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With reports of over £1 billion in costs for integrated care board redundancies and the chief executive officer of NHS England warning that services could have to move to plan B, could the Secretary of State set out what plan B is?
I thank the Secretary of State for his answer, but waiting lists have risen for three successive months now, doctors are on strike, GPs are in formal dispute with the Government, and the ICBs are cutting 50% of their staff and do not have £1 billion to pay for it, all while the NHS 10-year plan has been published but with no delivery chapter. When will the Secretary of State come to the House with the delivery plan for the NHS 10-year plan?
I rise to speak in support of amendment 24 and the other amendments that I have tabled on behalf of the Opposition. I regret that we have not had the opportunity to hear from important voices on these incredibly important issues through a full Public Bill Committee. Victims groups of all different kinds care deeply about the measures in this Bill. We not only do not get to hear from them as MPs, but the nature of Committee of the whole House means that we do not have the opportunity to put forward for inclusion a whole range of measures that are worthy of our consideration and a vote in support. Anyone reading the amendment paper will see the richness and range of ideas that just will not get the level of detailed consideration they should. It would have been beneficial, and we may well end up giving this incredibly important Bill less than 15 hours of consideration in this House. I cannot help but feel that the measures related to early release are so unpalatable that the Government are doing their absolute best to rush this Bill through the House to avoid proper scrutiny. I will try, though, to at least give some time and thought to some of the amendments, even if ultimately we will not be able to vote on them. New clause 12 relates to changes to the unduly lenient sentence scheme. At present, the ULS scheme allows anyone to appeal most sentences to the Attorney General’s Office if they consider them to be unduly lenient. I and other Members of this House have made use of this scheme, as have others. It can and does lead to sentences being changed, but there are two major problems with the scheme as it operates. First, too many victims are unaware of the scheme and do not get long enough to make use of it. At this point, I pay tribute to the amazing campaigners who have done so much to raise this issue. Katie Brett secured thousands of signatures to a petition to change the scheme in memory of her sister Sasha. I pay tribute to Ayse Hussein and other members of the Justice for Victims group. The issue has also been raised for many years by Tracey Hanson, who I had the pleasure of meeting recently, in memory of her son Josh Hanson, who was the victim of an appalling murder. I know that other campaigners are similarly inclined. All of them are clear about the fact that the current scheme does not work. Our amendment will require the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims, and also extend the time available to appeal to up to a year for victims and their families if the victim is deceased.
As my right hon. Friend says, we can do what we want when it comes to placing conditions on people and expecting them to behave differently, but the only place where we can be sure they are not out committing further offences is prison. Across the board, this measure will let very many serious offenders out of prison earlier, and I shall say more about that towards the end of my speech. In respect of the undue lenient sentence scheme, the Government have previously said that they will await the outcome of a review of criminal appeals—a review that has already said that the system is working fine, and for the implementation of whose recommendations we have no timetable or plan. The opportunity to make that change is here, and I urge Ministers to take it. New clause 8 relates to what are clearly unacceptable restrictions on what people can say in victim personal statements, often described as impact statements. This is a further issue that the Justice for Victims group and others have raised. The parents of Sarah Everard, Susan and Jeremy, have made it very clear that the people advising them on their statements were doing their best to act in their best interests, and to help secure the best possible outcome for justice for Sarah, but the system and the rules around this are leading to too many people, like Susan and Jeremy, being told that they cannot say what they should be allowed to say. Glenn and Becky Youens, also from Justice for Victims, had the same experience when making statements about their feelings towards the vile criminals who had killed their precious daughter Violet-Grace. Our new clause will ensure that the Government can help victims to secure the best possible opportunity to say what it is that they want to say, while recognising that the statement is still being made in a court. New clause 16 is intended to close a loophole that I think all Members agree needs to be closed. Our current sentencing laws require a whole-life order to be passed for those who murder a police or prison officer in the line of duty. That is an important deterrent, and enables the delivery of justice for people who put themselves in harm’s way, dealing with violent criminals, should the worst happen. However, it is clear to me that the courts have not interpreted the meaning of that legislation as I—and, I think, most other Members—would have wanted them to. In 2024 a former prison officer, Lenny Scott, was murdered. He was murdered by a seriously violent criminal for doing his job as a prison officer. Lenny had bravely stood up to threats from this criminal while he supervised him in prison, as he had reported that he had contraband. Years later, this despicable person came back for his revenge. He was convicted of Lenny’s murder, but the courts decided that the whole-life order tariff did not apply because he had not been actively on duty when the murder took place. I think that is counter to the spirit of the measure. Our new clause would remove the loophole, so that in future if a prison or police officer is murdered because of something they did in their role, whenever that might be, the sentence will be a whole-life order. I imagine that of all the measures we are proposing, that will secure the greatest amount of cross-party support—not at this stage of the Bill, but during future stages in the Lords. New clause 10 supports greater transparency in our justice system by ensuring that sentencing remarks in the Crown court are available to everyone, and transparency is also at the heart of new clause 9. For too long, for the wrong reasons, we have not been transparent about criminals’ backgrounds. We know that political correctness led to the vile grooming gangs scandal going unchallenged, which should never have been allowed, for many decades. Part of the issue is that we did not have the data and the information that would have enabled us to understand what was happening and who was committing those offences. Why should we not have basic information about criminals that would enable us to have an honest debate about different patterns of criminal behaviour in different communities and different parts of the country, especially when we know that if we refuse to do this—if we refuse to be transparent—all that we do is give fuel to the wrong people? At best, indifference to the need to share this data is looking more and more like a desire to cover up what it might reveal. That has to stop, and our new clause will ensure that it does. New clause 11 relates to steps that the courts should take to limit parental responsibility for those convicted of child sex offences. In the last Parliament my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden and Solihull East (Saqib Bhatti) campaigned on this in support of a constituent who met Ministers in that Government to discuss it. In the current Parliament, the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) has joined the campaign, along with other Members. I understand that yesterday the Government tabled an amendment to the related Victims and Courts Bill, which is due for further consideration, and of course we will look closely at that to consider whether it meets the reasonable expectations of parents seeking to protect their children from child sex offenders. New clauses 13 and 14 also relate to child sex offenders.
My right hon. Friend has frequently raised this issue, and we are in violent agreement. In my experience, there is intellectual snobbery towards people who think there is moral value in, and an ethical basis for, punishing people properly. Anyone who talks about that often gets labelled as some bigot who does not understand patterns of criminality and all these other things. Of course they are important to consider, but none of these things means that we should not appropriately punish people. It shocks me that that still remains not part of the statutory purposes of sentencing. Punishing people is important, and we do not consider it enough. For all the reasons I have set out, this Bill is incredibly important. Today is incredibly important too, because it is the last chance for Back-Bench MPs to decide for themselves which parts of this very significant Bill they will support. Next week we will have Third Reading, where Labour MPs will have no choice but to vote for or against the entire Bill. We know that a major part of this Bill is the earlier release of nearly all offenders. The Opposition are opposed to the programme as a whole, but it is clear that this Bill is a major part of the Government’s plans to reform sentencing. It would be asking a lot of Labour MPs to ask them to consider voting against the entire programme, but we are not asking them to do that. Our amendment 24 gives Labour MPs the route through which they can most justifiably say to their Whips and the Prime Minister, “No, I can’t support this.” We are asking them to say no and to vote against the early release of rapists, paedophiles, seriously violent criminals, criminals who cause death by dangerous driving and attempted murderers. We are giving Labour MPs a clear route out of doing what would be absolutely unprecedented in the management of offenders in our prisons and a deep insult to the victims of serious violent and sexual crime. Labour MPs, many of whom I have got to know, work with and respect, will know that I spent the last week trying my utmost to encourage them to avoid being put in a position where the Whips will make them vote to release rapists, paedophiles and serious violent criminals earlier. Most shadow Ministers would happily sit back and watch Labour MPs vote for something that will blight their time in Parliament in the eyes of their constituents, but we have not done that. That is because whatever damage voting for this Bill might do to the electoral prospects of Labour MPs, what is more important to me is that its measures do not go through. As I have said before, I understand the frustrations that MPs of different parties have had over decades about the resources provided to our justice system and the prison estate. I mentioned on Second Reading that when Labour was last in power, it released more than 80,000 prisoners early because of the capacity issues built up during its time in office. This Government and the last Government have operated similar programmes. I wish that emergency release measures never had to be used, and if—this is a very big “if”—I had ever been Prime Minister or Chancellor during these periods, I would have taken different decisions. But at least these measures have to be announced in the full glare of the public eye, carry a political price and are genuinely legislated for as responses to short-term emergency challenges. I want Labour MPs to be absolutely clear-eyed about the fact that what we are voting on today is not a short-term response to prison crowding challenges. It is a medium to long-term plan—a decision about how we as a country want to respond to people who commit serious violent and sexual offences. I have never met a victim of a serious violent or sexual offence who thinks that the present system suitably punishes serious offenders. I have never met a victim who thinks that we should let these sorts of people out of prison earlier, but that is what this Bill will do. On Second Reading, I explained the sorts of offences that are included in these measures. Ministers have said that the very worst offenders will be excluded. Since Second Reading, the Opposition have been able to review sentencing data to try to understand what that means in reality. It highlights a disturbing truth and leaves the Government and any MP who votes for this Bill with a difficult question to answer. Those serving extended determinate sentences and life sentences will be excluded from the early release elements of this Bill, whereas those serving standard determinate sentences will not. Prisoners on standard determinate sentences will have their prison time cut. Every year, more than 60% of criminals sent to prison for rape are on a standard determinate sentence. Over 90% of criminals sent to prison for child grooming are on a standard determinate sentence. Around half of criminals sent to prison for attempted murder are on a standard determinate sentence. Hundreds of criminals guilty of child rape and sexual assault, including rape of children under 13, are in prison on standard determinate sentences. In total, more than 6,500 criminals sent to prison every year for serious violent, sexual and other offences are given determinate sentences. If Labour MPs vote against our amendment 24, every single one of those criminals will be able to get out of prison earlier. Labour MPs will be voting to let rapists and paedophiles out of prison earlier.
The Minister shakes his head. If he wants to intervene and explain why that is not the case, he can. No, he is not going to do so. Let us be clear: earlier releases will not be done on a retrospective basis. When the measure is enacted, every criminal in prison at that point in time will be able to benefit from these measures, including thousands of serious criminals. It is very clear to me that what is being said by Ministers—I anticipate that they will say the same later in defence of these plans—is in danger of misleading MPs. As it stands, Labour MPs will have to vote in support of the Government’s position that the most serious offenders are excluded. I invite MPs to reflect on how the Justice Secretary can possibly say that any rape—let alone hundreds of them—is not one of the most serious offences. Will Labour MPs who vote against amendment 24 tonight be able to say to survivors of child sex abuse that they supported a Government who wanted to classify thousands of child sex offences as not being the most serious offences? The Government have said that earlier releases will have to be earned through good behaviour, but that is simply not true. I appreciate that it can be difficult to always believe what MPs from Opposition parties are saying, but MPs do not need to take my word for it. The House of Commons Library briefing note on this Bill is there in black and white for everyone to read. It says: “As currently drafted, the provisions of the bill do not bring in any new criteria for people to adhere to prior to being released at the one third or halfway point, or any discretionary elements to release.” I will repeat that: the Bill’s provisions do not bring in any new criteria. Labour MPs need not look any further than emergency release measures and contrast them with this permanent, long-term change to find evidence that the Government’s approach is totally unprecedented. The SDS40 scheme and other schemes that have come before and sat alongside it have many more exclusions—for example, sex offenders—yet this permanent, non-emergency approach does not. What Ministers have been telling Labour MPs to secure their support is not accurate, which should always make Back-Bench MPs wary. If the Government are making inaccurate statements about a measure in a Bill that they want MPs to support because they cannot face the reality of what it does, then MPs should think very carefully about voting for it, because there is no going back. They will have to defend that decision. This morning, I emailed every single Labour MP the Library briefing note so that they could see it for themselves, regardless of whether they listen to this debate. Ignorance will be no excuse, because today will not be the end of it. I guarantee Members that the harsh reality is that history tells us that some of the criminals whom Labour MPs are being asked to vote to release will almost certainly commit further serious offences, at a time when they would otherwise have been locked up. MPs will then have to explain why they voted for non-emergency changes that let such people out earlier. I would not be surprised if one of these cases is sufficiently serious that the Government amend the Bill’s measures in future, in response to a public backlash. There is every chance that they will make Labour MPs go through the Lobby tonight and vote for the indefensible, and then at some point pull the rug from under them. I appreciate that a lot of Labour Members are new to this place, and they can speak to longer-serving Members about how it will make them look when they are forced to follow a line that is later withdrawn. I have made our position clear, and I have set out the consequences. MPs voting against our amendment 24 this evening will be voting to reduce jail time for extremely violent criminals, paedophiles, child groomers and rapists. I have done as much as I can to stop that happening. Ministers are resorting to saying things about the Bill’s measures that are inaccurate to secure support from their Back Benchers, and MPs should not let them get away with it. We have set out clearly how our amendment would ensure that appalling criminals do not see their punishment cut. I know it is difficult for Back Benchers to stand up to the Government and say no, but if we do not, thousands of the worst criminals will get out of prison earlier. Labour MPs now have to decide whether to vote for what victims of child abuse, family members of people killed by dangerous drivers, victims of rape and others want—victims whom many of them care about—or for what the Prime Minister and his Whips want. Tell the Prime Minister no, tell the Whips no, and vote for our amendment tonight.
Does the hon. Member think it appropriate for an immigration judge to support and advocate for a charity that is actively trying to stop asylum laws being implemented? Should an immigration judge be involved in an organisation like that?
As the hon. Lady is laying out the reality, Government Members are chuntering and suggesting that what she is saying is not true, so may I point out that the Library briefing clearly says that those with sentences of over four years for a violent or sexual offence who are currently released at the two thirds point of sentence would be released at the halfway point under the new provisions? That is a fact.
The right hon. Member is well known for his long-term support for the Prison Officers Association. While he is on his feet, will he commit to supporting our new clause 16, which would close the loophole relating to whole life orders for the murder of prison officers?
My right hon. Friend is talking about a contradiction in the Government’s position, but is there not another one? Labour Members and Ministers in particular talk about the volume of people who are going to be released as a result of their measures, but whenever they are confronted with examples of actual offences committed by the sorts of offenders they will be letting go, they always say, “Well, it wouldn’t apply to them.” The Government cannot have it both ways: either a lot of people are getting out of prison, including some of these people, or they are not. They have to make up their mind.
This is very much still on topic. The challenge with the argument that Labour Members put forward on rehabilitation is that it presupposes that all we need to do is put someone on a drug rehabilitation course once, and they will stop offending and it is all fantastic. The evidence shows the complete opposite. Even the very best drug rehabilitation courses that money can buy at the Priory have a long-term success rate of about 50%. In reality, whatever we do, some of these offenders are going down a path from which they will not be turned for a significant length of time, and that is when we have to put them in prison.
I did try to explain that there is a difference between association and causality. The hon. Member is comparing two different cohorts. If she were to match the cohorts properly, the difference in reoffending rates is nothing like that; it is more like 3% or 4%.
The Minister has described what is in the Bill as an earned progression model. I have read out to the Committee the independent Library briefing note, which says that progression will not be earned; it will be automatic. On what basis is the Minister continuing to describe it as an earned model?
I am sure the Minister will hope that Back Benchers have listened closely to what he has said, but more important is what he has not said. The Government have been briefing journalists that what we were saying about rapists and paedophiles getting out earlier was not true, and they have told the same to a number of Labour Back Benchers. To be clear, can the Minister put on the record whether any rapists or paedophiles serving standard determinate sentences will be released earlier as a result of this Bill—yes or no?
I am concerned that the disruption caused by an uncosted, unplanned simultaneous reorganisation of NHS England and the ICBs is affecting patient care. Before the summer, the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation recommended that the RSV vaccine should be given to those over 80 and those in adult care homes. In July, I asked the Secretary of State to confirm that this vaccine will be available in time for the winter season, and he said, “I can certainly reassure the shadow Minister on this.”—[Official Report, 22 July 2025; Vol. 771, c. 677.] The winter vaccine programme started three weeks ago. Why has he not delivered on his promise?
I thank the hon. Lady for her answer, but I would like her to check and perhaps update the guidance for GPs and the websites that continue to say that it is only available to 80-year-olds who turned 80 after 1 September 2024, which is not all people over the age of 80. Reorganisation is affecting delivery elsewhere, too. The Secretary of State also promised that the continued roll-out of fracture liaison services would be one of his first priorities. How many new fracture liaison services have opened since the general election?
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I am concerned that the Health team may have inadvertently misled the House. In July, the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation noted that respiratory syncytial virus vaccines were so effective that they should be extended to all those over 80 and those in adult care homes. The Secretary of State reassured this House in July that the recommendation had been accepted, and provision would be in place for this winter. When I asked about that today, the Secretary of State said from a sedentary position that he had delivered on that promise, and the Minister for Secondary Care then confirmed that. However, Government and NHS guidelines still show that availability of the vaccine has not been extended. How can I ensure that the record is correct?
The victims of these crimes were vulnerable children who were ignored, gaslit and dismissed. Two victims have now resigned because of the process, its failure and their lack of faith in it. Yet, I hear what appears to me to be an aggressive and defensive tone from the Minister.
She should remember that those people are watching. Will she listen to the victims and does she regret that those two individuals have resigned from the process?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire (Pete Wishart) for securing this timely and important debate, as well as his characteristically forceful and measured speech. It has been a fun debate with lots of contributions. I am sure there will be plenty more opportunities going forward, but I want to draw out a few particularly powerful contributions. First, my hon. Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) pointed out the issues around the prevalence of digital exclusion and the use of the veteran card. Secondly, my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis) rightly pointed out the issues that the gov.uk One Login has had. Thirdly, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon (Gregory Stafford) pointed out the problem of the prevalence of digital poverty among the elderly. Finally, the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley (Iqbal Mohamed), who always speaks with great wisdom in these debates, spoke about the issue of multiple NHS logins. This plan will make Government-issued digital ID compulsory to access work. Ignore the piffle—this is de facto mandatory. Given the contentious history of mandatory ID schemes in this country, one might have expected a policy of such weighty constitutional importance to appear in the Government’s manifesto, but it was conspicuously absent—like most current Government policy. Earlier this year, I stood across the Dispatch Box from the previous Minister, debating the digital verification system brought in by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. That scheme created a trust framework for a register of approved providers of digital identity verification services. Building on the competitive ecosystem established by the last Government, private sector companies are already providing right to rent, right to work and many other identity checks.
The point is that we have a sector that is already developing voluntary ID schemes. It is now being let down by the Government, who are bringing in their own mandatory scheme. Not once in the course of previous debates did the Minister mention that the Government intend to launch their own mandatory digital ID system for the right to work or anything else, but the concerns with this policy go beyond questions of democratic legitimacy. The National Audit Office’s report on Government cyber-resilience, published early this year, contains a number of concerning findings about serious gaps in cyber-security amongst Government Departments and public sector bodies. One of the most concerning is that the Cabinet Office does not have a strategy for how Government organisations could become cyber-resilient by 2030. There is no current plan to secure the Government’s cyber-resilience over the very same timeframe that this mandatory Government-run identity scheme, which will host the data of every working person in the UK, will be rolled out. We are yet to hear from the Government a clear timescale for bringing their cyber-security and resilience Bill forwards. Digital inclusion remains a challenge for many across this country and impacts vulnerable groups, such as those on low incomes and those with disabilities, the most. The Government’s policy of making digital ID mandatory to access work flies in the face of digital inclusion. The consideration given to digital exclusion being, “Well, we are going to consult on what to do,” as an afterthought is frankly shameful. Digital inclusion was at the heart of the previous Government’s levelling-up ambitions. The Government published their own digital inclusion plan in February, which will be implemented over several years. Why not concentrate on putting that plan into effect, rather than diverting resources towards their own costly digital identity programme? Universal digital inclusion and robust cyber-security must be conditions precedent to any Government-run ID scheme. At the moment, we have neither. We are left with a number of pressing questions. Why was this flagship policy not part of the Government’s election manifesto last year? Why has it been brought forward now? Why should it be mandatory rather than optional? Why are the Government pursuing a costly, Government-run ID scheme when the private sector infrastructure for digital ID services exists already? What is the Government’s plan to keep citizens’ data secure? Can the Minister guarantee that no one lawfully eligible to work will be excluded from employment by this scheme?
Children in Runnymede and Weybridge are waiting on average two years to get a diagnosis of autism or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder from Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS foundation trust. The trust is deviating from national guidance on new developmental pathways, and waiting times are even greater if children need medication. Does the Secretary of State share my concerns, and will he investigate the trust and make sure that children and families get the support that they need?
In view of the time limits, I will focus solely on the scandalously insecure One Login procedure. I will be writing to ask the National Audit Office to investigate because, apart from the strategic weakness of having a single login, the Government’s handling has been a disaster. As early as 2022, the information assurance team responsible for ensuring the security of the system raised concerns that it was being developed on unsecured workstations, by contractors in Romania who did not have security clearance. When it ran a red-team operation to see how secure it was, they broke into the system easily. They would have been able to install malware, and they were not even detected by the people running the system. What will happen when this system comes into effect is that the entire population’s entire data will be open to malevolent actors—foreign nations, ransomware criminals, malevolent hackers and even their own personal or political enemies. As a result, this will be worse than the Horizon scandal.
The tech has already been abroad. It has already been in Romania, and it is quite possible that malware is already inside it.
Alton and Petersfield hospitals give excellent step-up, step-down and end-of-life care. The trust is introducing more home-based care, which is good, but it also proposes closing a ward in one of the community hospitals. Will the Minister ensure that there remain sufficient beds and sufficient capacity in our local community hospitals for those patients who need them?
(Urgent Question): To ask the Home Secretary to make a statement on the recent criticism of the statutory inquiry into the rape gang scandal.
This scandal arose because young, mainly white girls were systematically gang-raped and it was covered up by those in authority because the perpetrators were mainly of Pakistani origin. It is all the more shocking that when calls for a national inquiry became public in January, the Prime Minister smeared campaigners as “jumping on a far-right bandwagon”. Comments like that are a disgrace and are what led to this scandal being covered up in the first place. Months later, just two days before facing a vote in Parliament, the Government finally agreed to the inquiry, but it is clear that they never wanted this inquiry and were forced into it. Perhaps that is why, months later, the Government have said nothing substantive publicly and their inquiry is descending into chaos. What we have heard publicly is that victims and survivors on the liaison panel have no confidence in the Government or the inquiry. In the last 24 hours alone, two have resigned. Fiona Goddard resigned from the panel, saying that “the secretive conduct and conditions imposed on survivors” —by the Government— “has led to a toxic, fearful environment, and there is a high risk of people feeling silenced all over again.” Hours later, Ellie-Ann Reynolds also resigned, saying that the remit of the inquiry had been widened to “downplay the racial and religious motivations behind our abuse.” The Minister shakes her head, but that is what Ellie-Ann Reynolds said. Fiona also raised the issue of Sabah Kaiser, who has been acting as a liaison officer on behalf of NWG. Just two years ago, Ms Kaiser described calling out the fact that the majority of perpetrators were of Pakistani heritage as “destructive, distracting, irresponsible”. Given those frankly appalling views and the complaints about them by survivors, will the Minister ensure that Ms Kaiser plays no further role? Victims and survivors have also questioned the suitability of former police officers or social workers to chair the inquiry. They do not believe that people from the professions that failed them so badly are suitable. Will the Minister accept this feedback and appoint a judge to lead the inquiry? Will the Minister confirm that the scope of the inquiry will not be diluted, as both Fiona and Ellie-Ann say is now happening, and that it will focus on the cover-up of the rape gangs scandal because of the fact that the majority of perpetrators were of Pakistani origin? Finally, Fiona said this yesterday: “I just won’t be gagged and controlled by the Government while they turn this inquiry into a cover up.” Will the Minister apologise to Fiona and Ellie-Ann?
I remind Members that in Committee, they should not address the Chair as Deputy Speaker. Please use our names when addressing the Chair. Madam Chair, Chair and Madam Chairman are also acceptable. Before I call the right hon. Member for Tatton (Esther McVey) to move amendment 46, I should advise the Committee that once that amendment has been disposed of at the end of the debate, I am provisionally minded to call the following amendments and new clauses for separate decision: amendment 24, in the name of the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan); new clause 6, in the name of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty); new clause 9, in the name of the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle; and new clause 30, in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller). Clause 1 Presumption of suspended sentence order for sentences of 12 months or less
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 47, page 1, line 14, after “months” insert “before any credit is given for a guilty plea”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea. Amendment 50, page 1, line 17, after “order” insert “with the maximum operational period”. This would mean that all suspended sentences given in place of immediate custody would be suspended for the maximum period. Government amendments 2 and 3. Amendment 48, page 3, line 8, after “individual” insert “or the public”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the court was of the opinion that not imposing an immediate custodial sentence would put an individual or the public at significant risk of harm. Amendment 49, page 3, line 8, after “at” leave out “significant”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the court was of the opinion that not imposing an immediate custodial sentence would put an individual or the public at risk of harm. Amendment 51, page 4, line 3, leave out “not more” and insert “less”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences of less than 12 months. Amendment 52, page 4, line 3, after “12 months” insert “before any credit is given for a guilty plea”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea (typically one third). Amendment 55, page 4, line 6, after “order” insert “with the maximum operational period”. This would mean that all suspended sentences given in place of immediate custody would be suspended for the maximum period. Amendment 36, page 4, line 11, at end insert “, or the court is of the opinion that, having considered the basis of opinion provisions in section 77 Sentencing Act 2020, it should mitigate the sentence to one of a community sentence as provided for in that section.” Government amendments 4 and 5. Amendment 53, page 5, line 15, after “individual” insert “or the public”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the court was of the opinion that not imposing an immediate custodial sentence would put an individual or the public at significant risk of harm. Amendment 54, page 5, line 15, leave out “significant”. The presumption for a suspended sentence would not apply where the court was of the opinion that not imposing an immediate custodial sentence would put an individual or the public at risk of harm. Clauses 1 and 2 stand part. Amendment 29, in clause 3, page 10, leave out lines 4 to 6 and insert— “(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “monthly income” means monthly income after deduction of— (a) such amounts as are required to be paid or deducted from the offender’s income under, or by virtue of, any enactment, or (b) such amounts as may be specified in the regulations.” This amendment changes the definition of “monthly income” for the purposes of income reduction orders so that any amount of money that is required to be paid or deducted from an offender’s monthly income as a result of other enactments (such as child support maintenance payments or under an attachment of earnings order) is not counted for those purposes. Clause 3 stand part. Amendment 1, in clause 4, page 14, line 4, after “(including victims of crime” insert “, ensuring their protection from further physical or psychological harm”. This amendment would amend the statutory purposes of sentencing to incorporate safeguarding victims from further physical or psychological harm. Clauses 4 and 5 stand part. Amendment 30, in clause 6, page 14, leave out lines 29 to 32 and insert— “(1) This section applies if— (a) a court is passing sentence for an offence, (b) the court has indicated that it appears the offence may have involved domestic abuse, and (c) having regard to any evidence and any representations that are made by or on behalf of the offender or the prosecution, the court is of the view that the offence involved domestic abuse.” This amendment introduces two procedural safeguards before a court can record that an offence involved domestic abuse: first, the court must have indicated that it appears the offence may have involved domestic abuse; and, second, the court must have given an opportunity to the offender and prosecution to adduce evidence and make representations before coming to the view that an offence involved domestic abuse. Government amendments 6 to 8. Amendment 31, page 15, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert— “(1) This section applies if— (a) a court or officer is passing sentence for an offence, (b) the court or officer has indicated that it appears the offence may have involved domestic abuse, and (c) having regard to any evidence and any representations that are made by or on behalf of the offender or the prosecution, the court or officer is of the view that the offence involved domestic abuse.” This amendment introduces two procedural safeguards before a court can record that a service offence involved domestic abuse: first, the court must have indicated that it appears the service offence may have involved domestic abuse; and, second, the court must have given an opportunity to the offender and prosecution to adduce evidence and make representations before coming to the view that the service offence involved domestic abuse. Government amendments 9 to 11. Clauses 6 and 7 stand part. Government amendment 12. Clause 8 stand part. Government amendment 13. Clauses 9 to 12 stand part. Government amendments 14 and 15. Clauses 13 to 15 stand part. Government amendments 16 and 17. Clauses 16 to 19 stand part. Amendment 24, in clause 20, page 37, line 14, at end insert— “(ab) but sections 244ZA(8)(a) and (aa) do not apply to any person convicted of— (a) rape; (b) assault by penetration; (c) rape of a child under 13; (d) assault of a child under 13 by penetration; (e) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity; (f) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13; (g) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence; (h) creating or possessing indecent photographs of children; (i) grievous bodily harm; (j) grooming; (k) stalking; (l) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult; or (m) death by dangerous driving, and (ac) but sections 244ZA(8)(a) and (aa) cannot come into force until the Secretary of State has consulted on and ensured exclusions for all offences considered to be serious violence, offences against children, sexual offences and domestic abuse offences, and”. This amendment would disapply the clause 20 early release provisions of the Bill in relation to those convicted of the offences listed in the amendment, and would require the Secretary of State to consult on and ensure exclusions for those convicted of other serious violent and sexual offence categories. Clauses 20 to 23 stand part. Amendment 41, in clause 24, page 46, leave out lines 20 to 23. This amendment would leave out the Bill’s provision to give probation officers more discretion in relation to licence conditions. Amendment 34, page 46, line 23, at end insert— “(c) after subsection (4A) insert— ‘(4B) In exercising any power under subsection (4)(b), the Secretary of State must have regard to any representations made by the offender.’” This amendment introduces a right for those being made subject to licence conditions to make representations as to their necessity and proportionality. Amendment 35, page 46, line 23, at end insert— “(c) after subsection (4A) insert— ‘(4B) The Secretary of State must not include a condition under subsection (4)(b)(di) (a restriction zone condition) in a licence, either on release or subsequently, or vary or cancel any such condition included in a licence, unless the Board directs the Secretary of State to do so (and must, if the Board so directs, include, vary or cancel such a condition).’” This amendment introduces a requirement for the Parole Board to have oversight of new restriction zones which will confine offenders to specific areas in the community while on licence. Amendment 44, page 48, line 17, at end insert— “(10) The Secretary of State must, before laying regulations commencing subsection (4) of this section, undertake an assessment of the potential effects of a driving prohibition condition on a person’s ability to attend— (a) employment, (b) education, or (c) a rehabilitation programme. (11) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report of the assessment carried out under subsection (10) including recommendations on— (a) offender rehabilitation, (b) offender reintegration, and (c) any other matters that the Secretary deems appropriate.” This amendment would require the Secretary of State, before commencing the driving prohibition provisions in the Bill, to publish a report on their potential effects on the ability of ex-offenders to attend employment, education and rehabilitation providers. Amendment 45, page 48, line 17, at end insert— “(10) The Secretary of State must, before laying regulations commencing subsection (7) of this section, undertake and publish an assessment of the potential effects of a restriction zone condition on a person’s ability to attend— (a) employment, (b) education, or (c) a rehabilitation programme. (11) The court may provide for exemptions in a restriction zone condition to allow a person to attend employment, education or a rehabilitation programme. (12) A probation officer may vary a restriction zone condition imposed by the court to allow a person to attend employment, education or a rehabilitation programme. (13) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, each year, a report on— (a) the number of people subject to a restriction zone condition, (b) the number of cases where a restriction zone condition has included an exemption or modification to allow a person to attend employment, education or a rehabilitation programme, and (c) evidence on the effects of restriction zone conditions on reoffending and rehabilitation.” This amendment would require the Secretary of State, before implementing the relevant provisions, to assess the potential effects of a restriction zone condition on an ex-offender’s ability to attend education, employment or a rehabilitation programme. It would allow for exemptions to restriction zone conditions, and require an annual report on their use and effectiveness. Clauses 24 and 25 stand part. Amendment 33, in clause 26, page 50, line 3, at end insert— “(1A) In section 254 (recall of prisoners while on licence), in subsection (1) after ‘prison’ insert— ‘where there is evidence of consistent non-compliance with licence conditions or a specific and imminent risk of harm.’” This amendment gives effect to the recommendation 4.3 of the Independent Sentencing Review for “stricter criteria and thresholds” for recall. Clauses 26 to 28 stand part. Amendment 22, in clause 29, page 55, line 5, leave out “both” and insert “more”. This amendment is linked to NC5 and amendment 23. Amendment 23, page 55, line 27, at end insert— “(8A) The third condition is that the basis for P’s recall is that P has breached a license condition, civil order, or criminal order in relation to the victim of the crime for which P is serving the sentence in question.” This amendment is linked to NC5 and amendment 22. Clauses 29 to 34 stand part. Amendment 32, in clause 35, page 65, line 33, at end insert— “(7) Before making regulations under section 46 to bring this section into force, the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice giving guidance to providers of probation services about how to discharge those functions lawfully having regard to— (a) section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and (b) the data protection legislation (see section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018). (8) The Secretary of State may not issue a code of practice under subsection (7) unless— (a) the Secretary of State has consulted providers of probation services and any other person the Secretary of State considers appropriate about a draft of the code, (b) the Secretary of State has laid a draft of the code before each House of Parliament, and (c) each House of Parliament has by a resolution approved the draft of the code.” This amendment prevents clause 35 from being brought into force until the Secretary of State has issued a code of practice to providers of probation services about how to take and publish photographs lawfully in light of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the data protection legislation. Before issuing a code of practice, the Secretary of State must consult providers of probation services, lay a draft before Parliament and obtain approval from both Houses. Clauses 35 to 44 stand part. Government amendment 19. Clause 45 stand part. Government amendment 20. Clauses 46 and 47 stand part. Government new clause 1—Deportation of foreign criminals— New clause 2—Electronic monitoring: oversight— “(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows. (2) In Part 14 of Schedule 9, in paragraph 31 (Electronic monitoring: person responsible for monitoring), after sub-paragraph (2) insert— ‘(3) Regulations under this section must ensure that— (a) electronic monitoring is overseen by the Probation Service; (b) the fitting of necessary apparatus for the purposes of electronic monitoring may only be undertaken by those in the employment of an organisation with responsibility for delivering electronic monitoring; and (c) the fitting of necessary apparatus may not be undertaken by an employee of HM Prison and Probation Service unless the responsibility for the delivery of electronic monitoring is held solely by HM Prison and Probation Service.’” This new clause would ensure that the probation service oversees electronic monitoring, and that prison officers would not be responsible for fitting tags unless tagging contracts are brought into the public sector. New clause 3—Unpaid work requirements: community work— “(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows. (2) In paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 9 (Restriction on imposing unpaid work requirement), after sub-paragraph (1)(b) insert— ‘(c) that the unpaid work is work undertaken for a non-profit organisation, social enterprise, voluntary organisation or local authority.”’ This new clause would prohibit private sector involvement in unpaid work as part of a community sentence. New clause 4—Probation capacity: independent report— “(1) Within three months of the passage of this Act, a report must be published and laid before Parliament by HM Inspectorate of Probation (‘the Inspectorate’) determining whether there is adequate capacity in the Probation Service to meet provisions of this Act anticipated to increase levels of demand on the Probation Service. (2) If the report under subsection (1) determines that the capacity of the Probation Service is inadequate, provisions of this Act anticipated to increase levels of demand on the Probation Service may not come into force until a further report determines that the Probation Service has adequate capacity. (3) Following a report under subsection (1), the Inspectorate must publish and lay before Parliament a further report, no less than once every twelve months, determining whether there is adequate capacity in the Probation Service. (4) If a report under subsections (1) or (3) determines that the capacity of the Probation Service is inadequate, the Inspectorate may direct that a prioritisation framework must be issued to the areas in which the capacity concerns apply, in order to provide local services with guidance about which activities to deprioritise. (5) The Secretary of State must, within two weeks of the laying of a report under subsections (1) or (3) with a finding of inadequate capacity, make a statement to Parliament setting out how probation capacity will be increased to an adequate level.” This new clause would ensure that the provisions of this Bill likely to increase demand on the Probation Service cannot be implemented until HM Inspectorate of Probation determines that there is adequate capacity to address those demands, and would enable the Inspectorate to trigger the issuing of a prioritisation framework to help local areas to identify which activities to deprioritise. New clause 5—Further release after recall: offenders eligible for risk-assessed release— “(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows. (2) In section 255C, after subsection (3) insert— (3A) Subsection (3B) applies if the basis for P’s recall is that P has breached a license condition, civil order, or criminal order in relation to the victim of a crime for which P is serving a sentence. (3B) Where this subsection applies— (a) at the end of the period of 56 days beginning with the day on which P returns to custody, P must be considered for referral for executive release rather than automatic release; (b) if P is referred for consideration for executive release, the Secretary of State may release P again on licence, and (c) if P is not referred for consideration for executive release, or if P is denied executive release, the Secretary of State must refer P’s case to the Board.” This new clause, along with amendments 22 and 23, would ensure that offenders who have been recalled to prison on the basis of a breach of license condition or of an order related to the victim are risk-assessed, to determine whether it is safe for them to be re-released into the community, rather than being automatically released after 56 days. New clause 6—Lifetime driving ban for death by dangerous or careless driving and related offences— “(1) This section applies where a person is convicted of an offence under sections 1, 2B, 3ZB, 3ZC or 3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. (2) Where this section applies, notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 1 of Part 8 of the Sentencing Code (Driving disqualification), the driver must be banned from driving for life.” This new clause would mean that anyone who causes death by dangerous or careless driving (or related offences) would be banned from driving for life. New clause 7—Under-18 anonymity for cases involving serious crime— “(1) This section applies where a person (‘P’) aged under 18— (a) has been convicted of an offence; and (b) will receive a custodial sentence of four or more years. (2) Where this section applies, prior to delivering sentencing remarks, the court must lift any reporting restrictions identifying P. (3) This section applies notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter IV of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.” This new clause would require reporting restrictions to be lifted at the point of sentencing for young offenders who have received a sentence of four or more years. New clause 8—Victim personal statements— “(1) The Secretary of State shall, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue revised guidance on the content of victim personal statements. (2) The revised guidance issued under subsection (1) must stipulate that when making a victim personal statement, a victim shall be able to say anything they wish about the defendant, provided it is not contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech, makes allegations of untried criminal conduct or is disorderly language. (3) The court must disregard any prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review how to make victim personal statements less restrictive and clarify what can be included. New clause 9—Duty to collect and publish data on sentencing— “(1) Within 24 hours of the conclusion of the passing of a sentence, the relevant court must provide HM Courts and Tribunals Service (‘HMCTS’) with information regarding— (a) the offence category; (b) the sentence length; and (c) such information about the sentenced individual as the Secretary of State may specify in regulations, but which must include— (i) nationality, (ii) sex at birth, (iii) country of birth, (iv) method of entry to the United Kingdom, (v) visa route, (vi) visa status, and (vii) asylum status. (2) HMCTS must collect and record the information set out in subsection (1) in a safe and secure manner. (3) The Secretary of State must publish statistics on the information set out in subsection (1) no less than once every three months.” This new clause would require HMCTS to collect data and other information on sentencing and sentenced offenders, and would require the Government to publish statistics on that data every three months. New clause 10—Court transcripts of sentencing remarks— “(1) All transcripts of sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court must be published within two sitting days of being delivered. (2) All published sentencing remarks must be made freely available, including online.” This new clause would require all sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court to be published and made available to all. New clause 11—Prohibited steps orders— “(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended as follows. (2) In section 8 (Child arrangements orders and other orders with respect to children), in the closing words of subsection (3), after ‘include’ insert ‘proceedings in the Crown Court or Magistrate’s Court under section 10A or’. (3) After section 10 insert— ‘10A Duty of a sentencing court to make a prohibited steps order in respect of sexual offences (1) This section applies where an offender has parental responsibility for a child and the offender is convicted of a sexual offence involving any child victim. (2) Where this section applies, a court must make a prohibited steps order when sentencing the offender. (3) A prohibited steps order made under this section must— (a) cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal for the offence in relation to which the prohibited steps order was imposed; and (b) continue to have effect during an offender’s licence period after release for the relevant offence. (4) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (Proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.’” This new clause would require the courts to make a “prohibited steps order” (PSO) – preventing a parent from taking a specific action or set of actions regarding their child – after the conviction of a person with parental responsibilities for a sexual offence involving a child victim. New clause 12—Unduly lenient sentences scheme: victims— “(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows. (2) In section 36 (Reviews of sentencing), after subsection (2) insert— ‘(2A) An application may be made to the Attorney General to review any sentence passed by a Crown Court under the terms set out in this section. (2B) An application under subsection (2A) must be made within— (a) one year of the sentence being passed, if the application is made by— (i) the victim of the offence for which the sentence was passed; or (ii) the next of kin of a deceased victim or a victim who lacks capacity; or (b) 56 days of the sentence being passed, if made by any other person. (2C) The Crown Prosecution Service must write to— (a) any victim of any offence for which a sentence has been passed in the Crown Court; or (b) the next of kin of any deceased victim; within 10 working days of a sentence being passed, to provide details of the Unduly Lenient Sentence scheme, the application process for the scheme, and the deadlines set out in subsection (2B) of this section.’” This new clause would extend the deadline for applications to the Unduly Lenient Sentences Scheme from 28 days to 56 days, or for a year for victims of crime (or the next of kin of deceased victims). It would also require the CPS to notify victims about the scheme. New clause 13—Sexual offences: offender personality disorder pathway— “(1) The Prison Rules 1999 are amended as follows. (2) In paragraph 20 (Health services), after sub-paragraph (1), insert— ‘(1A) Provision under subsection (1) must include access, for all eligible prisoners serving custodial sentences for sexual offences, to services provided under the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway.’” This new clause would require the Government to provide access to the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway to all eligible prisoners serving sentences for sexual offences. New clause 14—Sexual offences: chemical suppression— “Within one year of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report on how most effectively to introduce mandatory chemical suppression for certain individuals serving sentences for sexual offences, with appropriate legal and clinical safeguards.” This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on mandatory chemical suppression for certain sex offenders. New clause 15—Sentencing Council: abolition— “(1) The Sentencing Council (established under section 118 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) is abolished. (2) The Secretary of State may prepare— (a) sentencing guidelines which may be general in nature or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of offender; (b) sentencing guidelines about the discharge of a court's duty under section 73 of the Sentencing Code (reduction in sentences for guilty pleas); and (c) sentencing guidelines about the application of any rule of law as to the totality of sentences. (3) The Secretary of State may prepare sentencing guidelines about any other matter. (4) When developing sentencing guidelines, the Secretary of State must— (a) promote understanding of, and public confidence in, the sentencing and criminal justice system; (b) consult Parliament on all draft guidelines; and (c) publish the reasons for proposing any guidelines that could result in an offender receiving a shorter sentence than that set out in an Act of Parliament. (5) The Secretary of State may report, from time to time, on the impact of sentencing guidelines on sentencing practice. (6) The Secretary of State must monitor— (a) the application of the sentencing guidelines; and (b) the impact on victims of sentencing decisions. (7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.’ This new clause would abolish the Sentencing Council, give the Secretary of State the power to publish Sentencing guidelines, and impose various requirements linked to consultation and monitoring. New clause 16—Whole life order: murder of a police or prison officer— “(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows. (2) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 21 (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc), in sub-paragraph (2)(c), after ‘duty,’, insert ‘or if the motivation for the murder was connected to the police officer or prison officer’s current or former duties,’” This new clause would expand the circumstances in which it is appropriate to apply a whole life order for murdering a prison or police officer, to include murder motivated by the victim's current or former duties. New clause 17—Management of offenders: devolution to Wales— “(1) Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended as follows. (2) In Paragraph 175 (Prisons and offender management)— (a) omit sub-paragraph (2); and (b) in sub-paragraph (3), omit ‘probation’ (3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.” This new clause seeks to devolve probation services and offender management to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006. New clause 18—Reporting on use of electronic monitoring requirements— “In the Sentencing Code, in Part 14 of Schedule 9 (electronic monitoring), after paragraph 35 insert— ‘36(1) The Secretary of State must as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each calendar year prepare a report on the imposition of the electronic monitoring requirements during that year. (2) The report must set out— (a) the number of electronic monitoring requirements imposed during the year; (b) the number of electronic monitoring requirements imposed on offenders under 18 during the year; (c) the rate of compliance with the electronic monitoring requirements during the year; (d) the cost of administering the electronic monitoring requirements during the year; (e) the average amount of time taken during the year to activate a device used for the purposes of an electronic monitoring requirement after such a requirement took effect; (f) the number of devices used for the purposes of the electronic monitoring requirements that malfunctioned during the year. (3) The Secretary of State must— (a) publish the report, and (b) lay a copy of the published report before Parliament.’” This new clause requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a report each calendar year on the use of electronic monitoring requirements. The report must include the number of electronic monitoring requirements imposed each year, the rate of compliance and the cost of administering the requirements each year. The report must be laid before Parliament. New clause 19—Re-sentencing those serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection— “(1) The Lord Chancellor must make arrangements to ensure that every person serving an IPP sentence, whether in prison or the community, has been re-sentenced in accordance with this section within 24 months of the day on which this Act is passed. (2) The Lord Chancellor must establish a committee to provide advice regarding the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s duty under subsection (1). (3) The committee established by virtue of subsection (2) must— (a) include a judge nominated by the Lord Chief Justice; and (b) within 12 months of being appointed, lay a report before Parliament on the process of re-sentencing individuals serving an IPP sentence. (4) The Lord Chancellor may disband the committee established under subsection (2) after a report has been laid under subsection (3)(b). (5) The Lord Chancellor must disband the committee once all those serving IPP sentences have been re-sentenced under this section. (6) Subject to subsection (8), a Crown Court designated by the Lord Chancellor (“the re-sentencing court”) must re-sentence a person serving an IPP sentence in relation to the offence or offences for which they were previously sentenced to an IPP sentence. (7) The re-sentencing court must not impose a sentence more severe than the notional determinate sentence upon which the IPP sentence was based. (8) The re-sentencing court may confirm the IPP sentence only if— (a) the re-sentencing court determines that, at the date of the original sentencing, ignoring the alternative of an IPP sentence, the person serving the IPP sentence might appropriately have received a whole life order under section 321 of the Sentencing Act 2020; and (b) at the date of re-sentencing, there is a substantial risk of P committing a further offence if released. (9) The re-sentencing court may only confirm an IPP sentence where the judge hearing the matter is authorised to try cases of murder. (10) The re-sentencing court may recommend that the re-sentenced person may be subject to an extended licence, if the re-sentencing court considers this appropriate. (11) In relation to the exercise of the power in subsection (6)— (a) that power is to be treated as a power to re-sentence under section 402(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020; (b) the Sentencing Code applies for the purposes of this section (and, accordingly, it does not matter that a person serving an IPP sentence was convicted of an offence before 1 December 2020). (12) The Lord Chancellor must, at the end of every twelve-month period beginning with the day this section comes into force, lay before Parliament a report that sets out— (a) the number of persons who have been re-sentenced under subsection (6); (b) the number of persons who have had their sentences confirmed under subsection (8). (13) For the purposes of this section, “IPP sentence” means— (a) a sentence of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution for public protection under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; or (b) a sentence of detention for public protection under section 226 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; or (c) a sentence of indeterminate imprisonment or detention passed as a result of sections 219 or 221 of the Armed Forces Act 2006; (14) This section comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.” This new clause would implement the recommendation of the Justice Select Committee’s 2022 Report that there should be a resentencing exercise in relation to all IPP sentenced individuals, and to establish a time-limited expert committee, including a member of the judiciary, to advise on the practical implementation of such an exercise. New clause 20—Provision for a prisoner to apply to the Parole Board for a licence termination review following expiry of the qualifying period on annual basis— “(1) The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 is amended as follows. (2) In section 31A (imprisonment or detention for public protection: termination of licences), after subsection (3) insert— ‘(3A) Where— (a) the prisoner has been released on licence under this Chapter; (b) the qualifying period has expired; and (c) if his case has been considered for termination previously by the Parole Board and a period of at least twelve months has expired since the disposal of that application, the prisoner may make an application to the Parole Board under this subsection.’ (3) In subsection (4)— (a) after ‘reference’ insert ‘or application’; after ‘subsection (3)’ insert ‘or (3A)’.” This new clause would allow a prisoner whose licence has not been terminated by the Parole Board two or three years after their first release to make an application annually to the Parole Board for termination. This would increase the opportunities for licences to be terminated. New clause 21—Further release after recall: requirement for a review— “(1) Before sections 27 to 30 come into force, the Secretary of State must publish a review of the effectiveness of Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Suitability for Fixed Term Recall) Order 2025, including but not limited to— (a) an evaluation of its impact on— (i) public protection; (ii) rehabilitation; (iii) reconviction; (iv) probation capacity and resource; and (b) an assessment of how any learning from the evaluation specified in subsection (1)(a) will be applied to the implementation of the provisions of sections 27 to 30 of this Act. (2) A copy of the review must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.” This new clause provides an opportunity for the current legislation for recall to be reviewed prior to new legislation being rolled out, to ensure it is effective and adequately protects the public. New clause 22—Review of sentence following a change in law— “(1) Where a person is serving or subject to a sentence imposed for an offence, and— (a) the offence has been abolished, or (b) there has been a change in the law which materially alters the sentence that would be imposed for the same offence following that change in the law, that person may apply to the sentencing court, or to such other court as may be prescribed, for a review of the sentence. (2) On such an application, the court may— (a) quash the sentence and resentence the person in accordance with the existing law; or (b) make such other order as necessary in the interests of justice. (3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the procedure and eligibility criteria for applications under this section.” This new clause would allow a person still serving a sentence under a law that has changed to seek review or resentencing in line with the existing law. New clause 23—Review of the impact of a change in the law on unspent convictions— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report reviewing— (a) the effect of changes in the criminal law, whether legislative or judicial, on those serving sentences for offences that would attract a different sentence following the subsequent changes to the criminal law; and (b) the adequacy of existing mechanisms for addressing any perceived injustice arising from such changes. (2) The Secretary of State must thereafter lay a further report under subsection (1) every three years. (3) A report made under this section must include— (a) recommendations for legislative or administrative steps to prevent any instances of injustice arising from changes in the law; and (b) data on the number of persons serving sentences in the scenario set out in subsection (1)(a) and, of those, the number who remain imprisoned.” This new clause would create a statutory duty for the Government to review, on a recurring basis, how changes to the law affect those already convicted or sentenced. New clause 24—Sentencing Council— “The Sentencing Council of England and Wales is abolished.” New clause 25—Deportation of foreign criminals— “(1) A foreign criminal who has been sentenced to— (a) a custodial sentence of at least 6 months; or (b) a community sentence of at least 6 months, must be the subject of an immediate deportation order, subject to subsection (2) below. (2) The Secretary of State may determine, in exceptional cases, that a deportation order under subsection (1) does not apply. (3) In this section, ‘foreign criminal’ means a person who— (a) is not a British citizen or an Irish citizen, and (b) is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence.” This new clause is intended to replace Clause 42. It would apply an automatic deportation order to foreign criminals sentenced to at least six months’ imprisonment or a six month community sentence. New clause 26—Criminal cases review— “(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows. (2) After section 36 (Reviews of sentencing), insert— ‘Part IVB CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW (PUBLIC PETITION) 36A Scope of this Part (1) A case to which this Part applies may be referred to the Court of Appeal under section 2 below. (2) Subject to Rules of Court, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under section 36B shall be exercised by the criminal division of the Court, and references to the Court of Appeal in this Part shall be construed as references to that division. (3) This Part applies to any case— (a) of a description specified in an order under this section; or (b) in which sentence is passed on a person— (i) for an offence triable only on indictment; or (ii) for an offence of a description specified in an order under this section. (4) The Secretary of State may by order provide that this section shall apply to any case of a description specified in the order or to any case in which sentence is passed on a person for an offence triable either way of a description specified in the order. (5) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. (6) In this Part, “sentence” has the same meaning as in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, except that it does not include an interim hospital order under Part III of the Mental Health Act 1983, and “sentencing” shall be construed accordingly. (7) In its application to Northern Ireland, this section shall have effect subject to the modifications set out in subsections (8) to (11). (8) Subsection (2) shall not apply to Northern Ireland. (9) In this section— “offence triable only on indictment” means an offence punishable only on conviction on indictment; “offence triable either way” means an offence punishable on conviction on indictment or on summary conviction; and any reference in subsection (4) to the Secretary of State must be construed as a reference to the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. (10) For subsection (5), in Northern Ireland an order under subsection (4) shall be a statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (and not a statutory instrument), and any such order shall be subject to negative resolution (within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954). (11) References in subsection (6) to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and Part III of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall be respectively construed as references to Part I of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 and Part III of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986. 36B Criminal cases review (public petition) (1) If it appears to any adult British citizen aged 18 or over— (a) that the sentencing of a person in a proceeding in the Crown Court (“the person sentenced”) has been unduly lenient or unduly harsh; and (b) that the case is one to which section 36A applies, that British citizen (“the petitioner”) may refer the case to the Criminal Cases Review Commission (“the Commission”) for it to review the sentencing of the person sentenced, in accordance with section 36C below, and if the Commission refers the case to the Court of Appeal, upon such a reference the Court of Appeal may— (i) quash any sentence passed on the person sentenced; and (ii) in place of it pass such sentence as they think appropriate for the case and as the lower court had power to pass when dealing with the person sentenced, provided that the petitioner has filed the reference with the Commission in writing, signed by at least 500 signatures (“the co-petitioners”) including his own. (2) The Secretary of State may by regulations stipulate the information and form that the petitioner must provide when filing the reference. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, the condition specified in paragraph (a) of that subsection may be satisfied whether or not it appears that the judge— (a) erred in law as to his powers of sentencing; or (b) failed to comply with a mandatory sentence requirement under section 399(b) or (c) of the Sentencing Code. (4) For the purposes of this Part, any two or more sentences are to be treated as passed in the same proceeding if they would be so treated for the purposes of section 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. (5) Where a reference under this section relates to a minimum term order made under section 321 of the Sentencing Code, the Court of Appeal shall not, in deciding what order under that section is appropriate for the case, make any allowance for the fact that the person to whom it relates is being sentenced for a second time. (6) No judge shall sit as a member of the Court of Appeal on the hearing of, or shall determine any application in proceedings incidental or preliminary to, a reference under this section of a sentence passed by himself. (7) Where the Court of Appeal has concluded its review of a case referred to it under this section, and given its judgment thereon, the Court of Appeal, the petitioner or the person sentenced may refer a point of law involved in any sentence passed on the person sentenced to the Supreme Court for its opinion, and the Supreme Court shall consider the point and give its opinion on it accordingly, and either remit the case to the Court of Appeal to be dealt with or itself deal with the case. (8) A reference under subsection (6) shall be made only with the leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court and leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal that the point of law is of general public importance and it appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court. (9) For the purpose of dealing with a case under this section, the Supreme Court may exercise any powers of the Court of Appeal. (10) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland— (a) subsection (2)(b) shall read as if for the words after “failed to” there were substituted “impose a sentence required by— (i) Article 70(2) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, (ii) paragraph 2(4) or (5) of Schedule 2 to the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, (iii) Article 13 or 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, or (iv) section 7(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015”. (b) the references to sections 11 and 35(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 shall be read as references to sections 10(2) and 33(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980, respectively; and (c) the reference in subsection (3A) to a minimum term order made under section 321 of the Sentencing Code shall be read as a reference to an order under Article 5(1) of the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001. 36C The Commission (1) The Commission under section 36B is the same body as that established under section 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 and the provisions of section 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 shall apply to the role of the Commission under this Part. (2) Sections 9, 10, and 12A to 25 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 shall apply to this Part. (3) The Commission must review all cases referred to it within 8 weeks of receiving any such referral and must, within that time, make its decision. (4) If the Commission decides that the case should be referred to the Court of Appeal by reason of an unduly harsh sentence then, immediately upon receipt of the referral, the Court of Appeal must make an order that the person sentenced be released on temporary licence (“ROTL”) until further order of the court, and the Court of Appeal must also determine suitable bail conditions, if any and the person sentenced must remain ROTL until the Court of Appeal has determined the referral.”’ New clause 27—Foreign criminals: stalking— ‘(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows. (2) After section 32 (Automatic deportation) insert— “32A Deportation following stalking offences (1) This section applies where a foreign criminal— (a) has been convicted of an offence under sections 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or section 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; and (b) is subject to a deportation order under this Act. (2) Where this section applies, prior to deportation, a risk assessment must be prepared to assess the likelihood after deportation of the foreign criminal— (a) committing an offence which, were it to be committed in England or Wales, would constitute a further offence under sections 2A or 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or section 42A of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; or (b) contacting or seeking to contact the victim of the offence for which the foreign criminal was convicted in England or Wales. (3) A risk assessment prepared under this section must be shared, subject to the requirements of the Data Protection Act 2018, with the relevant authorities in the country to which the foreign criminal will be deported. (4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.’” This new clause would require the preparation of a risk assessment for any foreign criminal being deported after a stalking conviction, and for the assessment to be shared with the authorities in the country to which the offender is returning. New clause 28—Gambling treatment requirement— “(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows. (2) In section 201 (community order: community order requirements table), after the entry in the table relating to the alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement, insert— ‘(3) In Schedule 9 (community orders and suspended sentence orders: requirements), after Part 12 insert— “Part 12a GAMBLING TREATMENT REQUIREMENT 26A(1) In this Code “gambling treatment requirement”, in relation to a relevant order, means a requirement that during a period specified in the order the offender must seek gambling addiction treatment through the National Health Service. (2) In this paragraph— (a) “gambling treatment”, in relation to an offender, means— (i) treatment provided through a specialist NHS gambling service or gambling clinic; or (ii) another form of NHS treatment determined by a qualified clinician to have the best chance of reducing or eliminating the offender’s gambling addiction; and (b) ”qualified clinician” means an NHS clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist with appropriate professional qualifications. (3) Sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) apply to a relevant order which imposes a gambling treatment requirement. (4) The order may specify separate periods comprising the period specified under sub-paragraph (1). (5) For each treatment period, the order may specify the treatment provider but must not otherwise specify the nature of the treatment. (6) In sub-paragraph (5), “treatment period” means— (a) if the order specifies separate periods under sub-paragraph (4), any of those periods; (b) otherwise, the period specified under sub-paragraph (1).”’” This new clause would introduce a new gambling treatment requirement, requiring an offender to seek NHS gambling addiction treatment as part of a community order. New clause 29—Gambling addiction: support for offenders— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on how the Government will ensure that— (a) sentencing courts treat gambling disorder as a mental disorder for the purposes of section 232 of the Sentencing Code; (b) sentencing courts have access to appropriate clinical advice on the impact of a gambling disorder on offending behaviour, where relevant; and (c) offenders have access to treatment and peer support for gambling disorder, both in prison and in the community. (2) Within twelve months of the publication of a report under subsection (1) above and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State must publish a further report on progress against the objectives set out in subsection (1).” This new clause would require the Government to report to Parliament on how it will improve support for offenders with gambling addictions and ensure that gambling disorder is recognised as a mental health condition by sentencing courts. New clause 30—Re-sentencing those serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection— “(1) The Lord Chancellor must make arrangements for, and relating to, the re-sentencing of all prisoners serving IPP sentences within 18 months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed. (2) Those arrangements must include arrangements relating to the establishment of a committee to provide advice regarding the discharge of the Lord Chancellor’s duty under subsection (1). (3) The committee established by virtue of subsection (2) must include a judge nominated by the Lord Chief Justice. (4) A court that imposed an IPP sentence has the power to re-sentence the prisoner in relation to the original offence. (5) But the court may not impose a sentence that is a heavier penalty than the sentence that was imposed for the original offence. (6) In relation to the exercise of the power in subsection (4)— (a) that power is to be treated as a power to re-sentence under the Sentencing Code (see section 402(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020); (b) the Code applies for the purposes of this section (and, accordingly, it does not matter that a person serving an IPP sentence was convicted of an offence before 1 December 2020). (7) In this section— ‘IPP sentence’ means a sentence of imprisonment or detention in a young offender institution for public protection under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 or a sentence of detention for public protection under section 226 of that Act (including such a sentence of imprisonment or detention passed as a result of section 219 or 221 of the Armed Forces Act 2006); ‘original offence’ means the offence in relation to which the IPP sentence was imposed. (8) This section comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.” This new clause would implement the recommendation of the Justice Committee’s 2022 Report that there should be a resentencing exercise in relation to all IPP sentenced individuals, and to establish a time-limited expert committee, including a member of the judiciary, to advise on the practical implementation of such an exercise. New clause 31—Use of funds raised through income reduction orders— “(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the potential benefits and costs of directing the funds raised from income reduction orders into a fund that provides support for victims. (2) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment under subsection (1) before Parliament.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of the potential benefits of using the monies raised through income reduction orders to fund support for victims. New clause 32—Probation caseloads— “(1) The Secretary of State must, before laying regulations to commence the provisions in this Act, establish maximum caseload limits for probation officers supervising individuals subject to— (a) licence conditions; (b) community orders; or (c) any other form of court-imposed supervision by the probation service. (2) The Secretary of State must, each year, lay before Parliament a report on compliance with the caseload limits set under this section.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set maximum caseloads for probation before implementation of the Act, and to report annually on compliance. New clause 33—Access to rehabilitation and support services— “(1) The probation service must ensure all individuals subject to licence conditions, community orders, or other court-imposed supervision have access to— (a) NHS mental health and substance misuse services, (b) education, training and employment support, and (c) approved behaviour change or offender behaviour programmes. (2) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, each year, a report on the availability and use of the services provided under subsection (1).” This new clause would require the probation service to ensure people under its supervision can access mental health and substance misuse services; education, training and support; and approved behaviour change or offender management programmes, and to report annually on the availability and uptake of those services. New clause 34—Digital systems for tracking offender progress— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, undertake an assessment of the benefits and costs of implementing a digital sentence management system for prisoners and individuals who are subject to supervision by the probation service. (2) The assessment must consider the following potential functions of a sentence management system— (a) tracking offender progress, (b) providing for the sharing of information between the courts, probation service, and other relevant agencies, subject to the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018, (c) monitoring compliance with rehabilitation programmes, and (d) any other functions that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of implementing a digital sentence management system for prisoners and individuals subject to supervision by the probation service. New clause 35—Specialist teams for high-risk or complex offenders— “(1) The probation service must undertake an assessment of the potential benefits of establishing specialist probation teams to supervise— (a) high-risk offenders, (b) offenders with complex mental health needs, (c) offenders with substance misuse needs, and (d) young offenders who are transitioning to adult supervision. (2) The assessment must consider the potential benefits of specialist probation teams having lower average caseloads per probation officer. (3) The assessment must consider the potential arrangements for specialist probation teams accessing support from other relevant agencies. (4) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment under this section before Parliament.” This new clause would require the probation service to assess the potential benefits of establishing specialist probation teams to supervise offenders who are high-risk; have complex mental health or substance misuse needs; and young offenders transitioning to adult supervision. New clause 36—Domestic abuse aggravated offences— “(1) A court must treat an offence committed in England and Wales as domestic abuse aggravated, if— (a) the offender and the victim are personally connected to each other; and (b) the offence involves behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse. (2) In this section— (a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and (b) ‘personally connected’ has the meaning given by section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.” This new clause would require a court to treat a domestic abuse offence as aggravated. New clause 37—Rehabilitative programmes for offences relating to violence against women and girls— “(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the potential benefits of creating mandatory rehabilitative programmes about women and girls, for individuals sentenced for— (a) assault; (b) battery; or (c) actual bodily harm when the victim is a woman or girl. (2) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment under this section before Parliament.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the potential benefits of creating mandatory rehabilitative programmes about women and girls, for individuals sentenced for certain offences. New clause 38—Screening for traumatic brain injuries— “(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the potential costs and benefits of screening all prisoners for traumatic brain injuries at the start of their custodial sentence. (2) The assessment should consider— (a) how screening for traumatic brain injuries could inform the management of a prisoner’s sentence, (b) the health services and rehabilitation programmes available for prisoners with traumatic brain injuries, and (c) any other matters that the Secretary of State deems appropriate. (3) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment made under this section before Parliament.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the potential benefits of introducing standardised screening for traumatic brain injuries for prisoners starting a custodial sentence. New clause 39—Suspension of driving licences during bail for driving related offences— “(1) This section applies where an individual has been granted bail in respect of one of the following offences— (a) dangerous or careless driving; (b) drink driving; or (c) drug driving. (2) The court may suspend the driving licence of the individual, pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings.” This new clause would allow the court to suspend the driving licence of an individual charged for certain driving offences, pending the outcome of the trial. New clause 40—Access to rehabilitation programmes and education for individuals held on remand— “(1) Where an individual is held in custodial remand pending sentencing, the probation service must provide access to the same rehabilitative programmes that are available to prisoners after sentencing. (2) Where an individual is held in custodial demand pending trial, the probation service must provide access to the same— (a) education; (b) therapy; and (c) any other support that the probation service deems appropriate, that is available to prisoners after sentencing.” This new clause would allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. New clause 41—No presumption of suspended sentence— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender is not a British citizen or an Irish citizen.” New clause 42—Tagging of offenders receiving suspended sentences— “Where a court has imposed a suspended sentence, it must impose a condition that an offender must be subject to electronic monitoring for the duration of that sentence.” New clause 43—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 2)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, is an offence under section 1 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 or section 89 (1) of the Police Act 1996.” New clause 44—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 3)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, either involves possession of or threatening with an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon.” New clause 45—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 4)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, is aggravated by section 68A of the Sentencing Act 2020 (assaults on those providing a public service etc).” New clause 46—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 5)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has committed or been convicted of three other offences in the 12 months preceding the offence.” New clause 47—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 6)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has committed 10 or more other previous offences at the time of the offence or at the time of conviction for the offence.” New clause 48—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 7)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has previously received a suspended sentence order for the same offence.” New clause 49—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 8)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has previously received a custodial sentence for the same offence.” New clause 50—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 9)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, has a mandatory minimum sentence.” New clause 51—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 10)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, involves a firearm or ammunition including but not limited to the Firearms Act 1968 and the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006.” New clause 52—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 11)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, is one of burglary.” New clause 53—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 12)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, has a connection to terrorism, including but not limited to offences relating to terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Explosive Substances Act 1883.” New clause 54—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 13)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, is one that falls under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme under sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.” New clause 55—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 14)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has breached previous suspended sentence orders three or more times, either by failing to comply with the requirements of the orders or by re-offending during the order’s operational period.” New clause 56—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 15)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, was committed while the offender was subject to a supervision order.” New clause 57—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 16)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, was committed while the offender was on licence, or subject to supervision, under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release, licences, supervision and recall).” New clause 58—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 17)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offence, or an associated offence, is an offence under section 6(1) or (2) of the Bail Act 1976 (failure to surrender to custody).” New clause 59—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 18)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has a history of poor compliance with court orders.” New clause 60—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 19)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender is being sentenced for three or more offences.” New clause 61—No presumption of suspended sentence (No. 20)— “The presumption of a suspended sentence will not apply if the offender has already been convicted of committing the same offence three or more times.” New clause 62—Expiry— “This Act expires at the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which it is passed.” Schedules 1 to 4 stand part. Government new schedule 1—Sentence with fixed licence period in Scotland or Northern Ireland: consequential provision— Government amendment 21.
I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require a company that meets a specified criteria to report any cyber extortion or ransomware attack on the company to the Government within a specified time after the attack; to make provision about the content of such reports, including a requirement to provide information about any payments made; and for connected purposes. This is a timely and pressing matter. Illegal activity across the nation is on the rise, and cyber-attacks are no exception. The National Cyber Security Centre has reported a 50% increase in British cyber-incidents deemed “highly significant” over the past year. Furthermore, of the 429 incidents the NCSC was called upon to assist with, at least half were considered of “national importance”. Among the significant threats identified in the NCSC’s 2025 annual review are hostile states such as China, linked to a co-ordinated campaign involving three China-based companies targeting foreign Governments and critical networks, and Iran, which the NCSC assessed as a highly likely threat to UK entities. UK IT leaders are understandably alarmed. Research from Armis has revealed that 74% of UK IT leaders cite China and 71% cite Russia as their top cyber-security concerns. If that is not enough, recent espionage trials have thrown a harsh spotlight on the scale and intent of state-sponsored cyber-operations. The threat is undeniable. We must act with urgency to safeguard UK-based companies and critical infrastructure before these escalating menaces begin to seriously disrupt the functioning of our nation. Under current legislation, cyber-attacks need only be reported in limited circumstances: organisations handling personal data must report cyber-attacks that pose a likely risk to individual rights; essential service operators and relevant digital service providers must disclose incidents with “substantial” service impact; and a few regulated bodies, such as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Solicitors Regulation Authority, follow their own cyber-incident reporting requirements. Notably, there is no requirement for companies to disclose when a ransomware payment has been made, despite the significant financial burden such payments can impose. Cohesity’s “Global cyber resilience report 2024” found that 59% of companies targeted by ransomware chose to pay, with an average cost of £870,000 and some reaching as high as £20 million. The reality is clear: cyber-crime, particularly extortion and ransomware, has outpaced existing legislation. It has allowed dangerous gaps to emerge in our intelligence gathering—gaps that criminals are likely to exploit—and has weakened the defences of our national critical infrastructure against these escalating threats. The Cyber Extortion and Ransomware (Reporting) Bill seeks to close those gaps and reinforce the UK’s resilience against cyber-crime. Following Australia’s implementation of a mandatory ransomware payment reporting regime, which has so far been successful, it is imperative that the UK follows suit. The Bill would mandate any British company registered under the Companies Act 2006 that has an annual turnover above £25 million or is responsible for critical national infrastructure to inform the Government within 72 hours of becoming victim to a cyber-extortion or ransomware attack, with a further report being required if any payment is made by the company or a third party on its behalf, within 72 hours of the transaction taking place. We have all witnessed the shocking headlines about major British companies under siege from cyber-attacks, resulting in severe disruption and millions in lost revenue. From M&S to the Co-op, Harrods to Jaguar Land Rover, these attacks have been crippling, and yet the Government currently have no legal right to know whether a ransom payment was made to restore their systems. What if that payment was made to a terrorist organisation? What if it was sent to a hostile state? It is not the fault of the companies who, under immense pressure and with limited options, choose to pay to regain control of their operations. The fault lies in the gaps in our legislation—gaps that allow ransom payments to go unreported, potentially fuelling even greater threats against our nation. The proposed threshold of an annual turnover exceeding £25 million or those responsible for critical national infrastructure has been carefully considered. It captures approximately 78% of medium-sized businesses and all large corporations, while avoiding the overwhelming influx of reports that a lower threshold would trigger due to the high number of small and medium-sized enterprises in the UK. National critical infrastructure comprises all 13 sectors defined by the Government: chemicals, civil nuclear, communications, defence, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, space, transport and water. These criteria capture the vast majority of companies whose compromise through attack or ransom payment could pose a serious risk to the UK. It also reflects the volume of reports our resources can realistically manage, while establishing a clear, accessible threshold so that companies are not forced to navigate complex policy during the stress of an active attack. Another imperative component of this approach is the inclusion of all payment types, whether monetary, intellectual property, exchanges of gifts or services or other forms of benefits. This broader scope will enable law enforcement to trace criminal networks, identify patterns and disrupt the flow of illicit funds. It will help to inform better resource allocation, as well as holding the potential to foster collaboration across sectors that would result in faster alerts and stronger resilience. I understand that many companies may have reservations regarding the requirement to report incidents and ransom payments. It could leave them vulnerable to reputational damage from potential leaks, damaging their business further. This proposal is pro-business, and that is why robust legal protections would be established to ensure that any reports made to the Government remain strictly confidential, with no right of publication, unless it is deemed to be in the national interest. This will give companies the assurance they need to report without fear and the support they deserve to help their recovery. What happens if a company fails to report within 72 hours of a cyber-extortion attack or neglects to submit a follow-up report within 72 hours of making a ransom payment? Quite simply, it will face a civil monetary penalty. Mandated reporting is essential to our national security and collective wellbeing. Non-compliance must be actively discouraged. It is in the company’s interest, the public’s interest and the Government’s interest. The absence of mandatory reporting, especially for ransom payments, leaves a dangerous blind spot in our national security. When companies report these payments, our security agencies gain vital intelligence—intelligence that helps us to understand who is being targeted, how attacks are evolving and where our vulnerabilities lie before they are exploited. Espionage today is not confined to spies and stolen documents. It is digital, it is silent, and it is relentless. The grey zone exists. Cyber-extortion and ransomware attacks are fast becoming the preferred weapons of hostile actors seeking to destabilise our institutions and exploit our vulnerabilities. Their attacks are becoming progressively more complex, often leaving companies with no viable alternative but to make ransom payments. From individual hackers to organised criminal gangs and state-backed attacks from overseas, we cannot afford to fall behind in the race of technological defences and expose ourselves to increasingly sophisticated cyber-extortion attacks. While I acknowledge that the Government referenced the introduction of a cyber-security Bill in the King’s Speech, it is deeply concerning that, despite the urgency of the threat, the Bill has yet to even be brought before Parliament. Cyber criminals are not slowing down, and their methods are not becoming simpler. On the contrary, attacks are growing in complexity, scale and impact. Although I recognise that sound policy requires time to develop, we cannot afford to proceed at our current glacial pace. Delay only deepens our vulnerability, particularly in the light of recent events. We must act decisively and without hesitation to safeguard British businesses and protect our national security. The choice before us is stark: either we allow ourselves to become increasingly exposed as criminals outpace our outdated legislation and other nations fortify their defences, or we rise to meet the moment with urgency, resolve and the protections our country demands. It is time for us to send an important message: we will not allow cyber criminals to continue operating in the shadows, unchecked and unchallenged. Question put and agreed to. Ordered, That Bradley Thomas, Tom Tugendhat, Alison Griffiths, Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst, Joy Morrissey, Saqib Bhatti, John Glen, Greg Smith, Ben Obese-Jecty, Lincoln Jopp, Sir John Hayes and Jim Shannon present the Bill. Bradley Thomas accordingly presented the Bill. Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 29 May 2026, and to be printed (Bill 315).
I beg to move, That this House has considered progress on ending homelessness. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I thank the Backbench Business Committee, which I chair, for granting this debate—I am not surprised that it took that very sensible decision. I begin by welcoming the new Minister to her place and congratulating her on her appointment and the recent funding announcement to support local authorities in addressing homelessness. Her prompt action and proven commitment to tackling child poverty gives me, and I am sure the whole House, confidence that we can look forward to a constructive and purposeful debate today. I am grateful to the many Members who have attended. The Minister needs no persuasion that homelessness is one of the great injustices in our society and an affront to human dignity that we have a moral duty to end. I think we share that belief across this House. We see every day the human cost of homelessness. We see it far too frequently in the constituent letters we receive, in the stories we hear at our surgeries, and even outside the parliamentary estate on the streets of Westminster as we walk to work each day. But behind every statistic and every person is a unique story. This morning at least 4,600 people woke up on our streets, uncertain where they would sleep tonight. More than 132,000 households live in temporary accommodation, facing constant instability, and more than 172,000 children went to school today knowing that when they return it will not be to a home, but to a mouldy bed and breakfast, a run-down hotel or a short-term let that they could be asked to leave at any moment. They are not just numbers on a page; they are lives in limbo. Homelessness is a moral crisis, but also a practical one. Local authorities in London—I know colleagues will refer to their own areas—are now spending almost £5 million every single day on temporary accommodation that is often of such poor quality that it damages health and education and hinders opportunity. It is difficult to imagine another area of public spending where we would tolerate so much money being spent to achieve so little outcome. As winter approaches and the nights grow colder, the urgency deepens. This is the moment for decisive, co-ordinated action, so I ask the Minister when we can expect the Government to publish and deliver the promised cross-Government strategy for homelessness. Can she confirm that the interministerial group will continue to meet regularly under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State to drive that strategy forward? If she needs a vehicle to make that happen, my private Member’s Homelessness Prevention Bill, which received an unopposed Second Reading, could go into Committee with a money resolution and we could help get a legal position to support the work that she is going to do.
Clearly, the hon. Member anticipates something I will say later in my speech. I have long advocated that we need to build 90,000 affordable homes for social rent each year to meet the demand. As co-chairman of the all-party parliamentary group for ending homelessness, I want to draw the Minister’s attention to our new report, “Homes, Support, Prevention—Our Foundations For Ending Homelessness”. The report brings together evidence from across the country, from local and combined authorities, charities, service providers, academics and, crucially, people who have lived experience of homelessness themselves. The report distils a complex problem into three simple but essential pillars that any effective strategy must deliver: first, preventing homelessness wherever possible; secondly, rapidly rehousing people who still need help; and thirdly, improving support for those experiencing the most severe forms of homelessness. The best way to end homelessness is to prevent it happening in the first place. Almost everyone with lived experience who contributed to our APPG’s work identified a point at which their homelessness could have been prevented. That is a missed opportunity where timely help could have made all the difference. Prevention should not be a political issue; it is simply common sense and morally right, socially responsible and economically wise. Research by Shelter found that one in 10 people in temporary accommodation had to give up work due to their housing situation. That statistic alone should galvanise us to act earlier, before people lose not only their homes but their jobs, stability and self-confidence in a downward spiral. Through my private Members’ Bills, I have worked to put prevention at the heart of our response. The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 focused on preventing people becoming homeless and presented the largest and most comprehensive changes to the rights of homeless people for more than 39 years. Fundamentally, its purpose is to ensure that everyone at risk of being homeless or who is currently homeless is legally entitled to meaningful help from their local authority, regardless of their current status. Previously, local authorities had been entitled to assist only those who were deemed a priority and at crisis point. That excluded the majority of people, including almost all of those who were single. The Act also addressed the significant lack of meaningful advice and assistance, which more often than not in the majority of cases was not tailored to the individual’s needs and requirements. The Act implemented a duty on specified public bodies to refer any person whom they believed was at risk of homelessness within the next 56 days to the relevant housing department. That helps to direct appropriate and efficient support and resources to those in need and prevent them from sleeping rough before it is too late. The 56 days marks a significant extension; previously only those at risk of homelessness in the first 28 days would potentially receive some help. The extension to 56 means that people have a longer opportunity to relieve their situation. I am pleased to say that, in the first year of implementation, the Homelessness Reduction Act prevented 37,000 people from becoming homeless. It continues to be just as effective today, some six years later. In the first year alone, an additional 60,000 people who were previously ineligible for homeless support were assisted in getting off the streets and into appropriate accommodation. That is a rise of almost 50% on the previous year to the Act’s implementation. Today, I am proud to say that the Homelessness Reduction Act has prevented more than 1.7 million people from becoming homeless, with more than 777,000 now in stable and secure long-term housing. I am pleased that the Act has helped thousands avoid the trauma of homelessness, but the truth is that we can and must go further. Across our APPG’s evidence sessions, we repeatedly heard of cases where other public services missed crucial opportunities to step in: hospitals discharging patients on to the street; jobcentres overlooking signs of distress; prisons releasing people with no plan for where they would go next. Those are not isolated incidents; they are systemic failures. Recent analysis from the Institute for Government found that discharges from public institutions now account for almost half the recent rise in homelessness applications. If we are serious about tackling homelessness we cannot leave the burden solely on housing departments. It must be a whole-system effort, covering health, justice, education, welfare and local government. We must all work together to stop people falling through the cracks. Prevention is not only compassionate; it is cost-effective. When someone keeps their home, they recover faster after illness, they are half as likely to reoffend and they find it easier to get back into work. Will the Minister meet me and colleagues to discuss how she intends to embed prevention firmly at the centre of the Government’s homelessness strategy? Even with the best prevention measures, there will always be times when homelessness cannot be avoided. When that happens, our goal must be to get people back into stable, affordable homes as quickly as possible. That requires a clear, long-term commitment to increasing the supply of social and affordable housing. I have long argued that if we are serious about ending homelessness we must build more homes that people can actually afford. The Secretary of State’s recent commitment to delivering more social and affordable homes is welcome, but words must now turn into action, and that delivery must be targeted where the need is greatest. Too often, affordable homes are built in the wrong places or at rent levels that are out of reach for those most in need. I ask the Minister to confirm that she will work closely with the Housing Minister to ensure that the long-term plan for housing delivers social homes where they are most needed, and that people experiencing homelessness are given fair and equal access to them, because rapid rehousing works only when the homes are there for people to move into. We must also ensure that temporary accommodation truly is temporary—a stepping-stone, not a dead end. I have met families who have spent years moving between short-term lets, B&Bs and converted offices, never knowing where they will be next. It is impossible to rebuild their lives under those conditions. A genuine rapid rehousing model backed by adequate social housing can break this cycle. It restores stability, improves health and education outcomes and reduces long-term costs. We owe it to those families, and to the taxpayers footing the bill, to make that a reality. The third and final pillar of the APPG’s framework is support for those whose homelessness could not be prevented, and who need more than housing alone to rebuild their lives. Supported housing plays a crucial role in that effort. I introduced the Supported Housing (Regulatory Oversight) Act 2023 after receiving extensive evidence of rogue landlords exploiting vulnerable people and the taxpayer. Rogue unscrupulous landlords were setting up supported housing schemes and claiming public money through housing benefit, while providing little or no care whatsoever. Devastatingly, those abuses were not just financial ones; they destroyed lives. Through the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee I saw how deeply that issue runs. The challenge now is to strike the right balance: driving out the rogue providers while protecting the good ones, and ensuring that vulnerable residents are not made homeless again as a result of reform. That is why I agreed that the powers within the 2023 Act should be subject to consultation so that we can get this right; but we are two years on from Royal Assent and those powers have yet to see the light of day. I ask the Minister to provide an update on three points. When will the Government publish detailed guidance and timescales for implementing that, including funding for councils, strategic needs assessments and licence fees? What steps are being taken to ensure that local authorities are not misusing their powers to close providers down through housing benefit reviews without proper care for the residents’ welfare? Will the Government confirm that domestic abuse refuges and dispersal providers will not be required to register every individual property separately? That is an administrative burden that would put vital services at risk. Beyond regulation, however, lies a deeper issue: the collapse of support capacity. Across all our APPG evidence sessions we heard from charities, councils and service providers struggling to meet the growing complexity of people’s needs. The cuts to local support services over the past decade have hollowed out the safety net, leaving too many people without help at the moment they need it most. I have long been a champion of Housing First, a model that provides stable housing alongside intensive wraparound support. The evidence for its effectiveness is overwhelming, yet too many areas lack the funding to deliver it at scale. When I worked on the supported housing Act, it became clear that rogue operators had thrived precisely because legitimate, well-regulated support had been stripped back. If we want to eliminate exploitation and end homelessness we must rebuild the foundations of proper support. I ask the Minister: what discussions is she having with colleagues across Government about addressing the chronic underfunding of support services? Will the forthcoming homelessness strategy include clear measures to ensure that everyone, regardless of their needs, can access the right help to rebuild their lives? Homelessness is not inevitable. It is not a natural part of modern life. It is the product of policy choices, systems that fail to intervene soon enough and services that are no longer adequately resourced to meet the need. We have an opportunity and a duty to end that. This is a moment to bring together not only Government Departments, but local authorities, charities, faith groups and communities to deliver on our shared ambition that everyone should have a safe and secure place to call home. At oral questions last week, the Minister said she never knowingly misses an opportunity to meet an APPG. In that spirit, I warmly invite her to join us at the APPG for ending homelessness annual general meeting, which will take place between 1 pm and 2 pm on 11 November, where she can discuss these issues further—and of course we will benefit from her words at the meeting. I place on record my sincere thanks to the APPG secretariat—Rosie, Matt, Jasmine and all the team at Crisis—for their outstanding work in co-ordinating our efforts, and to the 47 parliamentarians and 27 sector organisations serving on the steering group. Their commitment, expertise and compassion drives this agenda forward every single day. This debate is not just an opportunity to restate our concern; it must be a catalyst for action. Homelessness is not inevitable. It is solvable. The test of any Government and any Parliament is whether we have the courage and compassion to solve it. Let us make sure that no child grows up without a place to call home, and that no person has to face another winter on the streets. Let us act together to end homelessness once and for all.
I thank the Minister for her response, and I thank Members for, by my reckoning,18 speeches and four interventions, which demonstrate the importance of this debate. Through the Everyone In programme, we proved during covid that it is possible to solve homelessness and rough sleeping. Unfortunately, that programme was not built on afterwards to end rough sleeping. Given some of the things that Members have added to the debate, I point out that the law exists to prevent local authorities from pushing homeless people far away from their homes, particularly if they have children or jobs. The law is in place; what is needed now is a coherent cross-Government strategy to combat homelessness, so that we can end it once and for all. I thank you, Mr Efford, for your chairmanship, and I apologise to colleagues who were short-changed in terms of time. That demonstrates the importance of this debate, and how we need to have another debate on the issue in the near future. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered progress on ending homelessness.
The hon. Lady has been an outspoken champion for the victims, and will continue to be so, but she must be concerned that two members of the panel have withdrawn, and we understand that one of the candidates to be chair of the inquiry has withdrawn. Clearly, there is concern across the House that institutions such as the police, social services, councils and the courts are all in a position where they have failed. Whoever chairs the inquiry must, therefore, have full rigour over services that they may have been involved in. So there is an issue of confidence. Can she update the House on how the inquiry will report back to the House and what scrutiny the House will have over the actions of the inquiry and the terms of reference?
Last week, I met one of my constituents, Tracey Hanson, in Parliament to honour the 10-year anniversary of the tragic loss of her son Josh, who was murdered in an unprovoked knife attack in Hillingdon, west London, in October 2015. We spoke about the tireless work that she has put into campaigning for victims’ rights, and I heard more about how the law that she wants to introduce—Josh’s law—would ensure that the rights of victims and their families to appeal under the unduly lenient sentence scheme are clear and equal to the rights of offenders. I will speak specifically to new clause 12, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for the beautiful Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan). After cruelly taking the life of Josh Hanson, Shane O’Brien absconded and evaded police for three and a half years before he was finally caught. Dubbed Britain’s most wanted man at the time, O’Brien was sentenced to at least 26 years in prison, just one year above the minimum sentence. After just missing the deadline to appeal the sentence as a result of unclear information about victims’ families’ rights under the unduly lenient sentence scheme, Tracey has spent years campaigning to ensure that no other victims face what her family did. Unfortunately, far too many victims and their families face the same problems, simply because they are not being made aware of their right to appeal sentences. There are also concerning numbers of cases in which clerical errors—in one case I heard of, it was an email stuck in a barrister’s outbox—lead to the Attorney General running out of time and missing the deadline to appeal a sentence. While appeals from offenders will still be considered by the Attorney General outside the 28-day window in exceptional circumstances, appeals from victims or their families will not. Historically, victims were at the centre of the justice system. Victims were the driving force in bringing criminal cases, and played a central role throughout the process. It was not until the 19th century that there was a significant shift towards state-led prosecutions, with the victims, rather than criminal cases, significantly diminished. The focus only started to shift back towards the victim with the very recent introduction of the first victim’s charter in 1990. I believe that we must recapture more of the focus from the state, and divert it back to those who are most directly impacted by crime. The lives of Tracey and her family will never be the same again. They should have been a central focus in the criminal case, and should have received the same rights, and information about their right to appeal against the sentencing decision, as the offender did. It is vital that victims and their families are clearly informed about their right to appeal under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. New clause 12 would require the Crown Prosecution Service to write to victims, or their next of kin, within 10 working days of a sentence being passed, providing details of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, the application process for the scheme and the deadlines, which would also be extended, giving victims a better chance of benefiting from the scheme.
I think that the justification for not changing that approach over many years has been an argument about finality of sentence, and giving the offenders that finality. I do not think that stacks up today; we need to afford victims more rights and more sensitivity within the system. New clause 12 is total common sense, and should be supported by Members on both sides of the Committee. It puts victims at the heart of sentencing, and does not compromise the need for finality in sentencing. It pushes the date back, but it does not change the status of that finality.
T7. Hinchingbrooke hospital is one of the few hospitals in Cambridgeshire that are yet to have an electronic patient record system, and its current level of digital maturity is at the lowest end of the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society scale. Hospitals within the new hospital programme are required to be at level 5 on the HIMSS scale, in line with the national digital capability framework. What financial assistance will be given to North West Anglia NHS foundation trust to facilitate an investment case, so that the rebuilt Hinchingbrooke hospital has a modern and enterprise-wide electronic patient record system?
I wish to speak to my new clause 6, which calls for the implementation of a lifetime driving ban for those convicted of causing death by dangerous or careless driving. Last year there were 380 convictions for causing death by dangerous or careless driving. Of those convictions, 202 were for causing death by dangerous driving, 150 were for causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, 23 were for causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, two were for causing death by driving unlicensed or uninsured, and three were for causing death by driving while disqualified. Fewer than 1% of those convicted of causing death by dangerous driving were given a lifetime driving ban; the figure was just two. Since 2017, there have been 1,348 convictions for causing death by dangerous driving, 1,314 convictions for causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, 158 convictions for causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, 17 convictions for causing death by driving unlicensed or uninsured, and 11 convictions for causing death by driving while disqualified. There have been nearly 3,000 convictions for causing a death through negligence or recklessness of the driver. Those are thousands of lives lost—husbands and wives who have lost their partner, children who have lost a parent, and parents who have lost a child. Thousands more lives are impacted tragically, forever changed, shattered.
I thank the hon. Member for her contribution, and I wholeheartedly agree. There are so many tales just like that from all our constituencies, and they indicate just how lenient we have been towards those convicted of dangerous driving, particularly those who have caused a fatality. That is precisely why I tabled new clause 6. I believe that families like the one she mentions deserve justice and the closure of knowing that those people will not go on to reoffend. Under section 163 of the sentencing code, any court may impose a driving disqualification for any offence committed after 1 January 1998. The minimum period of disqualification for causing death by careless driving is just 12 months. The sentencing guidelines for a driving disqualification following a conviction for causing death by driving illustrate the leniency that our judiciary applies to these cases. There is something badly wrong with our approach to justice when life is considered as cheap as it is in the current guidelines. The minimum period of disqualification for causing death by dangerous driving is five years. Consider that the threshold for dangerous driving is high, as it covers excessive speeding, drink driving, and dangerous and erratic overtaking manoeuvres—the type of driving that leaves us horrified. Now consider a case in which the outcome of that driving is that someone is killed. The minimum disqualification period is five years—an inconvenience. It speaks to a narrative of, “Whoops, I killed somebody.” The sentencing guidelines include the option for a lifetime disqualification, but reluctance to impose it is currently priced into the guidelines, which state: “Lifetime disqualifications will be rare, in particular because of the increased risk of breach and the possibility of hindering rehabilitation prospects. Lifetime disqualifications will generally be inappropriate unless there is psychiatric evidence and/or evidence of many previous convictions indicating that the offender would be a danger to the public indefinitely if allowed to drive.” Why are we so reticent to permanently remove killer drivers from the road? The guidelines refer to an “increased risk of breach”, but if someone is caught driving while disqualified, having been banned from driving for life after killing someone, perhaps we should send them to prison. Those who know me will know that I am far from anti-motorist. I am no fan of low-traffic neighbourhoods, blanket 20 mph speed limits or terribly designed cycle lanes, but while I have been a car enthusiast for many years, I am also a cyclist, and these days very much a MAMIL—a middle-aged man in Lycra. I have been knocked off my bike twice by cars that “didn’t see” me. I have been doored, and close-passed at 60 mph. I ride with cameras on my bike so that there is evidence of me being knocked off, and some of the driving I could show would deter Jeremy Vine from ever riding a bike in London again—but I have been lucky. Mike Gough was not lucky. Mike was known in Huntingdon for his passionate advocacy for road safety. He too was a keen cyclist, and he often cycled on the country roads around the town—the very same roads I was out on this past weekend. In March last year, as he headed back into Huntingdon along the Brampton Road towards George Street, he was struck by a Ford Transit van attempting to pass him. Paramedics attended the scene and attempted to give CPR, but Mike had been crushed and could not be revived. Mike was pronounced dead at the scene. Along the Brampton Road today, a white ghost bike now marks the site, as a tribute to Mike. The driver received a 12-month sentence—suspended for two years—and a two-year driving ban. As it stands, he will be back on the roads before the next election. Mike’s relatives said that the sentence did not reflect “the seriousness of what has happened or the catastrophic impact on our lives. Michael was the pinnacle of our family and a huge part of the local community. As a family we will never be the same again and our grief is immeasurable.” It is with these events in mind that I have tabled new clause 6.
The hon. Member makes a valid point. My amendment seeks to remove the chance that those people will reoffend further down the track. The custodial element remains unchanged, so there will still be the possibility of rehabilitation through the prison system to reduce the rate of recidivism. The issue here, as the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) also pointed out, is about giving families closure and the knowledge that those who are guilty of committing these crimes will not be able to go on to reoffend. New clause 6 proposes a lifetime driving ban for death by dangerous or careless driving and related offences—those I covered at the beginning of my speech. Having spoken to Mike’s widow Hazel and his daughter Kim, I can say that it is sobering to listen to somebody recount the story of the day that they had to attend the scene where their husband or father had just been killed. Selfishly, it is sobering to think about how easily it could have been me. I ride the same roads as Mike did. It was not an error, or avoidable on his part. The driver alone was at fault; it was his casual negligence that caused Mike’s death. Mike’s daughter Kim recounts: “On 27 June 2025, the driver, Dennis Roberts, aged 74, pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving. He was banned from driving with immediate effect, given a one-year sentence, suspended for two years, a two-year driving ban, 250 hours unpaid work and has to pay court charges of around £200. The sentence is within the guidelines of the law, but does the law fit the crime? He has lived his life like normal for 18 months, while we have lost our dad, husband, friend, grandad, and lived the last 18 months encompassed in a whirlwind of grief. Even after sentencing he continues to live his life, just with a small inconvenience of not being able to drive and giving up a few hours to work unpaid. How is that justice? In two years’ time he will be able to drive again. Would you give someone who used a gun carelessly and someone was killed their gun licence back after two years? I doubt it. They would most likely have a custodial sentence too.” I would ask all Members in the Chamber to think how they might feel if they were to get a phone call today informing them that their partner, parent or child had been killed in a road traffic accident.