both the complexity of the EU’s AI Act and its interaction with the Windsor framework are under consideration at the moment. The EU has made a proposal and we are working with it on that. I will be happy to engage with him on that particular question in due course.

    Hansard source
19. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    As I say, I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis. Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK.Official Report, 8 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 6WC. (Correction). Thirdly, the way that the amendment is drafted risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific and explicit reference to fair trial in the legislation, it calls into question how other information-sharing regimes are interpreted, such as under section 114 of the Online Safety Act 2023. In other words, drafted as it is, the amendment could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises its discretion not to disclose this in other regimes, as there is no explicit exclusion. For those reasons, while I totally agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis and his objective, I am afraid that the amendment in question risks undermining the objective.

    Hansard source
20. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I will not, because I am testing the patience of Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will give way.

    Hansard source
21. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    As ever, I would be delighted to work with the Chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one. I am delighted with the support that this House has shown for the intention and principles of the Bill, and I am grateful for Members’ consistent, principled scrutiny.

    Hansard source
22. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I can confirm that the Government will be very happy to engage on this question further with my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I commend the Bill to the House.

    Hansard source
23. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Kanishka Narayan

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time. It has been a privilege to take this vital piece of legislation through the House. I thank everyone who has played a role in getting the Bill to this stage, including the noble Baroness Lloyd of Effra, who has been instrumental in driving the policy in this Bill and leading its passage in the other place. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology; the officials who have worked tirelessly since the Bill’s inception; the Bill team, led by Shona Lester; the policy teams, led by Nick Dodd and Liam Harkin; the legal team, led by Alicia Swannell; and my private secretary, Ben Holloway. I also thank parliamentary counsel, the Clerks and the Chairs of the Public Bill Committee, and every Member of the House who served on the Committee, as well as Members who have provided important input today and during all previous stages. This country is subject to daily and unrelenting cyber-attacks. This is no longer the stuff of science fiction, but a daily reality that threatens public services, businesses and even our ways of life. As Dr Richard Horne, the CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, has said: “The real-world impacts of cyber attacks have never been more evident than in recent months”. The Bill delivers on the Government’s commitment to drive secure growth and make the UK more resilient to the threats we face. It recognises how things have moved on since 2018, with data centres playing an increasingly important role in our digital lives and supply chains continuing to diversify. It also recognises that things will continue to change, with a deliberate, technology-agnostic approach and proportionate powers to enable the Government to close regulatory gaps and respond to imminent national security threats. Since the introduction of the Bill, I have tabled a small number of amendments to refine its drafting and ensure that it achieves its intended purposes. They include designating Ofcom as the sole regulator for data centres, to reduce administrative burdens and strengthen accountability in this key sector. They also include enabling the network and information systems regulators to share vital information with other regulators and public bodies overseeing sectors and vice versa, enabling more co-ordinated and strategic oversight without unnecessary business burdens. They also updated the definition of cloud computing to respond to important feedback from the sector and made several minor and technical corrections to ensure that the Bill can be practically implemented. The version of the Bill before us is an ambitious, practical and proportionate piece of legislation. It is the result of engagement with industry, important regulator feedback, international dialogue and tireless work from officials. I wish Baroness Lloyd the best in moving the Bill forward in the other place, and I commend it to the House.

    Hansard source
24. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Judith Cummins

    Point of Order

    I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving notice of her point of order. There is a long-standing and well-understood convention that the Government respond to Select Committee reports within two months. Where that is not possible, the Department should engage with the Committee to explain why. I have no power to compel the Department to produce a response, but the Table Office will be able to advise her on how she might pursue the matter further.

    Hansard source
25. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Judith Cummins

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 3—Review of high-risk bodies— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the national security risks posed to relevant network and information systems by foreign state ownership or control of relevant bodies. (2) A review under this section must assess— (a) the number of relevant bodies which are owned, in whole or in part, by a foreign state or a foreign state-owned enterprise; (b) the risk of such bodies being compelled to facilitate unauthorised access to, or surveillance of, network and information systems in the United Kingdom; and (c) the adequacy of current powers under Part 4 (Directions for national security purposes) to mitigate such risks posed to the security and resilience of essential activities. (3) In this section— “relevant body” means— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations. “foreign state-owned enterprise” means a body corporate in which a foreign state has a controlling interest; “network and information systems” has the meaning given by section 24(1).”. This new clause would require the Government to review the security risks posed by critical suppliers and essential service providers linked to foreign states and evaluate whether current powers are sufficient to address these threats. New clause 4—Critical manufacturing and retail sectors— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations under section 24(3) to specify the following as essential activities— (a) the manufacture of critical transport equipment; (b) the industrial production and processing of food products; and (c) the retail sale of food and essential goods via large-scale distribution chains. (2) Regulations made under subsection (1) must designate appropriate regulatory authorities for these sectors.”. This new clause would require the Secretary of State to designate the manufacturing of critical transport equipment and retail of food and essential goods (when part of a large-scale distribution chain) as essential activities, bringing them within the scope of Part 3 of the Bill. New clause 5—Local authorities to be regulated as essential services— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows. (2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to the energy sector, insert— “Local Government Local Government The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government” (3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph 11 insert— “The Local Government Sector 12 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to specified kinds of essential services in the local government subsector. (2) For the essential service of the maintenance of electoral registers, the threshold requirement is that the entity is a local authority responsible for the maintenance of an electoral register. (3) For the essential service of the management of social care records, the threshold requirement is that the entity is a local authority responsible for the management of social care records. (4) In this paragraph “local authority” means— (a) in England, a county council, a district council, a London borough council, the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of the Isles of Scilly; (b) in Wales, a county council or a county borough council; (c) in Scotland, a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994; (d) in Northern Ireland, a district council constituted under section 1 of the Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972.”. This new clause would bring local authorities within the scope of the NIS Regulations as operators of essential services in relation to their functions managing electoral rolls and social care records. This ensures that public sector bodies holding sensitive data such as electoral rolls and social care records are subject to the same statutory protections as other critical infrastructure. New clause 6—Computer Misuse Act 1990: security and resilience of network and information systems— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the passing of this Act, review whether amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 may be conducive to ensuring, maintaining or improving the security and resilience of network and information systems used or relied upon in connection with the carrying on of essential activities. (2) Following the conclusion of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report which outlines— (a) the potential amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 which were considered as part of the review; (b) the review’s conclusions as to whether the potential amendments considered could be beneficial in ensuring, maintaining or improving the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems; and (c) the Government’s intentions to make amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 or act on any other recommendations of the review.”. This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review, within 12 months, whether amending the Computer Misuse Act 1990 could improve the resilience of network and information systems, and to report the government’s intentions to Parliament. New clause 7—Consultation on resourcing of regulatory authorities and regulated persons— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, carry out a consultation with regulatory authorities and regulated persons for the purpose of assessing— (a) whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have resources and capabilities adequate to fulfil their requirements under this Act; and (b) whether further government support is needed. (2) The Secretary of State must publish a report setting out the findings of the assessment carried out under subsection (1).”. This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult and report within one year on whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have sufficient resources and capabilities to meet their statutory obligations, and whether additional government support is required. New clause 8—Electoral infrastructure to be regulated as an essential service— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows. (2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to digital infrastructure insert— “Elections Electoral infrastructure The Electoral Commission” (3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph 11 insert— “The electoral infrastructure subsector 12 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to specified kinds of essential services in the electoral infrastructure subsector. (2) For the essential service of the administration of an election or the maintenance of an electoral register in the United Kingdom, the threshold requirement is that the service relies on network and information systems to— (a) maintain a register of electors containing more than 50,000 entries; (b) issue, receive, or process postal ballots for a parliamentary or local government election; or (c) count or aggregate votes cast in a parliamentary, mayoral or local government election. (3) In this paragraph— “parliamentary election” means an election of a Member to serve in the Parliament of the United Kingdom; “network and information system” has the meaning given by section 24(1) of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026. (4) In regulation 8A (nomination by an OES of a person to act on its behalf in the United Kingdom), after paragraph 1(b) insert— ‘(c) provides an essential service of a kind referred to in paragraph 11 of Schedule 2 (elections sector) within the United Kingdom.’”. This new clause would designate the administration of elections and maintenance of voter registers as an “essential service” within the meaning of the NIS Regulations. New clause 9—Political parties to be regulated as an essential service— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows. (2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to digital infrastructure insert— “Government Political parties The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government” (3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph 11 insert— “The political parties subsector 12 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to specified kinds of essential services in the political parties subsector. (2) For the essential service of the management and operation of a registered political party in the United Kingdom, the threshold requirement is that the political party is represented by at least two Members of the House of Commons. (3) In this paragraph— “registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.”. This new clause would designate political parties as providing essential services for the purposes of cyber security. New clause 10—Board oversight of security and resilience of network and information systems— “(1) Where a relevant body is governed by a board or equivalent management body, that body must exercise oversight of arrangements relating to the security and resilience of the body’s network and information systems. (2) In exercising oversight, the management body must— (a) approve the approach taken by the body to the management of risks to the security and resilience of the body’s network and information systems; and (b) satisfy itself, on a periodic basis, that appropriate and proportionate measures are in place to manage those risks. (3) The management body may be held accountable for failures by the body to comply with duties relating to the security and resilience of its network and information systems. (4) Members of the management body must undertake training designed to enable them to identify risks and assess appropriate risk-management practices. (5) For the purposes of this section, a relevant body is one which is— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.”. This new clause would require active board oversight of, and accountability for, security and resilience measures, where a relevant body is governed by a board or similar body. New clause 11—Requirement for regular testing of network and information systems— “(1) A relevant body must undertake regular testing of the security and resilience of the network and information systems on which it relies in the provision of its services. (2) Testing undertaken in accordance with this section must— (a) be proportionate, having regard to the size, nature and risk profile of the business; and (b) be conducted periodically, at intervals that are appropriate to the risks identified by the body. (3) A relevant body must document— (a) the outcomes of testing undertaken in accordance with this section; and (b) any remedial actions required or taken in response to the testing. (4) Information documented under subsection (3) must be provided to the relevant regulatory authority upon request. (5) For the purposes of this section, a relevant body is one which is— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.”. This new clause would require bodies to carry out proportionate, periodic testing of the security and resilience of their network and information systems and provide the results to regulatory bodies upon request. New clause 12—“Last-resort” powers in respect of data centres and AI models— “(1) Regulations under section 29(1) may confer on the Secretary of State powers (“last-resort powers”) to direct the shutdown of— (a) data centres, or (b) AI systems used or deployed by a data centre, in the event of an AI security or operational emergency. (2) For the purposes of this section— “data centre” has the meaning given in paragraph 11 of the NIS Regulations (as amended by this Act); “AI system” means a machine-based system that, from the input it receives, can infer how to— (a) generate predictions, digital content, recommendations, decisions or other similar outputs, or (b) influence a physical or virtual environment, with a view to achieving an explicit or implicit objective; “used or deployed” means made available to— (a) a substantial number of individuals within the United Kingdom; or (b) providers and operators of essential services; “AI security or operational emergency” means a situation where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that— (a) there is a security or operational compromise to one or more relevant network and information systems, (b) this compromise is caused, or contributed to, by the use or operation of an AI system used or deployed by a data centre, whether through autonomous or non-autonomous means; and (c) this compromise poses a catastrophic risk; “catastrophic risk” means a risk carrying a reasonable likelihood of causing or contributing to— (a) large-scale disruption to critical infrastructure or essential services; (b) significant degradation of the national security, national defence, or intelligence capabilities of the United Kingdom; or (c) severe, large-scale harm to human life; “data centre operator” means a person who operates a data centre; (3) As soon as reasonably practicable after, and in any event within seven days of, giving a direction under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must— (a) lay a report before Parliament setting out the direction and the reasons for it; and (b) take all reasonable steps to arrange for the report to be the subject of a debate in each House as soon as is reasonably practicable. (4) Regulations relating to last-resort powers must establish requirements on data centre operators in relation to data centres used for the training, deployment or operation of AI systems, including relating to— (a) the possession or installation of technical infrastructure necessary for compliance with last-resort powers; (b) the provision of secure communication channels for use by the Secretary of State when utilising last-resort powers; (c) the implementation of regular emergency exercises to ensure that a direction under this section can be received safely and implemented; and (d) post-mortem processes to be followed before a data centre is allowed to resume operations after the use of last-resort powers, including— (i) incident reporting; and (ii) implementation of mitigation measures to prevent recurrence. (5) A person commits an offence if they fail to comply with any requirement imposed by regulations made under subsection (4). (6) Regulations relating to last-resort powers may— (a) confer on the Secretary of State, or on a person designated by the Secretary of State, powers to act where they reasonably believe that an offence under subsection (5) is being, has been, or may be about to be committed; (b) include, for the purposes of paragraph (a), powers to— (i) close premises; (ii) turn off systems or require that they be turned off; (iii) take any other action necessary to control the risk arising from an AI security or operational emergency. (7) Regulations must require that, where powers under subsection (6) are exercised, the Secretary of State must— (a) give written notice of the action taken, and the reasons for the action taken, to the operator or provider as soon as reasonably practicable; and (b) inform the operator or provider of their right to apply to the High Court for relief. (8) The High Court may make any order it thinks fit on an application under subsection (7)(b), including— (a) confirming, varying or cancelling the requirements; (b) imposing additional requirements; (c) ordering compensation. (9) The Secretary of State must publish guidance on the use by licensing authorities, planning authorities and other public authorities of their statutory powers to facilitate compliance with regulations relating to this section. (10) A public authority must have regard to guidance issued under subsection (9) when exercising any function to which the guidance relates. (11) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the commencement of this section and subsequently at six-monthly intervals, prepare a report on the causes and potential causes of AI security or operational emergencies and lay a copy of the report before Parliament. (12) The causes and potential causes of AI security or operational emergencies considered in any report under subsection (11) must include — (a) adversarial uses of AI systems by state and non-state actors; (b) the capabilities for cyber-attacks by autonomous AI systems; and (c) the development of AI systems that can autonomously compromise national security, escape human oversight, and upend international stability, including systems described as “superintelligent AI”.”. This new clause would enable the Secretary of State to be granted “last-resort powers” to ensure that the government can intervene in case of an emergency caused by AI used or deployed by a data centre which can cause large-scale harm. New clause 13—Digital Sovereignty Strategy on risks posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy (“a Digital Sovereignty Strategy”) which sets out the Government's approach to maintaining the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems by— (a) assessing, managing and mitigating risks— (i) associated with foreign interference, (ii) arising from reliance on foreign-supplied technologies, and (b) preventing over-reliance on foreign providers by building domestic capacity. (2) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant network and information system” is a network and information system belonging to— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations. (3) A Digital Sovereignty Strategy published under this section must— (a) include risks associated with— (i) hardware, (ii) software, (iii) supply chains, and (iv) procurement processes; (b) include a specific focus on security and resilience in government digital procurement processes, detailing how the Government intends to reduce strategic dependencies on foreign-owned service providers to mitigate the risk of systemic disruption; (c) include a commitment to prioritise the use of technologies developed in the UK by UK organisations in relevant network and information systems to reduce reliance on foreign technologies, and (d) where risks are identified under subsection (1)(a)(i), state how the Government intends to address these risks by supporting the use of domestic technologies or systems for the purpose of ensuring the security of those systems.”. This new clause would require the Government to publish a Digital Sovereignty Strategy setting out how it intends to address risks to relevant network and information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies. New clause 14—Register of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4— “(1) For the purposes of informing action taken under Part 4 of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations, and within six months of the passing of this Act, establish and subsequently maintain a register of foreign powers that the Secretary of State believes present a risk to the United Kingdom’s critical network and information systems. (2) Foreign powers determined by the Secretary of State as eligible for inclusion on the register under subsection (1) must include states which have been confirmed by GCHQ as posing a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers, including where the relevant risk is posed by state affiliated groups. (3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. (4) In this section, “foreign power” means— (a) the sovereign or other head of a foreign state in their public capacity; (b) a foreign government, or part of a foreign government; (c) an agency or authority of a foreign government, or of part of a foreign government; (d) an authority responsible for administering the affairs of an area within a foreign country or territory, or persons exercising the functions of such an authority; or (e) a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government. A political party is a governing political party of a foreign government if persons holding political or official posts in the foreign government or part of the foreign government— (i) hold those posts as a result of, or in the course of, their membership of the party, or (ii) in exercising the functions of those posts, are subject to the direction or control of, or significantly influenced by, the party.” This new clause would require the Government to maintain a register of state actors posing a threat to UK cyber security for the purposes of exercising the Secretary of State’s powers under Part 4 of the Act, which enable the giving of directions in the interests of national security. New clause 15—Review of the cyber security risk posed by foreign powers— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act and annually thereafter, review the extent and nature of the risk posed by relevant foreign powers to the network and information systems of operators of essential services and critical suppliers. (2) A review under this section must identify whether any risk arises from— (a) activities undertaken outside of the UK, or (b) foreign owned or controlled infrastructure or locations within the UK. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1), “relevant foreign powers” include states which have been confirmed by GCHQ as posing a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers, including where the relevant risk is posed by state departments, state agencies or affiliate groups. (4) Within three months of each review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must— (a) lay before Parliament a report containing the findings and conclusions of the review; and (b) where information is not included in a report on the grounds of being prejudicial to the UK’s national security, send such information to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.” This new clause would require the Government to report on the risk to relevant network and information systems posed by specified foreign powers, considering whether such risks arise from extra-territorial activities and/or UK infrastructure or premises owned or controlled by foreign powers. New clause 16—Digital Sovereignty Strategy (relevant network and information systems)— “(1) The Secretary of State must prepare and maintain a Digital Sovereignty Strategy (“the Strategy”) in relation to relevant network and information systems. (2) The Strategy must— (a) set out the Government’s assessment of the risks to relevant network and information systems arising from or related to— (i) dependence on hardware, software, or digital services that may be subject to foreign interference; (ii) extra-territorial legal requirements that may be imposed on non-domiciled suppliers; (iii) vulnerabilities, undue control, or supply-chain dependency on foreign states or entities; (b) technological developments, market concentration, or strategic dependencies that may affect the security or resilience of relevant network and information systems; (c) set out the Government’s approach to mitigating the risks identified under subsection (2); and (d) include an assessment of— (i) the role of open source software, open standards, and open architectures in strengthening the resilience, transparency, and security of relevant network and information systems; (ii) the security and maintenance needs of open source software components used, or proposed to be used, in relevant network and information systems; (iii) the skills, capabilities, and capacity of United Kingdom-based developers, maintainers, and technical experts required to support the use of open source components in relevant network and information systems; (iv) options to increase the use of open source components and to diversify open source suppliers, reduce strategic dependencies, and enhance domestic capability in key technologies used in relevant network and information systems; (v) options for international collaboration in the production of open source components used in relevant network and information systems; (vi) any legislative, regulatory, procurement, or policy measures the Government considers necessary to support digital sovereignty through open source components and reduce systemic risk in relation to relevant network and information systems. (3) The Secretary of State must publish the Strategy and any revisions to it, subject to the redaction of information the publication of which would be reasonably likely to prejudice national security. (4) The Strategy must be reviewed at least once in every three-year period but may be updated whenever the Secretary of State considers that significant new risks have arisen. (5) In this section— “relevant network and information system” means a network and information system belonging to— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018; “digital sovereignty” means the ability of the United Kingdom to maintain secure, resilient, and reliable access to and control over the hardware, software, data, and digital services on which relevant network and information systems depend; “open source” has the meaning given to it in the definition published by the Open Source Initiative.” New clause 18—Review of the number of bodies providing cloud computing services— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by the number of different bodies providing or supplying cloud computing services. (2) For the purposes of this section, “cloud computing services” has the meaning given in paragraph 1 of the NIS Regulations.” This new clause would require the Government to review the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by the number of different bodies providing or supplying cloud computing services. New clause 19—Review of risks posed by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular Internet of Things modules— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular Internet of Things modules. (2) For the purposes of this section– “cellular Internet of Things modules” means devices that communicate over public mobile networks for the purposes of enabling autonomous machine to machine communication;”. This new clause would require the Government to review the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by providers of cellular Internet of Things modules owned or controlled by foreign states. New clause 20—Specification of retail commerce as an essential activity— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations under section 24(3) to specify as an essential activity retail commerce carried out by companies with an annual turnover in excess of £12 billion. (2) Regulations introduced under subsection (1) must designate appropriate regulatory authorities for this sector.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to designate retail commerce carried out by companies with an annual turnover in excess of £12 billion as an essential activity, bringing it within the scope of Part 3 of the Bill. New clause 21—Food supply chain to be regulated as an essential service— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows. (2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to digital infrastructure insert— “Food supply Food supply chain The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (United Kingdom)” (3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph 11 insert— “The food supply chain subsector 12 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to essential services in the food supply chain subsector. (2) For the essential service of the food supply chain in the United Kingdom the threshold requirement is that the person is in the food supply chain and does not qualify as small or a micro-entity (or is excluded) within the meaning of Part 15 of the Companies Act 2006. (3) For the purposes of this paragraph— (a) a “food supply chain” is a supply chain for providing individuals with items of food or drink for personal consumption, where the items consist of or include, or have been produced to any extent using— (i) anything grown or otherwise produced in carrying on agriculture, or (ii) anything taken, grown or otherwise produced in carrying on fishing or aquaculture; (b) a person is “in” a food supply chain if that person is a producer or an intermediary in a food supply chain. (4) In paragraph (3)(b)— (a) “producer” means a person who is carrying on agriculture, fishing or aquaculture; (b) “intermediary” means a person in the food supply chain between a producer and the individuals referred to in paragraph (3)(a). (5) In this paragraph— “agriculture” includes any growing of plants, and any keeping of animals, for the production of food or drink; “aquaculture” means the breeding, rearing, growing or cultivation of— (a) any fish or other aquatic animal, (b) seaweed or any other aquatic plant, or (c) any other aquatic organism. “plants” includes fungi. (6) In regulation 8A of the NIS Regulations (nomination by an OES of a person to act on its behalf in the United Kingdom), after paragraph 1(b) insert— ‘(c) provides an essential service of a kind referred to in paragraph 12 of Schedule 2 (food supply chain sector) within the United Kingdom.’” This new clause would designate those in the food supply chain that rely on network and information systems as “operators of essential services” within the meaning of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, thereby placing them under duties to manage risks to those systems and to provide notification regarding any incidents that have an impact on the food supply chain. Amendment 1, in clause 8, page 7, line 36, at end insert— “(1A) In paragraph (1), after “risks” insert “, including risks arising from fraud,””. This amendment would explicitly include fraud as one of the risks to the security of network and information systems that relevant digital service providers must identify and manage. Amendment 28, in clause 10, page 9, line 33, at end insert— “(2A) The measures taken by an RMSP under paragraph (1) must ensure that the number of customers to whom the RMSP provides services does not exceed the critical risk threshold. (2B) In paragraph (2A), the “critical risk threshold” is the number of customers within a sector or subsector where an incident affecting the provision of services to those customers by the RMSP would result in disruption that is likely to have a significant impact on the economy or the day-to-day functioning of society in the whole or any part of the United Kingdom. (2C) Paragraph (2D) applies where the number of customers to whom an RMSP provides services exceeds the critical risk threshold by virtue of contracts entered into before the coming into force of section 10 of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026. (2D) The RMSP must take steps to reduce the number of customers to below the critical risk threshold, including exercising any right to terminate a contract or vary the terms of a contract.” This amendment would place a duty on relevant managed service providers (“RMSPs”) to ensure that they do not provide services to manage the technology systems for a number of customers that exceeds a critical risk threshold, such that an incident affecting those services would be likely to result in significant disruption in the United Kingdom. This would prevent an RMSP managing the technology systems for a whole sector or subsector. Provision is also made for a situation where an RMSP is in breach of the critical risk threshold because of contracts entered into before the enactment of the Bill. Government amendments 7 to 11. Amendment 6, in clause 18, page 40, line 12, at end insert— “(8A) Where the CSIRT receives notification of an incident under regulation 11, 11A, 12A or 14E which it considers to materially involve autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, the CSIRT must share relevant technical information with the relevant body within 72 hours. (8B) For the purposes of this regulation, a “relevant body” means the AI Security Institute or any successor or replacement body designated by the Secretary of State.”. This amendment would require incident data relating to AI systems in critical national infrastructure to be sent to the body designated by the Government as responsible for AI safety and security. Government amendments 12 to 14. Amendment 3, in clause 18, page 41, line 15, at end insert— “Exemption from disclosure: right to a fair trial (1) Nothing in sub-paragraphs (1)(d) to (1)(f) of regulation 6, or regulation 6A, permits a NIS enforcement authority to share information with another NIS enforcement authority or with a person within paragraph (2) of regulation 6 if the Secretary of State determines that— (a) the receiving jurisdiction is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, or (b) the disclosure could result in actions being taken that would be incompatible with the right to a fair trial. (2) For the purposes of making a determination under paragraph (1) above, the Secretary of State must have regard to the opinion of— (a) subject matter experts, and (b) competent civil society groups. (3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026, publish and lay before Parliament an annual report detailing the determinations made under paragraph (1) above in the previous 12 months.” This amendment would prevent the sharing of information with overseas authorities for the purpose of prosecuting crimes not committed in the UK if the Secretary of State determines that the receiving country is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed. Government amendments 15 to 17. Amendment 4, in clause 29, page 54, line 9, at end insert “, including the risks arising from the use of embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK;”. This amendment would make explicit that regulations could concern the risks arising from the use of embedded components within the systems (such as cellular internet of things modules). Amendment 2, in clause 40, page 63, line 7, leave out “5” and insert “3”. This amendment would increase the frequency of the reports that must be published under Clause 40, from every five years to every three years. Amendment 5, in clause 43, page 66, line 18, at end insert— “(i) a requirement relating to embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK.” This amendment would provide an additional requirement that may be imposed on a regulated person, in relation to an embedded communications component manufactured outside the UK. Government amendments 18 to 27.

    Hansard source
26. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Judith Cummins

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I call the Chair of the Select Committee on Science, Innovation and Technology.

    Hansard source
27. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Josh MacAlister

    Lifelong Learning: “University of the Air” White Paper

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I start by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Southport (Patrick Hurley) on securing this very timely debate and on the characteristically thoughtful case he made. I also give credit to the hon. Member for South Antrim (Robin Swann), a graduate of the Open University himself, who reminded us of the analogue age of VCRs and the magic of Sir David Attenborough. I also thank the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for highlighting the genuine inclusivity of the Open University from its inception. He was also right to highlight the importance of prisoner education. Although it is not within my area of responsibility, I am very passionate about it, and I believe that the Open University and other providers have a really important role to play, given the captive nature of the audience and the chance for prison to be a place where people can genuinely turn their lives around. I want to answer the question about UCAS before I turn to the wider debate. The Open University chooses to manage applications directly, partly because of the need for flexibility beyond the normal academic cycle, but information about OU courses, including modular courses, is available on the UCAS website. I am keen not to get drawn too far away from the topic of the Open University, but I will respond in short to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin), who raised issues regarding level 7 apprenticeships. This is an area simply of disagreement on policy and on where the resources that sit behind the apprenticeships levy—which is now the growth and skills levy—should rest. I am really keen, as is the Education Secretary, for those resources to be targeted very much at those who might not have taken the university path and for those entry-level apprenticeship routes to be funded to the max. That is why that policy decision was made. I stand by it and believe it was the right decision on balance for the use of those resources. My hon. Friend the Member for Southport speaks in this debate not just as an advocate for lifelong learning but as living proof of its potential. As he spoke about movingly, his example is of someone who enrolled with the OU at the age of 30, and five years later emerged with both an undergraduate degree and a master’s degree to their name. That, for me, is the Open University’s mission in a nutshell—not a makeshift second chance, but a genuinely world-class route to opportunity for people who were not on academic pathways at the age of 18. That is why his advocacy carries such weight. In Southport, he has carried that conviction into the community at the heart of his constituency, championing the learning festival that took place in the town last year and being a strong advocate for improving educational opportunities more broadly. I have been lobbied many times about school buildings by him, so I can attest to that. As my hon. Friend explained, it will be 60 years ago next February since another Labour Minister, Jennie Lee, published the White Paper, “A University of the Air”. She did so in the face of immense scepticism. Whitehall was snooty, the press was cynical and much of the establishment argued that the money should be spent elsewhere, but Jennie Lee was, in Harold Wilson’s words, “a tigress”. At a famous Cabinet meeting at Chequers just before the 1966 election, she argued that while the national health service was the greatest creation of the post-war Labour Government, the “University of the Air” would make “just as much difference to the country.” The White Paper made a radical argument that higher education should be open to all, regardless of background or prior qualifications, that learning should be flexible, rigorous and lifelong, and that new technology would carry academic excellence far beyond the walls of traditional institutions. Jennie Lee won that argument, and 60 years on, every part of that vision—open access, flexibility and technology in service of excellence—reads less like history and more like a description of the task that sits in front of us today. The Open University, the institution founded as a consequence of that White Paper, is today the largest academic institution in the UK, with students in all 650 parliamentary constituencies. Since 1969, it has taught more than 2.5 million students worldwide. Three quarters of its undergraduates arrive with no previous higher education qualifications. The open door that Jennie Lee promised is still open. In the last five years alone, more than 15,000 people who began studying without any A-levels have earned higher education qualifications through the Open University. Two thirds of its students are working while they study. It is learning that fits around life—not the other way around. The OU was never second best: at the last assessment, 82% of its research impact was rated world leading or internationally excellent, and last year it was awarded gold—the highest ranking—in the teaching excellence framework.

    Hansard source
28. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Josh MacAlister

    Lifelong Learning: “University of the Air” White Paper

    I completely agree. I will turn now to the Government’s actions, which will take the Open University to its next chapter, so that those opportunities are spread even more across our great country. Last October, we published the “Post-16 education and skills” White Paper. There is a powerful alignment between the Open University’s mission to widen access and our own vision, set out in that White Paper, for a world-leading skills system that breaks down barriers to opportunity. The strategy in the White Paper is the blueprint for delivering our new target for two thirds of young people to be participating in higher-level learning—academic, technical or apprenticeships. We are determined to break the damaging link between background and success, and we want more people from all backgrounds to be able to access higher education as part of that. As part of our reforms, the lifelong learning entitlement —a policy from the previous Government that I am very pleased we are continuing, with cross-party support—represents one of the most significant student finance reforms in a generation. For the first time, it establishes a single, flexible funding system covering levels 4 to 6 across further and higher education, enabling people to learn, upskill and retrain throughout their working lives. The rationale for the entitlement is clear. More than a third of vacancies go unfilled due to skills shortages, and around 80% of the 2030 workforce are already in employment. However, the current system was largely designed for younger, full-time students and lacks the flexibility that adults in work need. The LLE will expand access to higher-quality, flexible education and training, promote learner mobility and ensure that providers can respond to the needs of learners, employers and the wider economy. Sixty years ago, a White Paper of just a few pages was dismissed as vague, insubstantial and impractical. Today, the institution it created has taught more than 2 million people, with my hon. Friend the Member for Southport among them. That is the test that Jennie Lee set us: not whether an idea is convenient, but whether it changes lives. She insisted that there could be no question of offering students a makeshift project, inferior in quality to other universities. Sixty years on, that standard still binds us. From January next year funding will, for the first time, follow the learner, module by module, at any stage of life. Our ambition that two thirds of young people reach higher-level learning is matched by an entitlement that lasts to 60, because opportunity should not have a closing date. Jennie Lee’s revolution was to say that the door to education should never close behind someone. The task of the next 60 years is to hold that door open wider still, in Southport and in every community like it. When our learners thrive, our country thrives.

    Hansard source
29. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Josh Dean

    Thames Water

    My residents are rightly angry that Thames Water has discharged sewage into the River Stort, one of our rare and precious chalk streams, for hundreds of hours. I have raised the issue in this House before, and Thames Water told me that its improvement plan will not be in place until 2028. That is clearly not good enough. Does the Secretary of State agree that this is the latest in a litany of failures by Thames Water? What assurances will she give my constituents that she will ensure that the need to protect our precious chalk streams will be a priority future consideration in the future of Thames Water?

    Hansard source
30. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·John Whitby

    Topical Questions

    T1. If she will make a statement on her departmental responsibilities.

    Hansard source
31. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·John Whitby

    Topical Questions

    At COP29, an agreement was reached to provide $300 billion of international climate finance annually to developing countries by 2035 to help them pursue green growth pathways, access clean energy, reduce deforestation and so on. What steps is the Department taking to ensure that this commitment is delivered in full by our international partners, and will the Government press for that finance to be provided predominantly as grants rather than loans to avoid increasing debt burdens on developing countries?

    Hansard source
32. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·John Healey

    Personal Statements

    With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a personal statement on my resignation as the UK Defence Secretary. Many in the media have pressed me to say more since Thursday, but I am a proud parliamentarian, and I wanted first to speak in this House, as I take my seat on the Back Benches for the first time in more than 10 years. I took the decision to resign with the greatest regret and reluctance. I continue to be certain about the decision. In time, I believe it will be seen as necessary in securing the future of our armed forces and alliances. It has been the privilege of my life to work alongside the exceptional people who serve this country in Defence—military and civilian alike. They work 24/7, so often unseen, and are the very best of Britain. They, and the new Defence Secretary, have my fullest support. I have been a Labour MP for nearly 30 years, a Labour member for 45 years and a trade unionist for longer still. It is my family—literally. Jackie, my wife, worked for Labour HQ. We met at a union conference. Two weeks later, we were engaged. All of us in politics ask so much of our partners. We only ever wanted a successful Labour Government leading a stronger Britain. My decision last week was about country, not career. I loved the job, though I will not miss going to bed with three phones or the 3 am phone calls. I am proud of what we have done in less than two years as a Labour Government. We stepped up international leadership for Ukraine, raised defence investment three years earlier than anyone expected, won record defence export deals, gave the armed forces their biggest pay rise for 20 years, brought 36,000 forces family homes back into public ownership, and signed major defence agreements with Germany, Norway, France and the European Union. Delivering for defence; delivering for Britain. The Prime Minister has led that drive, rightly earning respect at home and abroad. He and I jointly commissioned the first-of-its-kind strategic defence review, which has set the vision to transform our armed forces to make our military more warfighting ready and better able to deter. We have been doing exactly that in the 12 months since the SDR was published. We are delivering in a different way: investment with deep reforms to get a grip on budgets, procurement and delivery; investment so that every taxpayer’s pound works twice, once for national security and once to back British industry and create British jobs; investment in new defence tech—drones and AI—that draws lessons from Ukraine for our UK forces. I will always seek cross-party common ground on defence, but I will not let the Conservatives forget their record in government or the hollowed-out legacy they left in our armed forces. Since the SDR, we have seen the world changing still faster, with threats increasing and demands on defence rising: conflict in the middle east, new NATO missions in the High North, the US moving forces away from Europe, intensifying attacks in Ukraine and increasing Russian aggression towards the UK. NATO has now said that we must prepare for war with Russia within the next five years. This is the age of hard power and rising threat. This is not the moment for calibration or incremental change. This means bigger politics, bolder priorities and harder choices. Britain’s challenge now is the transformation and rearmament of our armed forces. The Prime Minister knows what the country needs for defence. He spelled out the threat this month when he said: “it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.” Britain must set the headmark of spending 3% on defence in 2030 and a clear path to 3.5% in 2035—the commitment all NATO nations have made to each other and to their people. I believe that this would command wide cross-party support. Our predecessors in this House experienced what happens when deterrence fails. They entrusted us with institutions such as NATO that they created to keep us safe. We do not choose the circumstances in which we serve or the responsibilities that fall upon us, either in this House or in government. It is the duty of our political generation to ready Britain for the uncertainties of the years to come. The decisions that we make in the months ahead will be judged by those who follow us. At this dangerous time, I see the current defence investment plans falling well short of what is required: a rise of 0.08% from next year to 2030, no date for reaching 3%, and no path to 3.5%. By 2030, well over half of NATO members will be spending 3% or more. When allies are looking for British leadership, we must not fall behind. When NATO needs European nations to step up, we must not fall short. Our adversaries do not follow timetables set by the Treasury. I appreciate how hard this is for Cabinet colleagues, and I am very grateful to those who support what is required, but not all needs to be done by cutbacks elsewhere. There are credible ways of meeting the mid-term funding challenges, working multinationally and as other nations in Europe are doing, that could allow us to protect the ability to deliver our Labour missions across Government. Beyond that, we need a bigger view of national security. It is not just a job for Defence or the agencies; every Department has a part to play in national security and national resilience. From Energy to Transport to Health, security must run through the Government like letters through a stick of rock. Security must be felt in communities right across Britain, reversing long-term decline and bringing new jobs and new hope. For now, Jackie is just grateful that I no longer carry three phones in my bag, although I do still have my bottle of HP sauce.

    Hansard source
33. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jo White

    Health Bill (Second sitting)

    Q One of the concerns of my local healthcare trust is around the release of elderly patients into the community, as it finds that relations with the ICB are sometimes difficult. How can neighbourhood health plans work well and cohesively with healthcare trusts to release patients into community care?

    Hansard source
34. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jo White

    Health Bill (Second sitting)

    I was talking about bed-blocking in hospitals and how neighbourhood health plans can work more cohesively with hospital trusts. Councillor Wright: I think we can answer this together. The whole point of neighbourhood health is to bring in everyone in the voluntary sector, your patient transport and all that, so that your joint strategic needs assessment has a good understanding of what is available to someone in the community when they come home. We talked before about having a strong single patient record so that good communication is there, and neighbourhood health is able to strengthen that. Neighbourhood health should be not just about shifting the need from hospital to community, but about reducing that need in the first place so that fewer people need to go to hospital. At the same time, we are seeing some good developments in the NHS, such as frailty teams and hospital at home teams, all of which help to prevent people from being admitted to hospital in the first place, and to ensure that when people come home, there is a team to visit them. You are right about the communication issue, although it has not been an issue where I am, as we have very good communication with our local ICB about the people being discharged, to make sure that someone is there to meet them and that nurses come out to see them when they come home—I cannot remember the word for that. We have the right systems in place and they are working. I do not know how neighbourhood health will work everywhere, but in our borough we have a step-down unit called Heathlands, which people quite often go to when they come out of hospital and which does quite a lot of rehabilitation. That already starts the plan to get them home: to go from hospital, to the step-down place and then to home. It is about having good systems in place, all of which should hopefully be supported by neighbourhood health, which should have a good knowledge of what is available locally. Sally Burlington: It should definitely help, if it works well; we should see more capability and capacity available in the community, closer to where people live, to help them when they come out of hospital. There is a lot of good practice and understanding about good discharge and how you plan from the point that somebody is admitted to when they come out of hospital. The emphasis on integrated neighbourhood teams will be important. It would be helpful if we could all remember that those must include social care and wider local government services and connections in to those, not just integration within NHS teams. It is definitely a positive step forward and, if we can try to make sure that the relationships between health, social care, public health and wider services are brought to life in neighbourhood health, that will help us in this way and in lots of others.

    Hansard source
35. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jo White

    Health Bill (Second sitting)

    Q You are speaking with tremendous passion and I can tell that you see this as an opportunity to make the NHS function far better. You mentioned at the very beginning that it took eight months to make the announcement that you were going to abolish NHS England. How quickly did you realise that NHS England was malfunctioning, far too bureaucratic and not delivering on the priorities for people in this country? Karin Smyth: That is a good question. When I was in opposition, I spoke frequently about accountability and democracy, as the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham was trying to highlight—I am sure that we will hear some more quotes. I cannot speak for the former Secretary of State, as he is not here, but it did surprise us going into the financial year when, despite very clear direction and expectation about the financial situation that the Government inherited and what needed to happen, we were still faced with a very large projected deficit. The duplication meant that there were a lot of people in the room and clearly things were being handed off and that was not working. Ultimately, this is a question that always lurked. I know that the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston is here, and during the passage of the Bill that became the Health and Care Act 2022, we said to the Department that that might have been the opportunity to act. I think that previous Secretaries of State, as was alluded to earlier, thought that they might do that. Ultimately, the benefits of doing it now outweigh the risks and that is the only way to make the system change. We heard from the King’s Fund about opportunity costs and that the benefits do not outweigh the risks—we do not think that is true.

    Hansard source
36. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jim McMahon

    Draft Digital Waste Tracking (England) Regulations 2026

    I congratulate the Government on the efforts being made on fly-tipping. We can quite often skirt over just how important these issues are, but in areas where fly-tipping is common, it absolutely ruins the local community. I put on record our appreciation for the work that is being done.

    Hansard source
37. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jim McMahon

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    On local government, there are clearly hundreds of local authorities, many of which are busy upgrading their systems. However, one thing that is not spoken about enough is the human capacity to actually do the work. Many local authorities, like Government themselves, find a real difficulty in recruiting the talent that they need. Does my hon. Friend agree that central Government could provide a greater role and act almost as a centre of excellence for cyber-security for local government?

    Hansard source
38. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jim McMahon

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I have often said about the device that was found in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government that unless someone is a member of staff, they cannot get to that side of the building without going through the Home Office. That obviously raises serious questions about the complex on Marsham Street more broadly. Does the shadow Minister accept that there is a pattern of foreign malign forces impacting our institutions, whether that is our Parliament or even the sovereignty of the United Kingdom itself? Unless there is resolve by Government and all parties in this place, we will not face that threat with the scale of response needed.

    Hansard source
39. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jim Dickson

    Thames Water

    For far too long, Dartford residents have put up with very poor performance and high water bills. It is extremely likely that Thames Water leaks contributed to the collapse of the Galley Hill road in 2023, as a result of which Swanscombe residents have been pretty much trapped in their town over the past three years. As the Secretary of State has said, it is vital that the company does not have its performance standards diluted or receives protection from fines as a consequence of the deal that is on the table. Does she agree that any deal must put consumers and environmental protections first, and that investors should not benefit at the expense of billpayers and vital infrastructure improvements?

    Hansard source
40. 16 Jun 2026·Parliament·Labour·Jessica Morden

    Topical Questions

    T6. On top of its efforts to interfere in Armenian democracy, Russia is now using economic pressure through arbitrary trade restrictions in an effort to undermine Armenia’s strengthening ties with the UK and Europe. What more can we do on a practical level, through our strategic partnership and alongside EU allies, to support Armenia as it continues to pursue European integration?

    Hansard source