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It could have been any Sir Keir —there are so many of them. I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker. This Government have decided that instead of fighting for Britain’s interests, all they will do is turn around and capitulate.
I will not. The problem is that this case is not just about these islands, or the issues we are debating today; it is about the way in which Governments approach these debates. Just in case we are in any doubt about the changed nature of the use of law against us, it is worth looking at the timeline of these events—which is completely coincidental. We know, because colleagues have mentioned it, that in the 1960s a deal was done, a payment was made, Mauritius accepted it and we moved on. Just after the Falklands war, a legal action was begun, using Mauritius and extending a claim. Just after the Falklands war, the KGB started to fund the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. By the way, it is not me saying this—it is in the Mitrokhin archive; it is all public. Just after the Falklands war, when the Soviets realised that they did not have the military power to defeat NATO, they started experimenting with lawfare, and we have seen them do it again and again. If Members would like to read reports on this issue, Policy Exchange very kindly published a report by me in 2013, and another one in 2015—“Fog of Law” and “Clearing the Fog of Law”, for those who have trouble sleeping. Since then, we have seen lawfare grow. We have seen states using the power of lawyers against the interests of the British people time and again, and the trouble with the capitulation we are seeing today is that it is not just about Diego Garcia, these islands or this interest; it is about the question of whether or not this Government will stand up for the British people, and for our security and our interests. Let me sketch out a hypothetical situation for you, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is possible, although I hope it is not necessary, that British troops will be asked to do some peacekeeping in somewhere like Ukraine. It is possible that they will have to leave at a moment’s notice with the equipment they have, without the ability to re-equip—simply to go with the best that they have. It is possible that countries like Russia will object. We know, because we have seen it happen in the late 1990s and all the way through the 2010s and 2020s, that the Russian Government and others have encouraged legal action against our armed forces. To be honest, Governments have been poor on this issue since 1999—Labour Governments initially, and then Conservative Governments—so it was very welcome that Lord Cameron stopped this, recognising that a different position could be taken. Sadly, this Bill reverses that position. It reverses the presumption that our Government, the British Government, will represent the legal interests of the British people and fight these cases. Instead, they will capitulate. The problem is that capitulation is what got us into this problem in the first place. We can look at the Bici case in Kosovo in the late 1990s, where we settled rather than fought, or at cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we settled rather than debated—rather than going to court and seeking a judgment. Those cases created precedents, and I am afraid that this Government are creating another precedent. I know that the Minister will say that the Governments of the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, and many other places have correctly said that this case has no connection to them. I am delighted that they have said so, and they are right, but they are sadly mistaken in thinking that that means nobody will test that point.
Had the hon. Gentleman been in the Chamber at the beginning of the debate, he would have been welcome to contribute, but given that he has such a passing interest, I am sure he will not mind if I carry on. The reality is that it is not up to the person who is pursued by law as to whether they will be challenged; it is up to the aggressor, and we know who the aggressor is. We know who has been using lawfare against us. We have seen it time and again, and I am afraid that the effect of this Bill is to concede that point. I am fascinated that so many Government Members feel that they had no choice but to conclude the negotiation. Admittedly it was begun mistakenly by a Conservative Administration and, yes, I did write to the then Prime Ministers—both of them—complaining about it and pointing out the error of their ways. I was a Minister, and I wrote about it and complained about it, as did Lord Murray of Blidworth—I think that is right. I am going to get his name wrong, forgive me—that is one for Hansard. We both wrote, because we both thought it was wrong at the time. What can I say? We left office. The civil servants re-presented the same offer and sadly, here we go again. The British people feel so disenchanted at the moment because we see changes of Government and no changes of policy. We simply see a continuation and the Whips’ briefings coming out again. We simply see the pointlessness of democracy in this place, because we might as well not bother being here. The Foreign Office stitched this one up. The Minister cannot even change the judgment, and he has sacrificed everything on the whims of an international process with no regard to the interests of the British people.
Will the Minister give way?
The International Court of Justice ruling is not binding. It is not in law. We did not have to abide by it. Why are we giving away British territory to Mauritius and then renting it back? There was no need for us to do so. Why are we doing it?
The point has been made over and over in this discussion that we are giving away something that we did not have to give away, and are renting it back—and the British taxpayer is paying for it. Last week, I asked the Leader of the House how much this was going to cost. She said, “alongside legislation we publish all the necessary documents, including the costings, which we have been transparent about.”—[Official Report, 4 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 453.] I regard the Minister as a friend, but to say the least, his figures have been opaque. Let me ask one simple question that my right hon. Friend might know the answer to: how much is the United States contributing to this deal?
We have been given an assurance from the Front Bench that no advance notice will need to be given about operational arrangements from the base. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) earlier indicated that there had to be Mauritian Government approval for the construction of facilities. How can we have the operational facilities without the construction of the facilities that back them up?
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his appointment. I had not intended to intervene so early, but I will, given that the record of the previous Government has come up. Can he confirm whether it is the case, as was the position under the previous Government, that we will retain sovereignty after 99 years on a rolling basis? Can he confirm the basis on which he is compensating the Mauritians, because it certainly was not the case that the last Government would have agreed to a remotely similar sum being paid? On this, as on so many other measures, there is an enormous gap between the negotiating position set out under the last Government and the total capitulation by Labour when they came into office.
The Minister invites me to respond to him. He needs to appreciate that there is an enormous difference between a tough negotiating position in the British national interest and the capitulation of the Government’s deal.
I welcome the Minister to the world of “neither confirm nor deny”, though I fear it may cramp his inimitable style somewhat. Does he accept that there are broadly three categories of hacker? There are the show-offs, who are aiming to boost their egos in the online world; the wreckers, who are usually working on behalf of hostile countries or political ideologies; and the extortionists to whom he referred earlier, who are out to blackmail people and relieve them of large amounts of money. In every case, though, there is always the anxiety that people’s personal data is going to be compromised and publicised. To that end, is the Minister really satisfied that so many Government services that deal with personal data—the latest being His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs—insist that people go online to supply that data to Government?
Will the hon. Member give way?
Admiral Lord West has been referred to twice so far in the debate. My right hon. Friend may be unaware that Admiral Lord West had a letter published in the national press on 28 May in which he talked about the “disgraceful decision to hand over ownership of the Chagos archipelago”. He added: “I do not accept that the move is ‘absolutely vital for our defence and intelligence’, as the Prime Minister claims.” I wonder what Government Back Benchers who have been slavishly reading their scripts make of that from someone of that calibre—a former director of Defence Intelligence.
rose—
If this means that we do not have to inform Mauritius in advance of a direct armed attack from the base, presumably it means that we have to inform it as soon as possible after such an attack. If such an attack were an overt attack, Mauritius would presumably know about it already because everyone would have seen it, so this rather suggests that we might have to inform it if there had been some sort of covert attack that other people had not seen and that it would otherwise not know about. Is that a satisfactory situation?
My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) is right, but the existing position goes even further. Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of the written answer from the Government on 7 February this year: “Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum.”?
It is a pleasure to take part in the debate. The Foreign Affairs Committee, on which I sit—I welcome two of my Labour colleagues from the Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) to the debate—has had the opportunity to question the Minister, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), although I was not entirely persuaded by some of his answers. That is not to say that the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has other powers, is not an appropriate body for looking at some aspects—indeed, the Defence Committee should also do so. The one thing that I think everybody agrees on is the importance of Diego Garcia and the Chagos islands to the United Kingdom. My right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) quoted Admiral Lord West, his former boss—he was, of course, a Minister in the last Labour Government and the security adviser to the Prime Minister—who said: “It is no exaggeration to say that Diego Garcia—the largest of the Chagos Islands—hosts the most strategically important US air and logistics base in the Indian Ocean and is vital to the defence of the UK and our allies.” I have no doubt that Labour Members share that sentiment, but perhaps not his later comment, which was: “An agreement with Mauritius to surrender sovereignty over the Chagos Islands threatens to undermine core British security interests, and those of key allies, most notably the United States.” We do need to listen to the warning he gave.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right—
If I might just answer my hon. Friend before doing so. Admiral Lord West has immense experience and knowledge. If the Defence Committee should decide to look at this, it might well ask him to give evidence on the basis of his considerable experience in the area.
I will come on to UNCLOS. As the hon. Member knows, it is an organisation that has expressed a view, but not one that is binding on the United Kingdom. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Attorney General, set out very clearly the various international opinions that have been expressed but which are not binding or mandatory for the United Kingdom to follow. That is critical to this debate.
I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman specifically on that issue, but I can tell him that it has been absolutely clear that whatever the UNCLOS opinion is, it is not binding on this country. We will read with interest its view, but it is not one that we are necessarily required to follow. The existing position has safeguarded the interests of this country for a very long period, so the first question one is required to ask is: why are we changing a guaranteed security status for this country by handing over the sovereignty of Diego Garcia? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam has said, it is based on opinions that have been expressed but not ones that we are required to follow. As the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) said, I understand that the original linkage of the Chagos islands to Mauritius that took place was regarded as a matter of administrative convenience. However, they are actually 1,250 miles apart. On that basis, when the United Kingdom agreed to the independence of Mauritius, it was separated from the Chagos islands. There was no suggestion at that time that the two should be linked and that the islands be given over to Mauritius, which, despite the linkage, had no claim and no involvement in their running.
It had already been rolled back. The hon. Gentleman is right that the last Government began discussions because Mauritius expressed a view. However, that was on the basis that a mutually beneficial arrangement could be reached. It was concluded that such an agreement could not be reached, and on that basis the last Government ceased the negotiations. It is not a question of their being rolled back; it was this Government who chose to reopen negotiations that had been closed down by the previous Government. I come back to the international judgments. The other one cited by Ministers on the Government Front Bench early on in the discussion, when this issue was first raised, was the risk to access to electromagnetic spectrum as a result of the ITU potentially reaching a judgment that might be based on the non-binding judgment expressed by the ICJ. There is no actual evidence that it was going to do that, but it was possible that it might, and for that reason the Government expressed the view that this was important. I would point out that the ITU has no ability to determine the use of spectrum. The Minister, in answering a written parliamentary question in February this year, made it clear that the allocation of spectrum was a matter for sovereign states. The ITU is a sort of gentleman’s club where everyone gets together to discuss these matters, but it is not able to hand over the right to the use of spectrum from one country to another. It is also worth noting that the ITU has, over the years, been subject to considerable pressure from China, which had a secretary general of the ITU. I recall from my time dealing with issues around the ITU the real concern about how the Chinese were seeking to use the ITU, so in my view it is a good thing that the ITU does not have the power to allocate spectrum. There are also serious strategic concerns that the Government have not yet properly addressed. As has already been mentioned, an element of the agreement involves a requirement for us to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base. When the Minister gave evidence to the Committee, I pressed him on whether that would require advance notification—
He is nodding. He gave me a very firm assurance that that was not the case. That is of some reassurance, but it does not go far enough. The fact that we are no longer able to carry out actions from our own base without then having to notify Mauritius, and presumably take note of any objection it has, represents a limitation that could well affect decisions as to where to deploy assets.
I shall give way to my right hon. Friend, who is an expert on these matters.
My right hon. Friend makes a fair point. A requirement for us to tell the Mauritians what has been happening from the base is exactly what might influence decisions as to its use for operations of the kind he describes. The Minister gave evidence to the Committee on this point just a few days, I think, after the Americans had launched their attack on Iran, which did not involve Diego Garcia. That was something I raised with the Minister.
I understand that that is part of the treaty, but I hope that when the Minister winds up, he will address the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) that the requirement to “expeditiously inform” Mauritius, even after an operation, presumably means that we must do so as soon as possible, and that that will presumably apply to whatever kind of operation has taken place using the base. Perhaps he could tell us whether that might compromise decisions about the use of the base. The other aspect I raised with the Minister when he was in front of the Committee was Mauritius being a signatory of the Pelindaba treaty. The Pelindaba treaty states that signatories will not have nuclear weapons on their soil. Britain, the UK, is not a signatory of it, but, as I say, Mauritius is. Again, the Minister told the Committee that there was no way in which anything in the agreement would affect the operational use of the base, but he would not go further and comment specifically on the aspects of potentially nuclear weapons on the Diego Garcia base. That is something of real concern, and I hope the Minister might say a little more about that conflict between his assurance and Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty, which specifically says that there should not be nuclear weapons held on the sovereign territory of signatories. I turn to the cost of the treaty to the UK. We are told that there is some disagreement about the precise figure. I have to say that even £3.5 billion seems pretty large to me, let alone £35 billion, which is universally believed on the Opposition side to be a more accurate figure. It has been suggested, nevertheless, that this is a relatively small amount of money and it is a good deal. I recall that when this was first suggested, a different Mauritian Government were in power. The Prime Minister of Mauritius at that time had signed a deal, which the current Prime Minister of Mauritius described as a terrible deal and that as soon as he was elected, he would reopen the whole discussion. It certainly appears that he was successful in doing so: the sum that has now been agreed is, the Mauritian Prime Minister has told us, considerably bigger than his predecessor had originally agreed, and this was a great success of the new Prime Minister of Mauritius that he managed to squeeze even more money out of the British Government. That does beg the question: at what point does it stop being a good deal? The impression given is that the British Government were so keen to sign up to this deal, they basically have signed away to almost any sum advanced by Mauritius. As one or two of my hon. Friends have made clear, that will be a difficult message to sell on the doorstep at a time when the Government are having to make significant savings and to raise taxes. In particular, I am concerned—the Minister will understand why—about the impact on the Foreign Office budget, because the Foreign Office suffered the biggest cuts of any Whitehall Department in the last spending round. It is already unclear about how those savings will be met, and there is speculation that the budgets of the British Council or the World Service, or our representation in embassies around the world, will be reduced. Despite those pressures and potentially very damaging cuts to Foreign Office expenditure, the Foreign Office appears to be expected to meet part of this bill. The Minister was unable to tell the Committee how the bill would be divided up between the Foreign Office budget and the Ministry of Defence budget. Perhaps that is something else that he might say a little more about when he winds up. I will also touch on the other aspect of the consequences of this deal: the impact on the environment, which has been referred to by one or two Members. I pay tribute to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who is, I think it fair to say, engaged in other projects at the moment. She was assiduous in raising with the Minister her concern about the treaty’s impact on an incredibly important marine environment—that is recognised around the world. She wrote to the Minister, as he will be aware, and said: “My principal concern is that there is now no funding mechanism in place to ensure Mauritius will properly resource marine protection in the Chagos Archipelago… Without any dedicated funding mechanism…there is nothing to ensure that this protection will continue other than the on-going willingness of the Mauritian Government to allocate resource”. As has been observed, the archipelago is 1,250 miles away from Mauritius, and we are not entirely convinced that that willingness in Mauritius, on which the Government appear to be pinning their hopes, exists. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the presence of the Chagossians in the Public Gallery. They have been very badly treated over years, and it is of concern to me that they appear to have had virtually no input in this agreement, and that there has been no consultation with them. I know that a contact group is being established in the Foreign Office, but there is some scepticism about whether it has ever met, and about how many staff will be allocated to it. Perhaps the Minister might give details in his reply. [Interruption.] I am pleased to hear him say that it met last week. I am grateful to the Government for answering questions so far, but an awful lot remain, and the answers that I have heard have failed to convince me that this treaty is in the economic, strategic and environmental interests of this country or the Chagos islands.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
I am extremely grateful to the former Attorney General for giving way. He is right to say that the matter could have been—and still could be, as I think he will also want to confirm—brought to our Committee. If, even at this late juncture, an overture were made to our Committee—clearly, it would have to be discussed at Committee—it would be perfectly possible for the Government to set out in those terms the advice they received that legitimises the position that they have taken.
Perhaps I can invite my hon. Friend to be helpful to the Minister. He clearly holds him in some regard, and he is right that he has got himself into something of a mess. By far the best way for the Government to proceed from hereon would be to make much more available either to this House or, as the former Attorney General, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) suggested, to the Intelligence and Security Committee. That would clarify the terms of this trade—why it happened and the assessments that were made that led up to it—in a way that the House would be able to either legitimise what the Minister claims or refute it. A lack of transparency is half the Minister’s problem.
Will the hon. Gentleman allow an intervention?
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
The hon. Gentleman is right. Questions about why the negotiations started have been raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), given that the national interest is the primary concern of all responsible Governments and could easily be compromised by this deal, but will the hon. Gentleman deal with this point? It has been made absolutely crystal clear in this debate that Lord Cameron, when he became Foreign Secretary, ended those negotiations. Lord Cameron is a man of immense experience, who has probably negotiated at a level beyond anyone present in this Chamber. He would have certainly taken legal advice within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office before he closed those negotiations. Why does the hon. Gentleman think that Lord Cameron closed them down, and why does he think that this Government reopened them?
The critical point here is that national security and the national interest are inseparable. Both depend on the sovereignty of this nation and the primacy of this Parliament, so although international treaties and agreements matter, of course, they can never matter more than that primacy. We cannot subcontract the national interest to an overseas place that in years to come might want to defend that interest, or might not, in exactly the way that my hon. Friend is describing.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I welcome the Minister to his new responsibilities, and on behalf of the many JLR employees in my constituency, welcome anything the Government can and will do to get JLR back to business as usual as soon as possible. On our broader defences, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 is 35 years old, and there are many who believe that its provisions impede the work of cyber-security professionals almost as much as, if not more than, cyber-criminals. Will he take this incident as an incentive to look again at the provisions of that Act, and to update it, as we need to, to make sure that cyber-security professionals can help companies such as JLR to deal with incidents just like this one?
It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb). I admire his principles and his persistence in his advocacy for his Chagossian constituents, and I know that he would recognise that his predecessor did the same. There is no dispute that Diego Garcia is crucial to the UK’s security and that of its allies; that is not something we are arguing about. I do not think—although I will be corrected if I am wrong—that it is the Government’s position that, in terms of the day-to-day practicalities of operating the Diego Garcia base, this new arrangement whereby we no longer have sovereignty over Diego Garcia but will continue to administer it, at least for 99 years, is better than what we have now. Rather, it is a more secure arrangement because of what has been described as the legal uncertainty surrounding our sovereignty over it. I see the Minister nodding, and I am grateful for that.
I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, and it is reinforced by the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) in reading from the agreement as to how any disputes are resolved. But I want to focus on the position now and the legal justification that the Government have already deployed for the arrangement that they seek to make. My hon. Friend is right that there will be further problems down the road, but there are problems already. It seems to me that if the position the Government take is as I have set it out and as the Minister accepts that it is, that must be right because it would surely be difficult to argue that, were it not for that legal uncertainty, renting Diego Garcia back from someone else would be better than owning it from a security point of view. So for the Government to persuade us in this House, and indeed the country as a whole, that this is a good deal for Britain, everything turns on the question of legal uncertainty, which Ministers have often referred to as the reason why the treaty, and therefore the Bill, are necessary. Having spent four years as Attorney General, I am quite familiar with legal uncertainty—there is a lot of it about in Government. It is, I am afraid, invariably the case that whenever a decision is made in Government, someone disagrees with it, and some of those who disagree will be prepared to go to a court and challenge the validity of that decision. Until the court—sometimes until the Supreme Court—has resolved the matter, there can fairly be said to be legal uncertainty about it. Legal uncertainty hangs around Government like the clouds, and it cannot be allowed to paralyse a Government. Nor should that sort of atmospheric legal uncertainty be the only cause of a decision as significant as that which this Government are now making to give up sovereignty over a vital military facility. There must be something more substantive—more tangible—to the legal uncertainty to which Ministers have referred. Many of us have tried to find out what exactly that is, but with very limited success. Given that, as far as I can tell, the legal uncertainty that is being talked about constitutes the entirety of the burning platform on which the Government rely to justify the Bill and the treaty, surely this House, before we approve either, must be given a proper and clear explanation of precisely what legal jeopardy the Government are acting in response to. In pursuit of that, it is worth having a look at the explanations that Ministers have given so far. Let us start with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), who of course is now the Deputy Prime Minister. He made a statement on the British Indian Ocean Territory negotiations on 7 October last year. He told the House that the issue of contested sovereignty over Diego Garcia was becoming more acute, and that “A binding judgment against the UK seemed inevitable”.—[Official Report, 7 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 45.] Many of us have been asking where that binding judgment might come from. The only court that had by then been mentioned was the International Court of Justice, which had issued an advisory opinion on sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. Indeed, on this subject it could only have been an advisory decision, because the UK accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by declarations dated 22 February 2017—I was Attorney General at the time. Those declarations made it clear that the UK did not, however, accept that compulsory jurisdiction in relation to “any dispute with a Government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”. That involves and includes Mauritius, so any dispute with Mauritius before the ICJ could not result in a binding judgment against the United Kingdom. That point has been put to Ministers and, as far as I know, they have not dissented from that analysis. If the ICJ could not make the binding judgment that the former Foreign Secretary told us was inevitable, which other court might? On that, again, I am afraid that we have not had clarity. On 13 November last year, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)—who I see has the misfortune of having to defend this position once again today—answered an urgent question on the Chagos Islands. He said: “International courts were reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago.”—[Official Report, 13 November 2024; Vol. 756, c. 793.] The Minister did not at that point say which courts, but I have done some digging, and I think I am supported in my assumption by what the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said in opening this debate. I think that he may have been referring to a determination made in January 2021 by the special chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea when considering a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. Tragically, I do not have time to go into the fascinating detail of that case, but in essence it was a dispute about the delimitation of maritime territory between those two states. The Maldives argued that the special chamber could not determine the case in question because there was an ongoing dispute about the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands between Mauritius and the UK. The special chamber decided, however, that it could treat Mauritius as the coastal state in the dispute before it, because of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the matter, which it said had legal effect. If that ITLOS case is what the Government are relying on, I think there are a few problems: first, the UK was not a party to that case; and secondly, the ITLOS chamber was seemingly basing its decision on that of the ICJ, which, as I have already indicated, could not make a binding ruling on the matter. I am not expecting the House, much less the Government, to accept my opinion on this, but it seems to me that, at the very least, the UK would have the basis of a decent legal argument here. It does not seem to be that this ITLOS decision demonstrates that there was no further hope for UK claims of sovereignty over Diego Garcia. After a bit more prodding, the Government’s argument moves on and introduces the issue of access to the electromagnetic spectrum. On 5 February this year, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered yet another urgent question on the subject.
I will give my right hon. Friend a lawyer’s favourite answer to any question: “It’s complicated.” But here is the point: the only legal analysis being offered here—the only explanation—comes from the Opposition Benches. The Government are not giving us anything. If he is wrong in what he says, we need to hear why from the Minister, but we are not and that is what troubles me.
If the hon. Gentleman is patient, I promise that I will come to that, but I wish to deal in a logical order with what Ministers have themselves said to justify their actions. On 5 February, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered another urgent question. In answer to my plea to give us more clarity on exactly what legal basis the Government were acting on, he said: “We currently have unrestricted and sole access to the electromagnetic spectrum, which is used to communicate with satellites and which is guaranteed and governed by the International Telecommunication Union, a United Nations body based in Geneva. If we lose it we can still communicate, but so can others.”—[Official Report, 5 February 2025; Vol. 761, c. 760.] I understand the point that he was making, but he did not explain how that issue might lead to a binding court ruling against the UK, and he did not even take a second opportunity to do so when asked about it again by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp)—those interested can find that answer in column 762. Luckily, however, my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary called a debate on this subject in Opposition time on 26 February, which was answered by the then Minister of State, the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds). She repeated: “Without a negotiated solution with Mauritius, it would pursue its legal campaign…That would lead to an inevitable, legally binding judgment,”. She was then interrupted, but went on to say that “in that kind of situation”— presumably that is the delivery of a binding judgment against the UK— “we would unfortunately see international organisations following that determination, such as the International Telecommunication Union.” —[Official Report, 26 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 874.] If we put all those ministerial utterances together, we are going round in circles. The Government say that they have to act because of the inevitability of a binding court judgment against the UK. They mention the ICJ, but the ICJ cannot make a binding judgment against the UK on this. They hint at ITLOS cases, but those refer to ICJ decisions. The Government then say that they are worried about the actions of the International Telecommunication Union, but when pressed that seems to mean actions that would follow a binding court judgment. We are back to square one.
My right hon. Friend makes an important point, which I know he has made before. I repeat the point I made earlier: we are simply not getting from the Government an adequate rebuttal of these points, and we need to have that. If the Government have a good answer to what he and my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) have said, Second Reading of the Bill is the moment for the Government to deliver that explanation. We are all still waiting.
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend, and perhaps I should refine my argument. It is not just that the Government are not answering the questions; it is that when they do answer the questions, they undermine their own argument. It is worse than we thought. We are not getting clarity from the Government about what would be the legal judgment that they themselves have relied on as almost the entire basis for their actions, and this really matters. The Government owe us a proper explanation. I am prepared to concede—I hope the Minister will accept that I am a fair-minded person—that there may be a persuasive argument that the Government could make about which court and which circumstances would deliver the kind of judgment that makes this action inevitable and necessary, but I have waited a long time to hear it, and I am still waiting. I hope that when the Minister stands to sum up the debate he will give us that answer, because the House of Commons deserves to hear it.