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<Question HRSContentId="{FD0DD6D3-5403-46A6-8567-C3B1A2953123}">4. <QuestionText HRSContentId="{67310250-AE1E-46E2-9299-7DDC9C2F8CC4}">What steps her Department is taking to help protect the public from press malpractice.</QuestionText> </Question>
Last month, a national newspaper intruded on the privacy of one of the families bereaved by the meningitis outbreak, publishing information that the family had asked to be kept private. In opposition, Labour promised independent regulation of the press to curb this awful behaviour, so when exactly will the Secretary of State keep that promise?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I rise briefly to say that I fully support these measures, which are clearly welcomed across all parties. I also support the comments of the hon. Member for Guildford in relation to extending the measures further, because by definition, anybody who is essentially associated with the political process is potentially subject to the hostility that we have discussed. Extending those protections is clearly important.
I just want to say, well done to the Government.
I completely support the thrust of these new clauses tabled by the hon. Member, in terms of protecting British democracy. I have a specific question in relation to new clause 3. Last year the Government proscribed a protest organisation. That proscription has since been overturned in the High Court, and it is still being considered. Is the hon. Member concerned about her new clause might interact with that particular case? Is there a case for thinking carefully about that issue?
Just to be clear, my concern is that literally hundreds of people have been arrested for holding placards in relation to that organisation. Potentially, under the hon. Member’s new clause 3, all those hundreds of people could be forbidden forever from donating to any political party. I am not sure that that is proportionate. It strikes me that there is complexity there, relating to the specific new clause. I am fully on board with excluding promotion of political violence and so forth, but that particular case highlights a complexity, particularly around the hundreds of people arrested for holding placards.
There are some people who renounce political violence— Nelson Mandela comes to mind. Obviously, he was never a British citizen, but there is a genuine question there.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I rise to move new clause 4, tabled by the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne). I will also speak briefly to new clause 12, tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, and new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove. She is here and I am sure she will speak. This incredibly important group of new clauses responds to a glaring absence in the Bill relating to crypto donations. As I will get on to, Rycroft has talked about this and the Government have committed to bringing forward related amendments. I am pleased about that, but it is very important that, in Committee, we take the opportunity to discuss in detail what shape those amendments might take and what the issues are around this topic. There is consensus across wide parts of the political spectrum that cryptocurrency poses particular risks in relation to political donations. Transparency International has highlighted a number of factors: cryptocurrencies are fast and borderless, there are various exchanges offering anonymity and they are increasingly used for money laundering. There are clear risks with crypto, which makes it a high-risk vehicle for political donations through which foreign actors, who would otherwise be unable to, might be able to donate to political parties and candidates and try to influence British politics. Again, as Transparency International points out, “it is reasonable to assume there is a strong likelihood that this alternative payment method is being used by hostile actors, such as Russia, to destabilise Western political systems.” We need to take these warning very seriously. Indeed, the Royal United Services Institute says: “Cryptocurrency donations to UK political parties present an urgent and under-addressed challenge to the UK’s electoral integrity and, by extension, to its national security.” It points out that “the Bill does not mention cryptocurrencies”, and says: “This leaves a critical gap in our foreign interference defences as the pseudonymous, cross-border and decentralised features of crypto enable it to be used as a political money laundering accelerant”. There are clearly many risks associated with crypto. Philip Rycroft pointed this out himself and recommended: “The government should legislate in the Representation of the People Bill to introduce a moratorium on political donations made in cryptoassets, with a power to end the moratorium only once Parliament and the Electoral Commission are assured that relevant regulation is effective.” There is some debate about whether we should have a blanket ban on cryptoassets or a moratorium with safeguards. I am mainly concerned about the outcome, rather than the particular terminology that is used to deal with this. We must ensure that crypto is not used as a vehicle for the pollution of British politics. One of the key issues is the use of AI to split donations into lots of tiny fragments that go under the radar of any benchmarks or limits, and of the scrutiny of donations. That is a <span id="347" class="column-number" data-column-number="347"></span>risk, but as RUSI points out, the more significant, under-recognised and under-dealt with risk is the indirect use of crypto. It is very easy to translate crypto into a fiat currency at the point of donation, so although I am moving new clause 4, tabled by the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which would “prevent parties and candidates from accepting donations in cryptoassets”, we actually need a stronger regulatory environment and to recognise that there may be even bigger risks from the indirect use of crypto further down the chain, which could still be used to hide the provenance of funding, even though it may not be in the form of crypto when it enters the coffers of a political party or candidate.
I welcome the commitment that the Government have made. I participated in that statement in the Chamber before Easter. As the hon. Member will have noticed, I even welcomed and congratulated the Government on their positive actions under the Bill without prompting from the Government Benches. It is important to give credit where it is due. It is also important to have the opportunity, in this Committee, to debate some of these details. If the Government are to bring forward legislation to institute a moratorium, it is important to think about what conditions will be set under which any such moratorium might be lifted in future. That is crucial, because it could otherwise be overturned very easily. I suggest that, at a minimum, the criteria for lifting any such moratorium should be that an adequate regulatory environment is in place for controlling the ultimate risk and that there is triple positive approval from Parliament, the Electoral Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority—the three most important oversight organisations on this issue. It will be very difficult and complex to find a mechanism to regulate cryptocurrency; I hope that we just get rid of it from our politics completely. But if the Government are going to introduce a moratorium, the conditions under which that moratorium might be lifted must be included in the primary legislation that puts it in place.
I share the hon. Member’s enthusiasm and sense of urgency about getting Rycroft implemented as soon as possible. In the spirit of giving credit where it is due, the Government did commission that review—which was good—the review was quite fast, there was an immediate statement, and the Bill is going through. I do not think that we are in a perfect place. I would have liked the Bill to have longer in Committee to give the Government a chance to introduce amendments that we could properly scrutinise. It is deeply unfortunate that, for a Bill that is about the workings of our electoral system, we are not able to do that core scrutiny in Committee—the crucial line-by-line scrutiny in the Commons, which is the elected Chamber. We are being asked, basically, to take it on trust. It is not that I distrust Government, but it is important to have this discussion now. I hope that the Minister will respond to those points. I have made the point about the importance of including in primary legislation the criteria under which any moratorium might be lifted in the future, and that there must be really strong safeguards. I have also made the point that a ban on crypto donations will not itself stop the risk, because of the downstream issues. We have to think carefully about how whatever mechanism is introduced deals with that. We have already seen that Ben Delo, who has given £4.5 million to Reform in recent months, has said, “Oh dear, since I am going to be hit by this retrospective moratorium I am going to move back to the UK to evade it.” That is clear evidence of gaming the system by a guy who, by the way, was convicted in the US of impropriety in relation to political financing. He was subsequently pardoned by Donald Trump. We have to be really careful of how bad actors might manipulate any legislative proposals that are introduced. A ban on cryptocurrency will not, in itself, stop the risks. We also need a cap on all political donations—we will discuss a group of new clauses relating to that in a bit, so I will save my arguments on that topic until then—plus a donor register, as I spoke about in Tuesday’s sitting. A donor register with donor registration numbers would address the issue of traceability and address the risk that donations are split into many tiny donations to hide the fact that they are all from the same place. Having to have a donor registration number that is associated with a particular, identified, allowable donor would go a long way to addressing that problem. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.<span id="349" class="column-number" data-column-number="349"></span>
For the sake of the record, I feel duty bound to say, “Me too!”
I tabled the new clause as a probing amendment, and I recognise that the Government have stated their intention to bring other amendments forward. I look forward to engaging constructively with the Government, not necessarily just in formal settings, on the specifics of the issues and concerns I raise. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>Clause, by leave, withdrawn.</em> New Clause 6 Overseas electors: postal ballots “(1) RPA 1985 is amended as follows. (2) After section (12) insert— <em>‘12A Overseas electors: postal ballots</em><span id="354" class="column-number" data-column-number="354"></span> (1) The Secretary of State must, by regulation, make provision regarding the casting of postal ballots by overseas electors. (2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must provide for overseas electors to be offered the ability— (a) to request an electronic version of their ballot paper for elections to print using the elector’s own printing facilities; and (b) in a relevant country, to return their completed ballot paper to a United Kingdom embassy, High Commission or consulate for onward delivery to the relevant returning officer by diplomatic mail to be counted. (3) For the purposes of this section, “a relevant country” is one where the United Kingdom maintains an embassy, Hight Commission or consulate. (4) Regulations made under subsection (1) may amend provision made by or under any other Act as necessary. 5) Any regulations made under this section must not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.’”—<em> (Zöe Franklin.)</em> <em>Brought up, and read the First time.</em>
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will briefly speak to the new clause, because it is important, and has clearly garnered support from a large number of Government MPs—indeed, the <span id="368" class="column-number" data-column-number="368"></span>second signatory is the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah). The new clause is quite reasonable; it simply would require the Electoral Commission to publish a report setting out its assessment of the risk of electoral online harms. As we have already discussed in Committee, there is clear evidence of electoral online harms, so it would be useful to ask the Electoral Commission to produce such a report to set the risks out clearly and the measures it intends to take to address them. I will not press the new clause to a vote. I am open as to whether this necessarily needs to be in statute or simply in Government guidance, but it is an important element of improving the safeguards against online harms in our electoral system. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>Clause, by leave, withdrawn.</em> New Clause 24 Repository of digital political advertising “(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as set out in subsection (2). (2) After section 61 insert— <em>‘Part 6A Repository of digital political advertising</em> 61A. Establishing a repository of digital political advertising (1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to require the Electoral Commission to establish a repository of paid-for digital political advertising. (2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must— (a) provide for the repository of political advertising to be publicly accessible; (b) specify that a provider of a Category 1 service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023 must ensure that prescribed information relating to such advertising is submitted to the repository as soon as reasonably practicable, and, in any event, within 72 hours; (c) set out the types of information to be prescribed; and (d) provide for material in the repository to be transferred to the National Archives for preservation after a certain period. (3) Before making any regulations that make provision for the matters under subsection 2(c), the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the Electoral Commission; (b) the Information Commissioner’s Office; and (c) OFCOM. (4) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.’” —<em>(Paul Holmes.)</em> <em>This new clause requires the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to require the Electoral Commission to establish a publicly available repository of political advertising.</em> <em>Brought up, and read the First time.</em> <em>Question put, </em>That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would require the Government to establish and publish a transparent protocol for responding to election information incidents and place that protocol on a statutory footing. That is important, because there is currently no clear, publicly accountable mechanism in the UK for informing voters about serious information incidents during election periods, such as co-ordinated disinformation campaigns or foreign interference. Although there may be internal processes, under the radar, in Government, those are not transparent, they lack clear triggers for action and they are not subject to democratic oversight. Their absence creates uncertainty about how and when the public would be notified if there were such attacks or threats to the integrity of an election. That potentially undermines trust, and leaves voters without information and potentially exposed to unchallenged misinformation at critical moments during an election. We can all recognise that that is a growing threat. The new clause would address that gap. It would establish a clear, publicly accessible protocol that would set out how, why and when election information incidents would be identified, assessed and communicated to the general public. The rise of disinformation has shown that co-ordinated online campaigns, bot campaigns and so forth can spread very rapidly during election periods, and can influence public perception before corrective action is taken. I will not name particular electoral processes, but we can all call examples to mind. It is a problem that we lack a transparent framework for dealing with public notification when such incidents occur. Other democracies have taken steps in this regard; most notably, Canada has already introduced a formal mechanism to respond to these risks. That highlights the gap in the UK. We should look at international best practice on this issue. We should be trying to stay ahead of—or at least catch up with—the threats that our democracy faces, as fast as possible. The new clause is clearly directly related to the Bill, so I would welcome the Minister’s response. To clarify, I do not intend to press it to a vote—I should have mentioned that it was tabled by the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central—but I move it because it raises an important issue that is crucial to the safety of our elections.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>Clause, by leave, withdrawn.</em> New Clause 30 Cap on political donations “(1) Part 4 of PPERA 2000 (control of donations to registered parties and their members etc) is amended as follows. (2) After section 54B (Declaration as to whether residence etc condition satisfied) insert— <em>‘54C Power to set cap on political donations</em> (1) A registered party must not accept a donation from a person if the value of donations from that person during the course of that calendar year exceeds the maximum amount specified by regulations made under subsection (3). (2) Where a registered party receives a donation which would cause the limit for the purposes of subsection (1) to be exceeded, the amount by which the limit is exceeded is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as a donation received from a person who is not a permissible donor. (3) The Secretary of State must by regulations specify the donation limit for the purposes of subsection (1) within three months of the day on which this act is passed. (4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. (5) Before laying a draft statutory instrument containing regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must commission an independent review of the level of the cap on political donations.<span id="373" class="column-number" data-column-number="373"></span> (6) The review must consider and make recommendations on the level of the cap in light of— (a) the prevailing economic conditions; (b) the effect of the cap on democratic participation and political competition; and (c) any other matters the Secretary of State considers relevant. (7) The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person or panel with relevant experience to conduct the review. (8) The person or panel appointed under subsection (7) must— (a) consult the Electoral Commission and any other persons the person or panel considers relevant; and (b) prepare and publish a report of its findings. (9) The Secretary of State must lay the report under subsection (9)(b) before both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after receiving it. (10) No later than three years after a report under subsection (10) has been laid the Secretary of State must commission a new review under subsection (5) for the purposes of determining whether the cap under subsection (1) should be amended.’”—<em> (Zöe Franklin.)</em> <em>This new clause requires the Secretary of State to set an annual cap on permissible political donations from a person, following an independent review to be conduct every three years.</em> <em>Brought up, and read the First time.</em>
I will speak to new clauses 30 and 54, tabled by the hon. Members for Stratford-on-Avon and for Hazel Grove respectively, which both deal with the important topic of a cap on donations. I will then speak to new clauses 58 in my name and new clause 65 in the name of the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), which both deal with limits on campaign expenditure, as the two topics are closely related. First, as the hon. Member for Guildford just set out, there is a very strong case for having a cap on political donations, which the Government have recognised to some extent in promising to take forward the Rycroft recommendations on instituting a cap on donations from British citizens living abroad. However, on the broader question of donations from any British voter, the issue of the total amount of donations, and the number of very large donations, has significantly increased over time. The public widely recognise the extent to which political parties—some, in particular—are reliant on funds contributed by a small handful of very wealthy donors, and it is a rightly a cause for concern for a large majority of them. As the public understand, that carries <span id="376" class="column-number" data-column-number="376"></span>the risk that individuals with very deep pockets can potentially have a disproportionate influence on our politics. Back in 2011, the Committee on Standards in Public Life produced a report addressing precisely this risk, the problem of increased reliance on significant donations, and recommended a donations cap. That was 15 years ago. The problem has only become more and more significant since then, as we have seen just within the last year with several donations in the many millions of pounds to one political party. This is clearly a problem and a risk to our politics—and a risk that has been recognised worldwide. As I understand it, about half of countries globally and well over two thirds of European countries impose some sort of limit on donations. The UK was one of I think 22 signatories to a UN resolution in December 2025 that identified the risk of corruption in politics from large donations and called for countries to consider instituting a cap on donations. It would only be consistent with our signing that UN resolution for us to take action on this ourselves. Philip Rycroft, if I may quote directly from page 29 of his report, identified this problem too. He talked about his worries that the lack of year-round spending limits on campaign expenditure plus the lack of limits on donations could lead to an “arms race among political parties and actors to out-raise and out-spend their competitors.” Although he felt that this issue fell beyond his remit, he pointed out that it was “something that could be usefully debated during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill”, so I am very glad that a number of colleagues have tabled amendments to allow us to discuss it and to hear from the Government. This proposal is widely supported by a large number of individuals and organisations that submitted evidence to this Committee—the Electoral Reform Society, Transparency International, Spotlight on Corruption, Open Britain and a whole range of others—and by a number of academics who specialise in this area: Sam Power, who gave evidence to us, Alan Renwick and a number of others. Transparency International points out: “Other comparable democracies have sought to curb the corrosive influence of big money in politics by setting donation caps…Canada caps donations to political parties at CA$1,750 annually; France caps donations to political parties at €7,500 annually and €4,500 for presidential campaigns; Italy’s cap is €100,000…and Australia has introduced AU$50,000 caps per donor per year, due to apply from July 2026.” This proposal has been recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, as I have said, and by the Hayden Phillips review, and it is supported by a majority of voters. YouGov polling published in December 2025 showed that 67% of UK voters say that there should be a cap of £50,000 or less, or indeed no private donations at all—some people feel the system should be dealt with like that. I will briefly pre-empt a point that I suspect the Minister will raise in her response, the fact that some other countries have greater state funding of politics. A balance has to be struck. My case is not that there should be no ability for voters to contribute to politics; <span id="377" class="column-number" data-column-number="377"></span>arguably, that is an important part of the democratic process. The problem is that in a democracy, in which by definition one person has one vote, money can buy huge amounts of influence that outweigh and hugely influence many of those votes. If a party has received many millions of pounds just in the past six months, it is not surprising that it will have a capacity to spend that in the non-regulated period in a way that is highly likely to influence voting. There is therefore a strong case for introducing some sort of annual donation cap now. Transparency International advocates for that being £50,000 a year. The CSPL, I believe, advocated for £10,000 a year, although that was 16 years ago; if we multiply that by inflation, it is about £15,000 a year now. Others have talked about £100,000 a year, which would bring the cap in line with the system that the Government have already committed to putting in place for donations from British voters overseas. There is clearly a problem with the distortion of our political system caused by the influence of big money, big donations in politics, and we have a crucial opportunity, in the passage of this Bill, to take action to address it. On many of the other issues that we have talked about—company donations, the influence of foreign money, crypto donations—I have repeatedly drawn a connection with the need for a cap on all political donations, because those things cannot be completely divorced. We will not be able to address the issues that concern us in relation to the distorting effect of money on our politics if we do not implement a cap on political donations. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that.
Will the Minister give way?
I have three quick points. First, the Minister implied that any limit on donations is unacceptable to her. That seems a very extreme position for the Government to take. Is that really the Government’s position in responding to new clause 30, tabled by the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon? The Minister seems to be taking that position, yet that new clause does not specify a particular level but that a cap should be set after a review, which is itself regularly reviewed. That seems a very reasonable approach. Does the Minister not recognise at all even the theoretical possibility that large donations can skew our politics? I would find that an extraordinary position for the Government to take. Secondly, this seems to be completely inconsistent with the fact that last year the UK and at least 59 other countries co-sponsored a resolution passed at the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption that calls on states parties to consider limitations on donations “with a view to combating corruption”. The Government have already recognised that large donations into the political system carry a risk of corruption. I do not expect the Minister to put a number on the table today, but to be consistent, would the Minister please take this away for consideration alongside the other issues that have come out of the Rycroft review? It is clear through this Bill Committee process that we need amendments to come forward that are not just driven by Rycroft, but also by some of the issues that Rycroft himself has highlighted as relevant yet outwith the specific terms of reference of his report—certainly including caps on political donations, expansion of the regulated period and reform of political advertising. Thirdly, there is the point about how politics in the UK is largely funded through private company and trade union donations—I tried to pre-empt this, but the Minister did come back with it as well. I have not at any point argued for more state funding of politics—that could be a separate debate, but I am not arguing that. By discussing the arguments in favour of a cap on donations, together with the arguments for stronger limits on expenditure, I am arguing for a politics in which money skews politics less overall.<span id="381" class="column-number" data-column-number="381"></span> We can surely recognise that if one person can contribute—for the sake of argument—£9 million to an organisation or political actor then that will inevitably have a hugely skewing impact on our politics. Do the Government really not recognise that? Will the Government really not take any steps to limit political donations and that skewing and pollution of our politics?
I will speak very briefly in support of the three amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Guildford, which highlight really important issues. It seems extraordinary, really, that we have such inequality between England, Wales and Scotland in relation to support for disabled candidates. Clearly, with such huge levels of under-representation of disabled people in our <span id="384" class="column-number" data-column-number="384"></span>politics, it is imperative that support is put in place to try to rectify that. I fully support the call for the reinstatement of the access to elected office fund.
I absolutely do—indeed, that is what the next two amendments are specifically about. That clearly should be the next step; the provision was put in place in the Equality Act, so it is just about commencing something already there under section 106 that would apply to reporting on diversity with a range of protected characteristics, not just in relation to disability. I completely agree that our politics should be representative of our population as a whole; we should all be challenging ourselves constantly, as individuals and as parties, to ensure that we are doing everything possible to address under-representation of certain groups. The lack of representation of women is particularly brought into focus by the fact that it is now nearly 100 years since the franchise was fully extended, yet women are still seriously under-represented in this House—and even more under-represented in local politics nationally. But there are many other dimensions of under-representation; while the first amendment relates specifically to support for disabled candidates, the next two amendments relate to that much wider spectrum. That is crucially important.
Ballot secrecy is extremely important. The shadow Minister has talked about family voting. I am deeply disappointed and concerned by the implicitly discriminatory accusations made by some parties in relation to family voting in recent weeks. I wish we saw as much passion about the far greater threat to our democracy posed by the skewing effect of huge donations. Conservative members of the Committee made no contribution in the discussion on caps on donations or limits on expenditure earlier this afternoon, but have devoted considerable airtime to this particular topic. I ask all of us to consider: what is the greatest threat to the integrity of our political system?
I think that I have made my point. Let us consider what the greatest threat to the integrity of our democracy is. I am concerned about the ways that concerns such as those articulated in these amendments have been weaponised by some political actors, so I will abstain if they are pressed to a vote.
Not the hon. Gentleman’s integrity—his judgment.
On a point of order, Sir Desmond. The House will note that I did not accuse anybody in particular of weaponising an issue. I observed that the issue had been weaponised.
I am going to rise above the party political aspects of the shadow Minister’s comments, but I want to engage with his extraordinary claim that communicating with people in their mother tongue is, in some way, exploitation. He expressed concern about the inclusion of diverse communities in our country. He talked about social cohesion, but what he is proposing is essentially a nativist policy. As was highlighted by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch, Gaelic speakers are accepted but Urdu speakers are not. I fundamentally disagree.<span id="400" class="column-number" data-column-number="400"></span> Of course, as a country we should provide support to assist people to learn English, but we should not force them, as the shadow Minister argued. If they are not yet fluent, it seems perfectly reasonable—in fact, clearly helpful for inclusion and participation—to provide election materials in the language in which they can be best understood. Indeed, that is what returning officers do. Election officers provide information in multiple languages, so why should parties and candidates not also be free to do so? Let me quote from the guidance for returning officers on the Electoral Commission’s website: “Some voters may need assistance in another language because of their limited English (or English or Welsh) language skills. You should consider what support you are able to provide to those voters in your area, such as providing translations of the polling station notices.” In Gorton and Denton, the polling station provided information in multiple other languages. The effect of the new clause would be exclusionary and discriminatory, and I strongly oppose it.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
The hon. Gentleman seems to say that the making of any political argument that he disagrees with is exploitation. That is ridiculous. <em>Question put,</em> That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer), proposes creating a new offence of misleading the public by candidates in a parliamentary election campaign. We are witnessing a proliferation of disinformation with a concurrent rise in distrust among the public. A recent survey by Ipsos MORI found that just 11% of the UK public trust politicians to tell the truth. That is clearly problematic and, unlike in advertising, finance or medicine, there is no legally enforceable standard of requiring truthfulness from those who hold or seek public office. Ministers are not allowed to lie, but, under the current situation, candidates can. This lack of accountability does, unfortunately, create an incentive to deceive. As the old saying goes, a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes. This legal vacuum has, unfortunately, enabled far-right figures to weaponise disinformation. It has enabled foreign powers to covertly manipulate elections and policy, and manipulation of voters through false factual claims has changed the landscape of the nation. There are already examples of that, including Brexit and campaign tactics in previous elections.<span id="414" class="column-number" data-column-number="414"></span> New clause 59 aims to protect voters from political deception by holding parliamentary candidates accountable for acts intentionally designed to mislead the public or manipulate voting in their favour. A similar measure is already provided for in the Government’s Public Office (Accountability) Bill. That creates a new offence of misleading the public, which will cover public officials. The parallel measure in new clause 59 will ensure that candidates are included in a similar provision and cannot use deliberate deception to win public office. As it happens, the Welsh Government have recently introduced equivalent legislation to create an offence of deliberate deception by candidates. Westminster would not be acting alone, and the new clause would provide consistency across Britain. This would not be a law to punish genuine mistakes, misspeaking and so forth, or to restrict legitimate political rhetoric. It would not cover manifestos, as a manifesto is a statement of intent. It would not create a new area of law, but merely extend it to plug the gaping loophole of political deception by applying existing legal principles. The new clause includes safeguards to ensure fairness, such as a high legal threshold for wrongdoing and a defence for those acting with reasonable excuse. Its phrasing ensures that the threshold for wrongdoing is high. It applies only to conduct that is “seriously improper,” so it targets deliberate misinformation campaigns, major false claims that could influence voters and manipulative or dishonest campaign tactics that are falsely used to steer voters towards a particular decision. There is overwhelming public support for this measure. A petition on this issue has more than 200,000 signatures, and polling by Opinium shows that 72% of voters support it. Further research by Survation found that a majority of voters in every single party is in favour of it. This measure would go some way to help repair trust in our politics, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I will briefly speak to new clauses 61 to 64, tabled by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough (Justin Madders). New clause 61 would introduce a code of conduct for political campaigning and put that on a statutory footing. There is already widespread agreement that we need a code of conduct for political campaigning—that was a recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference last year. The Government have committed to establishing a code of conduct for campaigns following that recommendation, and the Electoral Commission has absolutely welcomed this. I draw colleagues’ attention to one of the evidence sessions at the Speaker’s Conference last year, in which Labour’s executive director of governance and legal highlighted the question of whether the code of conduct should be statutory. He said: “A code might be helpful in setting a public benchmark of acceptable behaviour…ultimately, you would probably want it to be enforceable in some way, and then the question would be, is it appropriate to put that on a statutory footing? Is there a possibility of agreeing something?” I ask the Minister to consider that we have an excellent opportunity to put it on a statutory footing in this Bill to ensure that that code of conduct, which is so widely recognised as being absolutely necessary as per the recommendations of the Speaker’s Conference, has the force of primary legislation behind it.<span id="415" class="column-number" data-column-number="415"></span> New clause 62 is about an electoral advertising code of practice. We have already discussed issues relating to electoral advertising, and I have shared with the Committee my huge concerns about the regulation of online political advertising in particular and the urgent need for a real-time political adverts library. This new clause is more general. It is frankly unclear why ads for commercial products are held to greater account than ads that move votes and affect election outcomes. Fundamentally, that seems weird, unequal and deeply problematic. The organisation Reform Political Advertising has been campaigning very effectively, long and hard, in this area. In the 2024 London mayoral election, for example, it trailed a factual accuracy code, which seven London mayoral candidates, including Sadiq Khan and the Green and Liberal Democrat candidates, signed up to, and others supported. International precedent also exists. Regulation of factual claims in electoral advertising has been in place in New Zealand for several decades, with cross-party support.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the very next new clause on the selection list, which engages with precisely that question. In addition to New Zealand, there are similar rules about the regulation of political advertising in Australia. On the question of who will adjudicate, there is currently no independent body with the power to adjudicate on the truthfulness or accuracy of non-broadcast political advertising. That is an issue. Provision has been made in the new clauses for a separation: the code of practice would be established by the Electoral Commission and the oversight of the decision making—the adjudication—would be done by a different body. The 2020 report by the Lords Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee, “Digital Technology and the Resurrection of Trust”, called for a regulatory committee on political advertising that would involve relevant experts from the Advertising Standards Authority, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the UK Statistics Authority, who would co-operate through a regulatory committee on political advertising. Political parties would then work with those regulators to develop a code of practice, along with appropriate sanctions, that restricts fundamentally inaccurate advertising during a parliamentary or mayoral election or referendum. The Lords Committee recommends that that regulatory committee should adjudicate breaches of the code, and that is effectively what new clause 63 would put in place. “What then would happen about sanctions?” I hear hon. Members ask. Well, that takes us on to new clause 64, which again creates a separation. It would establish an enforcement framework and enable the <span id="416" class="column-number" data-column-number="416"></span>Electoral Commission to impose civil sanctions for breaches of the advertising code, basically according to a ladder of increasing seriousness. I warmly recommend the new clauses to the Government and the Committee. Despite the rapidity of my speech, given the shortness of time, the way that advertising can distort our politics is a crucial issue. I very much hope that the Government will warmly consider the issues, alongside all the other ones that they will hopefully come back to us on at a later stage.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>New clause, by leave, </em><em>withdrawn</em><em>.</em>
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission’s instituting criminal proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland—a capacity that the Electoral Commission previously had, which was removed by the Elections Act 2022. We currently have a bizarre situation where any individual or organisation <span id="418" class="column-number" data-column-number="418"></span>other than the Electoral Commission can make a private prosecution against breaches of political finance law but the Electoral Commission cannot. That gives rise to a criminal enforcement gap, which is not helped by a lack of investigatory and prosecutorial lead capacity, especially for UK-wide offences. Other similar regulators in the UK can bring criminal proceedings in areas under their auspices, so there is a real question: why not the Electoral Commission? I note that Philip Rycroft dealt with that question in his report and recommended an alternative approach. I have tabled the new clause as a probing amendment to ask the Government to provide more clarification. If we are not going to give these powers to the Electoral Commission, who should take the lead? The status quo is clearly not working. There is an alarming lack of prosecution in this space, going back quite a number of years. The net effect is essentially that people can escape from prosecution. If it is not going to be the Electoral Commission, we need much more investment in the capacities and powers of the police. I understand that we have a situation where the police might not feel that investigations are necessarily in their interest, because the fines that can be charged are not proportionate to the huge amount of police time that might be required to investigate the issues. I would like to hear from the Government how they will address the clear gap in the capacity of the system overall to initiate criminal proceedings on breaches of electoral law. An obvious solution would be to put it through the Electoral Commission. I recognise that Philip Rycroft has a somewhat different view. Will the Government please explain their view?
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. <em>Clause, </em><em>by leave, withdrawn.</em> Clause 75 Power to make consequential provision <em>Question proposed,</em> That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I thank my fellow Member from East Anglia for securing this crucial debate. He is right to highlight the vulnerability in our energy system that this war has exposed and the particular impact on rural communities. Does he agree that older people in rural communities are particularly impacted? As he says, we have seen a doubling or even tripling of costs and a huge financial outlay, which is resulting in some of my constituents having to pay by credit card because they do not have the cash. According to Age UK, 28% of pensioners were already struggling <span id="374WH" class="column-number" data-column-number="374WH"></span>before this crisis. Does he agree that this is further evidence that although the Government’s package is welcome, they need to go further and put in place a price cap to ensure that constituents, including older constituents, are supported?
It is great to see you in the Chair today, Ms Jardine. I oppose clause 1 and its many implications for justice. It takes away the defendant’s right to elect a trial by jury for all either-way offences, which, according to the Bill’s impact assessment, <span id="114" class="column-number" data-column-number="114"></span>will reduce jury trials by half. That is no minor thing, and I agree with the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle that clause 1 must be removed from the Bill, as well as clauses 2 to 7, which we will debate later. Compared with the removal of half of jury trials, there would be a highly contested and—in the Government’s own estimates—much smaller impact on efficiency in the courts. There is also the potential for the workload in the magistrates court and the Crown court to increase beyond what is estimated. As Emma Torr from APPEAL highlighted during our oral evidence session, this will include new allocation processes and new multi-step processes for considering appeals, and the need for judges to spend time outlining reasons for their decisions, which juries do not have to do. The chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales also told us about the impact on confidence in the system, stating: “Overall, the jury system is seen as the only part that still works, so why are we focusing on that? We want to focus on all those aspects that will reduce delays now, rather than hacking at a constitutional cornerstone, which also reflects community participation.”<span id="vol_col40" class="cross-reference" data-house-id="1" data-column-number="40" data-volume-number="" data-external-id="F5AD3787-E493-4BC8-89CE-6AA687F28380"><em>––</em>[<em>Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, </em>25 March 2026; c. 40, Q72.]</span> This cutback in jury trials is not the measure promised to victims of sexual and domestic violence in the Labour manifesto, and later we will consider amendments that would what was promised. This cut is not a measure that will, under the current system, help victims through more compassionate and better trained court processes, or by improving outdated buildings where they currently risk contact with their abusers. The lack of legal support for magistrates court processes could, as we heard from the head of JUSTICE, lead to more victims being cross-examined by their own abusers. We heard clearly from the leaders of the circuits that those working in criminal justice day in, day out have not yet been able to employ the real efficiencies that could come with more investment and innovation, and that would bring down the backlog without the measures in the clause. Those include the better user of technology, more sitting days, blitz courts and improvements at the investigation stage. I believe that we must act on the backlog, but that must start with those measures and the increased investment that is needed to correct what the chair of the Bar Council told us about investment under successive Governments. She said: “We saw a rapid cutting of MOJ funding between 2009-10 and 2022-23: it declined by 22.4%. We are about 30% below where we should be.”<span id="vol_col41" class="cross-reference" data-house-id="1" data-column-number="41" data-volume-number="" data-external-id="08240364-1D21-4AF7-AACD-77D2C74F7488"><em>––</em>[<em>Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, </em>25 March 2026; c. 41, Q75.]</span> The main point I want to express today is my concern about the motivation behind the choices that the Government have made in these proposals by taking up, and deviating from, the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts in a particular way, and about how the severe erosion of the principle of jury equity can apply to certain types of defendants and certain offences in a way that I suspect this clause is aimed at. That really eats away at a constitutional cornerstone in a truly historic way. It eats away at the principle of jury equity. We know that jury trials are more often chosen by black and other minority defendants, and that public confidence in a jury of their peers to see through institutional biases is real. We know that defendants whose crimes have been protests, motivated by the <span id="115" class="column-number" data-column-number="115"></span>public interest and committed to expose or impede powerful corporate or corrupt organisations and practices, also feel this way. Tim Crosland’s oral evidence on behalf the campaign group Defend Our Juries, which was set up before this Bill was proposed in anticipation of an attack on jury trials, told us about key recent protest cases where juries have chosen acquittal and applied the principle of jury equity in practice. Those included: “In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads.”<span id="vol_col89" class="cross-reference" data-house-id="1" data-column-number="89" data-volume-number="" data-external-id="BE1BB014-BE2D-405F-A34E-E443EFA0CEC2"><em>––</em>[<em>Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, </em>25 March 2026; c. 89, Q192.]</span> Tim Crosland told us how the principle of jury equity is there to apply to cases of conscience in which people’s actions were motivated by the public interest. He told us about the High Court’s 2024 judgment in the case of 69-year-old retired social worker Trudi Warner, who had displayed information about the principle outside a court hearing a protest case. It is worth our listening to more details of what was said in that judgment. Paragraph 16 discusses how the principle of jury equity is well established in our common law and recognised across the common law world. The judge gives several examples from Canada, New Zealand and the United States of the principle being applied. The judgment also talks about how its origins lie in Bushel’s case, from 1670, which “arose out of the prosecution of two Quaker preachers for holding an unlawful assembly. The Recorder of London, presiding at the trial, directed the jury to convict. The jury refused. They were fined and imprisoned until payment. It was this imprisonment that the jurors successfully challenged by habeas corpus, on the basis that juries have a right to find facts and apply the law to those facts according to conscience and without reprisal.” The judgment also quotes Lord Bingham, in another landmark judgment, on the principle’s history. He states that “the acquittals of such high-profile defendants as Ponting, Randle and Pottle have been quite as much welcomed as resented by the public, which over many centuries has adhered tenaciously to its historic choice that decisions on the guilt of defendants charged with serious crime should rest with a jury of lay people, randomly selected, and not with professional judges.” He added: “I know of no other real checks that exist today upon the power of the executive.” In my speech on Second Reading, I pointed out that a number of offences created recently to react to successful direct action protests now sit in the triable either-way category. They include, in the Public Order Act 2023, new offences about interference with key national infrastructure, including blocking roads, and specific offences about causing serious disruption by tunnelling; and, in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the offence of causing public nuisance, which replaced a common law offence and applies a higher penalty for acts that create serious annoyance or inconvenience, such as noisy protests.<span id="116" class="column-number" data-column-number="116"></span> Importantly, Tim Crosland pointed out to us in his oral evidence that the choices the Government have made in how to implement this measure will serve to virtually eliminate jury equity in practice. He told us that, of the more than 200 people jailed in the past few years for peaceful protest, only one has been jailed for more than three years. In that light, it is suspicious that the Government have chosen three years as the threshold in the Bill, despite the Leveson report’s recommendation of two years. Sir Brian also recommended raising the financial threshold below which criminal damage—often how direct action protests are charged—is charged as a summary offence and kept in the magistrates court, where sentences are limited, but the Government are not raising that threshold. Sir Brian also said that restricting the right to elect for jury trial was “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current…12 months”, but the Government propose powers to increase them instead. He also recommended that the new bench division should sit with a judge and two magistrates, to maintain a lay element in these Crown court cases, but the Government have chosen to ignore that, too. As far as the recent examples of cases in which jury equity has been applied are concerned, all those deviations from the recommendations point in the same way. In the light of evidence that other measures would be more effective at backlog reduction, it therefore seems to me that at least one motivation for adopting this measure is to stop the embarrassment of jury equity. I did not get the chance to ask the Minister about this during the oral evidence, but has she discussed with colleagues, companies or other interests targeted by protesters the implications and impact of the Bill and this clause, in deviating from the Leveson recommendations in the way that it does, on the important principle of jury equity? Finally, on Second Reading, I raised the question of whether these measures are yet another part of a package of the Government’s wider attacks on civil liberties. I have described this package as a “toolkit for tyrants” that includes “digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities…and dissidents.”<span id="vol782_col249" class="cross-reference" data-house-id="1" data-column-number="249" data-volume-number="782" data-external-id="BC15D1D9-F1E9-4A71-A918-E9C3FB3E2C3A">—[<em>Official Report</em>, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 249-250.]</span> I would like the Minister to reflect on the potential future impact of this attack on jury equity under a much worse Government.
The Scottish Green party is a separate party from the Green party of England and Wales, so I cannot vouch for its policies. However, the Green party’s justice policies look in the round at what is effective in reducing crime, rehabilitating offenders and improving society, based on evidence. I am sure that the Scottish Green party have those principles in mind with any policy it puts forward.<span id="117" class="column-number" data-column-number="117"></span> That is the end of what I was planning to say, and I hope we will hear more from the Minister about the erosion of jury equity and what Tim Crosland, in relation to the Bill, called its complete elimination. This will be an important effect of what is being proposed, and it has not had enough debate as yet.
<em>rose—</em>