Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,731 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   I have actually enjoyed seeing what the Foreign Office has been doing over the past few weeks. I was trying to determine why I have been getting so much more enjoyment out of it, and I think it is because it has been taking advice from “Monty Python and the Holy Grail”. Every time we have a Foreign Office question, the Black Knight comes in front of us. They are honourable, brave and doughty; they will not answer a question; they are torn limb from limb, and their arguments are struck down one by one; but they still want to have the fight.

   Hansard source
2. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   It is indeed. I applaud the Government and their Ministers for doing that. We hear time and again from Government Members that we have had ample time to debate these issues. I entirely agree, but that is exactly the problem. These debates have been going on for so long because we are not getting the answers that we need to do our job and scrutinise this deal. Anyone making a good argument should be able to justify their point and evidence it. I will summarise some of the key questions that I want answered, and will say why we seem stuck. I will then explain why that matters, and, finally, will give the context of this debate. First, we ask about the legal position. The Government say that there is legal jeopardy, but the Conservatives contend that what the International Court of Justice says is non-binding, that there is no court that could pass judgment, and that there is a Commonwealth opt-out. The Government say that the cost is £3.4 billion; the Government Actuary says that the figure is £34 billion, and the Conservatives contend that the Government are using the wrong tool to make a judgment on cost, because net present value does not count. When it comes to the environment, the Government say that safeguards are in place, but the Conservatives contend that Mauritius does not have a navy that would enable it to hold up its side of the bargain and prevent damage to fishing. Turning to the nuclear aspect, we Conservatives recognise that the Pelindaba treaty creates a conflict, and the Government have not explained why it does not. As for the US’s involvement and whether it has a veto, we believe that the 1966 agreement would need to be taken into account. Finally, although it has not been mentioned today or over the past few weeks, there is the long-term security of this base. At the end of 99 years, there is only an option for us to buy and continue, so what happens at that point? We have not secured the long-term security of the base at all.

   Hansard source
3. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   Fundamentally, the US should express its concerns publicly, and it has now done so. We have asked Ministers, both in this debate and on Monday, whether the UK Government can make a unilateral decision without amending the notes. The Government have said that they have to amend the notes, but they have not set out what happens if the US does not agree. That is the key part of this, but the Government keep reading out the same answer that I got on Monday when I asked that question, the same answer that I got when I intervened on the Minister, and the same answer that my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) got. They say that they have set out the process, which is primary legislation, secondary legislation, and then amendments to the notes. The question is: what happens if the Americans do not agree to that amendment of the 1966 notes? I will take an intervention if the Minister can tell us, because the fundamental point about US involvement is this: if they say no, but we say yes, where do the islands go? What happens to the agreement? What happens if they say yes and we say no? Those fundamental questions are why we keep coming back to this issue. If there was clarity and simple answers to simple questions, the Opposition would understand that and be able to make a balanced judgement. Instead, we have gaps in our understanding from the Government.

   Hansard source
4. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   My right hon. Friend is entirely right in pinpointing some of the issues, and I will reverse my speech and deal with some of those first. On the 1996 Pelindaba treaty, formally ratified in 2009, although the whole treaty is about where countries can research and what they can do with nuclear weapons, the key part, article 4, is about the prevention of parking of nuclear explosives. Paragraph 1 states: “Each Party undertakes to prohibit…the stationing of any nuclear explosive device” on its territory. By definition, if the base goes across to Mauritius, it will be under the treaty, because Mauritius is a signatory. There is a slight misconstruing, because there is a specific carve-out. Paragraph 2 states: “Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields”, and it goes on. What the treaty implies, and what it states specifically, is that Mauritius would have to be consulted and provide explicit permission for nuclear craft, whether submarine, boat or aircraft, to be there. Only yesterday we heard that that permission would not be granted. This question on the security of the nuclear aspect is unanswered, and I look forward to the Government trying to rectify that position, because they have not explained the interaction with the treaty. This is not operational; it is purely about legal text.

   Hansard source
5. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   Absolutely. On a technicality, the Minister is right to say that the treaty in front of us has no problems, but at the end of the day it is about the interaction with other treaties once we have signed it and sovereignty has been given away. My hon. Friend is right that things would not be covered once Diego Garcia no longer belonged to us, and the Government are struggling to explain that difficulty.

   Hansard source
6. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   My right hon. Friend is right. From memory, I think he is referring to article 3 of the 1996 treaty, which explicitly talks about researching and so on. The Government need to set out the implications and how that treaty interacts with this treaty that they are signing or want us to ratify. Let us step back a bit further. We are in this position, the Government argue, because of a non-binding ICJ judgment. I will ask the Minister again: with which court does he believe there would be a problem? The Government have said time and again that we could be brought into conflict with several courts. The Defence Secretary was worried about the United Nations convention on the law of the sea and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but we already know from a 2015 ruling against the UK over Mauritius that they cannot judge sovereignty, so that one is out the window. Earlier, I asked the Minister, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) about this issue, and she mentioned the 2021 special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. As she will know, the UK was not party to give information to that, and it rested on the non-binding judgment of the ICJ, which is already contested. There is an opt-out, because it is a Commonwealth interaction. Months on, the Government still cannot answer these simple questions. Another body that is often referred to—we will go over this again—is the International Telecommunication Union. We know from the Government’s own written answers that article 48 of the ITU constitution states that it cannot judge sovereignty. The Government know that, and I do not understand why they will not just stand here and say that. On finances, the figures and what they are made up of is contested. The Government are right on their figure, and the Opposition are right on our figure, but how can that be? It is because of the mechanism being used to judge that value. The Opposition contest that the best way to work out the figure is the nominal value used by the Government actuaries. The deal is over 100 years, and we have to take into account what things will look like and other factors. The Government actuaries say that the cost is £34 billion, yet the Government are using net present value, which gives us £3.4 billion. I am glad that the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry is here, because I posed this question to him in the last debate, and his answer was that the figure is in the Green Book. I retorted: “Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty?”—[Official Report, 9 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 748.]

   Hansard source
7. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend, who has experience of running a Department. I find it all the more frustrating that Ministers cannot simply set out the difference between the two values when I as a Back Bencher can spot it and explain it. The question is which is the better tool and why. Net present value has domestic use, and that is why the Office for National Statistics will not come out and say that there is a problem with it. It is a legitimate tool to use, but it is being used inappropriately when we are dealing with sovereignty. The assumptions that the Government are building their figure on are 3.5% for the first 30 years, but this is a 99-year lease. We do not even know what will happens with the other 70 years. If we compare with other countries, we see that the US uses a 7% social discount rate. We are posing simple questions, doing our job on the Opposition Benches, trying to get answers from Ministers as to why we would use this net present value. When we take everything into account, if we use simply an inflation-adjusted amount, it is £10 billion. There are three figures out there that are all correct, but all stand to be used in a different way. The fact that a Minister repeatedly cannot answer those questions is of due concern to Opposition Members. I will turn to the size of the environmental aspect. It has been pointed out multiple times that Mauritius does not have a navy or a force to protect the blue planet programme that is in place. Why am I concerned about that? We know that the 2015 UNCLOS tribunal was all about the fact that the UK wanted to put more protections in, but the Mauritians wanted fishing rights in the area—we already have history there—yet we would not have the Navy to enforce protections. It is a simple question for the Government to answer: how will they resolve that problem?

   Hansard source
8. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   Quite possibly. We already know that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has its blue planet programme to help to protect environmental areas that were, or are, under British control. Does this come under the FCDO budget as well? We still do not know the answers to these questions—very simple questions, which we have been asking for the past year. On the matter of the Chagossians, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) raised a very simple principle. Again, I am confused by what the Government are saying. The Prime Minister himself has said that Greenlanders will decide for Greenland, yet Chagossians cannot decide for Chagos. I understand that there could be an argument one way or the other, but the Government apparently will not make it. They do not seem to see the illogical nature of what they are putting forward when they make a statement referring to sovereignty in one area, but make no statement that would apply to the case that we are discussing today.

   Hansard source
9. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

   British Indian Ocean Territory

   Absolutely. That is another perfectly sensible question to pose to the Government, and for them to answer and to set out the reasons and the rationale. I am still concerned, when we are dealing with the detail, about the long-term nature of the deal and whether it is bomb-proof. When we come to the end of 99 years, what will happen? The only protection we have is that we have first say on taking it on. We have already heard, from Members on both sides of the House, how much China’s economy will grow. Will we even have the finances to buy that deal? Will we be outbid by the United States, by China, or by some other BRIC power? We are held over a barrel by the Mauritians, or, worse still, the Mauritians can simply say, “We don’t want it any more”, and the base is gone and we can do nothing about it. Why does all this matter? Those are all technical questions that I want the Government to answer, but overall we must see the wider context, which has been explained here numerous times before. The United States is changing its foreign policy, China is changing its foreign policy, yet the UK does not appear to have an approach in either direction. It appears that we are looking towards a sphere of influence, with America having one side and China and Russia having another. So the question for the House is, “Why rush this through?” Why not think about it? Why not answer these simple questions, to get this side of the House on board, so that we could then say, “We think this is the right thing for the country? The saddest aspect of this whole debate is the way in which the Government have turned it into a scapegoating of the Opposition as if we were playing political games, rather than seeing that the simple technical questions that need to be answered are the key to unlocking our understanding. If we as parliamentarians cannot get answers to these questions and do not understand the rationale, how can we explain it to our constituents, how can we explain it to the nation, and how can we explain it to the world? If the Government want us to stop—supposedly—playing politics, I ask them to give simple answers to simple questions, back them up and give evidence for them. Otherwise, we are left fighting the Black Knight, who is brave, who is forthright, who is keen to stand in the way of any progress, but who simply will not answer a question and is cut down, limb by limb, in a pool of blood.

   Hansard source
10. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Will the Minister give way?

    Hansard source
11. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    I am surprised that a party that represents trade unionists does not understand that when there is a dispute between one party and another, it is a good thing to try to talk about it. [Interruption.] Why did we start negotiations? Because there is a dispute, and we need to talk to other people to understand what is going on. That is exactly what any responsible country should do. There is a difference between signing off a treaty and entering into talks with someone. Trade unionists should know that.

    Hansard source
12. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Will the Minister give way?

    Hansard source
13. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Minister specifically directed some comments at me, opening up an opportunity for me to speak. How can I respond to those comments when I cannot intervene?

    Hansard source
14. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Youth Unemployment

    Will the Minister give way?

    Hansard source
15. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Youth Unemployment

    Will the Minister give way?

    Hansard source
16. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Luke Evans

    Youth Unemployment

    Does the hon. Member share my concern about the graduate market? We are talking about youth unemployment, but we know from the Office for National Statistics that 257,000 Brits have emigrated, of whom 70% were under the age of 35. We are losing a lot of talent, but that is not being picked up in the figures for youth unemployment, so it is likely that youth unemployment is actually significantly worse, and that is because of the Government’s changes.

    Hansard source
17. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    The mistake the hon. Member makes is in buying into China’s narrative that there is a grey zone in the South China sea. There is no grey zone. China should not be there, but it could not care less. It goes there anyway. The idea that some agreement we make with Mauritius is going to stop China acting at a later date is complete nonsense, as China proves in the South China sea every day.

    Hansard source
18. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    I welcome the opportunity to make clear my opposition to any proposal to give away this strategically important sovereign British territory. This is not merely a territorial concession; it is an act of strategic self-sabotage, a dereliction of duty and an unforgivable betrayal of our national security. At a time of growing global instability, when our adversaries are watching for any sign of weakness, Labour has chosen to send precisely the wrong signal: that Britain can be pressured into abandoning its own territory. This decision is indefensible on every level. The Chagos islands, and specifically Diego Garcia, have been a vital strategic asset for the UK and our allies for decades. The military base on Diego Garcia has played a crucial role in global security operations, supporting counter-terrorism efforts, maritime security and regional stability. It has been instrumental in projecting western power in the Indo-Pacific, a region increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition, particularly with China. By ceding sovereignty over these islands, Labour has put at risk Britain’s strategic interests and undermined our ability to operate in the region. What makes this decision even more staggering is that we are not just surrendering our sovereignty: we are paying Mauritius billions of pounds for the privilege. My central concern is the serious strategic challenge we face in respect of China. China has a population of 1.4 billion people and by 2030 its GDP is projected to be $26 trillion, second only to the US, and there are projections that it will potentially outstrip the US by 2050. China’s increase in military spending this year alone is expected to be 7.2%, which is the third consecutive year in which its increase in military spending has been over 7%. China has become the world’s largest shipbuilding nation, and its navy is expected to comprise 430 military grade ships by 2030, compared with the US navy’s estimated decline to 294 ships. China is a growing military power and there are no indications that it is anywhere near a supposed peak. Domestically and internationally, China conducts itself as an autocratic state. It has the most sophisticated domestic surveillance system in the world, Skynet, which as of 2023 has 700 million cameras—that is one lens for every two Chinese citizens. We must not be so naive as to assume that if we end up in even greater strategic competition with China it will care at all about what agreement we have reached with Mauritius. We saw with Hong Kong how easily agreements made with third countries can be ignored, as China did there. If Mauritius seeks to align itself strategically with China, do we think China will hesitate and ask it not to break the treaty because of international law? China will not respect any Bill or pay any attention to diplomatic consequences for Mauritius if it thinks it is in its interest to get Mauritius to break that agreement. That is the difference between any form of agreement and sovereignty, because once sovereignty has been given away, it can never be bought back.

    Hansard source
19. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is extraordinary that Labour Members are prepared to defend the deal, while admitting that they do not even know if our accusations are correct. They could say that they do not agree with what we are proposing, but to admit that they do not know whether nuclear weapons will be allowed on the island and that they are happy to support the deal anyway is disgraceful. We must address the wider consequences of this decision. If Labour is willing to abandon the Chagos islands so easily, what message does that send to our other overseas territories? The International Court of Justice may have issued an advisory opinion in 2019—[Interruption.] What I say is true; the world is watching. We have had pressure put on us in relation to a sovereign territory and we have collapsed, but Labour Members want us to think that the rest of the world will not interpret our standing from that.

    Hansard source
20. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    The people who we should be worried about are not the people in charge of the British overseas territories—we should be worried about the people who are watching what we do and making decisions about how they will act, as we saw with previous attempts to take control of those territories. Does the hon. Gentleman think that Argentina will observe this situation and not draw a lesson from it? Of course it will.

    Hansard source
21. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    That is a fact. My right hon. Friend will know that other UN bodies have supported Argentina for decades, and are pressuring us to continue negotiations around that issue. The Government rely on what the UN says, but the UN’s position on the Falklands is completely contrary to the interests of this country.

    Hansard source
22. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    My right hon. Friend highlights the lessons that the rest of the world will be drawing from this decision. A submissive approach to third party calls on these issues displays an incredible naiveté about the world we live in and the direction we are travelling. Our previous positive disposition towards the role that these institutions could play was in a different era, when we expected a converging uniformity of basic values and democracy. That convergence is not happening; instead, our enemies are using our desire to stick to it as a weakness to exploit. They do not even recognise basic legal norms and institutions in their own countries; their own citizens do not benefit from legal protections and rights, and they do not believe in the rule of law full stop. Do the Government really think that our enemies will put international legal obligations ahead of pursuing their own strategic interests? Of course not, yet we are expected to undertake a strategic surrender in the name of the rule of law in a way that advantages them, and on what basis—that they might look at what we have done and change their ways in the future, as they failed to do in Hong Kong? That is incredible naiveté.

    Hansard source
23. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    It is not just the WTO; the Chinese are supposed to follow the jurisdiction of international maritime courts, for example. The Government point to that as a reason why we should comply with them, but the Chinese break those rulings all the time, as we discussed in relation to the South China sea. They could not care less; they are restrained only by their strict self-interest. They pretend and play up the idea that they might follow the rules—when it does not suit, they do not follow them—yet we are supposed to follow the rules, because the aim is to get the Chinese on side. That is never going to happen. Let us look at the membership of the ICJ and the people who made the ruling. The vice-president was Xue Hanqin, who ruled that the UK should give the islands over to Mauritius. She is a former Chinese Communist party official who served as the director-general of the department of treaty and law in China’s foreign ministry—the same ministry that is overseeing the violation of the agreement in Hong Kong. It makes absolutely no sense to see it as a neutral arbiter. In 2022, she was one of two judges who voted against an ICJ ruling that Russia should suspend its invasion of Ukraine. Would our country slavishly adhering to those rulings, against our own national interest, bring onside wavering countries that are making their own strategic calculations about who they want to support when it comes to challenges such as Ukraine and, if it happens, Taiwan? Of course it will not. The historical argument for that approach has been to suggest that we will bring other countries over to our way of doing things—the rules-based order—but I am afraid that that is not happening. Countries across the world are actually looking at which bloc and which sphere of influence would be best at defending their interests if they seek to align with it. This surrender deal will make it very clear that they should think twice about supporting the western democracies and instead point their finger towards the autocratic states that will benefit so enormously from the deal. Surrendering the Chagos islands will simply strengthen those countries that want a more disorderly world. We should seek to use the rules-based order—we should not abandon that long-term goal, and we should continue to make it clear that that is our preference for how we run the world—but not with our eyes and ears closed to what is actually happening, and not at huge cost to our own interests. This is not diplomacy or pragmatism; it is weakness, and weakness has consequences. Britain is not just losing a territory; we are losing credibility. Our allies are watching as Labour surrenders key strategic ground without so much as a fight. Our adversaries are taking note and seeing a Government who lack the resolve to defend their own interests. This deal is a sell-out and a catastrophic misjudgment, and it must not go ahead. I urge every Member of this House to stand firm for Britain’s interests, our national security and our place in the world. We must reject this reckless agreement and demand that our Government defend British sovereign territory, rather than bargaining it away behind closed doors.

    Hansard source
24. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Does my right hon. Friend agree that at every single point from 2010 onwards, all the Labour party has ever done is encourage us to spend more?

    Hansard source
25. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Even if we accept the Government’s position that Mauritius does not get on particularly well with China, are we really leaving in the hands of fate the question of whether the Mauritians might change their minds 50 years from now and seek to line up with China’s sphere of influence? It is a huge gamble to take.

    Hansard source
26. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

    Youth Unemployment

    In the Minister’s speech, she seemed to be lauding jobs created by the Government. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is ridiculous to suggest that the Government should create jobs instead of business?

    Hansard source
27. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

    Youth Unemployment

    Will my hon. Friend comment on the proportion of benefits claimants who are under the age of 24? In Sleaford and North Hykeham, 25% of people on unemployment benefit are under the age of 24, which is clearly a very large amount.

    Hansard source
28. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

    Youth Unemployment

    My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech, and I am sorry to interrupt it. I want to ask her about the people who are writing hundreds and hundreds of applications for graduate schemes, and who are finding that they are locked out of those schemes, having been deprioritised because of the colour of their skin. Why should the Deputy Prime Minister’s son or the children of the Leader of the Opposition be prioritised for jobs over a tractor driver from Lincolnshire?

    Hansard source
29. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Will the Minister give way?

    Hansard source
30. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    What a pleasure it is to be called so soon, Madam Deputy Speaker; I am very grateful. My goodness me! I do feel sorry for the Minister, being wheeled out to defend the indefensible. I have to say, the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), has done a Trojan piece of work on behalf of the Government, and it is only fair that he should be given the day off. Every day is a school day when it comes to Chagos, is it not? We learn something new every day of the week, it seems. Perhaps the Government might like to reflect on whether, in that wonderful Keynesian way, when the facts change, we change our mind—apparently not. The facts have changed. The ground truth has certainly changed, not least the attitude of the United States; that is clear beyond peradventure. In February last year, the then Foreign Secretary said that without US agreement, the deal would be dead. But in recent days, the US commander-in-chief, no less, has said that the deal is “stupid” and “weak”. There cannot be any ambiguity in that. That is the contemporaneous view of our greatest partner and friend. Surely to goodness, that is justification for pausing the deal. We have learned about the Pelindaba treaty. I have to say that I was not aware of it until very recently, but it is a showstopper. Paul Bérenger, the Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius, recently said that there will be no nuclear weapons on Diego Garcia. He has been very helpful to the Government by laying out exactly what things will look like when Mauritius takes control of Diego Garcia. The Minister says, “Well, we cannot comment on that because it is operational,” but that is precisely what it is not. We are not talking about precise B-52s or Ohio class submarines going into Diego Garcia—I do not want to know about that. What I want to know about is the legal structure within which it is possible for these things to be in Diego Garcia and Chagos in general.

    Hansard source
31. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    That is precisely the case; it is as plain as a pikestaff, yet the Government persist with the policy. It is perfectly reasonable and respectable for the Government to say, “The facts have clearly changed, and all these things have come to light, so we will pause this. There is no hurry in this matter, nor any dishonour in saying that we need to consult on it more widely—potentially indefinitely. Nevertheless, we will continue the process and keep it open.” I appreciate that, to save the Government’s blushes, we cannot simply can it, but we can pause it. If the Minister wants more evidence that the Chagossians have been trampled all over during this process, she need only refer to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which said in December 2025 that we should pause the deal in order to ensure that the Chagossians’ voices are properly heard. She is being attacked from all quarters, and the unifying message from all those quarters is, “For goodness sake, let’s pause this—just think again.”

    Hansard source
32. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    My hon. Friend, who is experienced in these matters, makes an extremely good point. We need to keep our heads in all this. The Conservative party has been consistent in its opposition to this terrible, terrible surrender deal. The people out there honestly cannot understand why the Government persist with it. It is plainly not a matter of national security. I fear that all this is underpinned by the Government’s insistence on satisfying their post-colonial guilt. The Government need to get over that and understand that national security has primacy in this matter.

    Hansard source
33. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    I do not have any insight into the hon. Gentleman’s conversations with Labour Members. As a former Foreign Office Minister, I would say that there are negotiations and then there are negotiations, and sometimes we can use negotiations as a tool to keep certain parties happy, while having no intention of agreeing to what they are demanding of us. Furthermore, a lot of the pressure for all this comes from the advisory note by the ICJ. In this country, we think of judges as upstanding and impartial maintainers of our legal system and the rule of law. That is not necessarily the case when it comes to supranational judicial bodies. We know, for example, that Patrick Robinson—one of the judges involved with the 2019 ICJ decision—has been demanding that the UK pony up £19 trillion in slavery reparations. Those are not apolitical, independent judicial figures. Many of them have an agenda, and it is one that is hostile to this country—as hostile, I would say, as some of the parties, like Russia and China, that we are currently trying to prevent from getting a hold on those islands. It is perfectly reasonable for the President of the United States, who I have to confess is not my cup of tea, to decide—belatedly, but nevertheless—that this is a disastrous measure and that he wants nothing to do with it. He has signalled that in his own inimitable fashion, and the Government should take note, pause the surrender treaty and come back with something better, if at all. This deal, surely, is as dead as the dodo.

    Hansard source
34. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Dr Andrew Murrison

    British Indian Ocean Territory

    Does the hon. Gentleman see any parallel between the plight of Chagossians and the plight of Greenlanders? The Prime Minister has gone out of his way, correctly, to defend the rights of Greenlanders, but he is doing the complete reverse for Chagossians.

    Hansard source
35. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Draft Cheshire and Warrington Combined Authority Order 2026 Draft Cumbria Combined Authority Order 2026

    It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Huq. I am sure you will be pleased, as will the Minister, to know from the outset that the Opposition do not intend to divide the Committee on these orders. However, I do have a few questions to put to the Minister that are relevant to both orders; where they are not, I will be more specific. The first question is about the agreement that the Minister may or may not have reached with the Treasury about the underwriting of the 30-year mayoral investment fund. One of the concerns that the Opposition have highlighted, which I know has been shared to a degree across parties, is that with the English devolution Bill there is scope, perhaps, for new mayoral authorities to raise significant precepts. The feedback from several authorities is that the big incentive is that central Government are making a significant additional level of discretionary funding available to mayoral combined authorities. Clearly, 30 years runs over multiple future Parliaments, so it would be helpful to understand how the settlement has been reached with the Treasury, whether it means that the funding cannot disappear because of future changes in Government circumstances, and if so what the methodology has been, so that authorities entering into an agreement have a sufficient level of assurance that the funding will continue. I would like to ask the Minister about data sharing, which is one of the new functions conferred by these orders. The authorities in question all have multiple statutory functions—they provide children’s services, adult social care and a variety of different services—but the primary focus of the orders is transport. What data ringfence is drawn around those new data-control and data-sharing measures so that residents can have a degree of assurance and clarity about what is to be shared on this footprint and what is not? I also have a question about the precepts themselves. We briefly touched on the point about the 30-year mayoral investment fund; clearly, with transport as the major focus, the underlying assumption is that the mayor will use the new precept to underwrite investment in those transport functions. A great deal of debate is going on about how transport functions across the country should develop. It would be helpful for the Committee to know what assumptions, if any, the Ministry or other parts of Government have made about the level of the precept, and where that sits against other sources of funding, some of which the Chancellor has referred to, to underpin other elements of public transport investment. To what extent is it an additional levy being funded through a mayoral precept versus what is coming from central Government resources, as has been announced so far? Finally, I have two questions specifically on Warrington. Members across the Committee will be aware that the Minister’s predecessor sent envoys into Warrington council last summer—it is an authority with a debt of around £1.8 billion. I appreciate that nothing in the draft order, of itself, will change the status of that debt as something owned by Warrington council, but the arrival into this combined authority of one council with such a comparatively large level of debt raises questions. The first question is whether there is a risk that the mayoral precept is effectively bailing out the debt of one of those authorities. Alternatively, given that Warrington will be required to contribute financially, will it be able to raise the necessary funds through its own arrangements, since it has envoys in place whose job is essentially to manage down that debt pile, which is extremely large compared with the overall turnover of the authority? With those observations, which are largely about the process for reorganisation in these individual circumstances—as opposed to the principle, which we very much support—I close for the Opposition.

    Hansard source
36. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Defence Industry: Environmental, Social and Governance Requirements

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. We all know the world is becoming more dangerous. We talk about it all the time. We have these conversations in Parliament. We have them at home with constituents, family and friends, but we all know that words and conversations alone will not protect us. We need to make the hard choices now to ensure that the state fulfils its most fundamental role: protecting its citizens and its borders. Failing to do so puts the rest of our country at risk: our NHS, our education system, our markets and our way of life. That is why this debate is so important. I am genuinely thankful to my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin) for securing it, because it goes to the heart of a culture that must change rapidly if we are to stay safe. We must ensure that those countries that pose a threat to our democratic way of life are not inadvertently enabled by structures we have imposed on ourselves. There have been a number of fantastic contributions. My hon. Friend set the tone for the whole debate. The world is becoming more dangerous, and the system of international law that we have lived under, as well as the processes that underpin it, are disappearing rapidly, and we need to change to keep pace. He talked about challenging the culture and the need for the House to push that cultural change, so that money is flowing into the defence industry. He made a number of points about how ESG is being used in different ways, from university campuses to pushing back defence industries from job fairs. I think we can all agree that that needs to change. The hon. Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) has deep knowledge of this issue. He has worked at the coalface of the industry to understand how these contracts are formulated across Government and industry. He talked about the distinction between funding for things that go bang—hard, single-effect capabilities—and for dual-use technologies. I thank him and the hon. Member for Aldershot (Alex Baker) for their work on the “Rewiring British Defence Financing” report. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about how that is impacting the work on the defence investment plan. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) adds to defence discussions in the House on almost a daily basis. He spoke again about Northern Ireland and about companies, such as Thales and Harland & Wolff, which are at the heart of shipbuilding and aerospace defence. He spoke about how ESG is being used by those companies to ensure that they stay on Government frameworks. I would love to speak to him afterwards to understand how those policies may be impacting their business outputs. The hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) spoke powerfully about deterrence and about investing in defence now to keep us all safe. I think we can all agree that no one wants to go back to war. A number of the Members who have spoken in this debate are veterans who have experienced war, and they know that we do not want that for our country. To ensure deterrence, we must allocate capital to put ourselves in a strong position for the future. My hon. Friend the Member for Weald of Kent (Katie Lam) talked specifically about how ESG was used in the RAF to socially engineer certain outcomes, for which the RAF apologised. It should always be a meritocracy of the best man or woman for that job and nothing else should get in the way. She went into the nuance of the national legislation, the FCA and the red tape wrapped around companies. Lastly, I completely agree with the points raised by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire), about the need for the Government to give defence companies a firm contractual push so they know what is coming down the track. I would like to hear more about the bonds idea, which was raised in the Chamber two nights ago on Second Reading of the Armed Forces Bill. When we asked where the money would come from and what budgets would need to be cut to repay two to three-year bonds, we did not get a clear answer, so I would like to hear more. Organisations that have a role to play in our collective national defence must recognise that investing in defence is both patriotic and necessary. Anything that prevents them from doing so should be stripped away. I truly believe that that cultural shift must begin in earnest in this place. The three pillars of ESG examine how a company treats the environment, manages relationships with stakeholders, and governs itself. At first glance, that all makes sense. It is easy to see why those pillars send a signal to the markets about an organisation’s priorities, but here is the problem: the framework has evolved in a way that increasingly treats national defence as a negative, somehow signalling a bad actor. Defence-focused investments have been lumped together with industries such as tobacco and gambling. The hon. Member for North Durham added pornography to the list. How did we reach a position where we have forgotten that spending on defence and providing deterrence is the foundation on which everything else we value in society rests? I often speak about this with my dad, who was born in 1942 in Plymouth, a city that was bombed heavily during the blitz. Some of his earliest memories are of being under the stairs listening to the drone of Luftwaffe bombs overhead. His generation was the last in this country to experience borders and national security as fragile and uncertain, but as was raised a few times today, if we fast forward a few generations, for young people, the idea that they might have to fight for what they love is an abstract concept at best. We have lost our emotive memory of war, which puts us in a precarious position. I also fear that we draw the wrong lessons from history. When we mobilised during the first and second world wars, we did so with an existing industrial base. Factories could be repurposed quickly and critical resources were within reach. Closer to home, the lessons from covid further muddied the water. A debilitating pandemic was high on the national risk register, yet it was not given the seriousness it deserved. What followed was denial followed by urgency. Companies such as Dyson switched to producing ventilators and we scrambled internationally to source protective equipment for our NHS. In great British fashion, we muddled through. With the risk of international conflict rising by the day, however, I do not want us to have to muddle through again. We all have a responsibility to ensure that the state fulfils its primary duty: keeping our countrymen and women safe. Everything else is secondary. I do not want to wait until we are punched in the face before we react. That is why this debate matters. It is about the practical steps, such as where the money for increased defence comes from and how we cut the red tape that is holding back our defence industry. We also need to look hard at how we better align the capital allocation industry with defence. The Chief of the Defence Staff warned of the £28 billion gap between our current resources and our defence ambitions, so we must get serious. Concerns have been raised that only a small fraction of recent defence contracts have gone towards weapons and armour, fuelling fear in the defence industry of an effective procurement freeze at precisely the moment we should be accelerating rearmament. The private sector and private capital are not a silver bullet, but they are a major part of the answer. The Government are reported to be exploring public-private partnerships, but those will not progress while markets continue to view defence as unethical or constrained by ESG stipulations. That must change through Government contracts removing such prohibitive clauses and the Government being seen as a reliable partner where returns can be guaranteed. That means having defence spending that matches the rhetoric, and contracts awarded at the scale required to meet the growing threats. It is encouraging to see parts of the defence investment space already working to shift that culture. The UK Private Capital trade association has had a defence working group for nearly a year to educate the capital allocation industry about what national deterrence, both defensive and offensive, really means—a point raised by the hon. Member for York Outer—and why investment must include hard capabilities that keep us safe, not just dual-use technologies at the edges. We must also be honest about the barriers that remain. Societal pressures and perceptions around defence, particularly under the S pillar of ESG, have led to real reticence. Many high-street financing providers maintain restrictive policies towards defence firms, often requiring higher levels of due diligence. Increasingly, investment funds are developing ESG policies that exclude defence under blanket terminology around weapons or nuclear and extend deep into the supply chain, rather than acting in a targeted way. These unregulated exclusions are inhibiting defence investment at exactly the wrong time. I acknowledge that work is in progress to address that. As referred to by the hon. Members for York Outer, for Strangford and for North Durham, industry has developed initiatives such as the UK defence ESG charter and the HM Treasury and ADS trade body joint taskforce. However, I believe that more parliamentary support is needed to help investors understand the realities of the sector and encourage responsible investments. The Government must provide clear demand signals for both industry and finance. The outcomes of the defence industrial strategy and the strategic defence review will be crucial in setting the tone for where, what and how the UK intends to spend with the defence sector. I do not want to fall into the trap of opposing the Government for opposition’s sake. I want Labour to do well. I want the Defence Ministers to do well. If they do well, the UK does well, and we should all be on team UK. That is why I offer the following comments constructively. I hope the Minister receives them in that spirit. My party has done some hard work over the last 18 months. We have set out clear plans to boost defence spending through a sovereign defence fund of up to £50 billion, funded by reallocating existing expenditure currently directed towards costly environmental projects. That would enable the procurement of drones and new technologies at a far greater pace and scale, transforming the capability and lethality of the British armed forces. Crucially, it would help to deliver the industrial capacity we need here at home. To enable that ramp-up in domestic production, the sovereign defence fund would mobilise billions in public and private funding to overhaul the defence industrial base. There are practical steps we can take: taking stakes in UK defence start-ups, investing in dual-use companies, and building resilient supply chains to reduce reliance on hostile states such as China. This is a fully funded plan based on repurposing existing Government expenditure towards this national priority. It comprises three elements. First, £6 billion would be reallocated from the research and development budget in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology to the Ministry of Defence. As we all know, and has been touched on today, defence innovation has spillover benefits to other sectors, from communications to transport. Secondly, £11 billion would be ringfenced from the National Wealth Fund to become the national defence and resilience bank. That funding is currently allocated to a number of non-vital eco-projects; the remainder would stay focused on national resilience such as water and transport. Thirdly, approximately £33 billion would be mobilised from private finance through the same model already used by the National Wealth Fund, unlocking billions more in investment. We all know that other countries are doing this. Countries such as the United States and Germany are already allocating huge funds for defence and bolstering their domestic manufacturing and technological bases. We must do the same, because if we do not we will become prey to those who do not value our way of life. The Government must act with urgency, match words with action and help to drive the cultural shift that will allow our country to be properly defended. That is why this debate matters so much. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor again for securing it. I look forward to working with colleagues across the House to progress this agenda.

    Hansard source
37. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Damian Hinds

    Youth Unemployment

    Will the Minister give way?

    Hansard source
38. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Damian Hinds

    Youth Unemployment

    There are many ways that we can express it, but none of them are good: youth unemployment is at 15.9%; it is up 10%; it is up 1.5 percentage points; it is up over 100,000 in the last year; it is at a 10-year high—higher than in the covid era. Let us be clear: this is not economic inactivity we are talking about; it is unemployment. The definition of unemployment is not about who is claiming benefits; it is about having had no income whatever—not having worked for a paid hour—in the reference week. It is about being available for work and actively looking for work. That is the number that has gone up. The increasing number of people who are both studying and seeking to work—for whom, by the way, zero-hours contracts are especially relevant—is a particular issue, and I will come back to that point. Unemployment overall has gone up, but it is young people who have borne the brunt; the rate of increase has been almost twice as high for young people as it has overall. To be fair, that is usually the case—when there is rising unemployment, it is always young people who feel it first and hardest. Why? Well, as the shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately), said, the first thing that employers do when things look uncertain or difficult is to stop hiring. A hiring freeze is the quickest way to cut down the payroll. Secondly, if companies have to let people go, I am afraid that redundancy is cheaper when it comes to younger people, so they sometimes deploy a LIFO rule —last in, first out. There is then the secondary effect that the more experienced workers can fill the vacancies. On top of that, we have the situation at the moment whereby sectors that disproportionately employ young people—in shops, restaurants, hotels and throughout retail, hospitality and leisure—have been particularly hard hit by the national insurance and business rates hikes. I said that youth unemployment usually tends to rise faster and be higher than overall unemployment. That is true, but historically it is not as true in this country as it is in the rest of Europe. There are exceptions—in Germany and the Netherlands, for example—but it is the case in southern Europe. After the crash under the previous Labour Government in 2007-08, there was talk of a lost generation in southern Europe as youth unemployment rates soared so high. Why should the situation in those countries be different from the situation in countries like ours? There is a fancy economics term for it: insider-outsider theory. That theory basically says that when there are economic troubles in a system that has very heavily regulated labour markets, very high levels of employment protection and the very heavy involvement of trade unions, all the help tends to go to the people in work, and it is those trying to get into work—the outsiders—who suffer as a result. Historically, our country has had more liberalised—although not totally liberalised—labour markets, which has meant that we have not had those problems with youth unemployment to the same extent as some of our near neighbours in Europe, and we have tended to recover more quickly when they do occur. Right now, we have the historical rarity—I am not sure it is unique, but it is certainly a rarity—that the ratio of youth unemployment to total unemployment in the UK is higher than it is in the EU. That is before we feel all the effects of the Employment Rights Act 2025; I am sure that some effects were there already, but we have yet to feel the full effect. That Act will discourage taking on new workers, especially new untested workers, and that is of course what youth unemployment is. Let me talk about one aspect of the 2025 Act: zero-hours contracts. These contracts have a special place in Labour mythology, which comes from the time when the last leader of the party, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), used to bring them up every week at Prime Minister’s questions, saying that they were an epidemic, ripping apart our country. At the time, the Conservatives researched how big a deal zero-hours contracts were, and it turned out that fewer than 3% of workers had a zero-hours contract for their main job. There were others who had one for a second job, including many working as bank staff in the NHS. There were also lots of students on them. It turned out that the average number of hours on a zero-hours contract was 25, and—here’s the bit that nobody could accept—the average job satisfaction of people on a zero-hours contract was higher than it was for workers overall. Those on the Government Benches have been grimacing a little, but I do not know how many of them know that the proportion of people on zero-hours contracts has gone up since the general election of 2024. They are just a part of our economy. They are also heavily skewed towards young people, such as students working in sectors like hospitality and other seasonal occupations. About 40% of people with a zero-hours contract job are under 25. I myself was once a young person with a zero-hours contract—I just did not know it was called that. If colleagues across the House think back to their first job, perhaps washing up in a restaurant or working shifts in a shop, they probably did not know at the start if they would be working exactly the same number of hours every week and so on; it turns out that a lot of us probably had our first opportunity in the world of work through a zero-hours contract. It will be true for people even after the Employment Rights Act—those with such a contract will have some extra guarantees included in nit. However, it will also be a bigger deal, from an employer’s point of view, and it will add some risk to taking on young people. What will be the balance for employers and employees? It is, for Ministers, a leap of faith.

    Hansard source
39. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Damian Hinds

    Youth Unemployment

    I am not making a political point. I think it is right and reasonable to give employees visibility, and all good employers who want to keep their employees will of course do the right thing and try to do so. The Employment Rights Act, however, does an awful lot more than just let people know some time in advance about the hours of their next shift. The effects we see from the Employment Rights Act, taxation changes and other measures will not be mass lay-offs; it will be people—young people—not being taken on in the first place. Why does that matter? The Minister said it herself: it matters because of the scarring effect of youth unemployment. We know from studies that if someone is out of work in their early 20s, they can still be suffering the effects 20 or 30 years later. There are things the Government could do to mitigate some of what is happening, including on the regulations coming out of the Employment Rights Act. However, I just wonder why they are doing it overall. I think it is because, in a world where there have been enough U-turns from this Government—actually, I do not think there have been enough yet, but there have been a lot—that legislation is something that Labour MPs can bring home and say, “This is a proper left-wing policy that we have enacted.” But do they really want to bring home higher levels of youth unemployment in their constituencies? That is what will happen. The Government have introduced a number of schemes to try to mitigate what is going on, some of which are welcome. All Governments introduce somewhat similar schemes. However, the 55,000 people who will be eligible for the jobs guarantee should be seen in the context of the more than 900,000 young people who are not in education, employment or training. The scheme is limited in the areas it covers and, I think, people are eligible only after they have been searching for a job for 18 months or more, which would obviously count out many young people. I welcome Connect to Work, which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Dartford (Jim Dickson), although I do not think it is meant particularly for young people; it might nevertheless be helpful for people who have been off on long-term sick. I thought the timings sounded ambitious when the Government first announced it, though, so I would welcome the Minister telling us what they expect the numbers to be at the end of this financial year, including in my county of Hampshire. I know that I have already spoken for 10 minutes, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I just want to set the record straight on apprenticeships, which have come up a number of times. I hope I can help the House with a non-partisan description of what has happened in relation to apprenticeships over the past 20 or more years. The truth is that under the previous Labour Government, and under the first few years of the coalition Government, many tens of thousands of young people were doing an apprenticeship without even knowing they were doing so, so thin and flimsy were those apprenticeships. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle) may screw up his face, but that is true; the research evidence is available. The previous Government therefore reformed apprenticeships to be a minimum of one year, with a minimum of 20% time off the job, end-point assessments and qualifications designed by employers themselves, overseen by an independent Institute for Apprenticeships. Yes, when we did that, the number of apprenticeships went down, and the numbers that the Minister was quoting were all from after that change. Making the specifications of a qualification considerably more exacting will of course have an effect on the numbers. But guess what the new Government are doing? The minimum length for an apprenticeship will now be eight months. Try telling a German captain of industry that it is possible to do an apprenticeship in eight months. Will the numbers go up? Of course they will! I recently met hairdressers in my constituency and was reminded of how all this comes together. Hairdressers, like hospitality businesses and others, bring people into our town centres. They are more than just employers, and their businesses cannot just move online. They are now facing seriously higher employment costs, including national insurance contributions and, in many cases, much higher business rates, and that is before we get to the looming impact of the employment regulations. Hairdressers also have a very strong tradition of taking on large numbers of young people and apprenticeships. My worry is that, with the increase in costs, it will be simply unaffordable for them to take on young people in nearly the same numbers. The same is true for pubs and many other employers. We are seeing the early effects of Government policy in today’s youth unemployment numbers, and I take no pleasure whatsoever in saying this, but I am afraid that they are going to get materially worse. I ask the Government to take that seriously and to act, not by delivering some short-term programmes but by rethinking their approach in order to make it easier and less costly for companies to take on young people so that they can start their careers and build their futures.

    Hansard source
40. 28 Jan 2026·Parliament·Damian Hinds

    Youth Unemployment

    It was about the Minister’s projection for the Connect to Work numbers by the end of this financial year, its first year in operation.

    Hansard source