Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,779 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Sir Edward Leigh

   Crime and Policing Bill

   I agree. Let me move to new clause 20. I am dealing with very narrow legal points, and it might be of interest to the House that the KC concludes that the new clause “would render the 24-week time limit obsolete in respect of the prosecution of women who undertake termination of pregnancy in typical circumstances.” He explains that “the NC20 amendment would repeal the abortion law offences”, including those relating to a “late abortion”. In other words, new clause 20 would fully repeal all existing laws that prohibit abortion in any circumstances, at any gestation, both in relation to a woman undergoing an abortion, and abortion providers or clinicians performing abortions. In the second iteration of her new clause, the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) has added a measure that seeks to amend the Abortion Act 1967, to create the impression that a time limit would remain. However, the Abortion Act only provides exemptions against prosecution under the laws that new clause 20 would repeal, so those offences would no longer remain under new clause 20. Since the Abortion Act itself contains no penalties or offences, and neither would the proposed new clause introduce any, adding a mere mention of an ongoing time limit in the Act would be toothless and utterly meaningless under the law. New clause 20 would de facto have the effect of fully decriminalising abortion up to full term for both women and abortion providers. Hon. Members do not need to take my word for it. It is not often that they will hear me agree with the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, the UK’s leading abortion provider, but its assessment of new clause 20 concludes that it would “largely render the Abortion Act 1967 obsolete” and “create a regulatory lacuna around abortion provision and access.” There is one additional angle that Members need to be aware of. On new clause 20, the legal opinion finds that “the effect of the amendment is that a woman who terminated her pregnancy solely on the basis that she believed the child to be female would face no criminal sanction in connection with that reason, or at all.” Similarly, on new clause 1 the opinion confirms that “it would not be illegal for a woman to carry out her own abortion at home, solely on the basis that the foetus is female.” These amendments are not pro-woman; they would introduce sex-selective abortion. Sex-selective abortion is already happening in this country. Back in 2012, a Telegraph investigation found that doctors at UK clinics were agreeing to terminate foetuses because they were either male or female. A BBC investigation in 2018 found that non-invasive prenatal tests were being widely used to determine a baby’s sex early in pregnancy, leading to pressure imposed on some women to have sex-selective abortions. That evidence led the Labour party to urge a ban on such tests being used to determine the sex of babies in the womb. A report by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics similarly found that several websites were privately offering tests to determine the sex of a baby, and the council warned that the increasing prevalence of private testing may be encouraging sex-selective abortions. Passing new clause 1 or new clause 20 would likely make the situation worse. In conclusion, what we are faced with is an extreme set of amendments going way beyond what public dominion demands, and way beyond what is happening in any other country in the world.

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2. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Sir Desmond Swayne

   Crime and Policing Bill

   There is a difference of principle on the question of human rights, because there are two lives involved in these decisions. That is the fundamental problem.

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3. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Simon Hoare

   Crime and Policing Bill

   The right hon. Lady is setting out very clearly what the Bill is intended to be, and has rightly pointed to the cross-party support for the main thrust of it. Does she agree that that unanimity of purpose is put in grave jeopardy by the Christmas tree-ing of significant amendments relating to abortion? I know that she had a personal interest in this issue in opposition. These very dramatic changes to abortion law require a much fuller debate in this place than can be had on an amendment to a Bill that has the purpose that the right hon. Lady has set out. The Government never intended the Bill to be a Christmas tree Bill, but it has become one. The House runs the risk of fracturing its unanimity of purpose if those amendments are pressed to a vote and become part of the legislation.

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4. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Simon Hoare

   Crime and Policing Bill

   I am not a lawyer, but my hon. Friend has deployed a clear and compelling argument. At the beginning of his remarks, he referenced how amendment 19, to which I am a signatory, commands cross-party support. In advance of anything the Minister may say, is my hon. Friend able to indicate, from conversations he has had with the Home Office and individual Ministers, the Government’s response? He seems to be making such a compelling case; it would be helpful if the Government accepted it.

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5. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Simon Hoare

   Crime and Policing Bill

   My friend the hon. Lady—I hope she does not mind if I refer to her as a friend—is making a clear point. She has drawn attention to a great deal of confusion and misrepresentation in respect of what she is trying to achieve in her new clause, and she has shared some heartrending examples. However, she has just said something with which I think the whole House would agree. In recent years, we have seen our legislative approach to abortion effectively as placing ornaments on a legislative Christmas tree, tacking measures on to Bills in a very ad hoc way. I think she is actually right: this is a serious issue—I say this as a husband and as a father of three daughters—that requires serious consideration in a Public Bill Committee, with evidence from all sides and so on. Does she agree with me that, notwithstanding her laudable aims and heartfelt sincerity, it would be much better if these complex issues were dealt with in a free-standing Bill, rather than by amendment to a Crime and Policing Bill?

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6. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Sarah Bool

   Topical Questions

   In Prime Minister’s questions last week, I raised the need for a universal national screening programme for type 1 diabetes. Will the Secretary of State agree to meet me to discuss this, so that it could form part of the 10-year plan, given that it fits so neatly into prevention of issues such as diabetic ketoacidosis over treatment?

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7. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Crime and Policing Bill

   I rise to speak for new clause 106 and against new clauses 1 and 20. I am grateful for this opportunity to place on the record my grave concerns about this hurried attempt to significantly alter our nation’s abortion laws. It is my view that by doing so we risk creating a series of unintended consequences that could endanger women, rather than protect and empower them. We need more time. This is not a pro-choice versus pro-life debate. We already have the most inclusive abortion laws in Europe: medical abortion is available up to 24 weeks, which is double the European average, and we have the option of full-term abortion on medical grounds. Instead, today’s debate is about ensuring that legislation as significant as this—seeking to introduce a wholesale change to abortion laws affecting England, Scotland and Wales—is not rushed through without the chance for significant scrutiny. Indeed, 90 minutes of Back-Bench debate does not cut it, in my opinion. We should, of course, treat women seeking an abortion with compassion and dignity—that goes without saying. As a councillor on Plymouth city council, I chaired the commission on violence against women and girls. Defending the voiceless is my guiding principle in politics, and it is with those women and unborn babies in mind that I make this speech. As over 1000 medical professionals said in an open letter cited in The Telegraph today, “If offences that make it illegal for a woman to administer her own abortion at any gestation were repealed, such abortions would, de facto, become possible up to birth for any reason including abortions for sex-selective purposes, as women could, mistakenly, knowingly or under coercion, mislead abortion providers about their gestational age. If either of these amendments were to become law, it would also likely lead to serious risks to women’s health because of the dangers involved with self-administered late abortions.” They continue, “Quite aside from the increased number of viable babies’ lives being ended beyond the 24-week time limit, there would likely be a significant increase in such complications if” new clause 1 or 20 “were to pass, as they would remove any legal deterrent against women administering their own abortions late in pregnancy. The current law permits flexibility and compassion where necessary but, for these reasons, we believe a legal deterrent remains important.” Many supporters of new clauses 1 and 20 claim that the 24-week time limit for abortions would not change, but that is misleading. Any time limit is meaningless if abortions are legalised all the way up to birth, for any reason, without a legal deterrent. My concern is that, once decriminalisation has taken place, further steps will be taken to expand abortion time limits. Indeed, many of the campaigners mentioned this afternoon are on record saying as much. It is important that we are realistic about that.

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8. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Crime and Policing Bill

   I do not think it is a case of being corrected. I have significant concerns that, should the new clauses be passed, those are the next steps—it is a bit of a slippery slope. We may just have to disagree on that. Public opinion and professional advice are clear. Polling undertaken by ComRes reveals that only 1% of the public support the introduction of abortion up to birth, 70% of women would like to see a reduction in the time limit from 24 weeks to 20 weeks or less—still well above that of many of our European neighbours—and 89% of the population oppose the sex-selective abortions that new clauses 1 and 20 would allow.

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9. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Crime and Policing Bill

   No, I will make some progress. Those who champion new clause 1 claim that it is needed to stop arrests, long investigations and the prosecution of women, but it is important to highlight that prosecutions under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act almost always relate to males inducing or coercing women into abortions. By decriminalising women, we would, by implication, also stop the opportunity to prosecute abusive or coercive males. To be prosecuted for aiding and abetting abortion, there needs to have been a case to answer in the first place. Instead, I stand here to suggest a better route forward: new clause 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson). She has rehearsed the arguments for that new clause excellently, but I will add that freedom of information requests have revealed that one in 17 women who took pills by post required hospital treatment—equivalent to more than 10,000 women between April 2020 and September 2021. Further investigation found that the number of ambulance service call-outs relating to abortion increased in London. They also increased in the south-west, where my constituency is, from 33 in 2019 to 74 in 2020—a 124% increase. That correlates directly with the removal of the need for a doctor’s appointment. At-home abortions were made permanent by just 27 votes in March 2022. Polling in June 2025 found that two thirds of women support a return to in-person appointments. I call on the House to support new clause 106.

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10. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Rebecca Paul

    Crime and Policing Bill

    I rise to speak against new clauses 1 and 20, and in support of new clause 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson). First, it is important for me to say that I fully support women’s reproductive rights. I think that we generally get the balance right here in the UK, and protecting that is a hill I would die on. However, I am disturbed by new clauses 1 and 20, which would decriminalise abortion up to birth. If they become law, fully developed babies up to term could be aborted by a woman with no consequences. The reason we criminalise late-term abortion is not about punishment; it is about protection. By providing a deterrent to such actions, we protect women. We protect them from trying to perform an abortion at home that is unsafe for them, and from coercive partners and family members who may push them to end late-term pregnancies. I have great respect for the hon. Member for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), who has tabled new clause 1. We share many of the same objectives on other topics, but in this case I think she is trying to solve a very real issue—the increased number of prosecutions—with the wrong solution. These amendments are driven by the case of Carla Foster, among others. Carla Foster is a mum who was prosecuted under UK law for carrying out an illegal abortion in May 2020, during the covid pandemic. She carried out the abortion at 32 to 34 weeks of pregnancy after receiving the relevant drugs through the pills-by-post scheme introduced during lockdown. This is a terrible case that harshly demonstrates the flaws with the current process, but the issue here is not the criminalisation of abortion after 24 weeks; it is the fact that Carla Foster was given the pills without checking how far along she was in the first place. She was failed by people here in Parliament who voted to allow those pills to be sent out by mail during lockdown without an in-person consultation. That was an irresponsible decision; and one that might have been forgiven in the light of a global pandemic if it had remained temporary. However, in March 2022 the scheme was made permanent. If we want to protect women from knowingly or unknowingly acquiring abortion pills after 24 weeks of pregnancy and inducing an abortion at home, we must put an end to the situation in which those pills can be acquired without a face-to-face consultation at which gestational age verification by medical professionals can take place. These drugs are dangerous if not used in the right way, as we saw when Stuart Worby spiked a pregnant woman’s drink with them, resulting in the miscarriage of her 15-week-old baby. Make no mistake: the pills-by-post scheme enabled that evil man and his female accomplice to commit that crime. It is also important to note that prior to the pills-by-post scheme, only three women had been convicted for an illegal abortion over the past 160 years, demonstrating the effectiveness of the safeguard. However, since that scheme was introduced—according to Jonathan Lord, who was medical director of Marie Stopes at the time—four women have appeared in court on similar charges within an eight-month period. Criminalisation of abortion after 24 weeks is not the problem; the pills-by-post scheme is. If new clause 1 passes while the pills-by-post scheme remains in place, here is what will happen. More women will attempt late-term abortions at home using abortion pills acquired over the phone, and some of those women will be harmed. Many of them will not have realised that they are actually going to deliver something that looks like a baby, not just some blood clots—that is going to cause huge trauma for them. Many of those women genuinely will not have realised how far along they are, due to implantation bleeding being mistaken for their last period, and on top of all of this, some of the babies will be alive on delivery. We in this place need to get away from this terrible habit of only considering issues through a middle-class lens. What about women who are being sexually exploited and trafficked? What about teenage girls who do not want their parents to find out that they are pregnant?

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11. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Crime and Policing Bill

    Order. I call David Smith.

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12. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Crime and Policing Bill

    Order. The speaking limit is further reduced to three minutes.

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13. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Crime and Policing Bill

    Order.

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14. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Crime and Policing Bill

    We have run out of time, so I will call the Front-Bench speakers. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

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15. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Crime and Policing Bill

    I call the shadow Minister.

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16. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Crime and Policing Bill

    Mr Mayhew, to be clear, nothing has happened that is out of order. Your point is more one of frustration than process and procedure, and it is not a point of order for the Chair.

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17. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Richard Holden

    Medicine Supply Chain: Community Pharmacies

    Supply chain problems are just one of the many issues that are having an impact on community pharmacies. My local pharmacy in Noak Bridge is one of them, but it is also being hammered with national insurance increases, and the combination of these issues means that its long-term viability is at stake. Will the review that the Minister has mentioned include all the impacts on community pharmacies that are affecting their long-term viability?

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18. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Mark Francois

    Points of Order

    Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker.

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19. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Mark Francois

    Points of Order

    Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. We now know undoubtedly that The Sunday Times was given access to the White Paper, because people could read most of it in The Sunday Times the day before Parliament saw it, although crucially the article did not mention up to 12 new SSNs—nuclear-powered attack submarines. I will explain in a quick second why that is important, Mr Speaker. At 10.30 on the Monday morning, journalists were invited to a reading room in Horse Guards Parade, where they were given access to the White Paper. Section 8.11 of the “Ministerial Code” clearly states: “where commercially sensitive material is involved, no copies should be made available to the media before publication.” Thus, that was clearly a breach of the code. However, there was an earlier sitting in the reading room, at 8 am, when we know the White Paper was also seen by members of defence companies, trade associations, academics, think-tanks and trade unionists, at the same time that the markets were opening. Mr Speaker, there is a possibility of insider trading. The share price of Babcock, which would benefit from maintaining SSNs, leapt very early on after 8 am—

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20. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Mark Francois

    Points of Order

    But, Mr Speaker—

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21. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 57, page 47, line 35, leave out subsection (6) and insert— “(6) Condition 4 is met in relation to a qualifying football season if— (a) a distribution agreement is in force between the two specified competition organisers in relation to the season, (b) the distribution agreement has been in force for at least the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8)), and (c) no distribution order has effect in respect of the specified competition organisers in relation to the season. (7) Where— (a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and (b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed, the applicable period is that period. (8) In any other case, the applicable period is 5 years.”

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22. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee. The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop. The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years. We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly. In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom. I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute. These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that. The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships. Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me. As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it. Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less. Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed. The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.

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23. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future. Question put and agreed to. Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 60 The mediation stage Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert “set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”. This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi). Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out “the question or questions for resolution” and insert “that question or those questions”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49. Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert “set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi). Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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24. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?

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25. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 62, page 51, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(c).

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26. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    Clause 62 is, in many ways, the most far-reaching and contentious provision in the Bill. It establishes the legal framework by which the Government’s regulator, having assessed final proposals under the new resolution process we have already discussed, may issue a legally binding “distribution order”, thereby compelling parties to adopt a financial redistribution model imposed by the regulator. This is not a minor regulatory power. It is a direct intervention into the financial core of English football. While the desire to resolve long-standing disputes, particularly between the Premier League and the EFL, is understandable, the clause as drafted gives rise to very real risks of overreach, unintended consequences and potential conflict with international football rules. Let me start with subsection (1 )(c). In the current drafting, if the expert panel finds that neither of the final proposals submitted by the parties is consistent with the statutory principles, it is required to terminate the process and notify the parties that it has done so. That is not an option; it is a legal requirement. We must ask what kind of resolution process it is, if both sides present imperfect proposals and the committee’s only course of action is to walk away. That is not resolution; that is resignation.

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27. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do. I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full. That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.

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28. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point; I will move on slightly while he seeks his tie and then come back to his question. We believe that such mechanisms should fall outside the regulator’s remit unless or until the parties themselves choose to make it part of a proposed solution. We believe that is a reasonable balance: it respects the autonomy of leagues, avoids placing English football at odds with UEFA compliance and helps ensure that the regulator remains focused on its core mission of financial sustainability and integrity, not financial redistribution imposed by decree.

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29. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but we do not believe that it necessarily applies to what the amendment seeks to do: to allow the leagues to resolve such issues themselves, rather than the regulator. That is what we are talking about here.

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30. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on. Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport. The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear. The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA. UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition. Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen. Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards. They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.

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31. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.

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32. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed: 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3)—(Mr French.) Question put, That the amendment be made.

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33. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?

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34. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages. I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?

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35. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions. I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?

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36. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?

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37. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers. Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases? Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources? Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs? Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied? Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation? Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions. Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator. Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation? Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?

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38. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them. As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively? Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified? Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action? I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts. The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities? The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.

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39. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?

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40. 17 Jun 2025·Parliament·Mr Louie French

    Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

    I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact? We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?

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