5,731 spoken contributions under 12 words (interjections such as “Will the hon. Member give way?”) are hidden. Show them

1. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Public Accounts Committee

   We now come to the Select Committee statement on behalf of the Public Accounts Committee. The hon. Member for Shipley (Anna Dixon) will speak for up to 10 minutes, during which no interventions may be taken. At the conclusion of her statement, I will call Members to put questions on the subject of the statement. These should be brief questions, not speeches. I emphasise that questions should be directed to the Select Committee member, not the Minister. Front Benchers may take part in questioning.

   Hansard source
2. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Points of Order

   I understand that this issue is important to the hon. Lady, but she also knows, because of her experience, that it is not a matter for the Chair. She has most definitely got her point on the record, and no doubt those on the Treasury Front Bench will have noted it and will ensure that the right Department hears of it.

   Hansard source
3. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

   Points of Order

   The hon. Lady has raised an important issue, but as she is far more experienced than even I am, she knows that this is not a matter for the Chair. If she wishes to pursue it, she can raise it with those in charge of the independent complaints and grievance scheme, but I do not wish to become involved in matters that do not involve the Chair.

   Hansard source
4. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

   Probation Early Release: Residential Properties

   17. What steps he has taken to ensure the equitable regional distribution of residential properties used by the Probation Service during the early release scheme.

   Hansard source
5. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

   Probation Early Release: Residential Properties

   Properties such as rundown B&Bs have long been used as houses in multiple occupation for services such as probation, and councils in large metropolitan areas use them for adult and children’s social services, effectively as a dumping ground. This is a cross-Government problem that has been going on over some time. Will the Minister assure me that through the early release scheme they will not add to problems such as those in Blackpool, where the concentration of HMOs used by multiple services creates transient populations?

   Hansard source
6. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

   Topical Questions

   I previously put it to the Prisons Minister in one of these sessions that anyone who fails a drug test on arrival in an open prison like Kirkham does not belong there and should be sent back to a more secure prison. The Minister said they were concerned but could not agree to that. Has the Department had any more thoughts on at least consequences for failing a drug test on arrival at an open prison?

   Hansard source
7. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

   Tourism: Overnight Visitor Levy

   Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. First we had a jobs tax that reduced the number of jobs in the economy, then we had a schools tax that reduced the number of children in independent schools, and then we had a farm tax that reduced the number of family farms. Given that correlation, have the Minister and the Government learned anything from this socialist tax-addicted way in which they are governing the country, and will the tourism tax do anything other than reduce tourism?

   Hansard source
8. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mr Andrew Snowden

   Saudi East-West Oil Pipeline

   The Minister seems confused about why the word socialism would be used in a negative context. It has something to do with the fact that every country that socialism touches it destroys, and we have a prime example here. Perhaps the Minister will take his head out of the sand and look at my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South (Douglas Lumsden), who is sat on the Conservative Benches off the back of a stunning by-election win that was a referendum on the North sea oil and gas issue. That shows the complete lack of confidence the industry has in the SNP in Scotland and in Labour here. It is time to drill, baby, drill.

   Hansard source
9. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mike Wood

   Sepsis Awareness Month

   I beg to move, That this House has considered World Sepsis Awareness Month. As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on sepsis, I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this debate. To the best of my knowledge, this is the very first debate in the House of Commons Chamber dedicated to sepsis. In the past, this devastating condition has been discussed only in Westminster Hall debates or raised through brief interventions and questions. Having sepsis debated on the Floor of the main Chamber during Sepsis Awareness Month is a major milestone, not only for Parliament but for the clinicians, charities and bereaved families across the country who have campaigned tirelessly to bring this condition out of the shadows. I would also like to thank the co-sponsors of this debate: the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson), who cannot be here this afternoon but who led an important Westminster Hall debate on this subject two years ago, and the hon. Member for Dartford (Jim Dickson), vice-chair of the APPG. Sepsis strikes indiscriminately, ruthlessly and with terrifying speed, without regard for background, class or, indeed, political allegiance. It is vital that we all stand united in our determination to tackle this deadly condition. It is a challenge that completely transcends party politics. On Sunday, communities across the world marked World Sepsis Day. The international theme for this year could not be more apt: “Invest in Sepsis—Save Lives.” The World Health Organisation recognises sepsis as one of the leading causes of death and disability globally, estimating that sepsis-related illnesses account for one in every five deaths worldwide. In the United Kingdom, NHS England has made it clear that sepsis claims more lives each year than lung cancer and represents the second biggest killer in our hospitals after cardiovascular disease. Every single year, an estimated 245,000 people in the UK develop sepsis and, tragically, more than 48,000 lose their lives. That is a higher annual death toll than bowel, breast and prostate cancers combined. Behind every one of those figures is a family left grieving and asking the same agonising question: what if? What if the symptoms had been recognised an hour earlier? What if antibiotics had been administered sooner? What if someone had simply asked, “Could it be sepsis?”? Madam Deputy Speaker, as you know, I do not approach this debate purely as a parliamentarian dispassionately analysing policy responses to one of the leading causes of avoidable death. I stand in this Chamber today because almost a decade ago, by the grace of God and the extraordinary skill and care of NHS staff, my life was saved. In January 2017, I was a relatively fit and active 40-year-old Member of Parliament. I had developed what I assumed was merely a winter infection. Like many people would, I assumed that I could push through it, take some paracetamol and carry on working. I travelled out to Strasbourg to take part in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Sunday evening, but within days my condition collapsed. An ordinary throat infection triggered a catastrophic immune response. My body, in attempting to fight the infection, began attacking its own tissues and organs. By Thursday, after seeing a French GP, I flew back to Britain. On Friday, I attended the official launch of the local enterprise zone that I had campaigned hard for in my constituency, but as soon as I arrived there I was so ill that I had to rest in the back room. On Saturday morning, I got out of bed, started putting my suit on over my pyjamas and told my wife Laura that I had to come down to Westminster to vote. Like many in politics, my behaviour can at times appear to some people to be a little idiosyncratic; fortunately, Laura realised that, even for a Member of Parliament, that was not entirely normal behaviour. Laura rushed me to Russells Hall hospital in Dudley, where my blood pressure plummeted into septic shock and my organs began shutting down. My life was hanging by a thread. The medical team had to place me in a medically induced coma. Doctors told my family that my chances of pulling through were no better than one in 10. For 11 days, I lay in intensive care on life support—or, as my family sometimes remind me, I slept through the difficult bits. When I did finally wake up, my muscles had wasted away—I could barely lift my arms, let alone stand or walk—but it could easily have been so much worse. What if Laura had left me to get some rest that Saturday morning while she took our daughter to her dance class? Above all, what if the nurse who examined me at the accident and emergency department had not had the insight to check whether the symptoms, which could easily have been mistaken for other illnesses such as flu or meningitis, might be sepsis? I owe a debt of gratitude to the doctors, intensive care nurses and other staff at Russells Hall hospital that I can never repay, but as long as I have the honour of serving in this House, I will use my voice to fight for sepsis patients and their families. There is a common misconception that sepsis is primarily the result of hospital-acquired infection, but the evidence demonstrates the exact opposite. A major 2024 population study led by Professor van Staa, analysing linked primary care and hospital data in England, showed that the vast majority of sepsis cases are community acquired, developing in homes, workplaces and local communities long before a patient reaches an acute hospital bed. That research also uncovered deep health inequalities in sepsis risk. The risk of developing sepsis is significantly heightened by socioeconomic deprivation, by frailty, by being housebound and by chronic conditions such as cancer, diabetes and learning disabilities. Exposure to antibiotics in the previous two months was also identified as a strong risk factor. While ethnicity was not an independent biological factor, black and Asian individuals suffer from a higher prevalence of predisposing conditions including diabetes, chronic liver disease and severe anaemia, which puts them at a greater risk, so tackling sepsis is not merely a technical, clinical issue but a fundamental challenge of health inequality and community prevention. One of the most critical clinical lessons learned in recent years is the direct link between viral infections and sepsis. For decades, the public and the medical community viewed sepsis almost exclusively as a bacterial complication, but the covid-19 pandemic demonstrated that viral infections can trigger the exact same catastrophic septic response. The overwhelming cytokine storms, microvascular clotting and rapid progression to acute respiratory distress syndrome and multi-organ failure seen in covid intensive care units are classic manifestations of viral sepsis. It is thought by many experts in the field that the vast majority of covid deaths were a direct result of septic reactions. Sepsis is not defined by the pathogen; it is defined by the body’s life-threatening immune reaction to any severe infection, whether bacterial, viral or fungal. That reality extends directly into long-term recovery: millions who had covid-19 are still living with long covid. Sepsis survivors have known that reality for generations under the name of post-sepsis syndrome. In my case, it is little more than some nerve damage and tiredness, even a decade later, but for many the symptoms are more severe. Up to 50% of sepsis survivors suffer prolonged physical, cognitive and psychological impairments from debilitating fatigue and cognitive brain fog to severe muscle weakness and post-traumatic stress disorder. The clinical insights gained from viral sepsis during the pandemic must now be used to build integrated recovery pathways for all sepsis survivors. To curb preventable deaths, a health system must act decisively in several areas; in the interests of time, I will go through just four. First, the system must ensure consistent rapid recognition. Time is the single most decisive factor in sepsis survival. Clinical research shows that administering appropriate antibiotics within the first hour of a patient presenting to an emergency department with sepsis reduces the risk of death by a full one third compared with delayed treatment. Secondly, the system must ensure that where sepsis is suspected, appropriate clinical escalation pathways are in place. Where sepsis is suspected, early warning systems such as the national early warning score 2, or NEWS2, have saved countless lives, and the ongoing roll-out of Martha’s rule across NHS trusts, which has already saved thousands of lives, is vital in ensuring that patients and loved ones can trigger an immediate independent critical review when they sense deterioration. Thirdly, we must take advantage of innovation in rapid diagnostics. We know that administering broad-spectrum antibiotics within the golden hour that I spoke of massively increases survival rates, but clinicians often face the dilemma of judging whether that is compatible with responsible antimicrobial stewardship. Deploying rapid molecular diagnostics, bedside biomarker technologies and wearable continuous physiological monitors can remove that guesswork, and provide targeted care before septic shock takes hold and it can be too late. Fourthly, although Britain has in many ways led the way in developing and enhancing sepsis care and treatment, we must be open to learning from established international models and practices. Sweden utilises standard sepsis alerts to prioritise patients at triage, and implements mandatory post-discharge telephone follow-ups. France, where I was when I was taken ill, has since introduced an integrated national sepsis plan spanning pre-hospital recognition, emergency pathways and structured rehabilitation to help patients return to employment. Australia established a national sepsis clinical care standard built around seven quality statements, ensuring end-to-end consistency from triage through to survivorship. The publication in July of the sepsis modern service framework by NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care is an important step towards doing that and learning the lessons from around the world; I warmly welcome it. The framework is one of the first to be published under the 10-year health plan. Its headline goal, “to reduce deaths, severe complications and long-term harm from sepsis…by at least 25% by 2035” is a target that every member of this House can endorse.

   Hansard source
10. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mike Wood

    Sepsis Awareness Month

    The hon. Lady makes a really important point. We know how these conditions can come round in a cycle. In order to break that cycle, we will need multiple years of vaccination. The modern service framework contains a number of vital commitments, but I particularly welcome: action 4 on improving the audit and feedback of sepsis-related clinical data across trusts; action 5 on updating training for NHS staff, social care workers and unpaid carers; action 9 on optimising care pathways and expanding access to rapid diagnostics and specialist advice; action 11 on standardising digital specifications for early warning systems such as NEWS2; and action 12 on reviewing and addressing capacity gaps in critical and enhanced care. A strategy on paper will not be enough to save a deteriorating patient on a cold winter weekend in an overcrowded emergency department. In the other place, my noble friend and our former colleague Lord Mackinlay of Richborough, who has spoken with enormous courage about his own life-altering encounter with sepsis, has repeatedly tabled written questions seeking clarity on how this framework will be delivered. Regrettably, the answers provided by Ministers in the Lords to date have been rather generic and vague, and lacking in operational detail. We cannot accept boilerplate responses on a condition that kills 48,000 people each year, so I have two direct questions that I hope the Minister will answer in her response to today’s debate. First, what are the specific milestone-driven timelines for the delivery of each of the actions set out in the modern service framework, and when will trusts and integrated care boards be expected to have these standardised pathways fully operational? Secondly, can the Minister assure the House that the Department of Health and Social Care is prepared to commit the dedicated investment required to make this framework work? When we call for investment, we must be clear that funding sepsis care is not an open-ended cost. It is one of the most cost-effective investments that the Department can make. Sepsis currently places an enormous financial burden on the national health service and the wider economy. Too often, cases of missed or delayed diagnosis and treatment result in weeks of high-cost intensive care unit admissions, in emergency readmissions due to incomplete recovery, in complex surgical interventions including amputations requiring lifelong prosthetic and social care support, or in the permanent loss of working-age adults from the workforce. Investing in rapid bedside diagnostics, digital early warning systems, specialist outreach teams and structured post-sepsis rehabilitation can dramatically reduce the lengths of stay in intensive care, lower readmission rates and keep people in work. Early intervention is not only clinically imperative; it is economically sound, and the theme “Invest in sepsis—save lives” is a call for smart preventive healthcare investment.

    Hansard source
11. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mike Wood

    Sepsis Awareness Month

    Absolutely. Of course, some infections are almost unavoidable, but where infections such as UTIs can clearly be reduced with the right care and precautions, we must do everything we can to reduce those risks. Every Member in this Chamber has constituents whose lives have been permanently transformed by sepsis. Some Members have been directly impacted or have watched as close family and friends have encountered sepsis. We know the speed with which it strikes, but we also know that with early detection, immediate treatment and high quality critical care, thousands of lives can be saved. We have the clinical evidence and we have the modern service framework. What we now need is clear delivery timelines, rigorous parliamentary accountability and the necessary financial backing to make this ambition a reality. If the Minister can deliver this and provide the resources and tools that the NHS needs to implement it, the modern service framework truly can be a turning point in the fight against this silent killer and the battle to save thousands of lives.

    Hansard source
12. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Mike Wood

    Sepsis Awareness Month

    I thank all hon. Members who contributed to the debate. The hon. Member for Dartford (Jim Dickson) spoke movingly about his constituent John. I was particularly pleased to hear how well he is now doing since recovering and about the support his family received from the community—in particular the work that Dartford working men’s club is doing in the community. If we are to really increase awareness so that people understand both the science and the risks of sepsis, it cannot be left to the NHS alone. It really does need to be a full community effort, so it is great to hear that the working men’s club is taking a lead. He also, rightly, spoke about the importance of data. Part of the problem is inconsistency in reporting sepsis cases. That makes it so difficult to have a meaningful figure for the number of cases, deaths and serious disabilities as a result of sepsis. We really need more consistency in the way that is coded, as well as a guide to best practice. I join the Minister in offering my condolences to the hon. Member for Carlisle (Ms Minns) on the sad loss of her mother; it must have been an unbearably difficult time. She also spoke about her constituent Kelly, and gave us the very important message that different people experience sepsis very differently, both in terms of outcomes and the lasting impact, as well as the nature of their sepsis. We heard important interventions from the hon. Members for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade), for Stoke-on-Trent South (Dr Gardner) and for Wolverhampton North East (Sureena Brackenridge). The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Winchester (Dr Chambers), referred to the force of nature that is Ron Daniels, who has done so much to push sepsis up the public agenda, and to change the way that the NHS understands and responds to sepsis. We all owe him a huge debt. The shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), spoke about how notoriously difficult sepsis is to diagnose, and about the issues around prenatal strep and the additional work that needs to be done in both understanding and responding to the sepsis that arises. I thank the Minister for the kind words she offered to me, and for the spirit of her response, particularly around the implementation plan and funding. She rightly referred to Martha’s rule, and the importance of ensuring that families, who know their children better than anyone else, are allowed to insist on an independent second opinion if they feel that there has been a deterioration in condition. I will briefly thank the many campaigners who have worked so hard on this issue—often because, sadly, they or a member of their family has been affected. They are too numerous to name, but I will mention the incredible work done by Harry Redknapp, who works tirelessly, and often without an awful lot of publicity and credit, to raise awareness of sepsis following his wife Sandra’s illness—I think he was in the jungle on “I’m a Celebrity...Get Me Out of Here!” when she was taken ill. Harry does so much incredible work voluntarily. Researchers and charities do incredible work, including Sepsis Research, and particularly the UK Sepsis Trust—both Ron Daniels and Sarah Hamilton-Fairley have helped to keep the issue rising to the level of importance it deserves. I thank all Members for the valuable contributions they have made today, and I look forward to holding the Minister to account as she delivers on the modern service framework. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered World Sepsis Awareness Month.

    Hansard source
13. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q I have two questions, if I may. Dr Prescott, if the test of the Bill is whether it results in fewer arrivals or more removals, what do you think is missing from it? Secondly, Ms Lyons, the Government say that last-minute modern slavery claims have frustrated removals. Do you accept that that is an abuse of the system? If you do not support the Government’s solution to that issue, what do you think the solution is? Dr Prescott: Obviously, reducing the number of irregular arrivals would be welcome for all concerned, but I gather that this particular session is looking specifically at the modern slavery components. We have to remember that only a relatively small proportion of small boat arrival modern slavery claimants are actually victims of modern slavery. A lot of victims of modern slavery do come here—sometimes legally, sometimes under false pretences. I am not necessarily sure that tying a reduction in small boat arrivals to modern slavery is necessarily a positive thing; I think you are slightly confusing two different issues. Eleanor Lyons: I think there are already safeguards in place to stop any misuse of the system. There is a high evidential threshold to be recognised and acknowledged as a victim of modern slavery. There are the reasonable ground and conclusive ground stages, and you cannot self-refer to be a victim—you have to be spotted by a designated first responder organisation. Multiple Select Committees over the years have found no evidence of a widespread misuse of the system. The latest Home Office data that has been provided is only for those on high-risk deportation flights, who represent less than 2% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery identified in this country last year. I do not think you need new legislative solutions to deal with any of those challenges; the Home Office already has the powers it needs if it wants to challenge them and tackle them. I remind the Committee that the largest group of victims in this country are UK nationals. All the changes in the Bill relating to questioning victims’ credibility if they take a long time to come forward, have inconsistencies in their account due to trauma, or have similar exploitative experiences to others—which they normally do, because organised crime groups exploit people in similar ways—mean they will also have their credibility questioned as UK nationals. For me, that undoes years of work by safeguarding professionals in understanding how victims feel scared to come forward and talk about their exploitation.

    Hansard source
14. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q To get the result that we want—tackling that abuse—what else should the Home Office be doing in that space? If this is not a solution, what would you put forward as an alternative, if that abuse does exist? Eleanor Lyons: If you took the premise that there is an issue with the system, I would focus on better training and support for first responder organisations so that they are good at doing referrals in the first place. There is a real mix in terms of how qualified and competent first responder organisations, such as local authorities, police forces and charities, are. I would also look at a higher quality of decision making from the Government. At the moment, about three quarters of negative decisions that are challenged are then accepted as having been the wrong initial decision by the Government, and are overturned. If there were more opportunities for people to be identified, better-quality decisions and a more trauma-informed approach, we would identify victims earlier in the process and there would be fewer challenges on that part. All this legislation will do is to make it very hard for us to identify or support victims who need help.

    Hansard source
15. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q From your operational experience, what is the single biggest thing missing from the Bill that would help the NCA to tackle the crime gangs behind the crossings? Has the NCA specifically asked the Government for anything that does not feature in the Bill? Helen Rance: Sorry, could you say the first part of the question again?

    Hansard source
16. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q What is the biggest thing missing from the Bill in helping you to tackle the crime gangs? Did you ask the Government for any specific things that have not come to be? Helen Rance: In answer to the second part, no—nothing specific has been omitted from the Bill. Obviously, the Bill has more direct focus on modern slavery and human trafficking—which I will call MSHT from now onwards—but in terms of the biggest thing that will help with organised immigration crime, which is a major focus of ours at the National Crime Agency, nothing specific in the Bill will fundamentally change how we investigate serious and organised criminals entering the country. What it will do is make our borders less attractive to criminals entering. That is our overarching opinion on that.

    Hansard source
17. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q Is there a particular feature that you would have liked to see in the Bill to aid you in that objective? Helen Rance: No.

    Hansard source
18. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q Is there any risk that the article 8 provisions in the Bill could move litigation on to different questions, rather than increasing the Government’s ability to remove those with no right to be here? If Parliament wanted to go further in restricting the circumstances in which article 8 can prevent removals, what could it do beyond what is proposed in the Bill? Professor Ekins: Litigation will certainly arise in consequence of these new provisions, if they are enacted; they will not end the controversy in this space. The litigation may turn on different questions, such as whether something counts as “normally”. There is a great deal of uncertainty about how the changes made by the relevant provision, clause 18, will be received by the courts. In a sense, the legislation leaves untouched the fundamental structure of article 8 in this context, which is individuated proportionality assessment. It tries to clarify, or maybe streamline, some aspects of the way in which article 8 is understood and applied—those changes are to be welcomed, so far as they go—but it is unclear whether, and to what extent, that will restrain the courts in applying article 8. The legislation takes for granted continuing individuated assessment. The legislation does not purport to be an exclusive code for article 8, does not displace article 8 under the Human Rights Act, and does not direct the courts to focus only on the terms of this legislation and close their eyes to the Strasbourg case law. The way in which article 8 will be understood and applied will be informed to some extent by this new legislation, but there will be arguments about precisely what it means and whether there are conditionals in the legislation at play. It will always be open to unlawful migrants and asylum seekers who are making arguments by reference to article 8 to invite the court to go back to the Strasbourg Court’s case law and to take this legislation as, in a sense, advisory. I know that that may sound somewhat strange, but that is effectively the structure we have. Parliament is not clearly telling the courts, “Focus only on this legislation, and close your eyes to the other body of case law.” It could attempt to do so: it could go further, by disapplying article 8 under the Human Rights Act and making this an exclusive code for the relevance of family life. That would require some recasting. To my mind, the more fundamental problem is that we are maintaining individuated proportionality assessment as the test for the lawfulness of removal. That will inevitably be somewhat—“ad hoc” is perhaps the wrong term, but it will be particular and unpredictable. A great deal will turn on the persons who are making the adjudicative decisions. The Bill obviously has something to say about that, but how it will play out is quite unpredictable. That is a complicated answer to your question. There will certainly be litigation, and it would be a mistake to think that this new legislation will authoritatively determine how article 8 will be understood. It will make some difference, but much turns on how it is received, which you simply cannot tell from where you sit now. Dr Casey: I agree. There are two different ways, broadly speaking, that this Bill could be received by courts and tribunals. One way—which, so far as the Home Secretary is concerned, would be the positive scenario—is that the tribunal takes very seriously the clear intent behind the Bill, which is to tighten and narrow the circumstances in which article 8 can be invoked and successfully relied on to resist a removal or deportation. However, as my colleague Richard pointed out, a lot of the wording in the Bill gives leeway for more flexible or generous interpretations for applicants. For example, the Bill says that article 8 applies “normally” only to a nuclear family—partners residing together, or a parent and a child residing together. That “normally” suggests that judges might take a broader understanding of other types of family arrangements. With the standards throughout the Bill—unreasonable impact, “adverse” impact or “unduly harsh”—there is, again, scope to give these a much more generous interpretation, such that, for some judges, it might be hard not to find an instance where deportation could not be considered harsh or as having an adverse impact on a child, because it separates a family unit. I can imagine some judges—not all, but some—reading these standards in a generous way that would capture a large sweep of cases and defeat removals and deportations. There is a scenario where the reception of the Bill is such that judges retain quite a lot of discretion to come up with their own understanding of the right balance between the public interest and individuals’ family life and, plausibly within the text of the Bill, to reach conclusions that are in tension with the clear policy intent behind the Bill. I think that that is an unavoidable situation if one accepts the strictures imposed by the ECHR and its jurisprudence because a sine qua non of article 8 law, as articulated by the Court, is that the tribunal must reach its own assessment—it must reach its own assessment of proportionality. At best, Parliament may give indications of where it wants weighting to go but, to stay within the strictures of the ECHR, the courts must have the final say. Also, in response to the question about whether, if article 8 claims are less attractive, other claims might be made under the ECHR: absolutely. I imagine that article 3 claims will probably increase. The difference between article 3 and article 8, as the Committee will know, is that article 3 is categorical—there is no qualification if the threshold is met. The threshold sometimes includes things like whether removal will lead to substandard medical care, compared with the NHS; that is ill treatment. We could see a spike in such invocations, and the Bill does not touch article 3 claims whatever. Professor Ekins: I should add that this legislation, as the Committee knows, builds on the Immigration Act 2014, which also attempted to tighten the understanding and application of article 8; that is largely viewed as having been much less effective than Parliament intended in 2014. This legislation will go further and that is to be welcomed, but the earlier Act should be a cautionary tale about the risks of failure.

    Hansard source
19. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q Do you believe that someone who deliberately enters the UK illegally from a safe country should face a different immigration consequence from someone who enters using a legal route? If not, what alternative deterrents would the Refugee Council support to discourage people from making those dangerous crossings? Jon Featonby: I am going to focus on the people who enter the UK for the purpose of seeking asylum within the international protection regime. For us, this comes down to how the refugee convention has been interpreted and operationalised since it first came in in 1951. That has been based around countries like the UK requiring somebody to be present in the UK, in their own territory, before they can access the protection systems. By its nature, that means that people have to undertake some of those dangerous journeys to get there. It is important to recognise that the convention talks about somebody being a refugee once they have been forced to leave a country because of war and persecution, and it is then blind to where that person is. There are obviously benefits if those people do not need to undertake dangerous journeys to get somewhere. There are benefits for the individuals who do not need to put their lives at risk—we see the really deadly consequences that has across the world—and benefits for the host countries themselves if people are able to arrive in an orderly manner and do not have to resort to the types of journeys that they have to now. It is also part of this important international context that most refugees—most people displaced from their countries—stay in the countries that border the ones they have fled from. Some people move on, and sometimes that can be because the countries neighbouring the place they have fled are no longer safe for them and no longer allow them to try to fulfil their lives, particularly as we see refugee situations becoming increasingly protracted across the globe. That is one of the things that we see lacking in the UK’s response at the moment. It is not just the UK’s response; we have seen the deterrence measures that you mentioned being adopted by successive Governments. We have seen some impact of that, particularly this year in terms of the drop in small boat arrivals. From the Refugee Council’s point of view, we would argue that the bit that has largely been missing from this is about how you continue to undermine the business model of the people smugglers and the people who take advantage of the people seeking safety. That is where we would talk about the importance of safe and legal routes. The previous Government opened up new routes, and we think that the Afghan and Ukraine schemes are great successes. One of the challenges that we see at the moment is that those safe routes available to people have dropped over the last year; the number of people arriving on safe routes in the last 12 months is down by about 50%. Refugee family reunion has been temporarily suspended for over a year now, and we have seen the closure of the Afghan schemes. We have been promised that new safe and legal routes will open in the new few months, with arrivals next year, but it seems that those numbers will be quite small. If we look at what worked in somewhere like the US under President Biden, it was having two sides to the approach: yes, the enforcement approach, but on the other side of that, quite generous, open, safe and legal routes, so that the people who genuinely need safety are able to get to somewhere like the UK without having to put their lives at risk.

    Hansard source
20. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

    Q If you think that the outcome of entering illegally should be the same as the outcome of entering legally, is there any other deterrent in that space? If the immigration consequence is not used as a deterrent, is there anything that the Refugee Council might accept? Jon Featonby: For the people who are refugees, it is about having an asylum system that first and foremost does what it should do, which is making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time. I think making sure that that happens has been a bit of a challenge under successive Governments now. For the people who are genuinely seeking protection and who need it, the system needs to make sure that they are able to access that protection when they do. What we have also seen is the challenge at the other end. For the people who are found not to have that protection need, there needs to be a firm and fair system in place to make sure they are removed from the UK as quickly, and hopefully as humanely, as possible. That is probably where there have been challenges. Some of them are legal challenges, but some of it comes down to basic good caseworking in the Home Office.

    Hansard source
21. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q56 Dr Sumption, looking at the evidence rather than at the Government’s intentions, which provisions in the Bill are likely to reduce arrivals or increase removals, and which have the weakest evidence base behind them? Dr Sumption: I will take those separately, starting with removals and then talking about arrivals. The two measures most relevant to removals are the appeals reform and the article 8 restrictions. It is very reasonable to assume that the article 8 restrictions will increase returns, but not as much as they will increase refusals, so some people will remain in the UK having been refused. It is very difficult to predict exactly how many people will be refused as a result of the measures, or how many of them will be returned. The Home Office modelling for the impact assessment seems broadly reasonable to me. It suggested just under 12,000 additional refusals as a result of the restrictions, and that some of those people—about 14%—would leave with no involvement of immigration enforcement at all, but the modelling also suggests that just over half would remain in the UK despite the refusal. It is one thing to restrict the legal challenges and the ability of people to get grants of status, but it is another thing actually to remove them from the UK. I am not going to get into the details of how much appeals reform will actually speed up the process; I am sure you have lots of other people to talk about that and the legal complexities. If the reform has the intended effect of speeding up final refusals, I think it is reasonable to assume that that would increase returns, because that means, in effect, that the immigration enforcement budget can be used more efficiently and that there is less chance of losing track of people during the lengthy period when an appeal is ongoing, but I do not have a view on precisely how effective it will be at speeding things up. It is quite reasonable to assume that there would be an increase in returns as a result of the measures in the Bill. The deterrence aspect—whether that would feed through into fewer people arriving—is harder to assess, and the evidence is not as good as I would like it to be. A few studies suggest that one of the things that makes a country less attractive is a lower probability of receiving a grant of status, particularly if combined with swift return. To the extent that the measures in the Bill make returns faster, there is some evidence that, particularly for low grant-rate nationalities—people who are relatively unlikely to get asylum—there could be a knock-on effect, so long as the refusals actually lead to a return. For people in the UK who have been refused but are not returned, the available evidence—I should stress that it is quite limited—suggests that there would be less impact.

    Hansard source
22. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Mr Mehmet, if the objective is fewer illegal arrivals and more removals, what is the single biggest measure that should be in the Bill but is not? Alp Mehmet: First, can I say the Bill is a step in the right direction? I commend the Home Secretary for having the courage to introduce a Bill with measures that are going to have some sort of impact. I am not sure what that impact is going to be; some bits of the Bill, frankly, are going to have the opposite effect to the one intended, and are more likely to attract people. I will come back to that later, if I may. If we are talking about the boats, the only thing that will deter both those coming in the boats and the smugglers themselves—the gangs—will be detention on arrival and speedy action to deal with and remove them. Only that will work; I have no doubt about that. There is nothing in the Bill that will allow that to happen. Have any measures of the sort that are being proposed worked? Nothing in the Bill reflects the sort of measures that, in certain countries, have had the desired effect of deterring people and keeping them away. The sorts of measures introduced in Australia, Denmark or—dare I mention it?—America, as well as even Greece, that have had an impact on the numbers applying for asylum bear no resemblance to what is in the Bill. Will the Bill have any major impact or deter? Sadly, I do not think it will do either. I am afraid that the Bill is a bit of a wasted opportunity, as was the last Bill, on which I also gave evidence with Tony Smith, who is appearing after me. That Bill also, in effect, cancelled out all the deterrent factors that were already in place. While this Bill has little things here and there, it is essentially all about process as well. I welcome the introduction of the new appeals authority, but I will add that it seems to be going back to the system that was in place 45 years ago, when I was an immigration officer in Dover and appeals first appeared on the scene. That may have an impact on gaming the system, for example, as the Home Secretary argues, but significant impact? I do not think so.

    Hansard source
23. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q From your experience of running Border Force, what actually deters an illegal channel crossing? Will anything in the Bill materially strengthen that deterrent? Tony Smith: I served in the Home Office from 1972 until 2013, at all levels, from immigration officer up to director general, when I retired. I saw lots of pressures on lots of Governments of lots of different colours about the issue of how to stop illegal immigration and remove those who should not be here. So I have a lot of experience there. Also, a couple of years ago, I went back into the Home Office as a consultant to advise on the implementation of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the setting up of the illegal migration operations command, which gave me experience with the boats issue. Fortunately for me, that was not happening during my service; people were coming in differently, in the backs of lorries or through the common travel area. The boats phenomenon is relatively recent, but I do have some knowledge and experience of it. In my view, the only way to tackle this is to stop illegal intake—in other words, you need to stop people getting to the UK in the first place. That is what we did with the carriers’ liability legislation. That is also why we put the Border Force in France, and why we stopped people getting on ships or aircraft to come here illegally—I think that one of the reasons smugglers shifted to the beaches is that we cannot do that there. Your first priority ought to be to try to reduce asylum intake wherever you can. The second point is to swiftly remove the people who do make it through into the territory. That will then send a deterrent message to those waiting in France, or wherever it may be, to come over. Those are the two metrics. On the issue of asylum intake, it is not just about the boats. Last time I checked, asylum intake was between 80,000 and 90,000, which is too high. People are coming with visas. You should be able to stop a lot of that, because they are all fingerprinted when they are given a visa and when they claim asylum. When I was in post, on a Monday morning, we would have a read of who had got visas and was now claiming asylum. The post would then be challenged and asked, “Why are you issuing visas to people who are then coming for asylum?” There are lots of things in all that, but basically the answer to your question is that you have to try to reduce the intake overseas as best you can and, when people do make it here, get that removals rate up.

    Hansard source
24. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q What is the single biggest border control measure missing from the Bill? Tony Smith: It is more what it does not do, which is exclude people coming from safe third countries, such as France, from claiming protection. That was the intention of the Illegal Migration Act. There is also provision in the 2002 legislation where someone has come from a safe country and, under article 31 of the convention relating to the status of refugees, they are not in immediate fear of persecution. We interpreted that as saying, “If you come from France on a small boat, you could have claimed asylum there—you did not have to—ergo you will not be granted asylum in this country.” The previous Government relied on that for the Rwanda plan, and this Government rely on it for the one in, one out scheme. There is now provision to exclude people from claiming asylum if they come via that route. There is no provision to exclude them from claiming protection under human rights or modern slavery. There are some things in the Bill that I applaud. There are attempts to tighten up on article 8 of the ECHR to stop some claims under human rights and under modern slavery provisions as well, which is to be applauded. But while you continue to run a system where somebody simply needs to get within the 12-mile zone and then make a claim for protection, and you bring them ashore and process that claim in the UK, I am afraid that that is always going to send a message back, particularly to the high-intake nationalities we are talking about, from Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and Iran, that all you need to do is get within the 12-mile zone and claim protection, and it is very unlikely—only about 4% have ever been removed—that you will be removed. I am afraid that that still creates a factor for migrants who are unsettled in the Schengen zone, who do not want to stay in France and who are determined to come here. It also still fuels the smugglers’ business model—there is profit in this; this is international organised crime—and they will continue to exploit that market.

    Hansard source
25. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q In your view, what is the single biggest reason why the UK fails to remove more people who have no right to remain? Does the Bill actually address the issue? Guy Dampier: The fundamental issue that we face, as we do in this entire crisis, is human rights legislation—whether international or domestic. It means that we have the extremely lengthy process of going through the asylum claim. It makes it very difficult to establish some of the facts and very difficult to remove people, even in cases where we have refused to grant them asylum. Tony Smith mentioned earlier that something like 4% of all small-boat migrants who have come since 2018 have been removed. Of those, the largest number have been Albanians because we essentially had a way to send them home without breaching human rights. That is unfortunately not true for the vast majority of other nationalities coming here. Until that human rights issue is tackled, the rate of returns will always be relatively low.

    Hansard source
26. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q If you could make one amendment to the Bill to increase the distinction between people coming to Britain legally and those entering illegally, what would that be? Guy Dampier: That is a very difficult one, because one of the big problems that the Bill does not tackle is the fact that an increased number of people are coming legally and then claiming asylum. Since 2019, I think, the number of those coming on the study route has gone up by four times and the number of those coming on the work route has gone up by 22 times. A lot of people are abusing the legal way of getting into the country and then claiming asylum, often suspiciously close to the end of their visa. Nothing in the Bill would really tackle that; that area is really missing.

    Hansard source
27. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q What effective measure would the IRC support to deter people from paying smugglers to cross the channel? Should deliberately entering illegally from a safe country carry any immigration consequence? Angela Afzal: We would say that we do not want people to be making dangerous journeys in order to receive refugee protection. That is why we advocate for a range of different safe routes: so that refugees have an option that does not involve risking their lives to get to the UK. We acknowledge, however, that at the moment, other than the one in, one out scheme, there is not an alternative for people to claim asylum from outside UK territory. If people claim asylum having made an irregular journey, gone through the asylum process and gained refugee protection, the entitlements they have should not be dependent on the method by which they entered the UK.

    Hansard source
28. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Is there any evidence that expanding safe and legal routes would reduce the number of small boat crossings, rather than simply increase the overall number of people coming to the UK? Angela Afzal: To reduce small boat crossings, there will be a range of interventions. Our position would be that the safe routes need to be part of that, because if refugees do not have an alternative, they will use people smugglers. Under the Biden Administration in the US, for example, there was a mixture of a change of internal policy on the border and an extensive offer of safe routes for people. The evidence showed that when there was an alternative, people chose it, and it reduced irregular arrivals significantly.

    Hansard source
29. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q As a practising immigration lawyer, where in the Bill do you anticipate the greatest volume of new litigation? Could any of those challenges actually increase delays to removal? Jacqui McKenzie: Sorry, I cannot actually hear the question. Professor Singer: Which aspects of the Bill do you anticipate would lead to the greatest number of litigation cases? Jacqui McKenzie: It is difficult to say, but one of our major concerns—this is purely as a practitioner, not a researcher—is about the removal of the current tribunal system and the establishment of the independent immigration appeals mechanism. We think there is considerable risk there, for a number of reasons. The first reason relates to the separation of powers, and it is one that the Committee should be very concerned about. The whole point of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 was that it was a constitutional device set up by Parliament to have a separation of powers. However, what we will see instead is a system where the Home Secretary appoints the chair and the chief executive officer of this new authority, and that person in turn will appoint the adjudicators, which gives rise to some concern. We are very concerned about whether there is scope to challenge that. The whole idea of the tribunal system is that we have highly trained judges with lots of experience presiding over it. However, it is not clear, and there may not be a problem, because we do not know where the adjudicators are going to come from. Our major concern at the moment is their independence. I just want to add that the whole of this is predicated on there being a backlog in the system, but it is not clear that just changing from one system to another will really address that. We saw the Home Office bring in large numbers of people to try to fast-track immigration decisions, but what we saw with those decisions was a number of errors, which have now caused problems in the immigrations appellate system. We do not envisage that that is going to change. In my practice, for instance, we regularly see decisions going into the appellate system that should not be there in the first place. The evidence of that is the fact that the tribunals are now awarding costs against the Home Office, and we had two cases recently where it was clear that the Home Office had failed to follow directions on the need to review the whole case or assess the evidence before it; it just failed to do that. If you are going to replace one system with another, but you still have very poor decision making in the first instance, you are not really going to clear the backlog. I could go on forever, but just recently I accidentally sat in on the wrong hearing at a tribunal. I was only meant to be an observer; a younger member of my team was doing a hearing, and I thought I would like to observe it. I was sent the wrong link by the tribunal, and it took me about half an hour before I suddenly realised that I was on the wrong link—I thought this other matter was just being heard first, and mine was going to follow. I sat through half an hour, and it was a man from Iraq with no representation and no bundle. The interpreter did not really understand him, and it was a waste of time. It took about 30 minutes for the immigration judge to say, “We have to abandon this.” That brings me to the fact that the other cause of the backlog is the large number of people who are not represented, and that is partly because of the problems in the legal aid system. I know we have recently had an increase, but if we want to get rid of the backlog, we are going to have to address the larger numbers of people coming into the system with no representation at all because they cannot find a lawyer. Most legal aid lawyers cannot make this work on the rates, so they are giving up. My own practice is currently considering giving up legal aid work, and we are one of the few that is still around doing it. You are going to have people coming into the tribunal system requiring adjournments, and the tribunal system will have to deal with not only that, but very poor decision making coming from the Home Office. I have other concerns about the Bill, but that is my biggest concern. The thing I am exercised about at the moment is whether there is a way of legally challenging this, but I do not know yet.

    Hansard source
30. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q In your experience, how often does article 8 make the decisive difference between somebody being allowed to remain or being removed? Do you think that the provisions in the Bill will materially and effectively change that situation? Jacqui McKenzie: We are worried about the provisions in the Bill around article 8, particularly as they relate to the best interests of children and the redefinition of the family, at a time when we are recognising that families come in all different types and colours—I do not mean colours in terms of race; that is probably not the best word. There is not a straightforward definition of a family. The Bill seeks almost to narrow it down to who lives in the house and who does not. That is the sort of language we are getting from the Home Office in trying to describe what it means, because we do not know yet. All we have is a template of an idea. We have section 55 on the best interests of the child, which most of us base our work on. That enables families using article 8 to remain together in the country. In the impact assessment accompanying the Bill, I saw that fewer than 12,000 families were likely to be refused. We are going for such a draconian measure to deal with a very small number of people. It almost reminds me of Rwanda again. We spent £700 million and we got four volunteers out. Even if we had got some people out through enforcement, it would have been a very small number. I cannot quite understand why we are targeting families. A lot of those families are actually the third and fourth generation of people who settled here and then brought over their children. In Windrush families, south Asian families and west African families, we have this concept of leaving children behind. The first came when they were over the age of 18, and now large numbers of their children are the ones caught up in the system and using article 8 to remain. Those are the sorts of people we would be targeting. This is their home. They are settled here. The numbers are small. It is not yet clear to me why we need to be doing this.

    Hansard source
31. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q As it stands, do you believe that the modern slavery supply chain provisions in the Bill will identify more victims and perpetrators, or is there a risk that they will create additional corporate reporting and compliance costs? Do you think the measures could be improved in any way? Dr Buttle: I think that the provisions as they currently stand ask businesses to report on what they are doing. It has now mandated particular areas, but there is a difference between reporting and performance. There is still an opportunity for companies to just take a tick-box approach, complying with the letter of the Bill and the clauses rather than actually taking action. So there is an opportunity for companies still to not do the human rights due diligence in the way that this Bill is currently drafted.

    Hansard source
32. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Are there any particular specifics on how you would improve the measures that have been put forward? Dr Buttle: At CCLA we have been advocating, in addition to reporting requirements, for a smart mix of legislation that would include a mandatory human rights due diligence Bill and potentially a forced labour ban for the UK.

    Hansard source
33. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q What impact do you expect the financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with the reporting requirements to have on company compliance? Dr Buttle: As I say, we have been evaluating companies’ modern slavery statements for three or four years now. There is also another investor coalition that we are part of, which is Rathbones’ Votes Against Slavery initiative. That has identified 194 instances of companies in the FTSE 350 not complying with section 54 over the past six years. That is quite widespread and companies are not actually complying. In our benchmarking work, we have identified some of the largest companies in the world that have exposure to modern slavery. They operate in high-risk geographies. They have supply chains that reach into high-risk geographies and they are in sectors that we deem high risk that are not currently complying with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. So we do think there is a risk at the moment, and we think that financial penalties would mean there is a risk of not complying with the legislation. On the way that the Bill introduces penalties of £1 million or up to 1% of turnover, that should be sufficient to make businesses consider this more seriously.

    Hansard source
34. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q The Government say that the reforms will make the system go faster. What is the current average time from an unsuccessful claim, through appeal to final resolution, and what do the Government expect the average to be once these changes have been implemented? Daniel Flury: It currently takes about 56 weeks for an appeal to clear the system in the first-tier tribunal, which is only going to worsen in the years ahead as more of the claims that have been sitting in the backlog for some time are concluded. It is even longer for appeals —that 56 weeks is all appeals. As to where we think it could get to, I do not think any of us could say yet, unless the Home Office wants to offer something. I think we can all agree that it needs to improve substantially, because 56 weeks is unacceptable in any jurisdiction.

    Hansard source
35. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Is there a quantifiable target for how many additional removals we forecast as a result of the changes? Daniel Flury: I could not say from an HMCTS perspective. Alison Hewett: Not at this stage. We are undertaking quite a lot of detailed modelling, but that is very much a work in progress. It would be inappropriate to get into that level of detail at this point.

    Hansard source
36. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q The sole test for the Bill is whether it will reduce illegal arrivals and increase removals. What is the single biggest amendment you would put forward to make that difference? Stephen Webb: In a sense, the Bill seems mainly to look at the stock rather than the flow, looking at people already in the country. I know the Government have legislated previously on the actual crossings. I suppose the question is, within the way the Bill is structured at the moment, what would make the biggest difference in deterring people from starting the journey in the first place? That is quite hard to say, because there are lots of changes around making it more difficult to make claims, particularly under article 8. My main point is that I feel, as I have written before, that it is not just article 8, but article 3 that gives asylum seekers an extremely high chance of staying in the country. Although the Government have chosen to toughen, somewhat, the way that article 8 will be treated, the Bill is silent on article 3. That is slightly disappointing, given that the Chişinău declaration, back in May, talked about reforming both and suggested areas where the courts—both domestically and in Strasbourg—could potentially tighten things up. I would see that as the main area.

    Hansard source
37. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Do you think there will be any significant effect from the proposed article 8 changes, or do you think we will just see everything coming back on different legal grounds? Stephen Webb: You obviously have a combination of both the article 8 definitions and the decision-making body, with a new appeals structure. The appeals structure could be very helpful. There is a significant problem of public confidence in the immigration tribunals as they stand, so I welcome the Government’s measures essentially to phase that out. It is very hard to say how decision makers and people on appeal are going to interpret this. There clearly is a toughening-up here, certainly on article 8. There is nothing at the moment that does much on article 3 claims, which, as the Committee knows, have been broadened very widely by the courts over the last 20 years into things like whether there is an equivalent health system in the host country and the receiving country, and into areas that are really quite surprising for something that is supposed to be an unqualified right.

    Hansard source
38. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Minister, the independent Regulatory Policy Committee has rated the Government’s impact assessment of the Bill as not fit for purpose. It says: “Little of the appraisal is quantified and most impacts are…uncertain.” What measurable difference do the Government expect the Bill to make? How many additional removals will it deliver? How much faster will cases finally be resolved? Anna Turley: The Bill is a really important part of our armoury for dealing with illegal immigration and securing our borders in this country. In introducing it, we have tried to be clear that this country has fundamental values of decency, fairness and tolerance that we hold dear. We have an historic role in providing safety to those fleeing war and persecution but, as we have heard today from lots of witnesses, we must recognise that the world is changing. The current system was not designed to cope with a world that is so volatile and insecure, or with people travelling through multiple safe countries before crossing the channel, particularly by boat. We have to confront the situation facing our asylum system, which is one of the most permissive, compared with other countries in Europe. Unfortunately, it is acting as a pull factor, providing a perverse incentive for people who have arrived illegally to switch to the asylum system once here. The Bill, as part of our wider process, tries to tackle that. The Bill is part of a range of measures we have in place to tackle issues raised by the shadow Minister, such as removals. I just want to set it in its context, because we have had a lot of conversation today about whether the Bill will be the silver bullet to stop the boats. I think it is really important to see it in the broader context of all the other measures that we are bringing in. As you know, we have established the Border Security Command, which has been part of the reason why—together with our one in, one out deal with France—we have already seen small boats down by over 40% this year. We have stopped 38,000 channel crossings, and the number of asylum claimants we have awaiting their initial decision is at its lowest since 2019. We are now down to fewer than half the hotels that asylum seekers had been placed in, and we have seen 80,000 removals since the last election, including 11,000 foreign national offenders. As I said, the Bill is one part of the armoury that we want to use. The problems we want to tackle are clear. Some 41% of asylum claims are from people who are already here and hold visas from another form of entering the country. As colleagues have heard, the first-tier tribunals have 156,000 appeals outstanding, with 72 weeks being the current average for asylum appeals. We have a number of late claims mechanisms that people use to threaten removals, and at the moment 95% of asylum decisions get appealed. That is the context we are trying to deal with through the course of the Bill’s passage. We have obviously talked about the Bill’s measures today, and we are confident that they will start to address, as part of that broader armoury, some of the pull factors that are leading to us being seen as having one of the most permissive processes in Europe.

    Hansard source
39. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q We do not know how many more removals we are expecting as a result, and we do not know how much faster it is going to go. What would you see as the benchmark for measuring whether the Bill has succeeded? Anna Turley: I do not want to put a specific figure on it. I am pleased with the statistics we have seen, and I want people to judge us on the outcomes of the measures we have introduced so far, which have seen 60,000 removals and 48,000 crossings stopped. We will have our metrics to measure this, but I do not want to put a specific figure on the impact at this stage of the Bill’s progress. We know the measures are specifically designed to tackle the blockages in the system and the reasons why people are able to frustrate and string out appeals. The Bill is targeted at the specific issues that mean people can string out the process, which are why the system is not functioning.

    Hansard source
40. 15 Sep 2026·Parliament·Matt Vickers

    Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

    Q With regards to the article 8 changes, can you give us one concrete example of a category of case where someone could successfully resist removal today on article 8 grounds, but where the Bill would prevent them from doing so in future? Anna Turley: Bas, you have an example—we discussed this earlier today. Bas Javid: With all the measures in the Bill, we want to address what potentially gives people the opportunity to frustrate removals, either in bad faith or just by being late, whether that is article 8 appeals or national referral mechanism issues. I would highlight two things that frustrate operational removal. One is the successive number of issues that people raise, but not necessarily all together, and there is also the fact that it is done very late, often on the steps of the plane, particularly on charter flights. To give an example, in 2025, on all the charter flights that my teams ran, over a third of the people frustrated their claims through late NRM referrals. That is just an example of the kind of things that happen, and that obviously also puts a lot of extra cost and wasted resource into the system, where I would otherwise use that resource to remove people legitimately.

    Hansard source