5,731 spoken contributions under 12 words (interjections such as “Will the hon. Member give way?”) are hidden. Show them

1. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Thank you for that. Mr Caplan, you represent RIA. Please explain to the Committee what RIA is and how important your organisation is. Darren Caplan: We represent rail suppliers in the UK—all around the country, large and small. They can be companies like Siemens and Angel, and they can be SMEs—60% of the supply chain are SMEs and they are our members. There are about 640,000 jobs in the UK rail industry, and about half of those work in the supply chain, so it is quite a lot of jobs. Around £40 billion of GVA is rail, and half of that is from the supply sector. Around £14 billion of Treasury revenue comes in from our sector, and half of that is from the supply sector, so it is a really important sector, covering building, maintaining, reviewing, infrastructure, rolling stock, signalling and so on—it is the full gamut of the rail industry. The point you picked up on, Mr Mayhew, is really important, and I am happy to expand on that. I have in front of me the Bill’s clauses and provisions. Schedule 2 is the one we are concerned about, and it is really significant. It says: “The Secretary of State must provide the ORR and Great British Railways with a statement, in relation to a funding period, indicating the amount of financial assistance that the Secretary of State reasonably considers may be made available to Great British Railways by the Secretary of State…for the purpose of funding the activities of Great British Railways during the funding period.” That period is five years. It says, “must provide”. Then, three pages later, on page 64, it says: “If the Secretary of State proposes to vary the financial assistance to be provided…the Secretary of State must notify Great British Railways of the proposed variation…The Secretary of State must notify the ORR if…the Secretary of State considers that the proposed postponement, withdrawal or reduction is likely to have a material impact on the ability of Great British Railways to carry on the activities specified”. That is “provide” versus “notified”. It says they must “provide” the budget for a five-year period, but later it says they just have to “notify” if they want to change what they do. That is hugely significant, because it means that you can set up a five-year budget and decide that you want to change it once in that control period, or every month if you want to. That is highly political, because a future Secretary of State can decide what they want to do coming into a new control period. The future is less certain under the Bill than it is currently. We have had control periods for the last 30 to 35 years— we are now in CP7. Under the Bill, the future version of funding assistance for rail will be less certain than it is now. The Bill also only talks about postponing, withdrawing or reducing, and not increasing. At no point does it talk about funding going up; it is all about reducing it. For my fellow witnesses, when they are looking at where they are going to invest, they will say that there might be £45 billion invested over five years, but that could come down—if you do not know for certain, why should you do it? My final point is that rail is a very certain industry: you know what you need to spend in five years—you know the renewals you need to do, and you know the rolling stock you need to get, maintain or refurbish—so why can you not commit to a five-year spending envelope? It is very simple.

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2. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q You are saying that schedule 2— I think you referred directly to paragraph 7(4)—increases risk and uncertainty for the supply chain, and that, as with any business, you price risk. That draft might be a Treasury draft, and I do not want to blame DFT—it may have been imposed, and who can possibly lift up the secrets of the boudoir in government—but do you agree that the outcome of that draft is that it increases risk and uncertainty, and that gets priced into the contract, so either investors will withdraw because they have no certainty, or if they remain, the cost to GBR and therefore to the taxpayer inevitably increases? It reduces, rather than increases, value for money; do you agree with that statement? Darren Caplan: Yes, absolutely—

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3. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q I am going to cut you short. You say absolutely. What about the other two? Rob Morris: That is absolutely correct. Malcolm Brown: It is fundamental economics.

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4. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q I am grateful that we got a little more time to explore that. At the moment, we are in control period 7, so that takes us— Darren Caplan: To 2029.

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5. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Yes. That is the last 30 to 35 years or so. A control period is a five-year investment cycle. The period is agreed at the start of the CP, or shortly before the start of it, and that funds the maintenance or improvement works. Darren Caplan: Operations, maintenance and renewals.

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6. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   I am going to put words into your mouth, but please correct me if I am being unfair. In each control period, you get a bell curve of activity. You start with a low level of activity, because people did not know that there was certainty of funding, and then in years 2 and 3 it gears up and you get peak activity in year 2.5, roughly. Then, as you get towards the end of the control period where the medium term funding dries up or is uncertain, you get a drawdown of activity. That is the point that you were trying to make—is that correct? Darren Caplan: It can happen between control periods as well, but the basic point is that over those five years, that money is the same. It can vary a bit between years—you can carry some over—but in that time you spend that money. Our concern about schedule 2 is that you can reduce the amount of money in that period.

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7. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Would it be a better system if you had control periods that had a greater certainty looking forward at any one time between the decision when money was tied down—if indeed it is tied down under the terms of the Bill—and the date at which the activity would then take place? For example, for the current control period of five years, if you take the decision on funding for the next control period, let us say two years out, would that be effective in increasing certainty, reducing the need for a bell curve of activity, and thereby reducing costs for the supply sector and, by extension, for the Government and taxpayers? Darren Caplan: Absolutely. If you do the work that you need to do on rail when you need to do it, it is much cheaper than doing it at a later date. It is 30% cheaper to do a renewal when you are supposed to be doing it than at a later date. That is better for the taxpayer, because you can aggregate it. It is also better in terms of passenger experience, because the asset is being maintained when it needs to be.

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8. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q I am just going to interrupt you. That is a different point from the one that I am asking about. I am talking about the cost of planning and implementing renewals and about having a degree of certainty looking forward regarding when that money will be spent. If you always have a minimum of, let us say, 24 months for planning and commitment to funding, does that make it easier for the supply chain to commit resources, and therefore cheaper? Darren Caplan: These guys can talk to that specifically, but I assume so, because you are planning out your workforces, your investment in partner machinery, your overall business plan, the apprentices you are going to take on and innovation—all these things can be planned in advance. If you know, you will get a better cost.

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9. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

   Railways Bill (Second sitting)

   Q Can you illustrate that with electrification, for example? Rob Morris: Yes—electrification and signalling are both part of the renewals process. The five-year cycle that we currently have—which is often referred to as the boom-and-bust cycle, because that is what it is like for us—adds, let us call it, a subjective cost increase of about 30%, as Darren mentioned.

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10. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q What sort of sums of money are we talking about in the control period? Rob Morris: The overall figure is normally about £40 billion, in terms of renewals and operations maintenance.

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11. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q So 30% of £40 billion is an increased cost as a result of this process. Rob Morris: Subjectively, yes. I think there will be more accurate figures around that, but it is an inefficient process.

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12. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    That is amazing. Rob Morris: One thing I would say to support the figures that Darren mentioned earlier is that we have had a particularly sluggish start to this control period, which is actually prolonging that and impacting on skills and capabilities in the industry, which might add additional costs to remobilise.

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13. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q And your combined evidence—again, I am putting words into your mouth, but correct me—is that the Bill as drafted not only does not solve that problem of 30% of increased costs, of the £40 billion every five years, but actually exacerbates it, because it removes what little certainty there currently is. Rob Morris: Your words are correct. Darren Caplan: Yes. Malcolm Brown: I am not in that space, so I could not comment.

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14. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q So for the people in that space, yes. I am going to move to Siemens now. Historically, during the period of privatisation, rolling stock improvements have been inextricably linked with franchise bids. As franchises have come up for renewal, different operating companies have been in a bidding process, through competition, to make the most attractive proposal to the Department for Transport. Some of that would be in cheques to the Treasury, but a lot of it has been in improving rolling stock infrastructure. My own operating company, Greater Anglia, entirely renewed its rolling stock right across its area as part of its franchise bid. That impetus for improvement of rolling stock is being removed entirely and replaced by GBR, a nationalised bidder. It has various duties. I look at clause 18(3), which we discussed a little earlier, under which it has a duty to improve “railway service performance”, but that is defined as being, in the main, reliability and passenger overcrowding. There is no reference to improved customer experience, to quality of rolling stock and to improved services that would come with new rolling stock. For Siemens, are you concerned that moving to GBR will lead to a reduction in the pace of improvement in rolling stock? Rob Morris: Again, it is about understanding what the ambition is specifically with rolling stock and the funding thereof. My belief is that there is a need for a passenger growth target, which would further fuel the need to make sure that there is a clear approach to modern, carbon-neutral, efficient rolling stock to match a similar infrastructure for the betterment of GBR.

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15. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q At the moment, all of that is missing from the Bill, is it not? Rob Morris: Yes. Malcolm Brown: If I may, there is a natural life cycle. There is a beat rate to replacing, renewing and then retiring rolling stock. It is lumpy, because you do not replace trains one at a time; it tends to be in fleets. There is not a great deal we can do about that. What would concern me is if we reverted to everything being planned and done by a central organisation. We have tried that before. I refer the Committee to the 2014 National Audit Office report on the DFT procuring IEP. It did not go well, the National Audit Office says. There is a natural tension there just now—the commercial tension of trying to improve rolling stock and always trying to have the next best thing. You talk about Greater Anglia. Apologies, but it is Alstom’s trains that we bought in there. They are a step change that was there before, but we cannot keep replacing every single train every time. We need to refurbish trains. We invested £125 million in the Pendolino fleet on the west coast. That created 100 jobs at Widnes and its own infrastructure there. That was completed on time and on budget. Nobody ever really talks about that, but we can do it. We have given the passenger an environment that is as new. That is a lot more cost-effective than simply going, “We must buy a new train every time we feel like it.”

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16. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Where is the incentive to carry on and accelerate that process in this Bill? Where is the incentive for GBR? Malcolm Brown: I cannot comment. I presume it is going to be in one of the building blocks. My concern is that we have a group of people who are trying to design trains for a hobby, when we have manufacturers such as Siemens in the UK, which have global platforms for trains. Yes, we adapt and customise them for the UK, but we get all the benefits of the manufacturing experience of a global manufacturer with the economies of scale that that provides as well. We do not need bespoke custom-built trains in the UK.

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17. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Thank you both, as ever, for coming to give oral evidence; it is very helpful. Mr Burnham, I am going to focus on you. It is difficult, isn’t it? You have a national rail network, where you have to have a degree of national organisation, but you have devolved areas as well, which rightly have ambitions for an increased level of control, as I believe you do for rail. There will inevitably be a degree of tension between them. Part of the Bill’s job is to do its best to get that balance right. Inevitably—I speak as the shadow Minister—it will be very hard to be perfect, but we need to do as much as we can to get the Bill as good as we can by design at this stage. I will start with the Bee Network up in Greater Manchester, which you have organised on the basis of concessions let by you, the mayoralty. The benefit of that is that the fare box is kept locally and it is operated privately. It does not have to be; you could run those concessions through a wholly owned subsidiary. I accept that. That approach of keeping the fare box local does not work with GBR because the fare box stays with GBR. Even if you have a greater level of devolvement, it feels a bit like it is going to be GBR in Greater Manchester, just painted yellow. Is that what you wanted from the Bill, or did you have aspirations for a bit more control? Andy Burnham: Thank you very much for the question. I agree with the way that you have presented it. There is a tension to be resolved, but I believe it can be resolved. It is really important that you have mentioned the Bee Network, because I am responsible for running the tram and bus systems, so the backbone of the public transport system is under our control. We have to move to a world where the railway emerges from its railway silo and sees the bigger picture—the integration of public transport across all modes. I would encourage the Committee to think about that, because that change is coming. You will know, Ms Barker, that Liverpool city region will also soon embark on putting buses under public control, and I think the model we are creating will become something of a norm around the country. I think it is possible to go further, as you say, and my evidence for that is TfL Overground: an arrangement was reached between the Government, the railways and TfL on an integrated, fair offer. I believe that is entirely achievable in Greater Manchester, where the railways come into the capped system. Actually, the rest of the Bee Network adds value to the railway, because no longer will it be the case that you buy a ticket in somewhere like Buxton or Glossop and your travel runs out at Manchester Piccadilly; in a capped system, people can have their onward travel all included under that daily cap. That is what operates in London, and I see no reason why it cannot operate in Greater Manchester—indeed, we will insist that we get the same. Isn’t it all about revenue sharing, hopefully in relation to passenger growth? We have a plan to bring eight rail lines into the Bee Network, starting with two this year, and it is a plan that has been agreed with the rail industry. This is potentially a win-win for everybody, because the arrival of the capped Bee Network system gives people more reason to use the railways, so we think that we can increase patronage on those rail lines. It has to be a real partnership with the railway, which is why we are encouraging the Committee to go beyond the idea that we are just consultees who can be listened to or not. Meaningful partnership is what will build the right railway and the right public transport solution in our city. It is much more than painting the trains yellow, although I do want to see yellow trains all over Greater Manchester with bees on them.

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18. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Welcome to the Committee, Ms Brabin; I am sorry that we started before you managed to get in. Tracy Brabin: My apologies for being late.

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19. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Is there not a bit of a problem then, Mr Burnham? That is not what is in the Bill. At the moment, the Bill has a duty to consult, but it does not give the level of power to mayoral combined authorities that you were just identifying. In your answer, you said that you will insist on getting more. Well, you will not get more powers under the Bill, as currently drafted—those powers are not given to you. What do you say about that, and how do you think it should be changed? Andy Burnham: I do not think it can be justified any more that there is one transport arrangement for London, but that arrangement is not available to everywhere else—[Interruption.]

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20. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q First, I apologise for taking so long during the Division. I am also a Whip, so I had to stay in the voting Lobby. It is something to get used to again when you come back to the House. I am picking up fag ends, because it sounded as though the Minister was discussing very similar issues to those that I was discussing before we left. It was rather frustrating, Mr Burnham —the Division bell went when you were about to deliver a hammer blow against the Government on your disappointment about what is not in the Bill and what should be in it. You used to say that you wanted more autonomy for the Bee Network. I have heard your answers—it is clear that your position on that has not changed. You want to have more autonomy, but the Bill does not provide it at the moment. You have a duty to consult, which is okay so far as it goes, from GBR, and then thereafter, once it has consulted with the mayoralties, it only has a duty to have regard to what it is that you have said or requested. In your combined evidence, what would be a better form of words more accurately to reflect the relationship that you think should exist between the national and the regional? Mr Burnham, because we were halfway through a conversation, perhaps we could start with you, then move on to Tracy. Andy Burnham: Thank you. I do not know about coming back, but what I do know is that in my 16 years here, there were enough Tory MPs around that there was no double-jobbing, I do not think, from my memory. We will move on. I think that it is about a meaningful role. I do not think autonomy is actually what we are asking for here today, any of us. Tracy Brabin: No. Andy Burnham: What we are saying is that we want a meaningful partnership, which is about more than just being consulted and then ignored—which, if we are honest, does happen to us as mayors with the rail industry. Even though I am chair of the Rail North Committee, we sometimes have to work very hard to make the railways listen to what democratically elected mayors and leaders say. It is a different relationship, and I would say that I strongly feel the railways need culture change. We need to get back to a railway that serves people and places, not a quite adversarial section of transactional arrangements that can be very complex. It feels to us sometimes that the railways have lost sight of that.

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21. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q It has become very command-and-control, hasn’t it? It is top-down, but you are saying that it should be more bottom-up. Andy Burnham: Yes, I think if you end up with a very top-down railway, it is a bit like the phrase I used to hear in the Department of Health: “You can hit the target and miss the point.” Is that not that the risk with the railways, if they become too much like monolithic structures? It has to be a bit of both. If you go back to the old British Rail days, I remember a thing called Regional Railways, which was very separate to InterCity, so that split has always been there in the railways. What we are arguing for in front of the Committee today is to think of the railways in a more place-based context. Railways serve growth in local areas, and there are things that we can bring to the table to support the health and growth of the railways in the future. It points to a different partnership, but it is a partnership. We want the right to specify timetables, as it is legitimate for us to make those requests, and we want a stronger role over station access. Actually, we think there should be a presumption in favour of devolution. Rather than a right to request, the onus should be the other way around; there should be the right to refuse, which presumes that it should be devolved, if that is possible, but there is still a callback if it cannot be devolved. There is a relevant recent example: the Access for All funding. The Rail North Committee has asked the Department to devolve the Access for All funding, so we do not get the situation that Tracy described a moment ago. Currently, that is not being supported by the Department. We submit lists of stations to the Department as part of our Access for All bid on a regular basis, but we have often had the experience that it comes back with a different prioritisation to the one we sent in. This is really granular, local stuff, and it is mind-boggling to us that you have an infrastructure programme for the railways, and then an Access for All programme at the highest level that is dealing with very local schemes at stations. It is a meaningful partnership, and we are calling for a devolved role, where there can be one. Tracy Brabin: I totally agree with what Andy has said; it is about accountability. I do not think you could expect the Secretary of State to be accountable for the whole of the network. How on earth would they understand the challenges? At Denby Dale, all they need is a ramp, and those sorts of decisions should be made locally. We are building three stations in the next year. Why are they so expensive? In Germany, I think it is £5 million a station, but here they are £50 million. In the ’80s, it was £500,000 a station in today’s money. Surely, if we are working together as a collective for the good of the nation, we could find a way that makes it easier—one where we are more agile in building stations, and where we are part of that conversation around services. Also, it is about where we get then get the revenue from, so that we have a circular pound—the one that goes into the washing machine and comes back out again on the other side—and can build more accessibility on more stations.

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22. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q It is a very good podcast; I listen to it a lot. Thank you very much for giving oral evidence. I now realise how you get a CBE in this country—you just have to be involved in the railways and they come along. You are certainly the third—probably the fourth—that we have had before us today. I am going to focus on a couple of things. On access and capacity, we have heard a lot of evidence today; I do not know how much you have heard, but it has replicated, in essence, what was put before the Transport Committee a few weeks ago. There is a huge amount of concern in the sector about whether the Bill provides a level playing field between GBR and open access, freight and the like, coupled with a very weak—those are my words—appeals process, which is so narrowly constrained that it only deals with errors of law as opposed to disagreements on the merits. Is it right that there is a real problem with the future of competition in our railways? If you agree with that broad statement, perhaps you could expand on your reasons why. Richard Bowker: I will probably say more about certainty and confidence for investors than competition per se. If I think about my experience at the Strategic Rail Authority, it was a significant frustration that elements of planning in terms of timetable and service were split apart in the way that they were. I think the Government are right to want to create a directing mind—I say directing mind rather than guiding mind. We have a capacity-constrained railway. In places, that is very severe, and someone needs to say, “Right. This is how we think we should allocate capacity.” Having said that, there is a possibility that the pendulum has swung a little far. Probably the biggest issue with that would be rail freight. If you are a rail freight operator, at the moment you have certainty; if you are unhappy with the way that you are treated, you can go to the ORR. As an independent regulator, the ORR can make the final access decision. What is contemplated is a perfectly logical process, starting with an access and use policy, capacity plans and capacity decisions. The problem is that railway timetables are not really like that; they are more dynamic. These things change. We looked at doing exactly this at the SRA, and it is very difficult to do. It changes constantly, so it has to be very agile. Under the Bill as drafted, while the process could work perfectly adequately, the capacity duty in clause 63—and potentially clause 18(4)—seems to say, to me at least, “Yes, GBR has all these duties, but they are subject to the capacity duty.” I can see why that causes tension and concern among freight operators, for example. I am not saying that it cannot work, but until we actually see it work, there is a risk that third-party operators will be concerned.

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23. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q You looked at it when you were with the SRA, back in the day, and you rejected it, presumably. What were the reasons for your rejection of that approach? Richard Bowker: The ’93 Act was not set up that way; it was set up so that the Strategic Rail Authority was responsible for setting an overall strategic plan for the railways and for managing the award and management of franchises, but Railtrack plc, and then Network Rail, was under the regulation of an independent economic regulator. The two worlds were apart. Whereas the regulator had to have regard to our strategies, it did not have to comply with them, so we always had that tension. It was not really for me to change it. That is why I think that, overall, this is a good approach.

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24. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q We heard evidence earlier today from Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group, and she was very concerned. She said that her members are very concerned, and that that has fed into the ability to take investment decisions, which require a degree of certainty. She was very concerned about clause 63 and its relationship with clause 60. She was also concerned about the ability of the Secretary of State to take unilateral decisions about non-GBR infrastructure without notice and without consultation. We heard that those approaches, together with an effective inability to appeal, meant that investment for rail freight, but also for open access—other rail users—was put in doubt. Do you think she is overreacting? Richard Bowker: It is not for me to say whether she is overreacting, but I absolutely understand the concern, because rail freight in particular involves a lot of private capital. You have to have a degree of confidence and assurance that if you have access rights, you will be able to maintain them, so I understand that. I think the Government are right to create a directing mind. We have seen too many examples of timetabling processes that have gone wrong for precisely that reason—it is about balance.

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25. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q It is not really the directing mind I am focusing on; it is having a level playing field where, for the first time, we are going to have GBR being the directing mind but also an operator. There is a direct structural conflict of interest in the design of GBR as set out in the Bill—that has been the evidence of many people to the Committee today—combined with essentially no right of appeal other than on matters of law. First of all, do you recognise that as a proper concern? Secondly, if so, do you think a partial solution would be to have a mechanism for appeal on the merits to an independent regulator—let us call it something like the ORR? Richard Bowker: On the first point, yes, I recognise the concern. Secondly, personally I would look at clause 18(4) and ask whether we really need to have the capacity duty able to override other duties. As far as the appeals process is concerned, I can see why being able to look at a case on the merits rather than on a strictly legal basis would help enormously. If GBR believes that its access and use policy, its capacity planning and its final decisions constitute a good process, it should not fear that.

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26. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Right. Actually, I am slightly surprised, because this is an unusual process; it was a Tony Blair innovation that we got rid of. We did not think it had much purpose, but we will find out in the next few minutes, won’t we? We have heard lots of evidence, and some clear, consistent themes have risen out of it. If you have read the Transport Committee’s report on this issue from a few weeks ago, as I am sure you have, you will know that the sector is giving the Government a few messages very loud and clear. We will discuss those a little bit, but the secret question is: So what? What are you going to do about it? That is what I hope you will come back to. A level playing field is fair and without discrimination. There is a structural conflict of interest between GBR as the holder of the ring and GBR as an operator—for example, in the relationship with open access, with freight and with independent retailers. Each one of those—they are sectors, not individual organisations—has profound concerns about a structural conflict of interest that has been deliberately built into the Bill. Combined with that, there is an appeals process that is not worthy of the name. We can say that it is robust, but we all know that it is not. It is very, very tightly defined. It relates only to areas of law; there is no appeal on the merits at all. GBR is judge, jury and gamekeeper, as well as participant—that is a slightly mixed metaphor, but you get the point. With the defenestration of the Office of Rail and Road as an economic regulator, the independent arbiter of the relationship with GBR is now gone. You have heard the evidence. What are you going to do about it? Keir Mather: It is a very good question, Mr Mayhew. It goes to the core of the differing ideological perspectives that underlie the debate we have had today on the Bill. Although you see the state seeking to take too much control and giving itself an unfair advantage, our perspective on why this legislation is so important is that passengers—who are ultimately both people who pay for services on the railway and taxpayers who end up funding those services more often than not under this broken rail system, and will do once GBR is established—deserve a good service. We believe that having a unified service with a single guiding mind to bring track and train, passenger services and infrastructure together under one roof, with one point of accountability, is the best way to achieve those aims. You asked me what we are going to do about the concerns raised today. It is my obligation as a Government Minister to address them, to explore ways in which we can allay them further and to progress the work the Department is already taking on through its stakeholder engagement, whether that be on the freight target or the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, to make sure that stakeholder concerns are heard. On the principle of fairness and transparency as it relates to ticketing and third-party access, it is worth making the point that GBR is, by public law principles, obligated to have regard to fair and transparent processes as part of how the system works. On access and appeals, that is a real point of contention, which we will explore throughout Committee, but I heard the concerns raised by freight stakeholders and others. I want to take this opportunity to be really clear that the Department’s very firm view is that clauses 60 and 63 are not in contention with each other and that Great British Rail has the ability to decide what constitutes best use of the railway, in a way that not only meets its duties, but balances opportunities for GBR services, rail freight and open access alongside one another. The clauses provide an opportunity to appeal on the basis of whether that has been followed, through the ORR, but also a robust process, once that allocation has been determined, to figure out whether GBR has been compliant with the law, as of course we always expect it will be. Overall, this is a point of ideological difference that exists between our two parties. Labour believes fundamentally that you need one point of accountability and that the Government need to take a more proactive role in fixing this broken rail system. I am really pleased that this piece of legislation seeks to achieve what I think are very noble aspirations.

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27. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q The question I asked had absolutely nothing to do with ideology or the unification of track and train; it is a fundamental question of fairness. The Government have decided that this is the route they want to go down. I may disagree with that, but that was not my question. Having decided to go down this route, it must be the Government’s intention to be fair and to treat participants in the rail sector that are not being nationalised—that is 60%, by the way; correct me if you have secret plans to nationalise the rest of it as well, because so far you have not told me or anyone else—fairly. The Bill has designed in a structural conflict of interest, as we have heard many times from all sorts of different people. Given that the Government have taken that decision, my question has nothing to do with ideology—it is practicality. What are the Government planning to do to reassure that 60% that they will not be steamrollered by a GBR that says, “We are the masters now. We can do what we like and there’s no effective right of appeal, so suck it up.”? Keir Mather: I would point to the extremely robust suite of accountability measures that sit within the Bill as it stands. If you look at the legally binding duties GBR has in how it undertakes its work, one of those, which came out in our discussion with the ROSCOs, is to ensure that those who provide railway services can plan the future of their business with a reasonable degree of assurance. GBR is bound to meet a freight target set by the Secretary of State; it is legally bound to meet its duty to promote the interests of freight and, in clause 60, through the design of the best use of the railway as GBR sees it, it must give equal regard to users of the railway. Open access operators and freight are included as part of that mix. However, we also need to think about what this legislation does in the future and how that contrasts with the situation now. The ORR had to turn down a number of open access applications on the west coast because we had insufficient capacity in our rail network. I do not understand how that constitutes fairness or competitive advantage for open access operators—it means that they are locked out of providing services and turning a profit by a rail system that is failing. GBR having the capacity to manage, within one centralised function, capacity on the railway overall allows us to unlock those benefits, in partnership with mayoral combined authorities, but with a robust set of accountability measures to ensure that it is compliant with the law, compliant with its duties, and compliant with the aspirations of the Secretary of State, irrespective of their ideological predilections. Hopefully, that is an adequate answer to your question.

    Hansard source
28. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q Do the Government want private investment in the railway to continue? Keir Mather: Absolutely. It is fundamental that that investment continues, both on the—[Interruption.] Sorry— I will just say this very briefly and then let you come back. On the rail freight point, where we have a target in place allowing us to boost the amount of goods moved by train, it might create more capacity for open access to work on the network, but the infrastructure delivery and the long-term rolling stock strategy that accompany this legislative piece of work also offer the private sector a real opportunity to play in the future of our railway, as I see it.

    Hansard source
29. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (Second sitting)

    Q They do not agree, do they? We have heard stark evidence today that the lack of a level playing field and the lack of advanced sight of where this legislation is going are making investment in the railways less likely, not more likely. That is the evidence of the sector that you have heard today. You can put your fingers in your ears and say something different, but that is the evidence that we have heard. Whether it is the access in use concerns, the failure of the appeals process to be anything worthy of the name, or the fact that the proposed powers for the Secretary of State to change without notice access in use, taken in combination, the evidence from multiple witnesses today was that the Bill does not make it easier. Are you going to listen to them, or are the Government going to pursue their dogged insistence that everyone else is wrong and they are right? Keir Mather: If you take something like the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, the consultations are undertaken in close partnership with the private sector. If you are asking me whether it is going to be easier in the long term, with GBR created, for private sector operators to engage with a level playing field, I think that it will be. I think that it creates a very clear structure of accountability measures, clear metrics by which decisions are taken and robust accountability, if GBR does not meet its obligations under the access regime, to make sure that it does things correctly, especially on the matter of access. I think it is important that we dig into this further, because it came out consistently with the freight operators. GBR has to decide how it meets its capacity duty once it has decided what best use of the railway constitutes. That is a really important safeguard that is built into the Bill. The Secretary of State gives GBR its funding envelope through the business plan, and needs to ensure that GBR will deliver the services that it has said it will. It is therefore very important to have that capacity duty in place, but that is after GBR has made a determination, while balancing its existing duties and its need to promote freight and service providers on the railway, on whether or not those services stack up. I think that the accountability process and appeals process are very clear, and give private operators multiple points to raise concerns, and robust enforcement measures for the ORR to substitute decisions and ask GBR to think again. The point about thinking again is very important, because we want GBR to improve as an organisation, and to become more agile and more responsive to the needs of the private sector, and the appeals process facilitates that.

    Hansard source
30. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q Thank you for coming. Broadly speaking, we are talking about governance and accountability in this session. I am going to dive straight in, Mr Larkinson. On the appeals process as envisaged by the new ORR, we can see from clause 68 that there is to be no appeal on the merits of economic considerations; it is only to be approached on the basis of judicial review in the High Court, which means only an appeal on a matter of law and procedural issues, and a time limit for applications of just three months. First, will you confirm that that is your understanding of the constraints of this particular appeal process? John Larkinson: May I add one thing to that? When an appeal comes to us, there are various things that we can do. For any appeal, we can in effect send the decision back to Great British Railways and ask it to reconsider. In doing that, we could also in effect direct it to look at particular issues. That is the first thing that we could do. On our ability—I think this is probably what you are coming to—to substitute a decision, or in effect to require a different decision, that is extremely narrow indeed. That comes back to the judicial review principles. In my mind, that is because the bar is set very high. It comes back to the broad intent of the Bill, which is to make GBR a directing mind and to give considerable power to GBR. Alongside that, the intent of the Bill is in effect to empower GBR to learn from its mistakes: things are put back to it and it gets a chance to reconsider. What the Bill does not want, however, is for someone else like us to say, “No, the decision should have been this.” It comes from the intent of the Bill, I think.

    Hansard source
31. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q That answer was about the powers you have once an appeal comes to you, but my question was on what kinds of appeal can get in front of you in the first place. Going back to the original question, am I right in saying that, under the Bill, there is no right for an appeal on the merits, and that you cannot have a second look at the decision-making process? John Larkinson: A second look? We can look at whether GBR has followed its processes.

    Hansard source
32. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q I do not mean to confuse you; I seek to clarify whether an appeal on judicial review principles means that someone who is unhappy with a decision cannot have that decision reconsidered—so there is no appeal on the merits. John Larkinson: Judicial review principles are things like irrationality and illegality—it is very, very narrow.

    Hansard source
33. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q You agree that it is very, very narrow. John Larkinson: Absolutely, yes.

    Hansard source
34. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q If someone goes through the appeals process on that very, very narrow front and is successful in their appeal, the ORR can order only two things to happen. The first is that the decision is sent back to GBR to have a think again, and the second is to substitute a decision, where the failure has been an error of law and there is only one possible alternative in the circumstances. It is in those very, very narrow circumstances that you can substitute your answer, because there is no other answer. John Larkinson: They are very narrow, yes.

    Hansard source
35. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q Given those enormous constraints, can you sit before the Committee and say that this is a strong appeals process? John Larkinson: Using words like “strong” is quite difficult in the context of it being an appeals process that is designed to fit with the underlying model, which is a directing mind for GBR. Therefore, as you correctly say, our ability to override a GBR decision is very narrow indeed. I agree with your description—it is a very narrow role.

    Hansard source
36. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q You say that it fits with the description of what the Government want GBR to do, but from the drafting of the Bill we can conclude that the Government want GBR to be the final arbiter. There is no appellate course from a decision by GBR, except in an area of law. It is the judge and jury in this. John Larkinson: That fits again with the idea that things go back to GBR to reconsider; it is all put back in GBR’s court. That is the fundamental design, as I understand it.

    Hansard source
37. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q I thank both the witnesses for coming. There is a lot to get through and we are short of time. I will start with Mr Williams. You have written a report on the future of railway. You proposed the creation of GBR, but to operate through private concessions as opposed to nationalisation. The Government have now taken a very different view. Please can you set out briefly the pros and cons of nationalisation over what you proposed. Keith Williams: When we did the review, the real focus was on passengers, to be honest. I was asked a number of times: “Is it nationalisation or is it privatisation?” I left that to one side because from my perspective, it was the better running of the railway, which is the structure that is now in place. To some degree, during the course of the review, franchising had been seen to be failing, and that was one of the premises of the review at the beginning. Of course, what happened in the intervening period was that covid came along, and that changed everything, so everything was de facto put back into public ownership. To a large degree, we were agnostic on that. However, if you look at the railway even today, parts of it are run in the private sector and parts of it are run in the public sector. As I see it, public ownership was accelerated through covid and through the end of the franchising, which in my period was due to end in 2029, so it was a long way off. Obviously, that was brought forward because of covid.

    Hansard source
38. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q I turn now to the Bill, rather than the broader situation. There are huge powers in the Bill for the Secretary of State or the Department for Transport, in relation to setting out the long-term strategy, intervening in fares and their structure, and giving guidance and direction. Those are the key areas, but there are a number of others. Are you a bit concerned that there is going to be some backseat driving going on? Keith Williams: From the Government?

    Hansard source
39. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Yes, from Government rather than GBR being the director. Keith Williams: No, the way I see it is that, actually, there is a good segregation of functions within the system now that were not there previously. Again, if you look back to 2018, the failure of the system was in part brought because every decision went back to Government. The Secretary of State finished up having total responsibility for the timetable fiasco that happened in 2018. That is when we came to the review. One of the clear things we wanted to do was to get a segregation of functions, which I think the Bill successfully does. It holds good to the review in that respect. Government are responsible for strategy—and hopefully longer-term strategy than we have seen in the past—then they hand the operation down to the people who can run it in the interests of passengers and customers, with strong regulation, safety and a public ability to react when things go wrong. I think that system is very good. I come from a business background and in some ways it echoes what I see in business: a board sets the strategy and then passes the management down to the CEO and the people who run the business. I am not concerned about backseat driving to that degree.

    Hansard source
40. 20 Jan 2026·Parliament·Jerome Mayhew

    Railways Bill (First sitting)

    Q Mr Brown, there are very few references in the Bill to value for money driving competition. In fact, the competition remit of the ORR is specifically excluded for large sections of the operation of GBR, and the Secretary of State has no ability to grant provision of service contracts to private companies—it has to be to a GBR or a subsidiary of GBR. How can operations of GBR be challenged on value for money for taxpayers? Do you think they have the balance right here? Richard Brown: Do I think what, sorry?

    Hansard source