Showing every spoken contribution, including 142 under 12 words. Hide short remarks
We are debating clause 1, which as I understand it will completely remove defendants’ right to elect; the rest of the Bill puts in place procedures <span id="131" class="column-number" data-column-number="131"></span>whereby other people—judges—will decide whether a jury trial is held. The right to elect a jury trial is being completely abolished. Is that not correct?
Tim Crosland’s point was that the Government are, in effect, abolishing the principle of jury equity. Can the Minister tell us that we cannot ever expect a judge to triage a case based on the fact that the true interests of justice might lie with a <span id="140" class="column-number" data-column-number="140"></span>defendant relying on the principle of jury equity? Will she admit that the principle of jury equity is being abolished by the clause?
The Minister has made many points about magistrates court hearings being as fair, but she seems to have forgotten the amount of evidence we heard during the oral evidence sessions. Witnesses acknowledged that magistrate court hearings were “rough and ready” and “rough around the edges”, that mistakes may be made, and that the Bill later removes the automatic right to appeal, which is an important safeguard against what she must admit is the slightly inferior justice that can be found in the magistrates courts. Will she not admit that and talk more about the appeals situation?
Apologies to the Minister for heckling. The point about the right of appeal is absolutely key. If mistakes are made in the magistrates court, it is currently the case that they are corrected at quite a rate. We heard evidence on that. Those two things give Opposition Members genuine and legitimate cause for concern.
I rise to speak to both the clauses and the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, which the hon. Member for Hazel Grove spoke to. Briefly, commencing section 9 to PPERA, as proposed by new clause 47, is something that was put into legislation 17 years ago, so it feels really quite overdue. Regarding the points that were just discussed around new clause 49, which proposes the reduction to £500 of the threshold for declaring the source of a donation, making such a declaration is not necessarily a hugely onerous process. I imagine that when someone makes a donation and fills in a form, they just put, “Source: my salary”. This is not necessarily a hugely problematic part of the process of creating more transparency. We surely all agree that more transparency is needed in our political financing system, to protect from the corrosive effect of foreign donations, and of huge inequalities and the lack of transparency over domestic donations. I strongly support all the new clauses. I will raise a couple of additional points, which I would like the Minister to respond to. First of all, regarding the provision in clause 56 and schedule 7 to submit two returns now—to both the local returning officer and the Electoral Commission—I note that the Electoral Commission, in its briefing to the Committee, argued that this provision clearly makes things more complex and problematic, and it argued that the primary responsibility for submission should be to the Electoral Commission. Does that not make more sense? Given that the Bill is introducing a requirement to submit to the Electoral Commission, why do not we just say, “Submit the return to the Electoral Commission”? Then the Electoral Commission can correspond with the returning officer if it wants to. But let us just have one submission and make the process as simple as possible for candidates and parties. Could the Minister respond on that point from the Electoral Commission about the requirement to submit two returns? Secondly, a point raised by Philip Rycroft in his extremely useful report, under recommendation number 7, is that “The Electoral Commission should mandate political parties to submit their annual reports and accounts and campaign spending returns in a standardised format.” Could the Minister comment on whether she proposes to take that recommendation forward? It would be very helpful in improving transparency and clarity in the system.
Broadly, I hugely welcome all measures to improve the risk assessment of donations, which is critical, so I am glad to see those here. I agree that much more needs to be done than is currently in the Bill, as outlined by Philip Rycroft, among others, so I welcome the Government’s commitment to do that. I share the frustration expressed about the fact that we have two processes going on in parallel and so, from my perspective, we will not have sufficient opportunity adequately to scrutinise the proposals that the Government are promising to bring forward in relation to Rycroft. However, I absolutely feel their urgency and look forward to whatever opportunity we do have to scrutinise them. I agree with the hon. Member for Hazel Grove that there are critical missing elements that we could and should be addressing in this part of the Bill: crypto donations, in particular, but also the desperate need for an overall cap on political donations. We will be able to discuss those issues later, when we come to the new clauses, but it seems rather odd that the Government have put nothing in this part of the Bill in relation to those critical elements. I want to raise two specific issues in relation to this group of amendments. First, the Electoral Commission has made two points about the articulation of risk factors. It would like the list of risk factors to include any other risk factors that a reasonable party would consider relevant, rather than any other risk factors that a political party itself considers relevant, because that would constitute marking its own homework. It seems <span id="248" class="column-number" data-column-number="248"></span>to me that that small tweak to language would clarify the risk factors. The Electoral Commission also recommends the inclusion of a risk factor relating to a person’s connections to other countries and jurisdictions. That might be a more inclusive way of addressing some of the points about a foreign influence registration scheme. I would welcome the Minister’s comments on those two recommendations—requests, essentially—from the Electoral Commission. Secondly, in a report produced last month, CenTax—a joint initiative of the London School of Economics and the University of Warwick—pointed out that it would be potentially much more sensible to establish a donor registration system operated by the Electoral Commission itself. That would mean transferring responsibility for the risk assessment for “know your donor” checks to the Electoral Commission rather than to political parties, which, depending on their size and longevity and so forth, might have varying capacities to do that. When a donor wished to make a donation to a party above a certain minimal threshold, they would apply to the Electoral Commission for a donor registration number and then use that when making the donation. That would make it much easier to keep track of multiple donations by a given donor, either to a single party over a period of time or to multiple parties. That seems to me a sensible and workable proposal for improving transparency and clarity in the system, recognising and addressing the burden of compliance requirements that will be placed on parties—including local parties, which, as has been mentioned, are very much reliant on volunteers—and ensuring a consistent approach to donor risk assessment and monitoring. I would welcome the Minister’s response to that recommendation from CenTax that a donor registration system should be established.
It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Sir Desmond. In clause 60, we are considering company donations in UK politics, and I ask the Minister to consider outright banning them, as happens, for example, in France and Canada. There is no real reason for companies to be permitted to make donations, particularly when we are concerned, as in this Bill, with ensuring that company donations are not a mechanism for channelling funds from outside the country into British politics. Why not make the situation clear and allow only individuals, whose connection to the country can be clearly tested, to donate? Company donations have been nearly half the size of individual donations in UK politics in recent years. These are really significant sums.
I consider companies and trade unions to be completely different entities. One is a profit-making organisation, and the other is a membership association designed to represent the interests of its members. The two are not parallel, and I am completely fine with trade unions making donations. Company donations have a huge influence on our politics. There is also a tax advantage for companies; there is effectively a taxpayer subsidy to them, and the advantage can be up to about 40% for companies making donations from company funds, compared with individual funds. I would therefore like to hear why the Minister thinks it is important to retain the ability for companies to make donations and does not want to follow the example of France and Canada in stopping such donations. Individuals can still make donations. On a couple of specific points, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove referenced the fact that there is a clear problem in the Bill as currently drafted. A loophole permits companies to give donations up to the limit multiple times, both to a party and potentially to every single one of its candidates. Surely the limit should be set so that it reflects the total value of donations to all recipients. That has been argued for by the Electoral Commission and in Philip Rycroft’s recommendation 4, and it is also covered by amendments 36 and 37 in the name of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington.<span id="273" class="column-number" data-column-number="273"></span> It is also clear that the test should be post-tax profit, not revenue. It is far too easy for companies to inflate their revenues by engaging in what is sometimes called transfer pricing in other sectors, effectively enabling them to completely bypass the intended restrictions. Surely it is in the spirit of the Bill, and should therefore be put into the letter of it, that the test should be post-tax profit, not revenue. If we are going to permit company donations, we should be really clear that they are derived from profit made in-country, because using the revenue test provides a huge loophole. Again, that is called for in Philip Rycroft’s recommendation 2, and by the Electoral Commission and many others, so I very much hope the Minister will respond positively. Amendments 34 and 35, in the name of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, would make the donor criminally liable. The Minister responded by saying that the onus should all be on the recipient of those donations, but that is not how the law operates in other areas when it is broken: the commissioners of the offence, as well as the recipient of the funding, are guilty. So I ask the Minister to think again. If we are talking about large companies making huge donations, they arguably have greater capacity, and certainly just as much responsibility, as the recipient to check that they are operating within the law. I refer the Minister to my comments on a previous clause about establishing a donor register, which would enable us to deal with these issues and involve the Electoral Commission in ensuring that these checks are in place. I will briefly touch on new clause 13, in the name of the hon. Member for North East Hertfordshire (Chris Hinchliff), new clause 32, in the name of the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), and new clause 52, in the name of the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon). They all recognise the widespread concern in UK politics, and among all of us to some extent, about how company donations risk twisting, and in some cases have twisted, our politics. Each of those Members has tabled a new clause seeking to ban donations from particular categories of company donor. The first seeks to exclude property development and construction undertakings, the second seeks to exclude those who have had public contracts at any time in the last 10 years, and the third seeks to exclude any companies involved in oil and gas extraction. I have huge sympathy for the arguments and for the broad thrust of those new clauses. I am not necessarily convinced that, in their current form, they are ready to be incorporated in the Bill, but they highlight a key concern. For example, there has been widespread concern about cases where large donations by a property developer were associated with planning decisions under a previous Government that went in favour of that property developer. There have also been serious concerns about the revolving door between the Government and the legislature, and profit-making companies. I would really like to hear the Minister’s response to those three new clauses tabled by Labour Members, which highlight concerns about the influence of particular groups of companies on our politics. However, the issues I really hope the Minister will respond to are, first, stopping all company donations, because people who want to make donations can still <span id="274" class="column-number" data-column-number="274"></span>make them as individuals; secondly, adopting the post-tax profits test, rather than the revenue test; and, finally, ensuring that the donations limit applies to the total value of donations, not just single donations.
I thank the Minister for her engagement with my point. In UK politics, about 22% of donations into politics over the past few years have been from companies. We are not talking about requiring the Government to step in and put 60% of the funding into politics; we are talking about the risks associated with a specific form of donation. Under the measures the Government is putting forward in clause 60, we are putting in place requirements to ensure that persons of significant control are clearly allowable donors. However, it is possible for a company to restructure so that it just goes underneath that and does not meet the 25% threshold. So that could still be a channel for illicit or foreign funding to come into British politics. Would it not be simpler to require any persons who have significant control in a company and who wish to make political donations to make them as individuals?
I do apologise, Sir Desmond. I think I have made my point.
I apologise, but I have not heard the Minister respond to the point that I and the hon. Member for Hazel Grove made about donations being counted cumulatively, which is also one of the Rycroft recommendations.
I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 62, page 83, line 17, leave out “£11,180” and insert “£500”. <em>This amendment, together with Amendments 89 to 94, would bring the reporting threshold for donations from Unincorporated Associations in line with the permissibility threshold for donations to political parties.</em>
The clause contains the welcome measure of preventing donations from impermissible donors being made through the mechanism of unincorporated associations and reducing the level at which they have to register with the Electoral Commission and report gifts. That is very positive. The current situation really cannot continue, so I am pleased that, through these measures, the Government will try to manage and block malicious interference and ensure democratic safety. Although unincorporated associations are used legitimately by some, they can be an opaque vehicle for funds of unknown origin, so there is potential for them to be used to introduce foreign interference in our political system. Interesting Transparency International research published last year found that, of the £40.4 million in donations made by unincorporated associations since 2010, a huge £38.6 million was unaccounted for. More than 95% of donations from unincorporated associations came from those that have not reported the source of their income, so it is clearly time for change Despite those concerning statistics, the previous Government increased reporting thresholds for unincorporated associations in the Elections Act 2022, so I am very glad that this Government are reversing that decision through the Bill. Under normal regulations, donations to political parties must come from a permissible source if they are over £500, but if the donations are made by an unincorporated association, even with the lower threshold, the reporting requirements are not triggered until donations reach over £11,180 in a calendar year. Even with the new rules, it is possible for an unincorporated association that does not meet the threshold and is therefore not required to register to make donations without any checks. That is clearly an undesirable and unnecessary loophole, so I support the amendments that have been tabled by the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Lauren Edwards), which aim to close this loophole, and I urge the Minister to consider reducing the permissibility threshold for unincorporated associations to £500, equal to the permissibility threshold for other sources of donation.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. <em>Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.</em> <em>Amendment made:</em> 79, in clause 62, page 83, line 28, at end insert— “(h) create offences of— (i) giving an unincorporated association false information about a gift that may be used to make a political contribution, and (ii) withholding information about such a gift with intent to deceive.”—<em>(Samantha Dixon.)</em> <em>This amendment is consequential on amendment 85.</em> <em>Clause 62</em><em>, as amended,</em><em> accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.</em> Schedule 9 UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS MAKING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS <em>Amendments made: </em>80, in schedule 9, page 168, line 2, at end insert “, unless it already has one (see sub-paragraph (6A))”. <em>This amendment, and amendment 81, amends the new provisions on responsible persons for unincorporated associations to make it clear that an association is not required to appoint a responsible person when it already has one in place, but that the Commission must be notified that the responsible person is willing to continue to act.</em><span id="282" class="column-number" data-column-number="282"></span> Amendment 81, in schedule 9, page 168, line 30, at end insert— “(6A) Where an unincorporated association would be required by sub-paragraph (2) to appoint an individual to be the responsible person in relation to the association but an appointment of such a person is already in force, the notice under sub-paragraph (3) must inform the Commission that the responsible person is willing to remain as the responsible person in relation to the association (and sub-paragraph (4)(a) is to be read accordingly).” <em>See the explanatory statement for amendment 80.</em> Amendment 82, in schedule 9, page 170, line 7, after “within” insert “any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of”. <em>This amendment prevents unincorporated associations from being permissible donors in relation to other unincorporated associations: it is intended as an anti-avoidance measure to prevent gifts being channelled through chains of unincorporated associations.</em> Amendment 83, in schedule 9, page 170, line 20, leave out from “within” to end of line 22 and insert “any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of section 54(2),”. <em>This amendment makes similar anti-avoidance provision to that in amendment 82.</em> Amendment 84, in schedule 9, page 170, line 24, at end insert— “(4) Section 162 (meaning of exempt trust donation) applies for the purposes of this paragraph as if, in subsection (2)(a), for ‘27th July 1999’ there were substituted ‘7th April 2026’.” <em>This amendment modifies the meaning of “exempt trust donation” for unincorporated associations by providing that a trust set up before 7th April 2026 (i.e. the date of tabling this amendment) is a permissible donor to an unincorporated association.</em> Amendment 85, in schedule 9, page 173, line 11, at end insert— “(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert— ‘(3A) A person commits an offence if— (a) they knowingly give an unincorporated association any information relating to— (i) the amount of any gift to the association, or (ii) the person or body making such a gift, which is false in a material particular, or (b) with intent to deceive, they withhold from an unincorporated association any material information relating to a matter within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii), in circumstances where they believe that the unincorporated association may use the gift for the purposes of making a political contribution.’” <em>This amendment creates a new criminal offence where a person knowingly provides an unincorporated association with false information, or withholds information with intent to deceive, about a gift that they believe the association may use for the purposes of making a political contribution.</em> Amendment 86, in schedule 9, page 173, line 15, at end insert— “(b) in sub-paragraph (2)(b)(iii), at the end insert ‘or 3A’.” <em>This amendment inserts a missed consequential amendment so that paragraph 7(2)(b)(iii) of Schedule 19A to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 refers to the new paragraph 3A inserted into that Schedule by paragraph 9 of Schedule 9.</em> Amendment 87, in schedule 9, page 174, line 9, at end insert—<span id="283" class="column-number" data-column-number="283"></span> <TableWrapper Columns="1" Size="8"><table class="hansardTable"><thead><tr><th><p>“Paragraph 6(3A)(a) of Schedule 19A (knowingly giving unincorporated association false information about gifts)</p></th><th><p>On summary conviction in England and Wales: fine or the general limit in a magistrates’ court</p><p>On summary conviction in Scotland: statutory maximum or 12 months</p><p>On summary conviction in Northern Ireland: statutory maximum or 6 months</p><p>On indictment: fine or 1 year</p></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><p>Paragraph 6(3A)(b) of Schedule 19A (withholding from unincorporated association information about gifts with intent to deceive)</p></td><td><p>On summary conviction in England and Wales: fine or the general limit in a magistrates’ court</p><p>On summary conviction in Scotland: statutory maximum or 12 months</p><p>On summary conviction in Northern Ireland: statutory maximum or 6 months</p><p>On indictment: fine or 1 year”. —<em>(Samantha Dixon.)</em></p></td></tr></tbody></table></TableWrapper> <em>This amendment sets out the penalty for the new offence inserted by amendment 85.</em> <em>Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.</em> Clause 63 Electronic material promoted by third parties <em>Question proposed,</em> That the clause stand part of the Bill.
<em>indicated assent.</em>
I will speak to new clauses 10, 24, 25, 27 and 28—I will rattle through them. First, new clause 10—tabled by the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), whom I thank for her work on this—relates to guidance on the law regarding digital communication offences in relation to elections. We need this clause and, although it is more complex, one word explains why: deepfakes. This new clause is, to a significant degree, about deepfakes. Tackling deepfakes is complex, but we can take practical steps now to modernise election law and improve our ability to regulate in this area. Both the Electoral Commission and the Crown Prosecution Service have highlighted the need for clearer guidance on whether deepfakes fall within existing election offences. Unfortunately, the law on digital election offences is currently unclear. That uncertainty creates confusion for candidates, platforms and law enforcement, weakens democratic protections and leads to inconsistent enforcement. New clause 10 would require the Government to address that gap by publishing clear guidance within 12 months of the Bill’s passage, setting out how digital communication offences apply during elections, so that expectations are clear and enforcement is consistent. In terms evidence for why this is needed, we all know that deepfakes and manipulated content targeting politicians are already circulating, including outside election periods. Existing laws may technically cover those harms, but their application in digital context remains unclear.<span id="288" class="column-number" data-column-number="288"></span> Recent examples include a deepfake video in October last year of a Conservative MP, the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman), which falsely claimed that he had defected. I was part of an event where he explained that, under the Online Safety Act 2023, he could potentially make a complaint about that, but would have to demonstrate that he was psychologically terribly damaged by it. That is not really what this is about—it is politics that is damaged by the proliferation of such material, so we should take our collective responsibility to deal with it very seriously. In October 2023, a deepfake audio of our current Prime Minister went viral and has repeatedly resurfaced. In Ireland last year, an AI-generated video disrupted a presidential election. Those cases and many others demonstrate the growing risk. Clear guidance is needed to ensure that the law can be effectively applied during election periods. The new clause is very reasonable. It does not require the Government to commit absolutely to something right now; it simply requires the Government to publish guidance to clarify the situation. The Government, in their response to the Speaker’s Conference report published recently, said: “The Government recognises that there are potential issues with Section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. We are reviewing how this legislation should apply in a modern electoral setting. Where necessary, we will take appropriate action to clarify the scope of Section 106, particularly to ensure that it captures emerging technologies (such as deepfakes and other AI technologies) and is future-proofed.” Where better to do that than in this legislation? This is the point when the Government should action the commitment that they have already made. New clause 24 proposes a repository of digital political advertising. Such advertising plays a key and increasingly central role in election campaigns, but remains significantly less transparent than traditional campaign materials. Voters are often unable to see who is targeting them, how much is being spent or whether messaging is consistent across audiences. Campaigners are able to use targeting on social media platforms, for example, to make very targeted adverts, so that nobody can see what material is going to whom. That lack of transparency creates real opportunities for misinformation. It undermines trust in the democratic process and leaves the system vulnerable to manipulation by foreign or domestic actors, as well as opaque funding sources. While the Bill, as it stands, makes progress on digital imprints, it does not go far enough to ensure meaningful, real-time transparency. New clause 24 would address those gaps by requiring the creation of a comprehensive, publicly accessible repository of digital political advertising and strengthening existing disclosure requirements. The reasons for that are well understood. Digital adverts can be micro-targeted to specific groups without wider scrutiny and there is currently no single public record of what ads are being run, by whom, at what scale or with what funding. International evidence, including from elections in the US and Europe—and, I would argue, in the UK—has shown how online political advertising can be exploited to spread disinformation and obscure funding sources. That issue was addressed by Philip Rycroft in his very useful report; I note that, on page 47, he says: “Strictly speaking, this issue of advert libraries strays beyond my remit”,<span id="289" class="column-number" data-column-number="289"></span> but that he has “heard enough evidence to suggest that there would be considerable benefit” from establishing this practice, and he calls on the Government to take action. I welcome that point and very much hope that the Government will consider this new clause, a practical and proportionate transparency measure that would align digital campaigning more with offline political advertising. New clause 25 relates to the Electoral Commission’s powers to obtain information outside formal investigations. That is something we heard about in oral evidence and Philip Rycroft speaks about it specifically in his recommendations 9 and 10. The regulation of digital campaigning requires timely access to information, especially during very fast-moving election periods. At the moment, the Electoral Commission can effectively gather information from online platforms only through formal investigations, which can be initiated only once there is sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation there—a significant gap. The Commission cannot proactively monitor or respond to emerging risks in real time, including the risk of foreign interference or bot activity—a growing problem that we have seen in previous elections. As election campaigns increasingly take place online, that reduces the effectiveness of enforcement. Philip Rycroft has made a clear case for that change, so I do not need to labour the point. I very much hope that that is one of the recommendations that the Government will take away and come back on, and I would welcome some warm words from the Minister on that. New clause 27 would require a Government review of regulated periods in relation to elections—again, something addressed in the Rycroft report, which covered the need to ensure that transparency requirements apply year round. Philip Rycroft is clearly seriously concerned about the risk of gaming the system. Currently, because regulation applies only within the regulated period, but expenditure applies during the entire year, there are strong incentives for political actors to front-load expenditure just before the regulated period kicks in. There is huge evidence of that; I have seen it from another party in my own area, with huge chunks of spending coming in just before the regulated period. That is a clear loophole. Philip Rycroft draws attention to that issue, stating that high spending limits, “combined with unlimited spending possibilities outwith the regulated period, drives a sort of arms race among political parties and actors to out-raise and out-spend their competitors.” The net effect is extremely problematic for our politics. He goes on to state: “Reducing the spending limits and introducing such limits across the whole electoral cycle could potentially relieve some of the fund-raising pressure, in turn diminishing the inducement to look to non-permissible sources to stay ahead.” Rycroft acknowledges that the issue was beyond his direct remit, but it is useful that his report comments on where issues to do with foreign influence overlap with broader questions about how we regulate finance in our system. He states:<span id="290" class="column-number" data-column-number="290"></span> “The issue of spending limits and wider caps is one for the political class as a whole to consider if it wishes to restore confidence in the political process and to keep big money out of UK politics. This might be something that could be usefully debated during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill.” Indeed—so today is our opportunity to debate it. I am saddened that the Bill, as it stands, does not address the need for year-round spending limits or for caps on overall donations—we will come to that a bit later—but this is the moment when we can and should respond to Philip Rycroft’s call to discuss this issue. I challenge the Minister on this: there is a clear need for regulation outwith the regulated period—for year-round regulation of political expenditure—and I hope that she will address that and take it forward. Finally, new clause 28, also in the name of the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central, is essentially about labelling AI-generated material. Just in the past 24 hours we have seen a global controversy over the use of an AI-generated image, posted by a person who shall perhaps remain nameless. It is clear that AI-generated material is widespread in politics. Sometimes it is easily spottable, as in the case I have just referenced, but at other times it may not necessarily be so. Legislation has not yet caught up with that issue. This new clause, like new clause 18 on the same topic, which I suspect the hon. Member for Hazel Grove may speak to shortly, is a much-needed step to improve transparency so that we know when material is produced using AI. The Electoral Commission briefing raises some questions about the specifics of how the issue is addressed, and makes the point that there is a need for similar approaches to be taken across digital and non-digital formats. I take that point broadly, but I do not think it is beyond the wit of civil servants to come up with a form of words that will address the issue. The use of generative AI has been particularly prevalent in the digital space, so this is a real opportunity for regulation to catch up. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on all these very useful new clauses.
I will pick up the hon. Member’s points in my summing up.
On a point of order, Sir Desmond. Do we need to check whether any of the amendments debated with the previous clauses need to be moved, including the ones that I tabled?
I strongly support measures to strengthen the capacities and powers of the Electoral Commission, which plays a crucial role in regulating our politics. I will speak briefly to new clauses 46 and 53. As has already been highlighted, they are basically fully in line with Philip Rycroft’s recommendations 9 and 10, so I hope that Government amendments will be tabled in due course to address those recommendations, the justification for which has been clearly outlined. My new clause 57 concerns the Electoral Commission’s fining power. I very much welcome the Government’s announcement that they will bring forward secondary legislation to increase the commission’s maximum fine to £500,000 from £20,000, which is clearly peanuts and no disincentive at all. That will be a significant improvement, and of course will bring the measure in line with the penalty that can be imposed for breaches of electoral finance rules in relation to referendums in Scotland.
Absolutely. It is clear that the previous level, £20,000, was utterly inadequate, so I welcome the Government’s commitment to strengthen that. The purpose of my new clause 57 is to suggest ways in which it could be strengthened further, namely by putting the maximum fine into primary legislation, and by providing that the maximum fine would be £500,000 or 4% of campaign spending, whichever was the higher. I will explain why. Most other regulators in the UK can impose unlimited fines, a high multimillion-pound fine or a fine as a percentage—for Ofcom, for example, 10%—of annual turnover. In its 2021 review of electoral finance, the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that the fine should be 4% of the value of campaign spending or £500,000, whichever was the higher. My new clause simply calls for what the Committee on Standards in Public Life argued for. Analysis from Spotlight on Corruption has shown that the currently proposed increase to a £500,000 maximum fine would amount to a mere 1.5% and 2.1% of the campaign spending of the Labour and Conservative parties respectively, as the two largest-spending parties. If those parties had committed an egregious offence during the 2024 general election and the 4% measure had been in place, the maximum fines would have been £1.2 million or £955,000 respectively—double the current maximum. Arguably, it should be even higher—Ofcom can fine 10%—but my new clause simply puts forward the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. The Minister touched on the question of whether to have the limit in primary or secondary legislation. She argued—I think I am paraphrasing accurately—that one of the advantages of having it in secondary legislation is that it can be easily updated. However, the previous level of the fine, which was £20,000, was set out in secondary legislation—it was in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010—and it was never updated. The Minister said that the level of the fine might need to be set out in secondary legislation so that it could be more easily updated to make it higher, but the historical record shows us that we have had fines that are far too low and that they are not adapted.
The Minister will forgive me, but I did not hear her respond to the reference in my new clause to the 4% of campaign spending. Did I briefly drop off? Will she consider that when introducing secondary legislation?
<Question HRSContentId="{ED4BA7EA-06EE-40A5-840D-ADBDFD2B7A85}">T6. <QuestionText HRSContentId="{2B6C62AA-CFE6-4561-9485-AAD9C183A6E2}"></QuestionText>The British Dental Association has highlighted that current budgets allow just 39% of adults to access NHS treatment within a two-year period. Is that really the height of the Government’s ambition, and if not, what access percentage are the Government aiming for?</Question>
Council tax is widely acknowledged to be a deeply regressive and unfair tax based on property values that are decades out of date, and the poorest households pay a much larger proportion of their income in council tax than the wealthiest. Rather than consulting just on better ways to collect it, will the Minister instead commit to review and replace this outdated and unfair tax with a system of taxation that is fairer and based on property values?
In the Prime Minister’s 17-page statement, there was not one word of condemnation for the actions of the US, despite the fact that it started this illegal war. Last week, Trump threatened to wipe out an entire civilisation. The Prime Minister rightly condemned the horrific Israeli attacks on Lebanon, but we all know that the war criminal Netanyahu just ignores what we say, because there are no consequences. Will the Prime Minister take action, put sanctions on Netanyahu and withdraw all permission for the US to use UK bases and UK airspace, to make clear that we will not be an accomplice to the rogue actions of Donald Trump, which endanger us all?
I thank the Select Committtee Chair sincerely for the “Access denied” report, which painted a bleak picture of legislative loopholes and lacklustre political will from consecutive Governments when it comes to addressing the huge list of barriers faced by disabled people when accessing public transport. When it comes to step-free access on the railways—on which my speech will focus—it is not just the barriers faced by disabled people that we need to talk about; these barriers also apply to older people, people travelling with children, people with luggage and work equipment, and many other travellers too. We must never ever forget that improving and enabling access for disabled people—or fixing the environment, as the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth (Ruth Cadbury) called it—actually fixes access for all in an inclusive, socially just way. Sixteen years on from the Equality Act 2010 coming into force, one issue repeatedly coming up in my Brighton Pavilion constituency remains the long-term problem of step-free station access. Multiple community train stations in Brighton, including Moulsecoomb and London Road, have compromised access. The problem is most keenly felt at Preston Park station, which is used by a very large number of passengers. It is a station rooted in the heart of the community, which sees thousands of people use it to access direct trains to London, Gatwick, Bedford and Cambridge, as well as west along the coast towards Littlehampton. For visitors travelling to fabulous events hosted at the nearby park—like the Foodies festival in May and the concert due to be held in July by adopted local rock god Nick Cave, and the Bad Seeds—Preston Park station should be the obvious get-off point, yet for decades it has been overlooked when it comes to funding bids to address accessibility issues. It is a category C station with no step-free access and is simply inaccessible currently. There is no lift, with stairs to every platform, and, as the railway is a barrier for travel across the constituency, this lack also impedes active travel more generally. Without step-free access, my local residents are required to travel 2 miles to Brighton mainline station to board trains there, and this can be in addition to calling ahead to pre-book the use of a ramp at that station. This is all an unreasonable adjustment. Yet, despite all these problems and the potential benefits of fixing them, in May 2024, in the dying days of the last Government, Preston Park station did not make the 50-station shortlist for Access for All funding. In January, when making an announcement to cull the Conservatives’ 50 station list to eight definites and 19 maybes, Lord Hendy in the other place accused the previous Government of “raising significant stakeholder expectations” about the station accessibility funding, and said: “This Government is committed to a rigorous approach and only making commitments we believe are affordable and would represent value for money to passengers and taxpayers.” This example, which is so frustrating for my constituents, shows that positive aspirations for the railways are not enough on their own; they need to be backed up with concrete funding and real commitment.<span id="479" class="column-number" data-column-number="479"></span> Step-free access is not a convenient thing to have in an ideal world. Step-free access to platforms is a necessity and an equalities issues. It enables participation in work, education, healthcare and social life. I am not filled with confidence that the Government are committed to the funding needed, or the urgency with which it is needed, but there are huge opportunities for the Government to reform their approach through Great British Railways—I really hope to hear something from the Minister on this later. What has been communicated to date by Ministers does fall short. They must take steps to commit to the funding and resource needed to rapidly remove barriers, and end the discrimination that disabled people face when trying to navigate public transport networks. Finally, I invite the Minister to visit Preston Park station to meet my dedicated local campaigners, and to see the multiple issues faced not just by disabled passengers and those with access needs, but by the general public as well. I invite him to see these problems at first hand.
It is a pleasure to serve under you, Dame Siobhain. I support clause 47 and the removal of the requirement for ID to be photographic and the introduction of credit and debit cards as acceptable ID insofar as those are important improvements for accessibility. However, they do not go far enough. I want to speak in favour of new clause 19, tabled by my hon. Member for Hazel Grove. The Green party believes that we should be scrapping voter ID. Mandatory photographic voter ID was introduced via the Elections Act 2022, despite there being no evidence of a need for it in the first place. It was widely criticised at the time as a blatant act of voter suppression by the utterly discredited Johnson Government, who were presenting a solution looking for a problem—as the hon. Member for Hazel Grove has said. We have heard today about the importance of defending the safety and integrity of our democracy, but I would contend that there are numerous other, far more pressing threats to the safety and integrity of our democracy: the influence of dodgy donors; the widespread prevalence of disinformation; the giving of covid contracts to mates; the stuffing of the other place with political appointees—including donors; and parties breaking election law without adequate penalties or prevention. There are many threats to the safety and integrity of our democracy. I would contend that the threat of personation, which, as we have heard explained several times, is a numerically tiny and very rarely occurring offence, is not the main one. I very much hope to see a proportionate level of passion expressed by some colleagues in other parties when we come to discuss the urgent need to clean up political finance and stop disinformation later in discussion of the Bill.
I am very much aware of time, of which the hon. Member has had a lot. I know that people are keen to move on, so I would like to complete my remarks. Out of all allegations of electoral fraud in the 2019 elections, only 33 related to personation fraud at the polling station—that is, 0.000057% of the over 58 million votes cast in all elections that year. Only one instance resulted in a conviction and one in a caution. Following the 2023 local elections, the cross-party democracy and the constitution all-party parliamentary group inquiry concluded that voter ID is “a ‘poisoned cure’ in that it disenfranchises more electors than it protects”.<span id="217" class="column-number" data-column-number="217"></span> That inquiry found that voter ID brings with it a risk of injustice and highlighted that there is no immediate right to appeal for those who have been denied a ballot. For those and other reasons, Labour Ministers should be scrapping the voter scheme in its entirety—not least because that would be consistent with their own opposition to the 2022 Act at the time. Labour tabled a reasoned amendment at the time, which was very good, and cited the creation of unnecessary barriers to entry for voting as one of the reasons for opposing Johnson’s anti-democratic legislation. During that debate, the then shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Putney (Fleur Anderson), said the voter ID proposals are “simply not proportionate to the risk of voter fraud.” The hon Lady was right—as she was when she went on to flag that “the significant staffing and financial impact was disproportionate to the security risk of voter fraud.” She was also right when she said: “Even if one person lacked their ID to vote, that should be a reason to rethink this Bill entirely.”<span id="vol_col261" class="cross-reference" data-house-id="1" data-column-number="261" data-volume-number="" data-external-id="AC1A8A30-0BCD-4E0D-9A16-46CFBEC00893"><em>––</em>[<em>Official Report, Elections Public Bill Committee, </em>7 September 2021; c. 261.]</span> We know that the requirement for voter ID has had a chilling effect on turnout. Statistics from the Electoral Commission have already been cited, so I will not repeat them. As we heard in oral evidence, Democracy Volunteers pointed out that those official statistics are likely a significant underestimate, because of all the people who do not even get to the clerk before they are turned away. I hope the Minister will reconsider and adopt new clause 19, scrapping voter ID entirely, consistent with her party’s previous position. If not, I hope she will, at the very least, commit to ongoing monitoring of its impact, given the serious concerns about it. The Electoral Reform Society points out that the impact of the voter ID requirement is not currently being monitored at local elections, and that the next general election will be the last at which monitoring is required under the law as it stands. If we have just one more data point, we will not know whether the changes in clause 47 that the Government hope to introduce will have the desired effect, or whether improvements—such as scrapping this Tory scheme in its entirety—need to be made. Evidence from the Electoral Commission suggests that some groups were particularly likely to have a problem voting, including disabled or unemployed people, and those from certain demographics. Evidence indicates that more deprived areas have a higher proportion of voters turned away compared with less deprived ones. If the Government refuse to scrap voter ID entirely, it is essential that the impact of voter ID requirements continues to be monitored and that data is collected, so that we can understand whether there is an indirect discrimination effect in how this policy affects voters. Finally, several improvements have been suggested by a number of people, through oral and written evidence—including the Electoral Commission—for other mechanisms of widening accessibility and replacements for voter ID. I hope Ministers will consider the inclusion of poll cards as ID, given the good evidence that that lowers the percentage of voters turned away. Consideration should also be given to statutory declarations to allow provisional ballots to be cast and later verified, so that any failure <span id="218" class="column-number" data-column-number="218"></span>to provide the required documentation can be cured. I am also sympathetic to calls for vouching to be allowed, which I believe is also one of the Electoral Commission’s recommendations. I very much hope that the Minister will approach further measures to improve the accessibility of voting with an open mind, and ensure that we monitor the impact of what I feel has a repressive effect on our democracy. I look forward to discussing the far more pressing challenges to the security and integrity of our democracy as we come to later parts of the Bill.
<strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{A5D5D2E4-BBA5-4D77-89B5-9B35A4D06EC6}"> </QNum></strong> I have a question of clarification for any member of the panel who wants to answer. In the letter received from the wider VAWG sector, the offences they are concerned that victims of coercive control or abuse might be charged with after striking back are triable either-way offences and therefore affected by this Bill, but rape and sexual assault, as far as I understand it, are indictable-only and will remain so. The impact on those more serious cases that have been discussed will therefore be due to the impact on the time to trial and on the efficiency of the courts, which we know will be uncertain and somewhat delayed. Is that your understanding? In some of the evidence we have heard, it sounded like the assumption is that rape trials will become judge-only, but that is not what this Bill is about. <em><strong>Dame Vera </strong></em><em><strong>Baird</strong></em><em><strong>:</strong></em> No, it is not. It has been, I am afraid, ramped up outside these rooms, with all these Churchillian speeches suggesting that jury trial is being taken away, full stop. That is completely untrue, as you rightly say.
<strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{B0EF6DB3-70D0-43EE-B07E-12CFC59E91BD}"> </QNum></strong> But the victims’ groups who have written in because they are concerned about the criminalisation of women are talking about triable either-way offences, which are directly affected by this Bill. Are their concerns there valid? <em><strong>Professor </strong></em><em><strong>Hohl</strong></em><em><strong>:</strong></em> One thing to remember here is that over 90% of domestic abuse cases are already heard in the magistrates court. VAWG comprises not just sexual violence; it includes domestic abuse, sexual violence and sexual offences. There are some that will be in the either-way category. We have had a really emotive conversation this morning. One of the issues is judge-alone versus jury trials, and there is a lot of emotion on either side. When we look back at the actual research, there is mention that judges may have biases, and a judge-alone trial may disadvantage people. If that is the genuine concern, why are we happy <span id="21" class="column-number" data-column-number="21"></span>to accept that for sentencing and admissibility? Why is it that in all the law we are making to guide admissibility of evidence, we trust a judge to separate between myth and stereotypes and facts, but not a jury? If we are genuine about it, we have to go a lot further around oversight and accountability in the judiciary. It would be odd to just worry about it on that specific issue. I would also like the Committee to consider the evidence around juries. This is not to cast shade on juries but to pause and look at the research, which shows that juries, too, have biases, and there are worries about myths and misconceptions. The research on juries shows that these problems exist there, too. These issues exist with judges and juries. The remedy is not going to be either holding on to the status quo or not. The remedy will be something utterly outside of the discussion we are having that is about accountability and oversight. Some of the measures in the Bill go that way—for example, recording creates transparency, and judges having to spell out the reasons for their verdict also goes towards that. The debate has moved a really long way away from what the research actually tells us, to quite an emotive batting to and fro. If there is space for the Committee to consider that wider evidence, I would recommend it is looked at.
<strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{FDEF038F-CAF9-4729-AE1D-129F67DC4993}"> </QNum></strong> Riel, in my submission from the Criminal Bar Association, there is concern about risks to judges in public criticism. <span id="46" class="column-number" data-column-number="46"></span>The example given is on sexual offences, but I want to ask about protest-related offences and more political crimes, where the victim is the state or a powerful actor. Would the risks to judges also apply in those cases? <em><strong>Riel Karmy-Jones:</strong></em> Yes. We are already seeing that in immigration cases. We are seeing judges being targeted and threatened as a result of decisions made in immigration cases. The problem is that the judge will set out his decision making in writing; it will be on a transcript; and, under these proposals, it will go to a victim. It is wrong, not for those decisions to go to a complainant in a case, but for them then to be pored over and disagreed with. What does the judge say if they do not believe a complainant victim? They have to say so, and that could lead to huge disruption and upset, whereas with a jury, those people are largely anonymous and protected by reason of their anonymity. It is far rarer for us to get jurors who are targeted and attacked than it will be, in our view. As the Lady Chief Justice pointed out recently, it is far more likely that judges will be targeted as a result of their decision making.
<strong>Q</strong><strong><QNum HRSContentId="{ABE77EC3-36EC-40D6-AA9F-85BEC3357A03}"> </QNum></strong> Thank you so much, Claire; it has been really powerful to hear from you. I have heard from a constituent who has a close family member going through all of this, and she has been advised by solicitors to avoid the family court at all costs, describing the potential outcomes as a “lottery” and talking about very patchy training and understanding. Would you back my constituent up on those conclusions? <em><strong>Claire Throssell:</strong></em> Yes, I do back that up. Judges do need training. They are hiding behind the fact that they are independent. They should be independent—they are the law of the land—but they should not be above the laws that they serve, and they do need training. They do need understanding. Like I say, the court is another arena; it is a secondary abuser. We go through the abuse, we take the courage to leave—that is not easy—and we enter a court system where we think, “This is going to be fair; this is going to be just.” We go into these arenas, and there are no guarantees that we can protect our children. We are ripped apart, and our personalities—we go through trauma. We tell people the same thing again and again, but we are not seen, heard, believed or supported.
I warmly welcome the Rycroft review and the Government’s swift action set out today on crypto and on overseas donations, although I would like to see them go much further. The Secretary of State said that he will amend the Representation of the People Bill wherever necessary. As a member of the Bill Committee, I would love to see those amendments tabled while we are still in Committee so that we can give them the line-by-line scrutiny that, as he referred to, is the normal practice of this House. Will he please pull out all the stops to ensure that happens? On stopping the spread of disinformation on social media, Philip Rycroft refers on page 47 of the report to the significant benefits that could come from having a real-time online library of social media adverts so that we get that transparency and that light shone on how all sorts of actors are influencing people below the surface. Does the Secretary of State support Philip Rycroft’s view on that? Will he table an amendment to deal with that problem?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I am delighted to speak on a Bill of such huge importance. I am also delighted to be speaking so positively in support of clause 1. I might have some constructive suggestions to make on further clauses, but I warmly welcome the long-overdue legislative change for votes at 16. The extension of the franchise to 16 and 17-year-olds will be hugely positive for our young people and for our democracy. It will be good for voter registration and turnout. It will help to embed healthy democratic habits in young adulthood that will continue into adulthood. It is vital that the voices of young people are giving the respect and the democratic space that they deserve. Voting is a healthy habit that we want young people to form early on. Engaging younger voters in the process of voting creates positive habits for the future. Hon. Members will know that in 2024, turnout in the general election was just 59.9%—narrowly avoiding the 2001 historic low of 59.4%. Not only are too many voters not turning out; the turnout gap between younger and older voters has been expanding. We see lower levels of turnout in constituencies that have larger proportions of young people. Introducing votes at 16 creates an opportunity to improve democratic education, providing a chance to create a seamless transition from learning about and discussing politics in the classroom to engaging in local and national elections. Research has shown that the earlier young people are engaged in voting, the more likely they are to carry on voting later in their lives. In Austria, Scotland and Germany, those who were enfranchised at 16 or 17 were more likely to turn out to vote into their twenties, compared with those who first voted at 18. Enfranchised 16 and 17-year-olds also tend to turn out to vote in greater numbers than those voting for the first time who are aged 18 and over. That is likely <span id="114" class="column-number" data-column-number="114"></span>because younger voters are better supported through their first experience of voting while they are at home and in education. By the time those who are 18 or older first vote, many will have already left home—for example, having gone to university—and are likely to be moving home more frequently, and may find it harder to register to vote or know where to vote. Registration levels for 18 and 19-year-olds are just 60%, compared with 96% of those aged 65 and over. The main arguments being advanced against expanding the franchise are that 16 and 17-year-olds are not considered adults in many legal circumstances, such as in criminal law. We have heard comments today about the concept of full legal adulthood. The suggestion is that lowering the voting age conflicts with other legal thresholds of adulthood, such as restrictions on alcohol, gambling and jury service. I point out that adulthood starts in a phased way from 16, as 16-year-olds will pay tax, 17-year-olds can drive a car, and the majority of things that we prohibit 16 and 17-year-olds from doing are public health-faced, such as drinking and gambling. They are aimed at preventing people from developing unhealthy and potentially harmful habits.
I think the hon. Gentleman is in effect making my point for me, which is that adulthood starts in a phased way. There is no simple black-and-white cut-off at which things change from one night to the next. In society, we recognise that many aspects of growing up are part of a process. Voting is clearly a healthy, positive habit, and lowering the voting age to 16 and 17-year-olds will help to support their development. The 16 and 17-year-olds whom I know and meet are thoughtful, interested and interesting. Their thoughts are worth having and are worth listening to. Their voice matters, and I want to know what they think. They have very pertinent and sometimes unexpected views on the key debates and decisions occupying much of our time in Parliament. If we take the grotesquely unfair rip-off system of student funding, with the deeply unfair loans that young people wanting to go to university must take out unless they are exceptionally wealthy, 16 and 17-year-olds are thinking now about those loans as they think about whether university is for them. If we take the debate on whether social media should be banned for those under 16, these people can really tell us what it is like and how it affects them. If we take the debates we have had in Parliament on decriminalising abortion and any number of other vital issues, including the state of the planet and what that means for our futures, young people’s lives are the most affected by the decisions elected representatives take and they will have to live with the consequences of those votes for longer than any of us.
I completely agree with the hon. Member. It is interesting that young people are often better able to engage with climate change than many of us who are older and are preoccupied with the short-term issues right in front of us. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove that we need a proportional voting system so that everybody’s votes are equally taken into account. That would enable us to make policy in a way that focuses more on the longer term and the investments we should make on a generational basis, rather than people, under the first-past-the-post system, being so focused on short-term decision making and on the next general election. Young people are concerned about what sort of world they will inherit—what the world will be like when they are 50—and they are going to have to live with the decisions we make for a very long time. I want to speak briefly about trust in politics. Giving young people votes at 16 tells them that their voices, votes and views are valued, and this really does matter. The 2024 British social attitudes survey, conducted after the general election that year, recorded a new low level of trust, with only 12% of people saying they trust Governments to put the interests of the country above those of their own party. Votes at 16 would be a really valuable sign of trust in and respect for our young people, which is a healthy and important part of defending and bolstering our democracy. At a time when division and polarisation are unfortunately flourishing, it is vital to work with and support young people to make their voices heard, because they do want to bring the country together. There is positive evidence for extending the franchise to 16 and 17-year-olds. For example, younger voters in Germany have had a positive impact on family discussions of politics. In a number of countries, 16 and 17-year-olds already have the vote. As has been mentioned, it is also the norm for many voters in the UK. Scottish and Welsh 16 and 17-year-olds are already enfranchised to vote in devolved and local elections, and I would love those in England and Northern Ireland to have the same rights. In conclusion, enfranchising 16 and 17-year-olds would not drastically change the electoral landscape, but it would allow young people to have a voice in the decisions that are made for them every day at local, regional and national level. It is also a golden opportunity to improve democratic education, which I believe we will have a chance to discuss that in more depth later in our line-by-line scrutiny, as well as to register young people to vote and to embed that deep democratic respect for the right to vote. I congratulate the Government on taking this forward. Lowering the franchise is a really important opportunity to nurture more active citizens for the future. I will be absolutely delighted to vote for clause 1, <span id="116" class="column-number" data-column-number="116"></span>giving 16 and 17-year-olds the vote, so we can positively engage the next generation in politics and improve the health of our democracy.
I rise to speak to new clause 9 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton Pavilion, and to oppose clause 2 stand part. New clause 9 seeks to extend voting rights to prisoners serving sentences of four years or less. That is the sentence length at which a prisoner would traditionally have been eligible for release after serving half their sentence. Extending the franchise to more people in prison would widen civic participation, strengthen our democracy and aid rehabilitation.
I have made my position about the new clause clear, but perhaps this is a good moment to discuss a point that I was going to come to later. Various points have been made about the importance of restorative justice and rehabilitation. Imprisonment is a punishment for something that somebody has done wrong. There is a wide variety of things that people may have done wrong and for which they are rightly imprisoned, but should we not use the opportunity of a person’s imprisonment to support, encourage and reward prosocial behaviour? Voting is prosocial behaviour that helps to integrate and rehabilitate the person and connect them back to the society from which they have become estranged through their crime. We encourage prisoners to use libraries to engage in educational opportunities and a whole range of other prosocial activities. In the same way, should we not encourage prisoners to engage in voting?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, although I am disappointed by his tone and what appears to be a politically motivated attempt to score points rather than to engage with the substance of the debate, which is about whether prisoners should be encouraged to vote. Whether somebody is a victim of a racially aggravated assault, a rape or any other horrific crime, if the perpetrator receives a sentence that comes within the framework of the new clause—I very much hope that it would not be less than four years for a serious crime—we should encourage that perpetrator to participate in voting in the same way as we encourage prisoners to participate in other prosocial behaviours. That is done very widely in many other countries. Imprisonment is the punishment to the individual. The question is whether we should prevent those individuals from engaging in rehabilitative behaviours that reconnect them with society.
I confess that I am a little puzzled at the questions that are being raised about specific types of crime. I am not sure whether hon. Members are suggesting that particular types of crime, for example those motivated by racial hatred, should be treated in a particular way in relation to voting, or whether they are simply objecting to the idea of any prisoner being allowed to vote. By raising one particular type of crime in making arguments against the new clause hon. Members are not, sadly, engaging with the substance of the argument that I am making. By way of background—as has been mentioned—in 2005 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK’s blanket ban on voting rights was unlawful. In 2017 the UK therefore extended the right to vote to prisoners on remand, civil prisoners—normally those in prison for failure to pay fines on time—and offenders on home detention curfew or released on temporary licence. However, that did not go far enough. The strength of our democracy is determined by how many of us participate in it. Against a backdrop of declining trust in our institutions and in democracy, that is more vital than ever. Not only are more than 21,000 people missing out on a key democratic right, they are having their chances of rehabilitation and resettlement harmed. Studies have shown the positive impact that democratic participation by people in prison has on rehabilitation and resettlement. Prisoners who keep the right to vote have an enhanced sense of civic responsibility and are more likely to be successfully reintegrated following release. Let us consider other countries. In Guernsey all prisoners have had the right to vote since 1996. In Jersey, all prisoners serving a sentence of less than four years keep their right to vote, and in 2025 plans were announced to extend the right to vote to all prisoners. All prisoners in Ireland can vote by post. Across Europe, all prisoners have the right to vote—in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine. In France, disenfranchisement is considered as an additional penalty in some sentences, however the vast majority of prisoners retain the right to vote. In Germany, all prisoners retain the right to vote unless they have been convicted of an offence targeting the state or democracy. It is clear that the UK’s ban on prisoners voting makes us a real outlier among comparable countries. Clause 2 provides for the disenfranchisement of detained 16 and 17-year-olds. I am profoundly opposed to that and would like to see the clause removed, because fostering civic responsibility, civic pride and involvement is particularly important for young people aged 16 and 17 who are in custody—that is, about 420 young people at any one time. Any young person in that position is likely to have been badly let down. That point was made last year by the Children’s Commissioner, who in 2025 published an important report, “The educational journeys <span id="124" class="column-number" data-column-number="124"></span>of children in secure settings”. She found that children in youth custody are “failed before they arrive” and trapped “in a cycle of disadvantage”. The Commissioner made it clear that such young people faced “disrupted education, low English and maths skills, unmet additional needs and high levels of exclusion, compounded by poverty”. She also found that “children in prison have been failed by multiple services long before they arrive in custody, and their time in the justice system worsens their disadvantages and limits future opportunities.” I believe that it is wrong to cut those children—those young people—out of the voting process. They will know more about the failings of the state than many over-18s and their voices should be heard. The Bill is an opportunity to include them and to commit to supporting them to exercise their right to vote, which is a healthy habit that we should support and encourage all members of our society to engage in. As well as being right and fair, such inclusion, coupled with the right support and training for those who look after and educate them, could be a very positive part of their rehabilitation. I sincerely hope that the Minister will closely consider that in the context of clause 2. It is clear that the current voting system for prisoners in the UK needs urgent reform. New clause 9 provides us with an opportunity to talk about how to fix that broken system by normalising democratic participation in our prisons, as so many other comparable countries do; strengthening civic society; restoring faith in our democracy; and supporting rehabilitation among some of the marginalised people in the UK, including some of our most disadvantaged young people.
As I outlined in my speech, in many comparable countries, all prisoners are permitted to vote. The proposal in new clause 9, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton Pavilion, sets an arguably arbitrary cut-off date, but that is intended to offer balance. As we have to some extent previously covered, if someone is sentenced to four years they still become eligible for early release. That does not lessen the terrible nature of their crime. If somebody is sentenced to four years, they are still eligible to participate in educational programmes, rehabilitation, and a whole range of things that are not in themselves punishments but are designed to assist that person to reintegrate into society. Surely we all, victims included, want to ensure that perpetrators of crime are reintegrated and rehabilitated and do not offend again? That is the driving force behind this new clause: to reduce crime by reconnecting to society people who have been convicted and imprisoned.