Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,804 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Nick Timothy

   Domestic Energy Bills: Transparency

   I think we are getting closer to the Government admitting their secret plan. As soon as the local elections are done, Labour is going to sell out to Europe, and the result will be higher bills for British families. But there is more: the EU is expanding carbon pricing to include transport and heating emissions, so alignment with the expanded scheme would mean extra taxes on every British family for driving their cars and heating their homes. Will the Minister rule out aligning at least with the expanded scheme and say no to new taxes on everyday life—yes or no?

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2. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Nick Timothy

   Kashmir: Increasing Tension

   One of the consequences of mass immigration and radical diversity at home is that we see foreign conflicts play out among diaspora communities in Britain. We should all do everything possible to stop this domestic disintegration, including drastically curtailing immigration, but will the Minister take this opportunity to tell Members of this House who have played the politics of communalism to stop playing with fire?

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3. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Nick Timothy

   Kashmir: Increasing Tension

   On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Earlier, I asked the Minister to tell Members of the House who were playing the politics of communalism to stop playing with fire. He not only failed to do so, but attacked me for observing the undoubted tensions and sometimes even violence that take place here as foreign conflicts are played out in this country. Can you advise me on whether the Minister can withdraw this attack? If he simply misheard my question, can he be allowed to answer it now? This is a very serious issue.

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4. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

   With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 18—Consequential amendments to the Social Security Fraud Act 2001. Government new clause 19—Devolved benefits. Government new clause 20—Powers of Scottish Ministers. New clause 1—Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance— “The Secretary of State may not exercise any of the powers of recovery under this Act in relation to a person who has received an overpayment of Carer’s Allowance until such time as— (a) the Secretary of State has commissioned an independent review of the overpayment of Carer’s Allowance; (b) the review has concluded its inquiry and submitted a report containing recommendations to the Secretary of State; (c) the Secretary of State has laid the report of the independent review before Parliament; and (d) the Secretary of State has implemented the recommendations of the independent review.” This new clause would delay any payments being taken from people who the Government may think owe repayments on Carer’s Allowance until the independent review into Carer’s Allowance overpayments has been published and fully implemented. New clause 2—Impact of Act on people facing financial exclusion— “(1) The independent person appointed under section 64(1) of this Act must carry out an assessment of the impact of this Act on the number of people facing financial exclusion. (2) The independent person must, after 12 months of the passing of the Act— (a) prepare a report on the review, and (b) submit the report to the Minister. (3) On receiving a report the Minister must— (a) publish it, and (b) lay a copy before Parliament.” This new clause would look into the impact of the Act on people facing financial exclusion. New clause 3—Audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to Carer’s Allowance overpayments— “(1) An independent audit of algorithmic systems used in the assessment, detection or recovery of Carer’s Allowance overpayments must be conducted at least once every six months. (2) Any audit under subsection (1) must be conducted by persons with relevant expertise in data science, ethics and social policy who have no direct affiliation with— (a) the Department for Work and Pensions, or (b) any person or body involved in the development or operation of the algorithmic systems under review. (3) An audit conducted under this section must consider— (a) the accuracy of the algorithmic systems in identifying overpayments, and (b) the fairness of the systems’ design, application and operation, including any disproportionate impact on particular groups. (4) After every audit a report on its findings must be— (a) published; (b) laid before both Houses of Parliament within 14 days of publication; and (c) made publicly available in an accessible format. (5) If any audit identifies significant inaccuracies, unfairness or biases in any algorithmic systems, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the publication of the report outlining these findings, present an action plan to Parliament which outlines the steps which the Government intends to take to address the identified issues.” This new clause would provide for an audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to Carer’s Allowance overpayments. New clause 4—Inclusion of systems within the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard— “(1) For the purposes of this section, “system” means— (a) algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems; and (b) artificial intelligence, including machine learning; provided that they are used in fulfilling the purposes of this Act. (2) Where at any time after the passage of this Act, the use of any system is— (a) commenced; (b) amended; or (c) discontinued; the Minister must, as soon as reasonably practicable, accordingly include information about the system in the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard.” This new clause would require the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, to be included within the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard. New clause 5—Duty to consider domestic abuse risk to account holders— “(1) Before any direct deduction order under Schedule 5 is made, the Secretary of State has a duty to consider its effect on any person who— (a) is a victim of domestic abuse, or (b) the Minister reasonably believes to be at risk of domestic abuse. (2) In this section “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.” New clause 6—Review of whistle blowing processes in relation to public sector fraud— “(1) Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, conduct a review of whistle blowing processes in relation to fraud in the public sector. (2) A review conducted under this section must consider— (a) the appropriateness and efficacy of existing whistle blowing processes; (b) barriers to reporting fraud and reasons for under reporting of fraud; and (c) recommendations for change. (3) The Secretary of State must publish a report containing— (a) the findings and conclusions of the review, and (b) a timetable for the delivery of any recommendations for change within six months of the completion of the review.” New clause 7—Overpayments made as a result of official error— “(1) Section 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1), for “The” substitute “Subject to subsection (1A), the”. (3) After subsection (1) insert— “(1A) The amount referred to in subsection (1) shall not include any overpayment that arose in consequence of an official error where the claimant or a person acting on the claimant’s behalf or any other person to whom the payment is made could not, at the time of receipt of the payment or of any notice relating to that payment, reasonably have been expected to realise that it was an overpayment.”” This new clause would provide that, where universal credit overpayments have been caused by official error, they can only be recovered where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that there was an overpayment. New clause 8—Offence of fraud against a public authority— “(1) A person who- (a) commits, (b) assists or conspires in the committal of, or (c) encourages the committal of, fraud against a public authority commits an offence. (2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable- (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both); (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.” New clause 9—Application of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to investigations conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations for the purpose of applying certain powers of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to such modifications as the order may specify, to investigations of offences conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions. (2) The powers to be applied must include– (a) the power of arrest; (b) any other such powers that the Secretary of State considers appropriate. (3) Regulations made under this section shall be made by statutory instrument.” New clause 10—Liability orders— “(1) Where a person– (a) has been found guilty of an offence under section 1 or section 11 of the Fraud Act 2006, or the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud, (b) that offence relates to fraud committed against a public authority, and (c) has not paid the required penalties or not made the required repayments, the Secretary of State must apply to a magistrates’ court or, in Scotland, to the sheriff for an order (“a liability order”) against the liable person. (2) Where the Secretary of State applies for a liability order, the magistrates’ court or (as the case may be) sheriff shall make the order if satisfied that the payments in question have become payable by the liable person and have not been paid. (3) The Secretary of State may make regulations in relation to England and Wales— (a) prescribing the procedure to be followed in dealing with an application by the Secretary of State for a liability order; (b) prescribing the form and contents of a liability order; and (c) providing that where a magistrates’ court has made a liability order, the person against whom it is made shall, during such time as the amount in respect of which the order was made remains wholly or partly unpaid, be under a duty to supply relevant information to the Secretary of State. (4) Where a liability order has been made against a person ("the liable person"), the Secretary of State may use the procedure in Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (taking control of goods) to recover the amount in respect of which the order was made, to the extent that it remains unpaid.” New clause 11—Publication of results of pilot schemes— “Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish the results of any pilot schemes run with banks to test the provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 2.” New clause 12—Report on cost implications for banks— “The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the expected cost implications of the provisions of this Act for banks.” New clause 13—Annual reporting of amounts recovered— “(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing the amount of money which has been recovered under the provisions of this Act. (2) A first report must be published no later than 12 months after the passing of this Act with subsequent reports published at intervals of no more than 12 months.” New clause 14—Impact of Act on vulnerable customers— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament an assessment of the expected impact of the Act on vulnerable customers. (2) For the purposes of this section, “vulnerable customers” means someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care.” New clause 15—Publication of an Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish an Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy. (2) An Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy published under this section must set out– (a) how the Government intends to use automated technologies or artificial intelligence to tackle fraud against public authorities and the making of erroneous payments by public authorities, and (b) a series of safeguards to provide for human oversight of decision making that meet the aims set out in subsection (3); (c) how rights of appeal will be protected; (d) a framework for privacy and data sharing. (3) The aims of the safeguards in subsection (2)(b) are— (a) to ensure that grounds for decision making can only be reasonable if they are the result of a process in which there has been meaningful human involvement by a human of adequate expertise to scrutinise any insights or recommendations made by automated systems, (b) to make clear that grounds cannot be reasonable if they are the result of an entirely automated process, and (c) to ensure that any information notice issued is accompanied by a statement— (i) setting out the reasonable grounds for suspicion that have been relied on, and (ii) confirming that the conclusion has been formed on the basis of human involvement.” New clause 21—Offence of encouraging or assisting others to commit fraud— “(1) The Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows. (2) In section 111A (dishonest representation for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1G) insert— “(1H) A person commits an offence if they— (a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or (b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section. (1I) An offence under this section can be committed where the encouragement, assistance or guidance happens online. (1J) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or an unlimited fine.” (3) In section 112 (false representations for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1F) insert— “(1G) A person commits an offence if they— (a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or (b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section. (1H) An offence under this section can be committed where the encouragement, assistance or guidance happens online. (1I) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or an unlimited fine.”” New clause 22—Impact of Act on people with protected characteristics— “The Secretary of State must, prior to making regulations under section 103 to bring into force any provision of this Act, lay before Parliament an assessment of the expected impact of the Act on people with protected characteristics who are in receipt of social security benefits.” This new clause would ensure any impact of the Bill on people with protected characteristics in receipt of social security benefits was examined prior to the Act’s implementation. New clause 23—Report on public sector fraud during COVID-19 pandemic— “(1) The Minister for the Cabinet Office must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report evaluating the extent of public sector fraud that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. (2) The report must include— (a) an account of fraudulent or erroneous payments made by or on behalf of public authorities, including but not limited to the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England, (b) a review of how public procurement practices in place between March 2020 and December 2021, including— (i) the use of high priority and expedited contracting for suppliers, and (ii) the role of political appointments and personal connections in procurement decisions, may have contributed to fraud against public authorities, (c) the cost to the public purse of fraud against public authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic, and (d) an assessment of the adequacy of Government oversight and other measures then in place to prevent fraud against public authorities. (3) Where the report finds or concludes that there were— (a) failings in Government oversight and other measures then in place to prevent fraud against public authorities, or (b) any action or inaction by the Government which enabled fraud against public authorities, the Minister must make a statement to the House of Commons acknowledging these findings and setting out actions planned to ensure any failings are not repeated.” Amendment 15, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, leave out “10” and insert “28.” Government amendments 23 and 24. Amendment 16, in clause 4, page 3, line 33, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”. Amendment 13, page 3, line 33, after “notice” insert “or of the duration of the period mentioned in section 3(4)(a)”. Amendment 80, page 3, line 34, leave out “7” and insert “28”. Amendment 17, page 3, line 36, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”. Amendment 18, page 3, line 38, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”. Amendment 14, page 4, line 2, after “notice” insert “, including by extending the duration of the period mentioned in section 3(4)(a) where satisfied that the person is reasonably unable to comply with the requirement to provide the information within the time required by the notice”. Amendment 19, page 4, line 3, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”. Amendment 81, page 4, line 10, at end insert— “(7) Where a person has applied for a review of an information notice, the period mentioned in section 3(4)(a) is to be treated as beginning on the day after which the outcome of the review is notified to the person to whom the information notice was given.” Government amendments 25 to 29. Amendment 1, in clause 64, page 34, line 15, at end insert— “(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons. (1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), “the relevant committee” means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.” This amendment would provide for Parliamentary oversight of the appointment of the “Independent person”. Government amendments 30, 31, 76, 75, 32 and 33. Amendment 2, page 40, line 36, leave out clause 74. This amendment removes the requirement for Banks to look into relevant claimants’ bank accounts. Amendment 3, in clause 75, page 41, line 21, at end insert— “(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons. (1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), “the relevant committee” means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.” This amendment would provide for Parliamentary oversight of the appointment of the “Independent person”. Government amendments 34 to 43. Amendment 8, in clause 89, page 55, line 6, leave out from “unless” to the end of line 14 and insert— “(a) the liable person agrees, or (b) there has been a final determination by a court or tribunal that it is necessary and proportionate to exercise a power under Schedule 3ZA.” This amendment would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and proportionate. Amendment 10, page 56, line 16, leave out clause 91. Government amendments 79, 78, 77, 74, 73 and 44. Amendment 4, in clause 103, page 63, line 29, leave out from start to “following” in line 32 and insert— “Subject to subsections (1A) and (2), this Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office may by regulations appoint. (1A) No part of this Act may come into force until the recommendations of a report commissioned under section [Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance] have been implemented. (2) Subject to subsection (1A), the” This amendment which would delay the implementation of the whole Act until the findings of the independent review into Carer’s Allowance overpayments has been published and fully implemented. Amendment 20, page 64, line 1, at end insert— “(3A) Before bringing into force any of the provisions of Part 1 of this Act, the Secretary of State must consult with banks as to the costs which will be incurred by banks upon application of the provisions of Part 1. (3B) Where consultation finds that the expected costs to banks are at a disproportionate level, the Secretary of State may not bring into force the provisions which are expected to result in such disproportionate costs.” Government amendments 72 and 45. Amendment 5, page 73, line 6, leave out schedule 3. This amendment is related to Amendment 2 and removes the requirement for Banks to look into relevant claimants’ bank accounts. Amendment 11, in schedule 3, page 73, line 25, leave out from “accounts” to the end of line 31 and insert— “which belong to a person who the authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed, is committing or intends to commit a DWP offence.” This amendment would limit the exercise of an eligibility verification notice to cases where the welfare recipient is suspected of wrongdoing. Amendment 22, page 84, line 12, at end insert “(d) housing benefit.” Amendment 6, page 84, leave out line 12 This amendment would remove pension credit from being a “relevant benefit” for the purposes of the Act. Amendment 71, page 84, line 13, leave out from “to” to end of line 17 and insert— “remove types of benefit from the definition of”. This amendment would mean that benefits could not be added to the list of “relevant benefits” by regulations. Amendment 7, page 84, leave out lines 13 to 17. This amendment ensure that the bill can only be used in relation to benefits listed in the Bill. Amendment 21, page 84, line 25, after “money” insert “or such an account which is held by a person appointed to receive benefits on behalf of another person.” Government amendments 46 to 67. Amendment 9, in schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 99. This amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. Government amendments 68 and 69. Amendment 12, page 111, line 18, leave out schedule 6. Government amendment 70.

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5. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

   Just for the record, in case Hansard did not pick that up, that was Jennie the dog crossing the Floor, not a Member of Parliament.

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6. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

   That is the end of the Back-Bench contributions. We come to the Front Benches and first the shadow Minister.

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7. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

   I call the shadow Minister.

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8. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   River Thames: Unauthorised Mooring

   Order. The hon. Gentleman is very quick on his feet. I call the Minister.

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9. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Mr Richard Holden

   Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Health Service Commissioner for England

   I am pleased to speak in support of this important motion concerning the appointment of the next Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Health Service Commissioner for England—collectively known as the ombudsman. That office is one of the cornerstones of accountability in our democracy. It exists to ensure that when individuals are let down by Government Departments or the NHS, their voice is heard, their complaints are fairly investigated and, where appropriate, redress is delivered. In short, the ombudsman plays a vital role in protecting the rights of ordinary citizens, especially the most vulnerable among us. I am sure that, if they have not done so already, Members on all sides of the House will at some point refer constituents to the ombudsman— I certainly have. This appointment comes at a critical moment. Our public services, particularly the NHS, are under real pressure. Complaints relating to delays, miscommunication and administrative failures are unfortunately becoming more common. In that context, the role of the ombudsman is not just reactive; it must be proactive in identifying systemic failings and recommending improvements to prevent harm before it occurs. We Conservatives have carefully considered the proposed candidate, and believe that she brings a strong track record to the role, a deep understanding of institutional accountability and a proven ability to lead with integrity. It was great to have the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), involved in the selection process. We must have confidence that the next commissioner can act independently of Government and party politics, guided only by the principle of fairness and the interests of the public. The effectiveness of this role lies not in its visibility but in its vigilance. The ombudsman must be diligent, thorough and fearless in pursuit of justice, particularly for those who may feel powerless in the face of large institutions. This role is not an easy one. It requires judgment, patience, empathy and a readiness to confront uncomfortable truths. We believe the nominee has those qualities and will serve the public with distinction. We therefore support this motion for the sake of those who rely on these services and for the sake of good government.

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10. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Mr Peter Bedford

    Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

    The Bill addresses the serious issue of fraud and error in our public services. I welcome the Government’s continuation of the work of the previous Government to protect taxpayers’ money and uphold the integrity of our welfare system. The amendments proposed by the official Opposition would not undermine the Bill; they would enhance it. Our amendments would preserve the fundamental principles of fairness and proportionality while strengthening the tools at our disposal to tackle wrongdoing. In that spirit, I rise to speak in support of new clauses 8 and 21. New clause 8 is a measured and necessary proposal that would simply bring the Department for Work and Pensions in line with other Government bodies, such as HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service, which already have the power to issue arrest warrants for cases of serious fraud against the state. Why should it lack those enforcement capabilities when the crimes that it deals with are just as serious? The taxpayer enters into a social contract with the state—a contract based on trust, responsibility and accountability. My constituents pay their taxes and quite rightly expect that those who cheat, lie or exploit the system will face the consequences. We in this House are the guardians of that social contract. If the public believe that we are turning a blind eye to fraud or failing to act decisively, that trust begins to erode and the social contract will be put at risk. Illegal actions must have legal consequences. In supporting new clause 8, the Government could send a clear and unequivocal message: fraud and deceit have no place in our society. Turning to new clause 21, it has recently been highlighted that individuals are using social media to promote ways of defrauding the system, including through the Motability scheme. That is deeply troubling. Although Ministers have previously responded positively to my questions on that, the current version of the Bill does not go far enough. Unless the Government support our amendments, they will fail to take the concrete steps needed to address that evolving form of deceit. This House has an opportunity today to work across party lines to further strengthen the Bill and reaffirm our commitment to protecting the social contract between the Government and those governed. Let us act with unity and resolve to reduce fraud, restore public trust and ensure that our systems work for those who truly need them and not for those who seek to abuse them.

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11. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Mr Mark Francois

    Irish Republican Alleged Incitement

    (Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on the alleged incitement to murder Members of Parliament by the Irish republican group Kneecap.

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12. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Mr Mark Francois

    Irish Republican Alleged Incitement

    Two MPs—Jo Cox and Sir David Amess—have been murdered within the past decade, in the line of duty while meeting their constituents. Frankly, that could have been any of us. I should like to ask the Home Secretary, albeit in absentia, four specific questions. First, how long is this counter-terrorist police inquiry likely to take? The video plainly speaks for itself. How could the words “Kill your local MP” possibly have been taken out of context? Secondly, we now know that Kneecap applied for a £14,000 Government grant, during the previous Parliament, which was vetoed, quite rightly, by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch). Kneecap then appealed against this decision as “discriminatory”. The incoming Labour Government concluded that fighting the appeal would be “not in the public interest.” Can the Home Secretary tell the House which Government Minister approved that absurd decision to effectively surrender to Kneecap over this, and why? Thirdly, Kneecap are still booked to appear at Glastonbury—the organisers of which, incidentally, received some £1.5 million of taxpayer subsidy during the covid pandemic. Does the Home Secretary agree that it would be unconscionable for Kneecap to appear, at least while the police inquiry is under way? Kneecap should surely be barred today. To be crystal clear, do the Government agree with that—yes or no? Finally, Kneecap have now offered a “crocodile tears” apology to Katie Amess. Have that family not been through enough already? So, as it is within her gift, will the Home Secretary now seriously reconsider their request to examine potential failures by Prevent that may have contributed to David’s death, via the auspices of the Southport inquiry? Is that not the least we can do? Thank you, Mr Speaker.

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13. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Mr Mark Francois

    Irish Republican Alleged Incitement

    Cop out!

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14. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Mike Wood

    Staffordshire: Cultural Contribution

    It is an honour to stand before you, Ms Furniss, ahead of Staffordshire Day on Thursday, to talk about the hidden gems that make South Staffordshire such a unique and culturally rich area. I will begin with Codsall, where the past and present meet beautifully. The charming high street lined with historical buildings offers a snapshot of centuries gone by. It is not just about history, however; Codsall has a lively arts scene, with the Codsall community arts festival buzzing with local performances and workshops. It is a place whose creativity flows just as freely as its heritage. Next door, the village of Bilbrook offers a different kind of charm. It is a village where modern industry and natural beauty co-exist. The partnership between Jaguar Land Rover and the local community to protect Jubilee wood is a perfect example of how local heritage and industry can work hand in hand. A commitment to environmental conservation is a core part of the village’s identity and a fantastic backdrop for many of the cultural activities. Swindon may seem small, but its contribution to our cultural heritage is anything but. Chasepool in Swindon was mentioned in the Domesday Book, and is now an important part of that industrial heritage. Swindon forge—originally a fulling mill and then a corn mill—was converted into a finery forge in the 1620s, producing the wrought iron that drove the early industrial revolution. Then there is Himley—a village with a story to tell, which boasts the beautiful and culturally significant Himley Hall and Park, and holds a fascinating piece of British history: on the dark night of 5 November 1605, the gunpowder plot conspirators fled through Himley woods. In Kinver, we have something truly unique: rock-cut houses that have stood the test of time. These homes, carved into sandstone, are a testament to the resourcefulness of past generations and are now a major tourist attraction, with thousands visiting to step inside a piece of living history. Enville is a quiet, yet rich corner of South Staffordshire. Known for the impressive Enville Hall and the Enville Brewery, this village blends rural charm with modern industry. The brewery’s award-winning ales are a nod to the past, while its ongoing role in the community keeps Enville firmly in the present. The village of Pattingham exemplifies how culture and nature can co-exist beautifully. Patshull Park was designed by Capability Brown. Trysull might be small, but its legacy is enormous. This village is home to the arts and crafts-inspired Trysull Manor, a reminder of the region’s creative spirit. Then we have Bobbington, a village with a fascinating industrial past, and Lower Penn, with its surrounding areas offering a tranquil setting for outdoor enthusiasts. Perton is a village that has grown rapidly in recent years, but it has not lost sight of its roots. Finally, the village of Wombourne bridges past and present in the most remarkable way. Its roots go back to the middle ages, and it is home to some of South Staffordshire’s most iconic landmarks, such as the Bratch locks and the Victorian-era Bratch pumping station.

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15. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority. The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it. Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs. We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?

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16. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks. While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace. According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public. SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban. In response to the 2023 Home Office consultation on SIM farms, Mobile UK, the trade body representing the UK’s four major mobile network operators, raised concerns that the proposed ban risked being ineffective due to evolving fraud tactics and technological advancements, including the fact that single-SIM devices, rather than SIM farms, are now the most common tools used to send spam SMS messages, according to data from one mobile operator. Mobile UK further warned that the proposed measures would not eliminate large-scale spam or scam messaging, and urged the Government to broaden the definition of SIM farm to include software-based or e-SIM-enabled methods used to achieve the same fraudulent outcomes. In the Criminal Justice Bill in the 2023-24 Session, the previous Government included provisions to criminalise the possession or supply of devices capable of holding five or more SIM cards, targeting the infrastructure used in large-scale scams. I welcome the Government’s carrying forward the provisions in the Criminal Justice Bill to amend the definition of SIM farm and prohibit other electronic devices used to commit fraud via secondary legislation. Clause 80 introduces the new criminal offence of possessing a SIM farm, reflecting growing concerns about their misuse in fraudulent and criminal activity. The clause makes it an offence for an individual to possess such a system unless they can demonstrate that they have a lawful authority or good reason for doing so. That shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the legitimacy of their possession, aiming to deter misuse while protecting legitimate operations. The clause also provides examples of what may constitute a good reason, including the use of SIM farms for broadcasting services, public transport operations, communications network maintenance or freight tracking. Those carve-outs are designed to safeguard industries with genuine operational needs for such technology, while still targeting the widespread abuse seen in mass-messaging scams, SIM box fraud and illegitimate telecommunications activity. The clause is a key part of the broader effort to close regulatory gaps and strengthen the legal tools available to tackle modern digital fraud. Clause 81 makes it a criminal offence to supply a SIM farm to another person. Clause 82 offers a meaningful definition of what constitutes a SIM farm for the purposes of clauses 80 and 81, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the definition by regulation. Schedule 10 provides for powers of entry and other investigatory powers relating to offences involving SIM farms. Clauses 83 to 85 create the offence of possessing a “specified article”; criminalise the supply of such articles, with appropriate exemptions; set out the sanctions; and allow for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of a specific article via amendment to keep the legislation in line with technology and changing criminal behaviours. Will there be a formal review mechanism to assess the effectiveness and proportionality of these offences, particularly regarding the number of prosecutions under clauses 80 to 85? Given Mobile UK’s concerns that fraudsters are increasingly using single-SIM devices, e-SIMs and apps such as WhatsApp to bypass traditional SMS channels, is the Minister confident that the measures in the Bill and the Government’s current definition of SIM farm are sufficiently future-proof to tackle emerging forms of fraud?

    Hansard source
17. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    We are all too familiar with those who use protests and the anonymity of face coverings to commit criminal acts and intimidate others. When individuals conceal their identity, whether through masks, scarves or other objects, it becomes much harder for police to identify suspects involved in criminal activity such as violence, vandalism or intimidation. That anonymity can embolden a small number of individuals to commit offences, in the belief that they will not be held accountable. In 2024, masked individuals were reported to have attacked police officers in Rotherham during protests, leading to discussions about banning face coverings at such events. Members might recall that in Birmingham, a group of men wearing balaclavas and waving Palestinian flags stormed a pub, assaulted a patron and caused property damage. That incident was part of wider unrest across the UK, prompting investigations by law enforcement. My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor has ably set out the purposes and benefits of amendment 51, which seeks to provide a framework requiring those concealing their identity to provide advance notice. We heard during our evidence sessions about the legitimate reasons why people may wish to conceal their identity, and we are also aware of the need to protect the public from those who exploit such concealment to do harm to others. The amendment could provide a great opportunity for law enforcement to assess and monitor situations properly, offering a more flexible and accountable approach to managing exemptions. Does the Minister feel there could be enforcement benefits to having a more flexible power to assess the use of face coverings? Clause 86 rightly introduces a new offence aimed at individuals concealing their identity while attending public protests in designated areas. It recognises and provides for certain legitimate reasons that a person might have for covering their face, including those related to health, religious observance or occupation. It also rightly sets out obligations on the authorities to ensure public awareness of the rule when it is in effect, as well as the sanctions for those who fail to comply. The clause sends a clear message that protest should be lawful, peaceful and safe. When used appropriately and with the public properly informed, the measure could greatly enhance the safety of both demonstrators and the wider public by discouraging those who intend to use anonymity as a cover for criminal acts. Clause 87 sets out the powers available to senior police officers to designate a specific locality in England or Wales where the offence of concealing identity at protest will apply. It allows for the designation to be made for up to 24 hours if it is reasonably believed that a protest is happening or is likely to happen in the area, that it may involve criminal activity, and that it is necessary to limit or prevent such offences. The clause further sets out how the designation can be expanded and provides for the British Transport police and Ministry of Defence police to apply similar designations within their jurisdictions. Clause 88 sets out the requirements and procedures around creating such designations. I would be grateful if the Minister set out what safeguards are in place to ensure that the designation power is not applied disproportionately or used to deter legitimate protests. How will the police ensure that adequate and timely public notice is given to protestors or members of the public who may enter a designated area unknowingly? Will the Minister clarify how long written records of designations and directions would be retained, and whether they would be publicly accessible for scrutiny and accountability? Will there be a requirement for post-event review of designations and use of these powers to assess their proportionality and impact?

    Hansard source
18. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    I am content.

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19. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media. For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made. The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

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20. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling. By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.

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21. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers. The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime. When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods. The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?

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22. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.

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23. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence. The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change. Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.

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24. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK. Question put and agreed to. Clause 101 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 102 Confiscation Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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25. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings. One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is “to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.” That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court. Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate. Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime. A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited. In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle? Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings. Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.

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26. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard. Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups. What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?

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27. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable. Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?

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28. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy. Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed. In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made? Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.

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29. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage. Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21. The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs. New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance. This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?

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30. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?

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31. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention. Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation. Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety. Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism. Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?

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32. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made? Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision? Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.

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33. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders. Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18? Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs. New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan. The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?

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34. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence: “A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.” What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed? New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction. The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations. New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?

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35. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly. The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications. The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127. Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?

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36. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?

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37. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Visit

    In 2014, I was one of 39 Conservatives who voted in this House for recognition of Palestine. Since then, Governments have come and gone, and thousands of lives on both sides have been lost. The Minister said a few minutes ago that he could not go into the full details, but I am sure it would be helpful—if not today, in the very near future—to Members from across the House for him to provide a detailed analysis of what needs to change before recognition can take place.

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38. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Climate Change: International Leadership

    One area where we could show significant leadership is in the sphere of floating solar, which comes with huge benefits. My constituency has 2,000 acres of raised reservoirs where we keep half of London’s drinking water—you cannot see the top of them, Mr Speaker. Floating solar is twice as efficient as land-based systems and comes with none of the opportunity costs of putting solar panels on grade A agricultural land; in fact, floating solar panels actually improve the water quality underneath, so that Thames Water would have to use less filtration downstream. I hear, however, that the Government’s solar road map has disappointingly little about floating solar. Would the Secretary of State agree to meet me to discuss this further, prior to publication?

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39. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Irish Republican Alleged Incitement

    If this band remain on the bill at Glastonbury this year, will the Minister undertake on behalf of the Government that no Ministers will attend the whole festival?

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40. 29 Apr 2025·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    River Thames: Unauthorised Mooring

    I am grateful to my constituency neighbour for giving way—rivers have two banks, and we share one of them. I congratulate Spelthorne borough council, the EA and the police on doing such a good job on the Spelthorne side. I offer my support to the hon. Member in her endeavour to make her side of the river better. If we can give any assistance, we will of course do so.

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