Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,731 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Ben Obese-Jecty

   Ukraine and Wider Operational Update

   I start by recognising the US service personnel from my constituency, who played a part in the co-ordination of the interdiction operation to seize the MV Bella 1 via the joint intelligence analytics centre, Europe at RAF Molesworth, which is part of the US-European command. I am slightly worried that this might be a moot point, but turning to the coalition of the willing, the presence of boots on the ground in Ukraine was a red line for Putin, and potentially it might be a stick that he beats us with in order to push back on any peace deal. If we workshop that idea, with a force of 7,500, as is being reported in the press, we clearly cannot realistically maintain a deterrence force posture, which underlines the paucity of our anti-access and area-denial options. That would also explain the commitment to military hubs, and I would appreciate clarification as to what exactly they are. With Ajax off games for the foreseeable—maybe for years—and no viable recce-strike capability, what assessment has the Secretary of State made of the urgency to bring forward the next iteration of Project Asgard from quarter 2 to quarter 1, given its urgent requirement as a force multiplier on the eastern flank defensive line?

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2. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Aphra Brandreth

   Jury Trials

   The right to a trial by jury is one that has stood at the very centre of our criminal justice system for centuries. It is a crucial check on the power of the state as it undertakes one of the most solemn duties: to try a citizen and to determine guilt or innocence. That principle is, in the words of the Lord Chancellor himself, “a fundamental part” of our democracy. Instead of taking practical and obvious measures, such as fully utilising courtrooms that sit empty to address the serious backlog in the criminal justice system, the Government have instead chosen the destructive option that, in reality, is unlikely to adequately address the pressure on the system at all. The Government’s approach rests on the flawed assumption that only certain cases are serious enough to merit trial by jury, but who is to decide what counts as serious? Horrific crimes such as murder and rape are rightly treated with the utmost gravity, but offences deemed lesser can still ruin lives: a theft accusation can end a career; an assault can leave lasting physical and psychological harm; a reputation can be destroyed beyond repair. Our justice system is not merely about classification but about justice itself. It works by consent and is the stronger for it. Trial by jury embodies that public consent. Without it, we risk victims’ trust in its fairness and defendants’ confidence that they will be judged fairly by their peers. This debate is also about judicial decision making. The reality is that not all judges are created equal. No one is infallible. Judges can get things wrong and they can do so on more than one occasion. The strength of the jury system lies in renewal. Each case is considered by a fresh group of citizens. If a judge becomes the sole arbiter of guilt, there is a risk that errors—conscious or unconscious—can be repeated. The jury system makes our criminal justice system more robust, more resilient and ultimately more trustworthy. Jury trials also play a vital role in ensuring justice is done, because they are drawn from the communities they serve. That point was made to me by Daniel and Grace Robinson, who are constituents of mine and experts in addressing modern slavery and criminal exploitation. From the hundreds of cases they have seen, they note that juries often recognise indicators of modern slavery much more than would have happened without them. That is because they bring a broad range of experience. The Government seek to justify their changes on the basis of backlog reduction and cost, but we must not weaken the system that is respected across the world—

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3. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

   Engagements

   Q4.   Last year, the cargo vessel Baltic Clipper lost 16 containers off the beautiful West Sussex coastline. Beaches and seas in my constituency have been polluted with toxic debris. The clean-up was initiated and led almost exclusively by resolute local volunteers. Will the Prime Minister join me in paying tribute to all those involved for their extraordinary efforts? Will he, or the relevant Minister, meet me to ensure that the coastline is restored and that local taxpayers will not pick up any costs?

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4. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

   Jury Trials

   I hear everything my hon. Friend says. In his opening speech, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) laid out a number of matters that could be acted on immediately to improve efficiency and ensure that we maintain the pillar of society that is our jury trials. Do you agree that we should be focusing immediately on that, rather than demolishing—

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5. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

   Jury Trials

   I just wonder why the hon. Lady would not look to implement the recommendations from the shadow Secretary of State before seeking to restrict jury trials.

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6. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   Jury Trials

   Jury trials were introduced to bring order and justice to a legal system beset by opportunism, superstition, bias and archaic practices. For eight centuries, they have been the bedrock of English and British liberty, recognised globally as a bulwark against tyranny and oppression. Yet without any modelling, impact assessment or equalities assessment, and not in line with the review done by Sir Brian Leveson, the Government plan to scrap this ancient protection.

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7. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   Jury Trials

   I have yet to make an argument, but I will shortly. Who in this place can honestly say that if they were facing incarceration, they would be happy with just one judge and no jury making that decision? Think of the victims who face unconscious bias daily, and who will not get justice if just one person decides that question. Most sinister of all has been the debate in the Chamber this afternoon. Labour MPs have argued that juries—ordinary people—cannot be trusted and are not up to the job. They have said that it is too complex and too detailed. What next? Will Labour strip their right to vote as well? It is deeply concerning. The Minister has said that this change is not the result of some crisis that Labour MPs want to blame on the Conservatives, and that the Government would be making it anyway. It is ideological. Every time Labour has come into government it has tried to strip jury trials—under Blair when I was a child, and yet again now. Both the Prime Minister and the Justice Secretary have previously recognised the importance of jury trials; in fact, they opposed their abolition publicly. How will they justify their change of mind? Perhaps when the Justice Secretary is returned to Parliament after the next election, as he almost certainly will be, he will bring in trial by combat. Almost 40 of the Government’s MPs have opposed this change, and they are absolutely right to do so, because there are other options, including using unused sitting days and Sir Brian Leveson’s proposal to have one judge sitting with two magistrates; there would then be an element of a layperson having a say. Clearly, the Prime Minister can admit it when he gets something wrong and can change course, as we saw—albeit far too late—with the family farm tax, welfare and grooming gangs. Do not leave it too late this time. The Labour manifesto made no mention of curtailing our right to jury trial. This is not a minor shift in policy; it is a worrying trend fundamental to the relationship between the individual and the state. We see this trend in the proposal for digital ID and the stripping of fundamental freedoms. Jury trials recognise the gravity of removing someone’s right to liberty.

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8. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   Jury Trials

   I am just wrapping up, but go on.

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9. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

   Jury Trials

   If the hon. Lady had listened carefully, she would have heard that I did not say that jury trial was an inalienable right. The law says that one has a right to a fair trial. However, we have established historically that jury trials mean that we do not see unconscious bias. There have been archaic and appalling cases that have shown that one individual making a decision about others is often not fair, transparent or right. As we heard from Sir David Davis, there is a greater number of retrials when an individual made the decision in a trial than when a jury made the decision.

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10. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

    Jury Trials

    My sincerest apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker. A year of maternity leave does leave one with a few cobwebs. The British people are very clear that they do not want this fundamental change.

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11. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

    Jury Trials

    I am afraid that we hear again the continual argument that the average layperson cannot understand justice. If a defence lawyer or prosecution lawyer cannot make the argument make sense to the average person, they have no job representing an individual at court. It is their duty to make law transparent and understandable to every individual. We hear this argument that court cases have become more detailed, but we should be pleased that there are more detailed and complex arguments being made in our courts. It is a sign of a court system that is working, and that does not rely on basics or tropes to get justice, yet the Labour party sees it as the opposite. This is, unfortunately, yet another disappointing and deeply sinister step toward the Government fundamentally changing our relationship with the Crown and the state. I urge the Government to listen to the legal industry, and to listen to and trust the British people.

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12. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

    Ukraine and Wider Operational Update

    I welcome the action today, and I commend our armed forces on their action. Much of the discussion has focused on troops in the event of peace. I would like to take us one step further. The right hon. Gentleman said that yesterday the UK agreed that we will participate in US-led monitoring and verification of any ceasefire. Can he please clarify whether that means physical monitoring or remote intelligence? What if the terms of a ceasefire are unacceptable to Ukraine and to the UK? The agreement signed yesterday says that we “will” do so, but does it require us to accept, police and monitor any ceasefire, or would we be able to withdraw if the terms were not acceptable to either us or to our ally, Ukraine?

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13. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alex Burghart

    Northern Ireland Troubles Bill

    Happy new year, Mr Speaker. Over Christmas, seven former senior SAS officers wrote in The Telegraph: “In this Troubles Bill, the Government is complicit in this war on our Armed Forces.” A few days later, the Northern Ireland Veterans Commissioner, appointed by this Government, said that the Bill treats veterans “worse than terrorists” and is “eating at the very fabric of the Armed Forces”. Can the Secretary of State tell the House which former senior officers support the Bill?

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14. 7 Jan 2026·Parliament·Alex Burghart

    Northern Ireland Troubles Bill

    I note that the Secretary of State was unable to give a single example. There is, I am afraid, an ostrich-like complacency in the Government’s approach to this legislation. Senior representatives of our armed forces are telling this House that the legislation is impacting on morale and effectiveness. In November, nine former four-star generals argued that this “morally incoherent” Bill poses a “direct threat to national security”. Those generals tell us that highly trained members of special forces are already leaving the service, and by definition these men are very, very difficult to replace. No wonder The Times has said that “a fundamental lack of political and military understanding lies at the heart of this Bill.” Why do the Government think that they know better than our armed forces?

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15. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir Oliver Dowden

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I welcome the Minister’s comments about the obligation on the public sector. However, I caution him that, in my experience, cyber-security is one of those things that Ministers talk about, but then other priorities overtake it. The advantage of legislative requirements is that they force Ministers to think about it. I urge the Minister to look at that point again as the Bill passes through Parliament. There is a case for putting more stringent requirements on the public sector in order to force Ministers’ minds on the point.

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16. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir Oliver Dowden

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), who has brought tremendous expertise to this debate. In my previous role overseeing national resilience and cross-Government co-ordination of national security threats, cyber-security was probably the one area that caused me the greatest number of sleepless nights. There has been a lot of talk in recent months and years about the increased need to defend the realm and the steps that need to be taken to address the defence of the realm. We all know from past experience that the first line of any attack on the defence of the realm is highly likely to be through cyber-attacks. Indeed, in a completely different context, we need only to look at the public comments made by the President of the United States a couple of days ago about the first steps that the United States took in its intervention in Venezuela: he talked about the United States’ capability to knock out the power supply there. If we look at our adversaries, particularly Russia, North Korea and Iran, we can see that they are actively inculcating and encouraging environments in which cyber-attacks can be planned and take place. Whether that is done explicitly by private sector individuals or with the connivance of the state, a deliberate grey zone is created, with the desire to increase knowledge of cyber-risks to the United Kingdom and our allies, and to carry out penetrative attacks to that effect. We are likely to see this grey zone warfare continue to increase as a result of the actions that we see in Ukraine and elsewhere. We just have to look at our own experience. Many hon. Members have made the point that the initial attack on JLR rapidly cascaded and affected many others in the supply chain. From the Government’s own research and testing—this is in the public domain—one sees that a cyber-attack can rapidly cascade into other areas. For example, when we test the impact of a cyber-attack on our electricity system, it rapidly cascades into our water system, which is dependent on electricity. Clearly, it also rapidly cascades into our transport system. Before long, a small cyber-attack becomes a very, very large cyber-attack. In common with all other advanced countries, the United Kingdom is highly exposed to cyber-attacks—a point that I made repeatedly from the Dispatch Box. I welcome this legislation and the steps that the Minister has outlined today, but I gently caution against what he said. I do not think it was his intention, but he said that this legislation will fix the cyber-security problem. It will not fix the cyber-security problem. No single piece of legislation is ever going to fix the cyber-security problem, nor is this a question of good guys and bad guys or of, “The last Government did nothing, and this Government are doing something.” Each Government must have a fresh look at the challenges of cyber-security, and take necessary and proportionate steps to address the risks.

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17. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir Oliver Dowden

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    Yes, I totally agree. Indeed, that is why the National Cyber Security Centre, working in conjunction with the last Government and now the current Government, has set out the whole-of-Government approach. It cannot just be about the actions of individual Government Ministers or individual actors in the private sector; the whole of Government need to act together. On the further steps we could and should have taken—this goes back to my intervention on the Minister—I do think that more pressure needs to be brought to bear on Ministers in terms of their accountability for cyber-security, and I fear that if we do not put this into primary legislation, it can slip further and further down Ministers’ in-trays. Although Ministers have a desire to address it, more pressing and immediate problems distract their attention. I have some constructive suggestions about how we can improve the proposed legislation. The first is about many of the powers being delegated to secondary legislation or ministerial direction. I do not have a problem with that, because it is essential that we have a framework piece of legislation and then the flexibility to allow secondary legislation to be brought forward to address challenges as they arise, but I urge Ministers to undertake a meaningful and mandatory consultation on any secondary legislation that comes forward, so that businesses and others can contribute to it. I also caution against Ministers devolving to regulators their duties in respect of cyber-security. Too often—again, this applies to Governments of both colours—regulators are empowered to address cyber-security problems or any other problems. They then charge off in one direction and fail to take into account questions such as proportionality—the impact of the regulations versus their economic burden—and Parliament and Ministers cease to have a significant role. I urge Ministers to keep a tight grip on regulators and on the instructions that they give them. I would also be a little cautious about some of the arguments made by hon. Members about the need constantly to expand the scope of this legislation to further areas of the private sector. It is very easy for us in this Chamber to talk about the need for further legislation, but when a small business is faced with a huge Act and required to interpret it, it looks a very daunting prospect. My preference would be to continue the sort of co-operation that we have seen through the whole-of-society approach advocated by the NCSC. On proportionality, I urge Ministers to embrace AI. There are opportunities to use AI to triage incoming attacks and avoid duplication, for example, and a lot of streamlining of the system can be done in that area. On the flipside of AI, we must take very seriously the risk of cyber-attacks posed by agentic artificial intelligence. It appears that we reached an inflection point in November 2025, when Anthropic reported disrupting what it described as the first large-scale cyber-espionage campaign executed largely via agentic AI. We are likely to see much more of this. I would welcome the Minister saying in his concluding remarks what the Government intend to do to ensure that we keep up with this threat, because we are only in the foothills of the risk posed by agentic AI. Further to the point about the role of the public sector, 40% of incidents handled by the National Cyber Security Centre when I was the Minister responsible were from the public sector, so I question the exclusion of the public sector. I appreciate that the Government have announced a plan. I have not had a chance to look at it, but I can imagine what it contains broadly. The key thing is what stick is applied to public officials and Ministers, outside the core responsible Government Departments, to make sure that they take their responsibilities seriously, so I think some legislative proposals may be needed in that area. Similarly on budgets, again the core responsible Departments—the Cabinet Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology—will prioritise cyber-security. I fear that other Departments may not, so there is a strong argument for ringfencing cyber-security budgets for all Departments so that money cannot be transferred to more pressing short-term problems, as has often been the case, particularly, for example, in the NHS. It is very important that we do not overlook the basics. It is very easy to talk about legislation or to talk in high-level terms about threats, but probably the single biggest thing we could do to deal with cyber-risks in this country is to make sure that every time every single business and private individual gets one of those annoying pings on their phone saying that they need to upgrade their software to the latest operating system—it is the same with their PCs, iPads and so on—they do so. That is done by providers, because they know that there is a cyber-risk, and there is a patch to address it. If the patch is applied immediately, that can have a huge effect on the resilience of the whole of society, and the NCSC constantly puts out that message. We need to look at our resilience in society as a whole when we have a major cyber-attack. We have had major cyber-attacks, but they have tended to be in just one sector, albeit with cascading effects, as with JLR. We have not yet had a whole of society cyber-attack—either one that flows out of control from a criminal attack, or a deliberate attack from a hostile state cascading widely across all of society—affecting our electricity, water supplies and so on. I fear that it is only a matter of time before that happens, and we need to look at the resilience of individuals, including the ability to have analogue systems such as battery-powered torches, rather than electric torches, and so on. I started the work on that as a Minister, and I think more needs to be done in that space. We also need to look at the question of emergency communications. It was certainly my experience that public sector broadcasters—such as, I think, the BBC—are not required to take emergency communications from the Government in such situations. I think that is a loophole that could be exposed in such a situation. On resilience more broadly, we are in the foothills of the impact of AI. We are going to see vast impacts on employment and how people lead meaningful lives as AI advances more and more rapidly. For the resilience of our society, this House needs to have a much wider debate—not on this Bill, but more generally—about how we address the epoch-changing challenges we are facing. In conclusion, I think this is a welcome piece of legislation and an important step forward. My hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez) correctly highlighted the very important challenges, and they will need to be addressed as this Bill passes through the House. I think it is an important step forward, but it is only one step, and once this legislation is enacted, we will need to be prepared to return to this issue again and again.

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18. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir Julian Lewis

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. On the point about regulators, the industry has issued a brief, which points out, quite sensibly, that these regulators are going to have a lot of extra duties to perform and they will therefore need extra resources to be able to perform those duties, but the extra resources they require will only be unlocked when the Bill has passed. Is there not a danger of a transition period where duties will be laid on regulators to fulfil their role before they have the resources to carry it out?

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19. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir Julian Lewis

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    I do not think I heard the Minister mention anything about the risk of cyber-attacks on local government. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is another potentially juicy target for people who wish to cause major mischief?

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20. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    I beg to move, That this House has considered Government proposals for renewal of the BBC Charter. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. It is also a pleasure—although not wholly surprising—that the debate is so well attended. We may struggle to get everybody in; I will do my best to help. I am delighted to see the Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the hon. Member for Barnsley South (Stephanie Peacock). She and I have spoken together about media matters many times. It is good to see her back on her former brief. I understand that the Media Minister is otherwise occupied in the House. It is just over a year since I held a debate in this place on BBC funding. Since then, quite a lot has happened concerning the BBC. We have had major editorial failings around things like the “Panorama” reporting of a speech made by the President of the United States, the coverage of Bob Vylan at Glastonbury, and the documentary about Hamas. We have also seen some shocking revelations about harassment and bullying within the BBC, with the ongoing repercussions of the Huw Edwards incident and then the Gregg Wallace revelations. On funding, which I suspect will be the major topic in this debate, last year we saw a further 300,000 people declare that they no longer needed or were willing to pay the licence fee. All those things, I suspect, contributed to the decision of Deborah Turness and Tim Davie to resign. I was sorry that Tim Davie left his post. I think he did a good job in a very difficult circumstance. It is a sadness that most directors general, rather like politicians, have careers that end unhappily. We have also now seen the publication of the Department’s Green Paper on the future, which points out at the beginning that unless the charter is renewed by 31 December 2027, the BBC will cease to exist. I had responsibility, in the main, for the renewal of the last charter. I did not want to see the BBC disappear then, and I do not want to see the BBC disappear today. Therefore, it is important that we agree. The charter renewal document is wide-ranging and covers a huge amount of ground. I am sure hon. Members will wish to touch on a number of elements. I will concentrate on two. The first is the issue of governance and maintenance of standards. The last charter review resulted in the replacement of the BBC Trust, which at that time had overall oversight of the BBC, with a board, bringing together executive and non-executive members. It is worth remembering that the BBC Trust, which preceded the board, was wholly appointed by the Government. In theory, the board has only five Government appointees; of those five, three are in agreement with the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The UK Government actually appoints only two members, so concerns about political interference and independence are misplaced.

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21. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    No, I do not. I suspect the hon. Lady is referring to the board member for England, who I believe has outstanding experience in the field of BBC editorial independence; he spent a brief time in politics. It is worth remembering that the political appointees over many years have come from both sides of the House. There was a chair who was previously a Conservative Cabinet Minister, and a deputy chair who was previously a Labour Cabinet Minister. If there was ever a concern, it was about the appointment of a former Labour Cabinet Minister to a management position. That seemed to me much more concerning since they had direct day-to-day editorial decisions. At the time, although I got on very well with James Purnell and I worked with him when he was Secretary of State, I did not think that he should have been appointed to a management position. But I have no concerns about political interference at the moment. On the failings revealed by the Prescott report on editorial standards, clearly there need to be changes to the editorial oversight. As was debated a few months ago, there is a strong case for making the editorial standards committee much more independent. It is also at least worth considering—this is part of the Green Paper—whether the job of running an organisation with around £5 billion to £6 billion can be combined with having overall control over the entire editorial output of the BBC. Those are both huge jobs and I think it is becoming increasingly difficult for one person to hold both of them. That is something that needs to be considered. The biggest challenge facing the BBC, which I sought to highlight in the debate a year ago, is about future funding. We have seen a steady decline in the number of people who are willing to pay the licence fee. The licence fee evasion rate has doubled so that it is now 12.5%. One in eight who should be paying the licence fee are not paying it because they are avoiding their responsibility. On top of that, another 3.6 million, we are told, have declared they do not need to pay it because they do not use the BBC or watch live TV. The Public Accounts Committee recently concluded that that results in a loss to the BBC of over £1.1 billion, and it will go on increasing. We are seeing more and more choice available through streaming services, which people choose to subscribe to. People no longer turn to the BBC in such numbers for news and current affairs. And of course the licence fee is rising. At a time when the cost of living is high, people will consider whether they wish to continue paying it. So the Government are right to look at alternatives, which is something I have been involved in for over 10 years. When I chaired the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, we produced a report on the future of the BBC. I am delighted to see the current Chair of the Committee with us this afternoon. A lot of the arguments that we considered 10 years ago stand today. There was one thing I was disappointed to see in the Green Paper. First, before considering how to pay for the BBC, we should ask what we want the BBC to do. Let us first of all decide what the BBC ought to be doing and then how to pay for it. Yet the Green Paper rules out this debate. It states that “we do not believe a smaller BBC” is in the public’s interest. By making that statement, we are not questioning whether the BBC still needs to maintain eight national television channels and 10 national radio stations, despite the fact that the alternative choice available has enormously increased over the past 10 to 15 years.

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22. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    I completely understand that. The Green Paper contains quite a lot about the BBC’s involvement in providing coverage in the nations of the United Kingdom, and indeed in the languages of the United Kingdom. If the hon. Gentleman believes, as I do, that one of the principal purposes of the BBC is to provide content that otherwise would not be available, then that is a good example of where it is absolutely right that the BBC should continue to invest. There are some things, however, that the BBC does not necessarily need to continue doing, because there is such choice available. As I say, I regret the fact that that does not seem to be part of the debate within the Green Paper. It seems to suggest that the BBC should go on doing everything it does now, but that then begs an even harder question: if the BBC is to go on spending as much as it does today, how will we pay for it at a time when the willingness to pay the licence fee is declining year on year?

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23. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    Whether or not it is value for money is a debate that the BBC has advanced for as long as I have been debating the BBC. The question is: what do we compare it with? Is 25p value for money, or is £1.50 value for money? Unless it is decided what the BBC should be doing, we cannot determine that. The other big factor is that paying the licence fee is not a choice. People do not have the opportunity not to pay; if they want the BBC, and indeed live television at all, they are required by law to pay the licence fee. Saying, “Oh, it’s fantastic value for money,” is very difficult when nobody has ever been given the opportunity to demonstrate whether they think it is value for money by choosing whether to pay for it.

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24. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    I agree that children’s television is incredibly important, and it is a matter of real concern that fewer and fewer commercial channels are investing in children’s TV. It was for that reason that, at the time of the last charter review, we set up something called the young audiences content fund, funded by the licence fee, which allowed other broadcasters to bid for licence fee funding to supply children’s programming. It was very successful. Unfortunately, it did not survive the mid-term review, but it was created in recognition of how important that provision is. I would like to see a revival of the young audiences content fund, because I think it was very valuable. Every time a Government has looked the licence fee, they have come to the conclusion that it has many flaws but there is no real alternative. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee that I chaired did recommend an alternative; we looked at the possibility of a household levy. While that is not perfect, it has already been ruled out. That too is excluded by the Green Paper, which states of the licence fee that “we are not considering replacing it with alternative forms of public funding”. So all those particular options have been closed off. However, the licence fee is highly regressive and hard to enforce. Evidence shows that women on low incomes face prosecution more than other groups. There are a lot of things wrong with the licence fee. In terms of alternatives, the Green Paper suggests one or two options. It talks about the possibility of extending commercial activity, which I certainly welcome, as it already contributes quite a large amount to the BBC’s income.

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25. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    I visited the S4C headquarters, and I am a strong supporter of S4C, which is often overlooked in debates about the licence fee. Of course, it is funded by the licence fee, and that is something we sought to preserve when I had responsibility for it. It needs to be taken into account. I was glad to see that the Green Paper talks quite a lot about S4C and, indeed, MG Alba, which supplies Gaelic broadcasting in Scotland. The issue raised in the Green Paper that is causing most concern to other organisations is the possibility of advertising. Advertising on the BBC would obviously change the nature of the BBC but, as is acknowledged, it would also have a huge impact on all the commercial broadcasters that rely on advertising. If the BBC took advertising, I suspect one of the consequences would be that Channel 4 would immediately go bankrupt, because Channel 4 is still completely dependent on advertising for its income. Although some people doubt it, I do want to see Channel 4 survive. It is not just Channel 4: ITV depends in large part on advertising, as does, of course, the whole commercial radio sector. If advertising were introduced on BBC TV or radio, the impact on the commercial sector would be enormous, and not something that I think the Government would want to see. The Green Paper acknowledges that there would be an impact, but it still suggests it is one option under consideration. That leaves only one alternative for the future: subscription. The last charter stated that the BBC should trial a subscription service for additional content on iPlayer. That never happened—the BBC was not very keen on it—but it was there. In the longer term, it becomes a more and more realistic option, not only because the alternatives look less and less attractive or acceptable, but because in due course it will become technologically possible. As I have suggested many times, it is not currently realistic to talk about the BBC moving to a subscription model, because a large number of people in this country still rely on digital terrestrial transmission to receive television services. If someone has DTT—Freeview, as it is known—they cannot switch it off. If they cannot switch it off, it cannot be charged for, because people cannot choose not to pay. Until everybody receives their television online—through the internet, rather than through DTT—a subscription model is not a realistic option.

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26. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    My hon. Friend perfectly illustrates why I do not think it is realistic at the moment. Until we reach the point at which everybody in the UK can access TV online—I recognise that that is a bigger challenge for my hon. Friend’s constituents than for those in many other parts of the country—it is not realistic, but we should begin to prepare for that time now, which is why we need to consider the option suggested in the Green Paper. The moment will come when it becomes possible. I realise that many other Members want to speak, so I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I welcome this opportunity to debate the BBC charter renewal, and I regret that there has not been one before now. A number of options have been set out, and I simply say that the one that is not an option any longer is the status quo. I look forward to the contributions from others about what the future should hold.

    Hansard source
27. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Sir John Whittingdale

    BBC Charter Renewal

    I thank you, Mrs Harris, the Minister and all Members who participated this afternoon. The fact that there are so many present—to my regret, I suspect a lot have had to curtail their remarks due to the time limit—demonstrates the importance of this subject. I welcome the Minister’s assurance that there will be further opportunities. My hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich and Evesham (Nigel Huddleston) is right: it is important that as many people as possible respond to the consultation, although I suspect that the Minister and her officials may hope that we do not have a repeat of what happened last time, which was a 38 Degrees campaign generating 190,000 responses. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport had to hire a new building in order to count and read them all. However, it is important, and I hope that this debate is just the start of what will continue to be a discussion leading to the next charter. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered Government proposals for renewal of the BBC Charter.

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28. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Robbie Moore

    Less Survivable Cancers

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I thank the hon. Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones) for securing this important debate. It is clear that we have all been affected in one way or another by a person we love, or are fond of, being diagnosed with cancer and passing away. While any debate covering cancer is serious, today’s debate is poignant for me. Just before Christmas, Keighley and the Worth valley lost two councillors to cancers. They were friends of mine, and I know their losses will be felt by not only their families and friends but the constituents and residents that they served, and the communities that they loved. Councillor Russell Brown served the Worth valley as a district councillor on Bradford council, and Chris Graham was a former Keighley town councillor who served the Long Lee and Parkwood wards. While any death to cancer is tragic, it also sharpens our focus on the need to ensure that the very best treatments and research are available for as many people as possible. That of course includes rare and less survivable cancers, which, by their very nature, do not receive the same level of attention as more common types. That must change. Let us start with the need to identify and screen cancers early. It is unacceptable that just 28% of less survivable cancers are diagnosed at stage 1 or 2, compared with 54% of all cancers. I am sure that a similar story is true for rarer cancers, which may not be considered until it is just too late. Here I must thank the work of the mobile cancer screening units that operate in Keighley and Ilkley as part of the Airedale hospital team, which are doing lifesaving work. I hope that, as we rebuild a new Airedale hospital over the coming years, they will have a new and improved hospital to be proud of, further boosting their work. The UK should be proud of its world-leading cancer research, and I know that this is something on which Opposition and Government colleagues agree. Indeed, the agreement on the Rare Cancers Bill is a hugely positive step to ensuring that rare cancers get the attention they deserve. I thank the hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) for his work on raising this important issue. After all, rare cancers are one in five of diagnosed cancers, and that must change. There will inevitably be cases where screening and improved treatment are not enough. At that stage, people across Keighley, Ilkley, Silsden and the Worth valley are indebted to Sue Ryder Manorlands hospice, which does excellent work in looking after those at the end of their lives. I am routinely impressed by their professionalism and compassion whenever I visit. Finally, I would like to speak about employers’ national insurance. That issue was raised with me by Sue Ryder Manorlands hospice, which now has to pay the Treasury an additional amount, which they cannot therefore put into end-of-life care. I encourage the Minister to raise that specific case with the Chancellor, so that we can ensure that hospices get the attention they deserve and the funding they need.

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29. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Nigel Huddleston

    BBC Charter Renewal

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I refer hon. Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) on securing today’s debate about a topic that he is extremely knowledgeable about. I thank the Minister for being here today; although this important topic is not currently part of her brief, she is also very knowledgeable about it. The future of the BBC is an important matter for its employees, licence fee payers and people who consume its output in this country and around the world, including many—although a declining number—of our constituents. The BBC is a cherished institution, and it is the UK’s most widely used news outlet: 94% of UK adults use BBC services every month on average. It has informed, educated and entertained generations of Brits. It is one of our most admired and respected institutions, and one of our biggest global brands. However, the BBC faces considerable challenges in the digital age, and an increasingly fragmented media landscape. Recently, it has faced other challenges to its reputation—some, admittedly, of its own making. Before Christmas, the Government released their long-awaited Green Paper as part of the process to review the royal charter. Sadly, they did so in a written ministerial statement rather than on the Floor of the House, so today is the first time we have had the opportunity to discuss this matter properly. The BBC’s existence and the licence fee arrangements are contingent on the BBC fulfilling its licence obligations—including those on impartiality, as outlined in the charter. Recently, there have been too many examples where the BBC has not been following its own editorial guidelines on impartiality—from push notifications to its coverage of the Israel-Gaza conflict to trans issues, as well as the high-profile doctoring of a speech by the President of the United States, which has led to a multibillion dollar lawsuit. That lawsuit threatens the future financial stability of the BBC and could lead to resources being diverted away from important and much-loved programming, such as children’s TV, natural history series, sport and national events coverage, music and local radio. Many of those things have been mentioned today; they are what that the BBC does so well, and they help justify the licence fee and sustain the BBC’s brand and reputation around the world. Abiding by impartiality is an important aspect of the current debate because, as the BBC’s own editorial guidelines clearly state, “Audiences expect the BBC's news and current affairs and factual journalism output to meet the highest levels of impartiality and accuracy.” I could not agree more, which is why the accusations of failure to uphold impartiality are so serious. There is also another important aspect of the debate around impartiality. The editorial guidelines make it clear that “There is no requirement to give all views equal weight…Minority views or those less supported by evidence, do not need to be given similar prominence or weight to those with more support, to the prevailing consensus, or to those better evidenced.” That begs these questions: why can the BBC not bring itself to call Hamas a terrorist organisation? Why did it feel obliged to reprimand a journalist for saying “women” instead of “pregnant people” live on air? Impartiality should not be used as an excuse to push minority or woke views that are not supported by the majority of the British population. Common sense must prevail. This whole area clearly needs a lot of tidying up, and the charter review offers an opportunity to do so. Does the Minister agree that the governance structures, processes and procedures around compliance with, and enforcement of, impartiality and editorial guidelines must be a key focus in the charter review process? Does she agree that the BBC should not wait, and that it can, of its own volition, take action now to change its procedures and overall culture on compliance in advance of the conclusion of the charter review process? The Green Paper rightly focuses on the issues of trust—mentioned many times today—public good, driving economic growth and funding. As has been pointed out by the Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage), and others, not every option has been considered. It is right that we should take a thorough review of all future funding options for the BBC, because all options, including the status quo, will have a knock-on impact on other public service broadcasters, and on the production and broadcasting ecosystem across the UK as a whole, including radio as well as TV. The licence fee model, in its current form, is clearly not sustainable, partly because people are walking away from the BBC already and taking their money with them—a point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon. Since 2019, more than 2 million households have stopped paying the licence fee, and in the past decade licence fee evasion has doubled. At the same time, the BBC has fallen behind innovative rivals when it comes to young people. Additional sources of funding for the BBC must be found, without jeopardising the rest of the UK broadcasting landscape and without distorting the rest of the UK advertising market. Does the Minister agree that the charter renewal discussion also needs to focus on how the BBC can further exploit commercial opportunities, particularly with its back catalogue and revenue from overseas? Does the Minister agree that we must also debate the other side of the equation: the size, scale and scope of the BBC, or what exactly its public service content duties should be? That point seems to be missing from the Green Paper, but it was raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon. The consultation also suggests that consideration be given to reduced or free licence fees for people on benefits. That does concern us. It would be outrageous if people claiming benefits were given free TV licences while hard-working people footed the bill. Turning briefly to comments made by other hon. Members, my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon expressed his thanks to the outgoing director general, Tim Davie, and I also put on record my thanks for his service. My hon. Friend the Member for Gosport expressed concerns that some funding options had already been ruled out; again, that is a matter of concern, and I hope the Minister can address that in a moment. The hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson) pointed out the concerning reality that licence fee penalties often disproportionately impact women. The hon. Members for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tom Rutland) and for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey) pointed out the very important role of the World Service, which is of course partly funded by the FCDO and not entirely by the licence fee. The hon. Member for Salford also highlighted the transformational impact of the BBC’s significant investment in Salford—something I had the pleasure of seeing in December. The hon. Member for Stevenage (Kevin Bonavia) highlighted the important role of the national broadcaster in the age of misinformation, and the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) highlighted accountability. Of course, something that we have not talked about much today, but which I am sure will be a matter of considerable debate going forward, is the role of the regulator, Ofcom. In conclusion, we want the BBC to succeed. To do so, it must be the best version of itself. That may be perhaps quite a significantly different version from what exists today. We look forward to working constructively with the BBC, the Government and all stakeholders in this charter review process. I encourage all interested parties, including our constituents, to get involved in the consultation process. Finally, will the Minister commit to ensuring that there are more opportunities in the future to debate this vital topic—the future of the BBC —in Government time, on the Floor of the House, and not just via written statements?

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30. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Mr Peter Bedford

    Topical Questions

    T8.   Since the Government came to office, the average household energy bill has increased by £200, so the Government’s claim to be cutting bills by £150 rings somewhat hollow with my constituents. Will the Secretary of State commit to reviewing the green levies and taxes that continue to drive up energy prices for hard-working families?

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31. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    Energy Jobs: Yorkshire and the Humber

    Sadly, it is not job creation that faces many of my constituents, particularly those who work at the Lindsey oil refinery. The Secretary of State knows that Axiom and others submitted bids that would have continued production at the refinery. Instead, we now have a deal with Phillips 66 that transfers the assets but not the business. Will he undertake to make a statement to the House and to answer the many unanswered questions that surround the deal?

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32. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    The Corporation Tax Act 2010 (Part 8C) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

    I am hesitant to delay the Committee, but I am afraid that I have some quite serious reservations about this statutory instrument. In order that Members who may not have looked in detail at the instrument before us can understand them, it may be useful to explain a bit of the background to part 8C, which was introduced by section 38 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015. The 2015 Act was snuck through in the first few months after my election as the MP for North West Hampshire, when I was still learning the tricks of the trade, and as a result I did not spot what is actually quite a pernicious part of the corporation tax landscape. So that colleagues are clear, this part of the 2015 Act says that in cases where HMRC has deducted tax unlawfully and is ordered by a court to return it, and where interest is then charged on that, because litigation may have taken years, the Revenue gets 45% of it back. It does not bear the full cost of the interest that is payable and it therefore does not bear the full economic cost of its unlawful behaviour. I have never understood why the Revenue should get special treatment over the interest payable by any other litigant in a commercial case, particularly as these restitution cases follow unlawful behaviour by the Revenue, and the litigation has often taken over a decade to come to some kind of conclusion. While they appear and are presented as benign and clarificatory, the problem with the regulations is that what they are actually doing is embedding that unfairness and asymmetry, and giving particular advantages to HMRC in the litigation process that I am not sure are entirely warranted. First, we have to bear in mind that the situation under the legislation at the moment is that the normal rules of corporation tax apply in terms of limits. The Revenue has to assess whether interest payable under part 8C falls within the scope of the 45% charge within four years of the end of the period in which it arises, even if the litigation has gone on for longer than that. That creates an incentive for the Revenue to act swiftly in the conduct of the legislation. The regulations give a bespoke new two-year time limit from the end of the accounting period in which the case is decided and the restitution is paid. That means that all the litigation delay risk is transferred on to the private sector company, which gives an enormous advantage to HMRC. Effectively, the regulations mean that the cost of the error by HMRC is capped, whereas the taxpayer is now exposed to prolonged uncertainty in the conduct of that litigation. Those two things together seem to entrench the asymmetry that the Revenue enjoys. The second issue I have is around one of the principles that I hoped was embedded in tax legislation, which is that it should never be retrospective. The regulations create a retrospective charge and will apply to cases where litigation is ongoing at the moment. There are litigants at the moment who believe that the case may have run beyond the four-year time limit, and that whatever they are awarded in interest will not now be assessable. The regulations will change that rule and are effectively using a retrospective logic that means that taxpayers cannot confidently close the books on their liability or otherwise, even after prolonged litigation that may have absorbed much of their energy and time. Those two measures seem to me to be particularly pernicious. I am interested to understand the Minister’s thinking on providing HMRC with this much more generous time limit to reach its assessment. I recognise that he is not here to justify the inherent unfairness of part 8C, but the new time limit creates the perverse incentive that HMRC can take its time. We know that since the amalgamation of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, the culture of HMRC has changed significantly over the years. When I was a trainee chartered accountant in the City, decisions on taxation were a question of two professionals sitting down together to decide what tax was actually due. The Revenue has a much more aggressive attitude towards tax collection—do not forget that this team has the ability to bust down doors without a warrant in pursuit of duty, an inheritance that it maintains from its time tackling smuggling. Those members of the Committee who are Daphne du Maurier fans will know that the excise men were well known for kicking in doors in those days—and they occasionally still do. That culture overtook, and many businesses now find themselves feeling bullied and living in fear of a call from the Revenue because of its much more aggressive approach towards tax collection, and it not necessarily collecting the tax that is properly due but collecting whatever tax it can get. As I am sure the Minister knows, businesses will often settle with the Revenue for more than is entirely due, because they just do not want the hassle and they want it to go away. To me, that is not a proper way to run a tax system; nevertheless it happens on a daily basis. My nervousness about the regulations is that they may give the Revenue the incentive to use as much time as it can and to absorb as much energy as it can from its counterparty in litigation, to the extent that in the end the counterparty will sue for settlement, which may not necessarily be to its advantage or even be the correct amount of tax that is due. Those are broadly my views. I understand from colleagues that they do not necessarily intend to divide the Committee, but I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

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33. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    The Corporation Tax Act 2010 (Part 8C) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

    I realise that this is being painted as a concession, but as I hope that the Minister knows, in the most serious restitution cases, where unlawful behaviour by the Revenue has occurred, it is very rare that courts award simple interest. Actually, most of the awards are interest according to part 8C. Presumably, that was what was behind the original introduction of part 8C and the Revenue was saying, “Oh my God, we’ve got this massive financial exposure; what are we going to do? I tell you what: we’ll introduce a penal tax rate on this interest that doesn’t apply to anybody else.” I would caution the Minister against throwing these regulations in as some kind of concession, because in truth, in the biggest, most important, expensive and difficult cases, simple interest is very rarely awarded.

    Hansard source
34. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    The Corporation Tax Act 2010 (Part 8C) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

    Anybody who is currently in litigation with the Revenue that has passed the four-year mark from the period in which the liability may or may not have arisen would now have the expectation that if they win and an award is made, it would not be assessed under part 8C. Will the Minister confirm that now it will be assessed, so people in that situation will need to recalibrate almost completely their assumptions of risk around the litigation?

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35. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Kit Malthouse

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    The hon. Gentleman is making a very interesting and pertinent speech. I hope he will welcome the fact that the Bill strengthens the requirement on companies to not only look at prevention but have an adequate recovery plan. Does he think that there is adequate sanction in the Bill for those companies that are deemed not to have an adequate recovery plan? My reading is that regulators cannot necessarily fine for a negligent recovery. As the hon. Gentleman said, the human factor so often matters, but surely that matters as much in recovery as it does in prevention.

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36. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Julia Lopez

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    Happy new year, Mr Speaker, and thank you for putting the heating on. I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the Government’s rationale for this legislation in the Secretary of State’s stead. I do not know why the Minister was demoted either, but I want him to know that we appreciate him. The official Opposition recognise the scale of the cyber-security challenge that the country faces. If the pandemic accelerated the adoption of digital technology at a pace we had never before seen, then the advent of artificial intelligence will embed that technology into our economy in wholly new ways that bring not only opportunity but unprecedented risk. AI and automation will not only transform productivity but equip hostile states, criminal gangs and opportunists alike with tools capable of eroding our national defences at speed and at scale. It is right that Parliament legislates to raise the collective security bar. We on the Conservative Benches support that principle. However, legislation of this kind does not come around often. Cyber law takes time to develop, and once the Bill passes, it is unlikely that Parliament will return to this territory for some years. That means that we must ask two simple but very serious questions today: will this law work and is it enough? Before we answer those questions, it is worth reminding ourselves of the real-world consequences of failure. Cyber risk is neither abstract nor theoretical. Last year, the UK experienced what is widely regarded as our most economically damaging cyber-incident to date when Jaguar Land Rover suffered a major attack. That was not a sophisticated act of cyber-warfare against the state—although such acts are happening with increasing regularity—but was carried out by a band of hackers. The consequences were enormous, however. For five weeks, Jaguar Land Rover was unable to operate its automated manufacturing lines, cyber-related costs mounted to nearly £200 million, and national economic output was visibly affected in that month alone. The real damage did not stop at the factory gates: hundreds of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain—many of them operating on thin margins—were pushed to the brink, workers faced uncertainty and contractors had their work paused. Ultimately, the Government had to step in with a £1.5 billion loan guarantee to prevent wider economic fallout. When we consider the Bill, we must ask whether it would do anything to strengthen our collective resilience. That is one of the tests that this legislation ought to meet, and it is not yet clear that it does. Indeed, the attack on JLR would not have been stopped, as the Minister himself has made clear, because it would not have been in scope. The cyber-threat landscape is evolving at an extraordinary pace. New research shows that cyber-attacks now cost our economy nearly £15 billion every year. High-profile breaches of businesses such as Marks and Spencer and the Co-op have demonstrated how quickly consumer confidence, jobs and supply chains can be put at risk. Last year alone, insurers paid out £197 million to help businesses recover from cyber-incidents. In fact, the collective cyber insurance bill of the FTSE 100 is now larger than the defence research and development budget. The Bill seeks to respond to one aspect of that reality by expanding the scope of regulation. Data centres, managed service providers, load controllers and designated critical suppliers will now fall within its ambit. That is a welcome acknowledgment that digitisation has introduced systemic risks that the original NIS regulations of 2018 did not adequately cover. The Bill also strengthens the powers of regulators, introduces cost recovery mechanisms and tightens incident reporting requirements. Those measures are intended to modernise our cyber framework and address clear shortcomings identified in reviews of the NIS regime in 2020 and 2022. On paper, that all sounds sensible, but intent alone is not enough, which brings me back to our central concern: whether this law will work in practice in raising the standard of our collective resilience. The uncomfortable truth is that, in some of the most high-profile cases of cyber-attack, the penetration of systems was carried out by attackers using valid credentials. That means systems behaved normally. The breaches looked like legitimate access until it was too late. Human frailties were exploited: help desks were persuaded to reset passwords, and staff and contractors were impersonated. This Bill would help mainly after an attack—not before—by mandating reporting, improving intelligence sharing and increasing accountability.

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37. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Julia Lopez

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    Absolutely. The hon. Gentleman is correct: this is fundamentally about culture—that is the point that I am making. We can pass as many regulations as we like, but a lot of the holes in our cyber-security systems come down to human frailties. That means this challenge is not just about new laws but about changing a number of things to make us more resilient. It is right not to dictate technical standards in primary law that will soon be outdated in the fast-moving world of technology, so the question is whether this law has the right mix of carrot and stick to make affected firms act in a way that raises the security bar—there are several areas where we fear it may not. First, there is potentially an enforcement paradox. The Bill expands regulatory powers and increases the scale of potential fines, but the evidence from the existing regime does not suggest definitively that fines and new regulations deliver us greater cyber-resilience. Under the current NIS regulations, enforcement has been slow, inconsistent and often toothless. Very few significant penalties have been issued. Where they have been issued, the delay between incident and sanction has sometimes stretched beyond two years. That delay matters, because it actively undermines deterrence and disconnects accountability from operational reality. Simply widening the scope of regulation without ensuring that regulators are properly resourced, empowered and required to act quickly risks creating obligations that exist on paper but lack any real-world bite. We also have concerns about the Bill’s cost recovery model. Funding regulators through levies on the organisations that they oversee risks unintended consequences in terms of improving our resilience. For large firms, the cost burden may be manageable, but for smaller enterprises it amounts to an additional operational tax that could divert scarce capital away from cyber-defence, staff training and innovation. There is also a structural risk here. Regulators that are reliant on fee income might face incentives to expand scope and complexity unnecessarily, creating bureaucratic drag that crowds out voluntary, market-led initiatives, which often raise standards more effectively than prescriptive regulation. More generally, I worry that this Bill will play into tech monopolies. The companies that thrive in this kind of environment are those with big compliance and legal departments. That concentrates risk and makes our tech economy less diverse, with serious implications that I shall come on to. There may be reporting challenges too. A two-stage reporting process within 24 and 72 hours may be achievable for large, well-resourced organisations with in-house cyber teams, but for smaller operators it risks creating a compliance culture focused on speed, not substance. There is also the danger of duplication. Many organisations already face overlapping reporting obligations under UK GDPR, sectoral rules and existing legislation. Without simplification and proportionality, the administrative load could be significant, once again diverting attention and resource from the very cyber-threat management that the Bill seeks to improve. We need to avoid this legislation becoming a “something must be done” Bill that totally misses the mark. The Bill also fails to grapple properly with the human factor in cyber-security, which has already been talked about by the hon. Member for Harlow (Chris Vince). Technology alone does not keep organisations safe; governance matters. Yet board-level ownership of cyber-risk is moving in the wrong direction. Only 27% of businesses now have a board member explicitly responsible for cyber-security, down from 38% just three years ago. Without mechanisms to ensure senior accountability, fines risk becoming little more than a cost of doing business. Directors remain insulated while operational teams are left to carry the can. National cyber-resilience depends not just on systems and software, but on leadership, culture and accountability at the very top. For those reasons, ahead of Committee consideration, we on the Opposition Benches are examining how the legislation can be strengthened, while continuing to support its core objectives. In the meantime, regulators must be properly equipped with the right powers, resources and clarity from Parliament on the intent of the law. Sanctions must be applied swiftly and consistently, and guidance must be clear, so that enforcement is credible and deterrence is real. The Government should also look at how reporting obligations are calibrated. A one-size-fits-all approach might place disproportionate burdens on smaller firms, and it might be better to ensure that reporting thresholds reflect the size, complexity and risk profile of an organisation. Equally, the funding of regulators must be transparent and predictable. There have to be safeguards against regulatory expansion for its own sake and firm assurances that funds raised are reinvested directly into improving national cyber-resilience, not absorbed by administrative overheads. While the Bill rightly prioritises critical national infrastructure, it cannot afford to ignore high-risk sectors that sit beyond its immediate scope. There is also a major role for market-based solutions. Cyber insurance, sector-wide intelligence sharing and collaborative resilience initiatives can all complement regulation. These tools can reduce risk and improve preparedness without adding unnecessary legislative complexity. The review cycle set out in the Bill may be too slow for the threat landscape we face and the pace of technological change. Annual or biannual reviews might allow Parliament to scrutinise effectiveness, respond to emerging threats and ensure that the legislation remains fit for purpose. Let me make some more general points about the Government’s approach to cyber-security and resilience, and issues about the risk of dependence and threat from adversaries. I see no evidence from this Government that they are thinking with any clarity about the risks of long-term technological dependency and lock-in—quite the opposite, in fact. Large parts of our economy now depend on secure, high-quality digital infrastructure, and that reliance will only increase as AI advances. Whoever provides that infrastructure will wield huge future leverage. It was that reality that ultimately drove the change of heart over Chinese tech sitting at the core of our 5G telecom networks a few years ago. However, the Government are seemingly betting every chip on US hyper-scalers. They provide our data centres, supply the platforms on which Government Departments are run and, more often than not, are the ones winning all the Government contracts. These investments will provide our companies with things that they need, from compute power to increasingly sophisticated AI platforms, but the UK is doing little simultaneously to mitigate our increased technological dependency. When I say “technological”, we need to understand that technology is what we now run our defence systems, factories, energy networks and communications on. Technology is the plumbing of our nation. During September’s much crowed-about state visit by President Trump, this Government were visibly begging for good economic headlines after the humiliating resignations of the Deputy Prime Minister and the ambassador to the US, not to mention the uncontainable mess of the Chancellor’s first Budget and the threat of her second Budget. The US-UK tech partnership was the result, with a huge amount of smoke and mirrors deployed over what it actually contained. Whatever substance lay within it, we heard just before Christmas that it had been paused, used as leverage by the US while other trade negotiations were under way. I am not criticising the US Administration for skilfully playing their hand in their national interest; I am asking this Government rapidly to wake up to the reality of a new world in which the post-war settlement is coming to an end—one that has been giving clues to its existence for many years, since long before President Trump came into office. The United States remains a vital ally, but in this new era Britain must be very clear-eyed about risk, the reality of hard power and the need to protect our sovereign interests. Cyber-risk requires as much thought about the fundamentals of plumbing as it does about the laws that try to manage how humans use or exploit technology. The UK Government have a vast procurement budget for which our own firms ought to be able to make a successful bid, but UK tech tells me consistently that, for all the talk in the Government’s AI strategy of sovereign tech capability, it has not got a look-in since Labour has been in power. I am concerned that this Bill should not introduce new, burdensome regulation for UK firms in a way that benefits non-UK incumbents with giant compliance teams and legal resources in a way that would exacerbate the risk of vendor lock-in. Let us turn to another risk. The private sector will have noticed that the new obligations in this Bill broadly do not touch the public sector, where cyber-risk remains red-light-flashingly large, notwithstanding the public cyber strategy that was thrown out today in implicit acknowledgment of that gaping hole. Knowing that the public sector holds such enormous cyber-risk, this Labour Government choose not to minimise it, but to create a brand-new one—a hulking great identity system mandated for anyone who wants a job and, we now hear, possibly for new-born babies. It is mandatory identity by stealth, not consent, and with no honesty about it. It is not to be against the ability of people to verify themselves digitally for banking, to access certain online services or to stop fraud to think that Labour’s mandated digital identity plan is a complete rotter. The Association of Digital Verification Professionals called what Labour inherited on digital identity a “world-leading model for data sovereignty that digitised liberty rather than diluted it”. The citizen, not Government, would be in control. This naive Government are crowding out private sector expertise and making everyone have one of these identities by stealth. They have no idea what this system will cost, and they will not be honest about what it will be used for. What of the cyber-security of this system? The system on which this digital identity will be run was breached during red team testing last year. When I asked the Secretary of State if that system has now met the National Cyber Security Centre’s cyber-security standard, no answers came. Whistleblowers have continued to speak out about the vulnerabilities of the system, and there is no sense whatsoever from Government that the dodgy digital identity plan will be paused until such a point when they are confident about cyber-security.

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38. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Julia Lopez

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    The hon. Gentleman is wilfully misinterpreting what I am saying. There is not an issue with having systems tested; there is an issue with the fact that the system test failed. There is no evidence that the Government have therefore acted to deal with those systemic failures.

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39. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Julia Lopez

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    The whistleblowers continue to raise serious concerns about the structures upon which the Government’s digital identity platform will be built. The hon. Member looks absolutely outraged that I might suggest there are some concerns about the cyber-security risk of a national, mandated digital identity platform. I find it extraordinary that he suggests that I am expressing concerns that a system might be tested. Of course every system must be robustly tested—that is not the point I am trying to make, and the hon. Member is being wilfully ludicrous in suggesting otherwise. This Prime Minister cannot run an economy, keep promises or control his Back Benchers, or his Front Benchers, so how on earth does anybody think he can run a secure digital identity system? At the same time as risking technological lock-in by friendly allies, we are creating new vulnerabilities for adversaries to attack. Just before Christmas, UK intelligence agencies warned about increasing, large-scale cyber-espionage from China, targeting commercial and political information. We discovered from Ministers that the Foreign Office itself was the subject of a major cyber-attack in October, which officials believe was carried out by Chinese hackers, and this came in the midst of a major row between the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service about the prosecution of spies operating here in Parliament. We will be looking closely at this legislation to identify where the Government should be addressing this cyber-reality with much greater force. An approach to cyber-resilience that looks only at introducing new regulations and compliance burdens without thinking through risks such as a mandated identity scheme, dependence on non-sovereign suppliers, the malign intent of other nations, and a failure to build up our own workforce and skills is one that will fail.

    Hansard source
40. 6 Jan 2026·Parliament·Julia Lopez

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

    As my right hon. Friend is aware, local government is outside of the scope of the Bill, but it is a very juicy target—much of the public sector remains a very juicy target. In acknowledgment of that, the Government whipped out a strategy very quickly this morning that is meant to give us assurances about the public sector’s cyber-resilience. I am not sure that that strategy will provide much reassurance, which is why it is important to understand that this Bill can only be one part of a much wider arsenal to tighten gaps where they exist, in both the private and public sectors.

    Hansard source