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The Minister says that advocates had no role in discharge, but they do when advising patients about their rights—that is fundamentally what they do. At the point of discharge, they enable patients to know what their rights are. I take his point about capacity issues. If the Government want to take the clause away, how will they hardwire patients’ feedback into the heart of the Bill?
I rise to address clauses 36 to 40, which focus on patients involved in criminal proceedings or serving custodial sentences, and how we better align their care and liberty and the protection of the public. These clauses engage serious and sensitive issues—individual liberty, the management of risk and the functioning of the justice and health systems in tandem. I turn first to clause 36. Under the current Mental Health Act, a restricted patient—typically someone who has been detained under a hospital order with restrictions due to the risk they pose—can conditionally be discharged under section 42 by the Secretary of State for Justice or under section 73 by the tribunal. Conditions can be placed on their discharge, but they cannot amount to deprivation of liberty. This is key. If conditions require constant supervision or control, such as being escorted at all times, then the patient cannot be discharged at all, even if they no longer need in-patient treatment. This was confirmed in the Supreme Court case, MM v. Secretary of State for Justice, in 2018. Essentially, at the heart of the clause is a group of individuals who have been detained in a hospital under a restricted hospital order. In other words, they are people who have committed serious offences but were found to be suffering from mental disorders at the time. These individuals are not sent to prison; instead, they are detained in secure hospitals under the Mental Health Act. In some cases, clinicians and tribunals decide that someone can be discharged from hospital, but only if they comply with very strict conditions. These can include requirements such as living in a particular place with 24-hour supervision, not leaving without permission, being monitored at all times and other limits that can seriously restrict their liberty. The issue arose in the case MM v. WL, in which a patient with capacity had consented to highly restrictive discharge conditions involving 24-hour supervision. The court found that the discharge under such conditions could not lawfully take place under the Mental Health Act, even with the patient’s consent, because it amounted to deprivation of liberty, and it was not lawful to call it a “conditional discharge”. The law as it stands does not provide for that, which is where this clause comes in. Clause 36 seeks to address the impasse by amending sections 42 and 73 of the Act. It allows both the Secretary of State and the tribunal to impose deprivation of liberty conditions upon discharge only where they are necessary to protect others from serious harm, and where conditional discharge is no less beneficial to the patient than continued hospital detention. I also welcome the intent of the clause: to introduce the principle of least restriction, ensuring that patients are not kept in hospital simply because the law offers no safe option. Paragraph 281 of the explanatory notes states: “This power supports the principle of least restriction by allowing patients to be discharged from hospital and treated in the community, where otherwise this might have been prevented.” However, I would like to raise several probing questions for the Minister. Do we know how many patients are currently affected by the MM judgment and held in hospital longer than clinically necessary? How will patients be supported to challenge these conditions, particularly if they have capacity and disagree with the restrictions? Equally, if we flip it and argue for more restrictions, what if there are concerns or disagreements from the services, clinicians or families? How will they be able to challenge the decision in reverse? I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley is here, as I am not legal expert, but when I was prepping for this, I also noted the retrospective effect of clause 36(5), which allows certain conditions to be applied to those already detained or conditionally discharged when the clause comes into force. The retrospective effect of clause 36 is noted specifically in subsection (5) and reinforced in the explanatory notes. Subsection (5) states: “The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any person who is a restricted patient within the meaning given by subsection (1) of section 79 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is treated as a restricted patient as a result of that subsection, whether the person became such a patient (or treated as such a patient) before or after the coming into force of this section.” This is a clear signal of retrospective application. I believe, in legal terms, this has the effect of changing legislation to make a provision apply as if it has always been in law in the past, not just from the date of commencement. What does this mean? This clause effectively retroactively legalises conditional discharges that include deprivation of liberty before the Bill becomes law, even though under current law, following the MM judgment, that was not permissible. The explanatory notes to the Bill make this point more directly. For example, paragraph 284 on page 53 states: “Clause 36 subsection (5) allows the new measures to operate retrospectively by providing that deprivation of liberty conditions can be imposed on restricted patients who are already detained, or who are conditionally discharged, at the time the provisions come into force.” Again, I am no lawyer, but this makes it clear that the Government are intent on validating past decisions, particularly those made before that are contrary to the MM judgment, which held that the Mental Health Act did not permit deprivation of liberty as part of the conditional discharge. Can the Minister confirm that article 5 of the ECHR safeguards has been fully considered in that respect? On page 72 of the explanatory notes, paragraph 394 says that the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting) believes that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR. To my surprise, when I was working on this at the weekend, I noticed that it says, “in her view”—a small drafting error that highlights my hours and hours of prep for this. On a serious note, the real-world effect of clause 36(5) is to retroactively legalise the use of conditional discharges that involve deprivation of liberty even though, under current law as interpreted by the courts, such decisions were unlawful at the time that they were made. Why does that matter? The retrospective provision protects public authorities, particularly the Secretary of State for Justice, and mental health professionals from legal liability for decisions made before, or in disregard of, the MM judgment. It shields decisions that may have breached a patient’s rights, particularly their right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR, by making those actions lawful after the fact.
I agree on that, and we will support the clause. But, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out earlier, we need interoperability between the moving parts to make sure that they all align with the provision in the clause. She is absolutely right: this measure is in the Bill because the patient in the MM case had capacity and had agreed to being discharged with deprivation of liberty impositions, and that was found to be unlawful because of a parallel Act. What I am worried about, and the point that I am trying to make, is that there are so many moving parts in these Acts that we could be in danger of complicating the situation further. Clause 36 seeks to address the uncertainty by legislating for a new power to impose deprivation conditions as part of a conditional discharge, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out. However, in doing so, the clause effectively runs parallel to, and perhaps even conflicts with, the as yet un-implemented LPS framework. The Government introduced the LPS framework through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019. It was intended to be more flexible and responsive than DoLS. But given that the LPS framework has not been commenced, and that there is no clear timetable for implementation—the Minister seemed to suggest that he was unsure whether he will implement them, even though the 2019 Act was passed by Parliament—are we legislating for an entirely separate deprivation of liberty route under the Mental Health Act, and potentially bypassing or duplicating existing safeguards under the Mental Capacity Act? It all comes back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley about good record keeping and legislative housekeeping. I ask the Minister how the new conditional discharge power will interact with either the DoLS or the liberty protection safeguards—if they are eventually implemented. Are they simply a subsection of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and therefore would not matter? Can the Minister foresee a time where a patient could be subject to both the new powers and the LPS, and if so, who is the decision maker and where do the appeals rightly lie? Should we not wait for the full implementation of the LPS before layering further deprivations in place? That is an open and rhetorical question, but one that vexes me when we are discussing this Bill in detail. There is a real risk here of fragmenting the legal landscape, leading to confusion for clinicians, patients and carers. Clause 37, which is about conditions relating to the transfers of prisoners and others to hospital, addresses a barrier to timely transfers from prison to hospital. At present, under the case R (ASK) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department of 2019, a transfer from prison under section 47 or 48 of the Mental Health Act cannot be authorised unless a specific hospital bed has already been identified. While well intentioned, that threshold has arguably had a negative effect in deterring referrals and delaying access to treatment. Clause 37 rightly lowers that threshold. It amends section 47 and 48 of the Act so that a hospital place need not be available at the point of referral. Instead, the clinical decision about suitability for hospital can proceed earlier, allowing for better planning and quicker transfers. That seems a pragmatic response to a bureaucratic bottleneck, but how will this amendment be implemented in practice to ensure that it does not create the false expectation of imminent transfer? Will there be national guidance issued for uniform application of that new test across the entire prison estate? Clause 38 deals with transfers from prisons to hospitals, and their timeline. It introduces a new statutory duty for transfers from prison or detention to hospital to be completed within 28 days of initial review for assessment via proposed new sections 47A and 48A. As we have heard, that reflects good existing practice. The NHS England guidance already recommends that transfers should be completed within 28 days. However, clause 38 now gives that statutory force subject to exceptional circumstances, which the Bill carefully defines. For instance, as we have heard, shortages of staff and hospital beds do not qualify unless they are caused by exceptional events such as fires or flooding. This clause is welcomed as an important safeguard for therapeutic benefit, because delays in transfer can cause serious deterioration. It must, however, be supported by sufficient resources and capacity, on which I have a few questions. What assessment has been made of compliance with the 28 day target, and what proportion of cases currently fall outside of it? Will investment be made to ensure bed availability and staffing so that those statutory duties may be fulfilled? When this was debated in the other place, the Justice Minister said: “I am pleased to share that this Government have recently established a health and justice strategic advisory group, which will bring together key partners with responsibility for the various parts of the transfer process. This group will be chaired by a national clinical director, who will report regularly to Ministers and be responsible for agreeing a joint work plan to support implementation of the statutory time limit, identifying solutions to common barriers to timely transfers and holding partners to account.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 31 March 2025; Vol. 845, c. 102.] That is laudable, so I tabled a written question to find out about the group that Lord Timpson talked about. Fortunately, the answer to my written question came back today. The group have not met and are not meeting until 1 July, so I ask for some clarification around that committee. It seems welcome, and this is a complex area. Given that the Justice Minister raised that issue, who will the group report to—the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health? Later in his remarks, Lord Timpson talks about the written ministerial statement coming to Parliament. We have heard the Government say that a couple of times about reporting timescales, but in his speech Lord Timpson talked about reporting to Ministers. What kind of time- scales and frequency can we expect if the group has not even met yet? What reporting will there be to Ministers, either in the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health, to address some of the issues that we are debating today? Clause 39 deals with transfer directions for persons detained in youth detention accommodation. It is rightly pointed out that this is a gap in the law. There is no power under section 48 to transfer to hospital a child who has been remanded to a youth detention accommodation by the Crown court, even if they urgently need in-patient care for mental disorders. That really does seem to be an anomaly. Such power exists for magistrates court remands, so clause 39 rightly corrects this, and I support it. Do we know how many children have been affected by that gap since 2012? I ask because if this is to come into law with immediate effect, it will have an immediate resource effect. We of course want to make sure that everyone—particularly young people—is in the right place. The fact that some of them legally are not may well cause another problem for us all. Finally, I turn to clause 40, which appears to be a technical clarification of schedule 1 of the 1983 Act, confirming that the whole of section 66(2)(d) is disapplied for unrestricted part III patients. It clarifies the right of application to the tribunal, and to me it seems uncontroversial and helpful. I acknowledge the thoughtful work being proposed in these clauses, and I understand what they are trying to do. They represent a clear attempt to modernise and humanise the way the Mental Health Act applies to some of the most vulnerable and high risk patients in our system, but we must ensure that any new powers, particularly those involving deprivation of liberty and retrospective legislation, are subject to clear safeguards, scrutiny and proper resourcing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my questions.
I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3, which introduce the independent mental health advocate system under the Mental Health Act 1983. I recognise the positive intentions behind the reforms. The proposals respond to long-standing concerns about access to advocacy for people receiving mental health treatment, especially for those who are not detained, but are nevertheless vulnerable, and may struggle to understand the challenges within their care. Currently, IMHA services are guaranteed only to a relatively narrow group—namely, patients detained under the Act, those under community treatment orders or guardianship, and certain patients undergoing serious medical treatments under sections 57 or 58A. As the explanatory notes make clear in paragraph 313, that excludes a substantial number of informal or voluntary patients, many of whom may be experiencing significant distress or coercion, even if they are technically not detained. The clause expands eligibility to a new category of English qualifying informal patients, bringing England more in line with a system already used in places such as Wales. This welcome and overdue development reflects the principle that the right to advocacy should be grounded not in a legal status alone, but in need and vulnerability. The introduction of the opt-out referral system for detained patients is also a step forward. Concerns have been raised that eligible patients never access IMHA, often because they are unaware, overwhelmed or too unwell for self-referral. Making the referral automatic is likely to increase the uptake and strengthen patient voices in critical decisions about care, treatment and discharge. Although the direction of travel is right, I want to raise several probing questions in areas of concern, particularly relating to implementation, scope and safe- guarding. On resource and workforce readiness, the Government are significantly expanding both the pool of eligible patients and the responsibility of advocacy providers. That is welcome, but it inevitably raises the question of capacity. Can the Minister confirm whether additional funding will be made available to local authorities, or is it up to the NHS and IMHA providers to ensure the expansion is deliverable? Are the new roles of the IMHAs explicitly addressed in the new workforce plan that he is introducing? What assessment has been done of the number of new IMHAs that will be required to meet the duties, particularly now we are using an opt-out model? Without the workforce and training in place, there is a risk that the rights introduced in the legislation will not be fully realised in practice. My second point is about capacity, consent and best-interest decisions. I would like to clarify a couple of points on schedule 3. It would appear, as drafted, that IMHA providers will be required to assess whether a patient has the capacity to decide whether to receive advocacy, and if not, whether it is in their best interests to do so. That gives providers a significant and quasi-clinical responsibility. Proposed new section 130B(2C) states: “Arrangements under section 130A must require a provider of advocacy services, on becoming aware of an English qualifying compulsory patient for whom they are responsible, to arrange for an independent mental health advocate to visit and interview the patient (if possible) with a view to determining”, first, “whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about whether to receive help from an independent mental health advocate”; secondly, “if the patient does have that capacity or competence, whether the patient wishes to receive such help”; and thirdly, “if the patient does not have that capacity or competence, whether it is nonetheless in the patient’s best interests to receive such help (which, if so, is to be provided under the arrangements).” On the first point about whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about receiving help from an IMHA, my understanding is as follows. The role of independent mental health advocates is to support people detained under the Mental Health Act, to understand their rights and to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment. IMHAs do not, I believe, have the legal authority to assess mental capacity. The assessment of mental capacity is typically carried out by a qualified healthcare professional such as a doctor, psychiatrist or specially trained nurse, following guidance under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. IMHAs are there to help patients understand the information about their treatment and their rights, and can support them in expressing their views, but they do not perform capacity assessments. So is this a change in professional scope? Is it an oversight? Is it an update? Or is it simply what is happening in practice, which now has legal backing?
The hon. Gentleman identifies exactly what the point of an IMHA is. The way the Bill is written, the IMHA determines whether a patient has capacity or competence to make a decision. That determining means that they are making the choice, which is quasi-clinical. According to the definition that the hon. Gentleman has just given, that would fall out of the IMHA’s scope, because that would involve the ability to make decisions about capacity. My concern is whether we have scope creep here. If so, we should be explicit about it—perhaps it is something we want to consider—but the way it is written, IMHAs will make capacity-based decisions about whether a person has the capacity to decide whether they need help. I would argue that that should be done by someone who is qualified as a doctor, a psychiatrist or community psychiatric nurse, as currently happens. That is the clarification that I am looking for from the Government. If I have the wrong end of the stick, I will happily back down, but this area of the Bill needs clarifying. To that end, and if the Bill is written as I fear, I would welcome it if the Minister can tell us how IMHA providers will be supported to make best interest decisions appropriately, especially in cases involving fluctuating capacity or complex presentations. Will there be clinical oversight or statutory guidance to avoid inconsistency or overreach in these assessments? Although I support the principle of proactively offering advocacy, we must ensure that the decisions made on a person’s behalf are done with the appropriate checks and accountability, and by the right people. My third point is about the exclusion of emergency section patients. The welcome change in the clause and the schedule expands the pool of support, but we should also pay attention to those who are, by definition, excluded. Paragraph 317 of the explanatory notes make it clear that individuals detained under sections 4, 5, 135 and 136 will not benefit from IMHA support. Those are often people detained in crisis situations, sometimes in police custody, or brought in under emergency powers. For completeness, will the Minister clarify why that group is being left out, given their heightened vulnerability and the likelihood of distress or disorientation? Are the Government satisfied that patients under these emergency powers are receiving adequate information and support at the most critical moments of intervention? Is there a mechanism to support the nominated person if the patient does not have capacity, so that the nominated person receives the information they need to make a fully informed decision? If the answer is that the duration of detention is too short to justify IMHA involvement, I ask the Minister: how short is too short when a person’s liberty and medical autonomy are in question? It may be that Government amendments 42 and 43 address some of those points, so I will return to this in a second before moving on to my fourth point. In terms of information sharing and patient autonomy, I welcome the retention of the duty to inform patients, especially informal patients, of their right to advocacy, and for that provision to be given both orally and in writing. However, I note that the responsible person must also—except where the patient requests otherwise—be provided with written information to the nominated person. What safeguards are in place to ensure that that does not inadvertently breach the patient’s privacy, such as in situations involving estranged family members, controlling relationships or very personal health issues, which could be disclosed but are not relevant to mental health? It is essential that the nominated person framework enhances advocacy and support and does not undermine the person’s right to control who knows about their care. Finally, I would welcome clarity from the Minister about how the uptake and impact of expanding the IMHA system will be monitored. Will there be reporting requirements on providers? If so, will that be through the integrated care boards, or is that part of the CQC? Will patients have the opportunity to feed back on the effectiveness of the support they receive? Before I turn to the amendments, I reiterate that the Opposition support the principle of strengthening advocacy in mental health services. Clause 41 is an important step towards a more rights-based and person-centred system, but the detail of the implementation is key. I note that proposed Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 specifically change the definition of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient” to exclude patients detained under any “legislation or by virtue of a court order”, rather than limiting exclusion to those detained solely under the Mental Health Act. That important clarification partly improves on one of the problems I mentioned when discussing clause 41. In simple terms, those amendments try to address the issue of clarity and coverage for patients detained under other laws, and I believe that this is how they do that. Originally, the Bill excluded only patients detained under the Mental Health Act from being classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services, but some patients might be detained under other laws or court orders, such as criminal justice laws, which the original wording did not cover. The amendments change the definition to exclude anyone detained under any legislation or by a court, not just the Mental Health Act. In practice, this means that patients detained under other laws will not mistakenly be considered informal patients eligible for IMHA services under this part of the Bill. The proposals close a gap so that the right groups get advocacy services, and there is less confusion for hospitals and advocates about who qualifies. In essence, by broadening and bettering the definition and defining the exclusion, this will ensure that patients detained under other legislation, such as the Criminal Justice Act, or other court-mandated detention powers, are not mistakenly classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services under those provisions. That reflects a more comprehensive and legally coherent approach to defining eligibility. This clarity is welcome, as it reduces potential ambiguity in respect of providers. That said, will the Minister comment further on how these changes will interact with existing IMHA provisions or advocacy entitlements for those detained under other legislation? Are there parallel safeguards or advocacy rights for those groups? What guidance will be provided to practitioners and IMHA providers to navigate the complexities of overlapping detention regimes, especially when a patient’s status might shift rapidly between voluntary Mental Health Act detention and court orders? Will this amendment necessitate any further changes in regulations or operational policies to ensure smooth implementation and clarity for patients, families and service providers? Ensuring that no patient falls through the cracks due to definitional nuances is crucial for integrity in our mental health advocacy services. Finally, Lib Dem amendment 19 would insert after “patient”, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13, “or English qualifying informal patient under 18”. As the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford and Opposition Members rightly pointed out, it is quite hard to see why the Government would not want to put that in place. The explanatory statement says that it aims to extend “the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.” It seems clear in what it does and is a well-defined amendment to that end. I am keen to understand why the Government do not want to support it. Do they believe that this is currently balanced elsewhere in the system? Are there already provisions elsewhere? If not, why—if it is good for adults and we are strengthening their opportunities—should it not be the same for our children? I will finish on that point. I would be grateful for answers on the clause, the schedule, the Government amendments and the Lib Dem amendment.
Q I am Dr Kieran Mullan, Committee member and shadow Justice Minister. You will be aware that at least part of the Bill aims to make changes to how the unduly lenient sentence scheme operates. Can you explain what, if any, role the CPS currently has in challenging or referring cases where it feels that the sentence is unduly lenient? Sarah Hammond: The CPS looks at every sentence that is imposed to see whether, in our view, it is potentially unduly lenient. If we identify that a case is potentially unduly lenient, we would ask for some advice from the prosecution counsel who appeared in the sentencing court. We would read that, and, if we still felt that the sentence was unduly lenient, we would put together a package of papers to send to the Attorney General’s office for consideration.
Q There have been reports of victims of crime and their families not even necessarily being aware of the existence of the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Does the CPS have a role in ensuring that there is a good awareness of the scheme, at least among victims and their families, and, if so, how effectively do you think you are playing that role? Sarah Hammond: Currently the responsibility for informing victims of the sentencing outcome from the hearing lies with the police witness care unit officers. Having said that, if there are questions that the witness care unit officers cannot answer then under the victims code they can refer the matter back to the CPS. We would then happily speak to the victim, explain the unduly lenient sentence programme, and signpost them to where they can access that and the steps around it. We have a guide for victims once they come into the criminal justice system, to explain what happens when a case comes to the CPS, and there is a section within that about when they feel a sentence is too short. We also have a presence in court at the sentencing hearing so, where possible, either prosecution counsel or a member of the CPS can speak to the victim about the sentence and answer any questions they have about potential challenges.
Q You will be aware that there is a 28-day time limit on the ability of anybody, including victims and their families, to appeal a sentence, given your experience of working directly with victims and their families around that crucial period. I have heard that it is not appropriate to expect a victim and their family to manage, consider and make an appeal during that 28-day window, considering some of the momentous events that might be happening to them during that period. Does the CPS have a view on whether a wider timeframe for victims and their families might be beneficial, based on your experience of working with people who are deeply traumatised at that point in time? Sarah Hammond: I am aware that the Law Commission is looking more widely into potential reforms of the law and criminal appeals.
Just to make you aware, the Law Commission’s current consultation paper says that it does not recommend any change to that time period, so I am interested in your views on that question specifically. Sarah Hammond: Okay. A timescale of 28 days is challenging, but at the moment we feel it works quite well. As professionals within that environment we are well used to obtaining the information we need with a sense of urgency. There are quite good mechanisms in place. That said, if there is evidence that extending the timescales would make the process smoother or more efficient and give people who, as you say, probably have other things on their minds than appealing sentence the ability to do so, then the CPS would support that.
Q Moving on to victim personal statements, commonly referred to as victim impact statements, I have heard directly from victims and family members that they are sometimes told to remove things from these statements that they would like to say—for example, personal remarks directed at the offender. The CPS plays an important role in working with victims and their families on those statements. Have you seen examples of the CPS advising that statements need to be changed? Sarah Hammond: I have not personally. I could make some inquiries into how often that happens and we could happily write to the Committee with some more detail around that.
Q Thank you. One of the amendments that the Opposition are tabling would introduce a greater freedom for victims and family members to speak more freely in their victim impact statements, with the proposal that the judge makes the choice of distinguishing between what is or is not relevant to sentencing. Would the CPS, in your branch at least, have any objections to allowing victims greater freedom to say what they would like at sentencing hearings? Sarah Hammond: I think we would have to look at what the extent of the legislation is, but we would be happy to work together with the Government in relation to that.
Q I am Dr Kieran Mullan, the shadow Justice Minister. I should say for transparency that I have had the opportunity to meet Katie and Baroness Newlove to discuss some of the matters before us today. I will begin by asking a question to all three witnesses. Do you think that the current 28-day time limit for victims and their families to appeal an unduly lenient sentence is sufficient, or should victims and their families get more time? Baroness Newlove: I welcome the fact that there is an extension as such, but the 28-day limit has not changed for the victim, and that is the worry. The extension is more in the backroom. I agree with it, because I do not want things to be rushed, but the limit has not changed for the victim, which worries me. Victims really do not know this information; it will be mentioned only if the prosecution lets them know about it. Once they leave the courtroom, it can take a long time, but the clock is ticking. Really, that is the crux of why we have mentioned this. Nobody understands undue leniency in the first place, and it is then for the victims to look into it. Also, at the end of the 28-day process, I have had victims put a request in, but the box has shut at 5 pm, and that is it. I think that is quite cruel to a victim as well. I think the limit needs to be a lot longer to give them time to absorb the sentence and understand it. When I say longer, I am thinking six months, because we give plenty of time to an offender, who has a legal advocate all the way through. I speak personally on this issue. I can assure you that it needs to be looked at again. Dame Nicole Jacobs: I would echo that. I am stating the obvious, but with victims—certainly through the lens of domestic abuse—you have to appreciate some of the dynamics of coercion and control, including isolation from family and friends. Often, a lot of information is unknown and comes to the attention of friends, family and victims in different ways. There is so much there that has to be unpicked and understood. I know we will go on to talk about this, but certainly support for victims throughout the criminal justice system, really needs improvement. It comes down to the most basic understanding of who is who, and what your rights are. That was the whole point of the Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and this Bill is about improving on that. It is really true how disorienting the system is, and we need to do so much more to put in place solid advice and support for victims. Those 28 days seem to fly in the face of that. Katie Kempen: We would also support an extension. Our experience of working with victims who have gone through court is often that the process traumatises them and they need some time for decompression. They need time to speak to their advisers or advocates. We know that victim services are under pressure. Our advocates will be carrying other caseloads as well. From our perspective, to give the victims time to understand and process what has happened to them, and to be able to access the support and guidance that they need, 28 days is really difficult to work within, so we would support an extension. We have no issue with the extension that is within the Bill. We support that.
Q I want to move on to questions about the victim personal statement, commonly referred to as a victim impact statement. I know we have discussed this, and there is widespread reporting that it has been suggested to individuals that they have to make their statements say different things and not necessarily criticise the defendant, even though they have been convicted and are guilty at that point. We have put forward an amendment to try to remove those curtailments on what victims can say in their impact statements. Do you have experience of victims being told they cannot say what they want, and would you support us doing what we can to reduce those restrictions? Baroness Newlove: Again, from personal experience—after 17 years, and still going through the criminal justice system—I think that, once a person is convicted, you have to consider the whole environment of what the victims and families have sat in. I sat for 10 weeks in a courtroom, listening to everything, and I think we need to understand that the victim personal statement—I prefer “impact statement”, to be honest; it was changed under Gordon Brown—is their right to have their say. I do not think there is the right to keep redacting. I am now a bit concerned because I am hearing that it is a piece of evidence, so they have got to be careful what they say. In all the years that I have been working in this area, I have never heard that before. For me, it is about having that voice—for example, hearing about somebody who has been brutally murdered. It is their opportunity. I am going to look further into this, as Victims’ Commissioner, but I think it is a right for the victims. It is in the victims code; it does not have any caveats. I am very concerned to hear, when we meet victims, that something has been redacted three times, or taken out three times. There needs to be more evidence about this and how they are treated. These are the most appalling crimes, and I do not think it is acceptable. Otherwise, victims are just going to say, “Why bother?” The championing I have done over 13 years has been to ensure that the victim impact statement is the voice of the victim, which has been silenced all the way through. Katie Kempen: The addition from our perspective is that the victims we support, by and large, find the whole process quite confusing, and they need support to get through it. We would welcome clear guidance, clear information and respect for the victim’s right to have their voice heard, in so far as is possible. Dame Nicole Jacobs: I would agree. A lot of these answers are going to come back to the same principles: one of the things that we have not achieved is clear support for victims, end to end. There are contracts, or bits and pieces—I am sure Katie can speak to this—that are parts of the process. However, all those things feed in to one another. The victim impact statement is an example of where victims often do not understand what their rights are. They do not understand who to speak to if they are being told something they feel is unjust or they do not agree with. We could do so much more. One gap in the Bill that I wanted to mention concerns wider support for victims, in terms of building community-based support that could start at a much earlier point in the criminal justice process. In the context of court delays, court backlogs and the sentencing changes afoot, this is a critical piece of legislation that could address some of those gaps. That would help victims very much, end to end. Some of the examples of injustice that we pick out would be much more comprehensively addressed. That is one of the things I would encourage you all to consider.
Q I want to ask about the requirement for defendants to attend the sentencing hearing. I have spoken to victims who are quite robust in wanting to see that implemented, even if a defendant is disruptive. We have tabled an amendment to give a judge an explicit right to restrain and gag a defendant if necessary. We have also said that, if a judge is minded not to compel a defendant to appear, or not to restrain them rather than have them removed from court, victims and their families should be consulted about that decision. If they are not going to be there, at the very least a judge should hear clearly the views of victims and families. Would you support a measure that ensures they are consulted? Would you support measures that say, if the victims support it, and it means the defendant being there restrained and gagged, we should consider it? Baroness Newlove: First and foremost, you need to consider what the victims and families have gone through—the whole context. This is just one part of it. I am nervous when you focus on one section and do not look at the environment. Victims and families are sat in the courtroom for many months. They have listened to everything. They may have given evidence via the defence. They have a prosecutor that is not for them, but for the state, and may have let them down. This needs to be viewed in its context. I have always said that I wish judges would own courts, because defendants run them ragged. I have been to many courts over the years, and when you get a good judge, you really get that. We are also talking, however, about families who do not understand the judiciary or the language. There needs to be a part of the hearing, when the defendant has been convicted, to say, “We need to speak to the families.”—but do not just do it on the day of the sentencing; give them the opportunity to digest, as you would with the defence and legal arguments, when nobody is allowed in. That could be private, where nobody comes in. It is important to recognise the whole context. If the defendant is not there, put TV screens in the prison cell. When I worked in the courts, I went to prison cells when defendants would not come down, and we have been up and done that. It is about controlling the environment but, more importantly, it is for the victim, because the defendant seems to control this, which is so wrong when they have been convicted. We need to train the judiciary how to do this, and it is not going to be favourable to one side. Victims only get this time after the whole process, and I am concerned that they will not have the opportunity to digest it. They are emotionally drained and I think it could be rushed too quickly. Dame Nicole Jacobs: I agree with that. Katie Kempen: Building on that, there is a need for a holistic exploration of what victims experience in the courtroom. Our report, “Suffering for justice”, referenced long waits for sentencing hearings and not being able to access special measures. The reality for victims in court is that they are standing outside court with the offender’s supporters and family, that they have to sit in the public gallery, and that they clearly feel they are being intimidated when the sentencing remarks come through. We welcome the sharing of the sentencing remarks with victims, ensuring that they understand the impact of them. We agree that the victims’ voice needs to be at the centre of any sentencing hearing. Some victims may well want the offender to attend. In other cases I have attended, I have seen young people give their victim personal statements against people who have abused them, it was very difficult for them to be able to see the offender. I really feel that victims’ needs should be taken into consideration so that they feel they can have their say in that environment. Baroness Newlove: May I just add something important? When offenders have been acquitted, as they were in my case—I say this because this is how it feels—the offender’s family may be in the public gallery. My family had to have police protection. It is about the environment in that sentencing court. It is not simplistic. I hope that the Government take on board the fact that there is all that going on: you having to digest a very important, very technical decision while you are being goaded and having to be protected.
Q A final question from me. I am conscious of time, so I will direct this question to Dame Nicole because of your particular expertise in domestic abuse. You will be aware that the Bill introduces a duty on the court to make an order to remove parental responsibility in respect of any children for whom an offender has parental responsibility, if they have been sentenced to four or more years. We have laid an amendment to suggest that provision should apply if an offender is convicted of an offence against any child, not just a child for whom they have parental responsibility, and to any offender who has a custodial sentence. Which do you think is the preferable approach, or, more generally, what are your views on removing parental responsibility for those convicted of child sex abuse? Dame Nicole Jacobs: I am very aware of dysfunctions within how domestic abuse is understood in the family court. It is positive to clarify to the court that, with certain offences, allowing parental responsibility should be considered inappropriate. Even saying that, though, I am a bit cautious about a completely black-and-white approach. I agree with the provisions in the Bill, but you would have to think very carefully about the range of other offences—for equivalent convictions against other children, absolutely, but I do not know enough about what is being proposed in terms of the range of other offences. While we are on the subject of family court, one of the long-standing clarifications needed from Government is about a presumption of parental involvement. The Government were looking into that literally years ago, when I was first appointed as a designate, and it has not been resolved. That should be either clarified through this legislation or just clarified full stop. In the family court, the welfare checklist in the Children Act 1989, which is adequate in considering the safety of a child, is often confused with a presumption of parental involvement. I believe that the safety of children, who are recognised as victims in their own right in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, should be paramount.
Q Good morning. I am Dr Kieran Mullan, a shadow Justice Minister. The antisocial behaviour that your work focuses on is often resolved, at least initially, through non-custodial sentences, so the other measures available to the court are particularly important. I would like to ask you about court fines and compensation. I have spoken to victims who feel it is unfair that if someone is responsible for, let us say, the criminal damage of property, the victim will not necessarily be awarded compensation for the value of that property, as they would if they took someone to the small claims court. To reassure people in the community that the measures available are effective, would there be benefit in ensuring that when someone is responsible for property damage, the victim is awarded compensation that matches the value of the damaged property? Rebecca Bryant: Compensation in relation to antisocial behaviour cases is currently quite vague. Often, if you are looking at cases that are resolved through an early intervention and prevention approach, you would be looking at more of a restorative justice element, and perhaps mediation, where there is no compensation and it is more about recognising the impact of the behaviour the person has perpetrated. Once you move into the legal action arena, we have to recognise that a lot of the people who are perpetrators of antisocial behaviour may not be in a position to pay any compensation—although I recognise that, from a victim’s perspective, some sort of restorative approach would be welcome. Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: I agree with that. Part of the problem with antisocial behaviour is that when we record it, and when certain agencies take reports, there is a real grey area in how it is classified. We struggle with the classification of crime versus antisocial behaviour. It is often dismissed as a misdemeanour or, as Baroness Helen said, it is low level, so we are not necessarily going to reach the threshold at which we can look at compensation. That is impactive for victims of antisocial behaviour, because it immediately makes them feel that what they have experienced and suffered is not as important or serious as other cases that might meet the criteria. We would really need to look at that before we could go that way. Additionally, victims of antisocial behaviour often do not report what they are experiencing because they feel they are not going to be listened to or taken seriously. Introducing a compensation element would just complicate that at this stage.
Q Is it ever an element of the community resolution process that a perpetrator might agree to make some kind of financial compensation voluntarily? Rebecca Bryant: That is not something that I have come across at all. Restorative justice and community remedy can be either between the two individuals or group of individuals who are involved in the antisocial behaviour—bringing them together and doing a piece of work to recognise the impact of that behaviour—or something in the community itself, perhaps with higher visibility. There was a pilot last year around immediate justice and the impact on the community of seeing the behaviour paid back, if you like. Restorative justice is often only one of the tools that we use to respond to antisocial behaviour. When we are talking about early intervention and prevention, we also use mediation and warnings, highlighting to the individual perpetrator the impact that the behaviour is having on the victim and the community.
Q Related to that is the issue of fines, which are separate from compensation. I accept your point about people’s ability to pay, and that there is always a process that ensures that fines are collected only in a way that is proportionate to someone’s means, but you can time out of fines: if you have not paid them in a certain amount of time, you do not have to pay them. Would you support that time limit being taken away, so that if someone comes into financial means later on in life, they will still be held accountable for stuff they did in the community for which they were given a fine as part of community resolution? Rebecca Bryant: Yes, I think I would, but how long is that time? I think a victim of antisocial behaviour, community safety issues or even crime wants to see some closure, move forward and move past the incident that has happened. Having something like that hanging over them for an indefinite amount of time might not enable them to have that closure. Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: The bonus of fines or penalty notices for antisocial behaviour is that we hope they act as a deterrent. If they are not working as a deterrent, it does not matter what amount of time we put on them: they are not going to have the effect on the perpetrator of stopping the behaviour. Yes, there needs to be culpability —we should not just have a “get out of jail free” card if we can wait out the clock—but we need to be realistic about what they are going to achieve.
Q I appreciate that some of what you deal with would not end up involving a magistrate passing a sentence, but sometimes that will be the case. Would it benefit transparency for victims, even at a magistrates level, to have a record of the remarks that were made in relation to why the sentence was passed? Rebecca Bryant: Absolutely, yes, I do. What is taken into account around sentencing is often rather opaque, as is whether someone actually has to attend the sentencing. Victims need to be able to see justice done, because they have had a traumatic experience and have perhaps gone through the process of giving evidence live and having to face the person who has perpetrated the antisocial behaviour, crime or community safety issue. Having access to the sentencing report and the sentencing itself, and understanding that their victim impact statement is being read out and taken into account, would be significantly beneficial. Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: I agree. We have to look at everything on a case-by-case basis, and in some situations it would not be appropriate—a victim would not feel comfortable with it. The problem with antisocial behaviour is, again, that grey area between ASB and crime. Impact is the biggest factor, and a victim needs to have that voice and explain how they have been impacted, but we certainly do not want the secondary traumatisation of coming face to face with someone who potentially does not acknowledge what they have done. You would have to look at the complexities of each case.
Q Hello. I am Dr Kieran Mullan, shadow Justice Minister. I want to begin with the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Obviously, you will work directly with victims, and the outcome of all your work will be a sentence passed by a judge. I know from personal experience that, privately, the police can sometimes be just as frustrated with sentences as victims are. You will know that at the minute, anyone, including victims and their families, has only 28 days to appeal against a sentence they consider to be unduly lenient. Given your experience of being in court and working alongside victims, with all the trauma that they might be experiencing at that time, do you think there is any merit in extending the time available for victims and their families to appeal against an unduly lenient sentence? Genna Telfer: That is a difficult question to start with. It is a tricky one. This would probably be better done through a victim survey of individuals who have been through the process. Although we would want to give people additional time to truly consider it, what might take someone two weeks to think about might take someone else 12 months, so what is the right timeline to put on it? I am not sure I can answer that from a policing perspective. Obviously, our witness care teams keep victims informed and talk to them. That is absolutely something we would do. We inform them about the scheme, but we do not tell them whether they are eligible for it or not, because we think that would be better done by the CPS, which has a better understanding of how it all works. But in terms of the timeline, that is a difficult one to answer, because how long is a piece of string? Clare Moody: I agree with Genna. I do not feel that I am qualified to say right now that if you extended this to three months or to two months—
Q If I may interrupt—sorry—do you think 28 days is enough? Clare Moody: I would want to come back to you on that point specifically and separately, because I do not feel right now I could give you an informed response.
Q Okay. I would like to ask you next about sentencing remarks. Again, you work with victims; you see at first hand, through your victim care work, the trauma of a court process. Very often—outside some very limited trials—victims do not get to see sentencing remarks. A week later, it is all just what their memory tells them and what might be reported in the press. Again, based on your experience of working directly with victims through the criminal justice process, do you think there is any benefit in having sentencing remarks published, so that people can actually see what was said in court at the point of sentencing? Clare, do you want to start with this one? Clare Moody: I absolutely can see the benefit in that. When you are in the moment, with so many emotions, and are in a high state of emotional experience, we do not retain information—none of us does. So we are talking about being able to refer back to that. I am not clear, to be honest, on the reasons why the remarks are not already published, so I cannot argue to the specific points about why this does not exist right now. But my instinctive response, if that is fair, is that, yes, it would seem sensible to publish those remarks. Genna Telfer: I think this came up recently. I am not sure whether it came out from one of the surveys, but there was a question about victims being present at sentencing, and I know that some work was going on about that with the CPS as well. So if they want to be in the room, rather than just reading the remarks, obviously, that might be beneficial to some victims.
Q I also want to ask you about the new power that is being introduced in the Bill to compel offenders to attend sentencing hearings. We are tabling an amendment to suggest that victims and their families should be consulted as part of that process. Again, based on your experience of being in the courtroom and of working with victims and families, do you think there is benefit in ensuring that victims and families are part of the discussion about what happens with attendance at hearings? Genna Telfer: Absolutely. That was one of the points that we were going to raise today. I think victims should be considered and consulted as part of that process. Having read about the way that this is going to work—the different options such as potentially adding time to the sentence, or physically removing a suspect into court— the second option is “reasonable force” and I can imagine there are lots of issues with that, in terms of practicality. If someone really does not want to be in court, it will be difficult to achieve that. There is then the potential disruption that could be faced, such as delays for the victim because the trial takes longer to go ahead as a result of that issue. So I think some victims will absolutely want that, but others would probably prefer not to have it.
Do you want to add anything, Clare? Clare Moody: In terms of the involvement of the victim in that decision making, as Genna said, there are complications around getting the perpetrator into the courtroom, but who would not want them to see the justice that is being meted out and for the victims to have that opportunity? But yes, the consultation would make sense.
Q55 I will start by asking about the unduly lenient sentence scheme. I do not know whether you are familiar with this scenario, but it allows anybody—including victims and the public—the opportunity to appeal against a sentence that they consider to be unduly lenient. The Government’s Bill proposes to give the Government more time to consider an application to the scheme. We have tabled amendments to suggest that victims and their families should have more time to consider an application to the scheme. Given your experience of working with women affected by violence, controlling behaviour and the other complex things that go on, do you think that 28 days after a sentence has passed is a sufficient amount of time to allow people who might in future wish to make such an appeal to make that decision? Suky Bhaker: Fundamentally, the challenge with the unduly lenient sentence scheme is that victims are not aware of it. Although increasing the timeframe would be beneficial, and increasing the timeframe for Attorneys General when it comes to reviewing the applications certainly would be, we need to address the underlying issues. We need to get this on a par with offenders’ rights. Offenders are made aware of their right to appeal by counsel immediately, and it is often the witness care unit that informs victims. However, a lot of victims do not fall under that scheme, so would never know that they were eligible. That is what leads them to apply quite late. There are also exceptional circumstances where offenders are able to apply outside of the 28 days. That needs to apply for victims as well, so that there is parity for victims and offenders. Andrea Simon: Although we are pleased to see that there are provisions around extending the unduly lenient sentence scheme time limit to 28 days in the Bill, we still think it is too short. Our members advocate that it should be extended further to six weeks for the Attorney General, and the 14 days to apply to the Court of Appeal should be extended as well. There definitely needs to be more time. Getting advice from a criminal barrister is also quite important in these cases. Anecdotally, we have heard from member organisations that there is not enough time for a barrister to look over sentencing reasons. This can sometimes result in judges failing to apply, for example, the dangerous criteria to a sentence, so we think it would make a significant difference if that time was extended. Farah Nazeer: I do not have a significant amount to add. Suffice it to say that victims—particularly of the abuses we are talking about, including sexual and domestic abuse—are deeply traumatised when they come out of that process, and need sufficient time to make a decision. They also need the right kinds of advice, and to know where to go for that advice. The pathways are often completely unclear and often victims are battling many other factors—ill health, trauma, managing children and all sorts of things. As colleagues have said, absolutely yes, but how about that wraparound support to enable victims to do that in the first place? Doing it is just not possible, even if the provision is there, if you do not have the support to do it. We have often sought to support victims to apply, and they are just not ready at all in that first month. It is too traumatic—everything is just a fog, a haze. It takes time for that haze and that fog to clear, for your mind to be able to still and for you to think, “Actually, I’m willing to go round this a second time.” Then the right support has to come into place—not just the legal support, but the emotional and trauma support, knowing that there is somewhere to place your children and knowing that the children will have support through the process. All that is equally important if a victim is to be able to claim justice.
Q I want to ask about victim personal statements, commonly referred to as victim impact statements. I have spoken to victims of crime who have been told that they have to change their victim statements, perhaps if they are making personal remarks about the offender. We have introduced an amendment that would minimise the restrictions that can be placed on what a victim can say as part of that process. First, have you ever heard of—or do you have experience of—people being told to alter or adjust their statements? Even if you have not, if that were the case, do you agree that we should do whatever we can to allow victims to say what they would like to say at sentencing hearings, outside of things that they legally cannot say? Suky Bhaker: For victims of stalking, the crime is very much a crime of impact. At Suzy Lamplugh Trust, we predominantly work with victims of stalking and harassment and, as I say, it is a crime of impact, so the victim personal statement is paramount in terms of explaining the effects of the crime, particularly because a lot of them are psychological effects; it is not physical behaviours that we are seeing. We would argue that it is absolutely paramount that victims should be able to take that opportunity and to have the power to voice exactly what that experience has been for them. They are often left powerless within a system, and this is their one opportunity to be able to convey the impact. Having said that, a lot of victims of stalking choose not to make such a statement because they choose for that information not to be shared with the perpetrator; often, perpetrators receive a sense of gratification in court on hearing about the impact. For us, there has to be a balance—perhaps in allowing victims to produce a statement but it not being available to perpetrators. Farah Nazeer: I guess that something underlying this is that barristers or solicitors will often advise people to remove things irrespective, because of the way the courts will respond to it. That speaks to a wider and more problematic culture within the court system. I do not think that you can really look at one without looking at the other.
Q I want to ask about the measures introduced by the Government to compel defendants to appear at sentencing hearings. We have tabled an amendment to suggest that when that takes place—when the judge is making a decision about that—the judge should have to consult with victims and their families about the approach to take: not to let victims and families dictate what happens, but to ensure that they are at the heart of that decision making. Do you think that victims and families would value the opportunity to at least make it clear to the court what their views on the matter are? Again, I start with Suky. Suky Bhaker: You need to take into account the risks for the victims. Some victims would very much like and want the opportunity for the offender to be there, but for other victims of stalking that occasion is an opportunity for the offender to have contact again with them. I guess that there would be concerns from victim survivors about the potential behaviours, or how that perpetrator might play out in a court setting. Stalking is very much about communication, so putting the victim and the offender in the same room actually fulfils the gratification of the offender on some occasions. However, we absolutely recognise that there is a sense of justice for other victims and that they very much want that offender to be there. You need to take the victim’s view into account. Farah Nazeer: I have nothing more to add to that; it is the same across all the crimes that we work with.
Q I now turn to something more clearly focused on the specialist areas in which you work, which is parental responsibility. The Bill introduces a measure that means that if someone is convicted of a child sexual offence related to children for whom they have parental responsibility and they are sentenced to four years or more in prison, an order would be put in place or they would lose their parental responsibility. There have been concerns that the measure should apply to any children so that you lose parental responsibility if you have been convicted of an offence against someone who was not one of your children. Do you have a preference for one of the two approaches? I do not know whether I have explained them clearly enough; please let me know if I have not. Suky Bhaker: We believe it should be extended to any child. Someone who presents a risk to their own children certainly presents a risk to other children. In fact, we would go further and say that it should be extended to include other forms of violence against women and girls as well as offences such as attempted murder. Andrea Simon: I echo that. We definitely agree in principle with the aims to limit the parental responsibility of men convicted of a child sexual offence. That restriction should certainly be expanded to include serious sexual offending against any child and should not be limited to the individual’s own child. There is a lack of clarity in the proposals about what would happen if a stepchild was abused, for example, so we want to see those loopholes and inconsistencies closed. Farah Nazeer: I agree. I would add that we think it should be extended further, given how long these things can take for those going through trial, those on bail, those awaiting trial or those being investigated—that is the reality of the vast majority of certainly domestic abuse cases. The consequences of ignoring that are dire. We have a report coming out next week that illustrates the impact on children in terms of harm and death when it comes to making these quite frankly unsafe contact arrangements.
Q Finally, one welcome measure in the Bill flips around the concept of where offenders can go and where victims are protected from seeing them, because it should be the offenders that we restrict. We should restrict their mobility so that victims can know that as long as they are not in certain places they will not run into offenders. Your organisations have probably called for that in the past. I am interested in your perspective on how important that will be for victims. Suky, would you like to start? Suky Bhaker: It is paramount that victims themselves should not feel that they are the ones being restricted by restraining orders. Often our service users tell us that exactly that happens and that the exclusion zones are not broad enough. Without knowing where the perpetrator is or making the zones wide enough, the victims themselves end up being the ones who feel imprisoned and restricted: they do not know where it is safe to go, because they do not know where the offender will be. Those exclusion zones definitely need to be made wider. Andrea Simon: We also need to think about the practicalities and who will actually ensure that the exclusion zones are adhered to and monitored, and that actions are taken if there are breaches. That is in the broader scope of how we resource probation and policing to make sure that victims can feel reassured that these measures will result in their safety. That is absolutely vital. Farah Nazeer: We often see orders that just do not make any sense—for example, where a perpetrator and a victim work in quite close proximity and that has not been taken into account, and where children go to school and so on. There needs to be a victim-centred approach when it comes to thinking about the exclusions and where a perpetrator can be. It is a really important principle and a good principle to have, but what we need is the training, the thought and the care that sits behind that, and also the enforcement. Even the orders issued currently are broken on a regular basis and there are not the resources to address that. It is one thing to set this in motion and put it in place, but how it works on the ground is something that the Committee should really consider when it comes to statutory services’ ability to deliver to the aspirations and ambitions of the Bill, and equally the ability of services on the ground to support victims through varying processes.
Q I am Kieran. Just for transparency, as with some of the other witnesses this morning, I want to say that we have had the opportunity to meet previously and discuss some of these issues. I want to begin by asking you about victim impact statements—or victim personal statements, as they are technically known. We have heard that people do not always get the chance to say what they want in their statements, and that they are told that they have to alter or edit them. Have either of you experienced that, and could you perhaps share that experience? As you are not here physically, I will direct things to you, Glenn, so that you know when it is your opportunity to speak. Glenn Youens: We were led to believe that our victim impact statement was a way of saying how the crime and what had happened had impacted our family. We had to write it two or three times before we even went to court, to make sure that it was right and put in the right process. When we got to court, we were told that we had to edit it as there were certain things in it that we were not allowed to say. For instance, my wife Becky called Aidan McAteer a “child killer”, and we were told that we couldn’t say that because he had not been convicted of it. Even though he had pleaded guilty to it, we were not allowed to call him that. There were quite a few things that Becky wanted to be quite graphic about. She wanted to talk about all Violet’s injuries, exactly what had happened to her and how she had died of brainstem death. We were told that we could not do that because it would not be fair on him. From our point of view, if this is supposed to be a victim impact statement, we are supposed to be telling the judge, the court and—in our case—the perpetrators exactly how what they had done has impacted our family. To then be told, “You can’t say that, you can’t say this”, does not feel like a true representation of the impact on our family. For us, it was quite a negative experience. Also, on the day, Becky’s mother, my mother-in-law, was also hit. She was crossing the road with Violet, and she never got the chance even to put across an impact statement, because she was in hospital fighting for her life. We tried to put those things in there, but we were told that we were not allowed to, because it would not be fair on him. For us, we feel that it should have been a chance for us to say to him how he had affected our family, but it was not done that way, so for us and a few other families we have spoken to, it was not as we feel it should have been. It was not a true impact statement. Paula Hudgell: Most of the people I have spoken to have had an experience like Glenn’s, but it just shows that there is a way of having a positive victim impact statement. We were very lucky that the barrister on our case was very experienced. She read out the impact statement in such a way that it captured everything. She got across everything that needed to be said, but in those two weeks of the trial, the jury had aged about 20 years. It had been very difficult, and they still did not know whether Tony was alive or dead. In that, she put a photo of Tony under the Christmas tree with my other children, which the whole courtroom just applauded, because they realised that he was alive and living as good a life as he possibly could. That impact was, we felt, absolutely right. It was right for the situation and for us. Everything had got through. The perpetrators were there, and for us, it was seeing their faces of sheer shock—they did not know he had had his legs amputated by that time, but we felt it was a very positive experience. It just shows that it can be done that way, but I know of so many people who had their victim impact statements changed. It was the same for the Everards; they were told to delete part of theirs. It is not everywhere that people have that experience to be able to do it properly. Glenn Youens: Having spoken with Paula last night and had a conversation about this, hearing how impactive and how positive it was for Paula—if that is the right word in the situation—really highlighted for us the inconsistencies in the information that people are given and the way things can be done. I am grateful that Paula got that, but for us it was completely the opposite. It just shows, even within our small group, how inconsistent that is from one court to another court. That is what we need to look at.
Q You mentioned the sentencing hearings, Paula. I want to move on to questions about the new measures to compel people to attend their sentencing hearing. First of all, we tabled an amendment to say that victims should be consulted as part of the process—that it should not just be left to a judge and that, while victims might not have the final say, the judge should be extremely mindful of what the victims’ views are. May we start with you, Paula, with your views? Paula Hudgell: Yes, we absolutely agree. We feel that the victims should be asked about the sentencing hearings, but we also appreciate that in some cases—although you want to see the perpetrators and you want to be there to see them sentenced—some of the perpetrators really do not behave, and they can actually cause more harm to the victims and their families by being there. I know it says it is down to the judges, but the victims and their families really should be consulted on how they want to proceed. Glenn Youens: I would say the same as Paula: it really should be down to the families. For judges, it is another case, another part of their job, but the families are the ones living that reality. If they want to see the perpetrators in court, they should be able to; if they do not want to, they should be able to put that forward. I do not think that anyone can make that decision apart from families. It is important that they are given the option. It should not just be what the judge thinks; there needs to be a conversation with them, letting them put their point across properly. Some people might want to see them; some people might not. It is really important that the families, the victims, are considered properly, and that it is not just, “This is what the judge thinks.” It needs to be a conversation with the victims.
Q There was a discussion earlier this morning about the extent to which force might be used to compel someone to attend. We have had the opportunity to speak to other members of the group, who have suggested that even if someone was restrained, or gagged, and making a lot of noise, they would still want them there, and other people would not want them there. Do you think that is a choice that some victims should be encouraged to make and that, if they are willing to tolerate that disruption, that should be something that we listen to? Paula Hudgell: Yes. As long as it is what the victims themselves or their families actually want, then yes, I think they should be compelled to be there. Obviously, it is slightly different, but with our VPS in a parole hearing they refused to listen to it. I do not agree with that, because you cannot see how that person reacts. It should not be down to their rights; it should be down to a discussion with victims as to whether they want it. Yes, I agree with forcing people. Glenn Youens: I think it is down to the families. In our case, Aidan McAteer and Dean Brennan asked if they could not come to court; they wanted to do it by video link. And the judge said, “No, you have to be there. You have to attend.” For us, that was what we wanted. At the end of the day, these criminals chose to do what they did; they chose to be there. Among the victims, nobody chose to be there. The victims should be looked after and made to feel that if that is what they want, then that is what we will do, because they are the ones who have been pushed into this. A lot of people do not have experience in court and do not have experience of the criminal side of stuff; they have been dragged into it. The least the courts can do is to make them feel as comfortable as possible. If that means the criminal being there and acting up, shouting up, doing what they want—if they still want to see the criminal’s face when they receive proper justice, the criminal should be made to attend. Whether that they should be restrained or had time added on to their sentence, they should be made to do it. What the victims’ families feel should be done for them.
Q I have a final question about the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As you may be aware, victims and anyone else really have 28 days to appeal an unduly lenient sentence. In the Bill, the Government have chosen to extend the time available to the Government to decide on an appeal, but they have not given more time to victims and their families. We have tabled an amendment to say that victims and families should be given more time to make an appeal. Paula Hudgell: It is very difficult when you have been through a trial or a sentencing. Your emotions are everywhere. It is so draining—it just takes over your whole life. A lot of the time, the information is not given that you can actually appeal a sentence. Twenty-eight days is not long enough. People are going through a bereavement. As one of our group pointed out, “You have 28 days to take a T-shirt back to the shop—28 days to make a decision over that!” You may not find out until the last minute. It is very, very difficult. Also, a lot of the time you do not know the process, unless you are from a legal background. Sometimes you are not told and that information does not filter through. Yes, it should be a lot longer, because your emotions are all over the place when you are in that situation. Glenn Youens: As Paula said, and as Katie said in our group—“Twenty-eight days? You get longer to decide if you like an item of clothing or not.” Becky asked the CPS about how we appealed the sentence, and we were actually advised on the day not to appeal it, because it was felt that if we did appeal it, the criminal could get less time in prison. That was our first experience with it. After that, we were planning Violet’s funeral; we had to go from there and plan our daughter’s funeral, and then we had 28 days to try and appeal the sentence. Your head was not in the right place. We did not open post for about four or five months after that. We did not answer the phone to people, because we were trying to put our life back together. But then to realise that, as you say, you have 28 days to appeal it—it is not enough time for people like us and other victims. Their first thing is trying to put their lives back together again. Then, when you are strong enough to realise, “I can go through this court case—I can go through this again,” to be told, “It’s too late now.”—I just do not think that is acceptable for families. Unless you have been in a situation where you have had to go to the sentencing of somebody who has killed your loved one, it is really hard to express how you feel in the next few days, weeks or months. I was off work for seven months before I returned to work—it was seven months before I felt like I could go back to any kind of normality. Yet you are only given 28 days to decide whether you want to go through that court case again, and also to decide whether that is worth doing when there is a chance that he might get a lesser sentence than the already insulting sentence he has been given. That needs looking at. It needs to be done properly, and the families need to be consulted, because I am pretty confident that most families you will speak to will agree that 28 days is not long enough to do anything in that situation.
Q It is really welcome that you are here. There is an understandable focus on women and girls, but these issues do not just affect women and girls, so it is great to have your representation. I want to ask about exclusion zones. At the minute, a perpetrator will be told that there are certain places that they cannot go, but they can go everywhere else. We have heard evidence that this means that victims of domestic abuse or other offences are constantly unsure about where they might run into the offender. The Government propose changing that around, so that there will be certain places that the perpetrator can go, and then the victim can be confident that, by not going to those places, they will not run into them. Do you have any views on that approach? Mark Brooks: We support that approach, because it puts the victim first and the rights of the perpetrator second. The ex-partners of some of the men we have spoken to have gone to prison and, after coming out, have caused a huge number of problems for them in the wider community. Those men and their children—daughters and sons—have had to move, and they are continually fearful of coming into contact. We would be in favour of that approach. It is the right way round.
Q You mentioned children, and I want to ask you about the parental responsibility measures in the Bill. Under the Government’s proposed measure, if an offender is sent to prison for four years or more for a sexual offence against a child for whom they have parental responsibility, they will have their parental responsibility removed. Under our amendment, an offender would lose parental responsibility if they were guilty of an offence against any children, not just their own. Do you have a view about which is the preferable approach? Mark Brooks: For it to act as a deterrent, we think it should apply in all cases. We want far-reaching consequences for anyone who commits those crimes, so we think it should be extended.
Q Lastly, the victim contact scheme and the helpline will be made available to a wider group of victims. Do you welcome that? What difference do you think it will make? Mark Brooks: I absolutely do. The key thing is to make sure that all victims are aware of it. We should make sure that domestic abuse victims, female or male, are far more aware of it, especially where the criminal sanctions have not been large. As you heard from the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, the impact of abuse post-separation or post-sentence—when the criminal sanctions have ended—can often be as traumatic as the crime itself, because it potentially leaves the victim on eggshells for the rest of their life. If they have access to the helpline and know what is happening with the person who committed the crime against them, they can better manage that. As previous witnesses have said, we obviously need more funding for people to go to local support services when their offender is released from prison.
Q I am Kieran Mullan, the shadow Minister. Forgive me, but I want to understand your capacity to give evidence as civil servants. Would I be correct in saying that, if you were asked to comment on something that is not Government policy, you are restrained in giving a view, or is that a misunderstanding from my side? Chris Jennings: That sounds well described from our perspective. It is obviously for Ministers to set policy, rather than us.
Q Would I also be correct in saying, from looking at your areas of expertise, that you do not have any particular expertise on issues such as physical restraint, the moving of prisoners and using force? Chris Jennings: I have operational responsibility for 15 prisons, so I have some expertise, but I have never been a prison officer and do not have personal experience in that way.
Q Thank you. On the issue of restraint and the use of force, would you accept that the prison service is experienced and very capable when it comes to using force in certain circumstances to manage prisoners and offenders? Chris Jennings: Yes, I would say we are skilled in that.
Q If I were to tell you, and it is true, that the US judicial system has a specific legal power to allow people to be restrained and gagged as part of court proceedings—they have the training, or whatever it might be, to make that a possibility—is there anything to make you believe that we would be incapable of replicating that, even if you might disagree on the policy of it? Chris Jennings: With the appropriate training and resources, I guess it would be possible.