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The new Weybridge health centre in my constituency, which is being rebuilt following the fire in 2017, was planned to provide a range of general services. When I visited it recently, I learned that the first floor still does not have tenants in place. Will the Minister meet me and representatives from the Phoenix family practice to discuss how we can ensure that Weybridge gets the best possible broad healthcare provision?
That matter is particularly pertinent when it comes to consideration of the Omagh bombing. Given the material that we are discussing today, what indication has the Secretary of State had from the Irish Government that they will withdraw their inter-state case against the United Kingdom at the European Court of Human Rights? It seems to me that they are very reluctant to act at all.
I am sure the Secretary of State will appreciate the importance of this point, as it does touch on the events of late 1998. There will be people out there watching the process of the Bill and wondering why they are, in effect, excluded from it. With the Bill as drafted, the suspicion may very well be that that is to spare the sensitivities of the Republic of Ireland, as the material that has been referred to would then come into scope if we were to extend this, perfectly reasonably, to the end of 1998, rather than confining it to the events prior to April 1998. If I may say so, the Secretary of State gave no compelling reason yesterday why the amendments that have been tabled to that effect would not be accepted by the Government.
The hon. Gentleman states that the electricity price is considerably higher than the gas price. He made the argument that gas is setting the price for electricity, but can he explain why the price of gas was so low compared to the price of electricity?
8. What assessment her Department has made of the adequacy of access to NHS dentists.
Access to NHS dentistry is a major problem in my constituency, with 86% of the respondents to my dentistry survey being unable to access one. Some told me that they still travel back to their old NHS dentist after moving home and, in one case, someone took a trip of more than 130 miles because no local practice would take them as a patient. Unlike GP surgeries, NHS dentists have no catchment areas. Will the Minister please look at whether that is making it harder for local people to get an appointment?
To add to that point, when the Secretary of State looks at that, will he also look at elements written into the Irish constitution, particularly with respect to the operation of the Garda and its duty to protect the reputation of the Irish state? That will also cripple any attempt to expose information.
Every single time we have seen a member of the special forces in the UK speak in public about this matter, they have made it plain that they do not believe that they are above the law. On the contrary, they believe that they are there to uphold the law and that what they object to is making the process the punishment, which is where we are now.
I commend the hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Lewis Atkinson) on his speech. While I disagree with some of its substance, I agree with a lot of his sentiment, and his support for our veterans is welcome. May I thank the Secretary of State for his telephone call at home to tell me that he was going to support my amendment 50? I should have realised—I have been here long enough—when I looked at the Order Paper for amendment 50 in the name of David Davis that it would have become Government amendment 50. I feel as if I have been nationalised. It is the only time that I will approve of a nationalisation. I thank him for that. I commend the Secretary of State for the elegance and tone of his speaking over the past couple of days. This is the most formidable and difficult of Bills facing the House, as I think anybody would recognise, and he has navigated it with great charm. He has reinforced my view that he should have been in the Cabinet long ago, and I thank him.
I am trying to do as much damage as possible. [Laughter.] I stand to speak principally to amendment 51 and, to some extent, to amendment 49, which would stop existing paused inquests going forward. Amendment 51 would address directly the paused inquest relating to Loughgall. I picked that event out because it is the most controversial and central to what the IRA were trying to achieve. It is emblematic of many of the reasons why we should not pursue any of these inquests, but should put them in their proper place with the legacy commission, which could deal with them dispassionately. Before I go any further, I draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and not just this year but in previous years. They relate to the fact that I was the trustee of the SAS Regimental Association for well over a decade—I cannot remember how many years. All parties in the debate so far, yesterday and today, have quite properly focused on the need to get closure for victims and, at the same time, to deliver justice for our veterans. Nobody can argue with those two aims. I am focusing mostly on getting justice for veterans by preventing them being punished by the process, but, before I pursue that line in detail, I will address some of the words and definitions that we are using, particularly the definition of “victim” in the operation of inquests in Northern Ireland. We all have in our minds a fairly clear idea of what a victim is, but unfortunately it is a little different in Northern Ireland. The difference arises from a deliberate decision taken by the Blair Government in article 3 of the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, which changed the definition of “victim” and ruled that anyone affected by the troubles through loss, trauma or injury would be classed as a victim. That means that proven murderers killed in an attempt to carry out another murder count as victims. I know of nowhere else in the world where the law treats killers as victims. This issue is still relevant. In September last year, the Democratic Unionist party used a motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly to try to restore some moral clarity by adding the word “innocent” before “victims”. Most of us would think of that as a tautology, but the motion was defeated by Sinn Féin, supported by Alliance. That is incredibly central to this matter, because the word “innocent” exposes the truth and draws a line between terrorists and their victims. In response to the point made earlier by the hon. Member for Sunderland Central, “veterans” and “victims” are not mutually exclusive terms, but “terrorists” and “victims” are. That is the significance of the amendments I am talking about. In the IRA active service unit killed at Loughgall, there were any number of people to whom that applied. The clearest example was Jim Lynagh, who was guilty of at least 20 murders and probably more than 30. His nickname was “the executioner”. He was not an innocent victim by any rational judgment of the word. Why Loughgall? It was the greatest single defeat of the IRA—the one that they are most sore about and still feel the scars of. Why is that? Because it involved the defeat of what they considered their most successful unit, the East Tyrone brigade. What was the measure of that success? That so-called brigade killed 250 innocent people. The defeat at Loughgall was seen as a humiliation for the IRA, and that means that they are now desperate to rewrite history and cast their murderers as heroes and British soldiers as amoral killers. That is why they want a coroner’s inquest, rather than a legacy commission. I am afraid that in Northern Ireland a coroner’s inquest is in many ways public theatre; it is just different. The shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), made this point, but I will reiterate it. In the rest of the United Kingdom, an inquest is not allowed to pursue a case if it becomes at all apparent that it may lead to a criminal prosecution, such as the finding of an unlawful killing, but in Northern Ireland the reverse is true. Even Northern Irish judges recognise the ludicrous nature of that situation. We saw that in the Coagh case with Soldier B, where there was judicial review attempt after judicial review attempt, which led to the judge talking about the “ludicrous nature of this challenge, funded as it is by legal aid.” The judge in that sequence talked about having to make views or judgments in slow motion or freeze frame on decisions. Those were life-and-death decisions, for the individuals concerned, and they were made in fractions of a second. That is the central reason for my objection. Why are operations such as Loughgall, Clonoe, Coagh or any of the others challenged by supporters of the IRA and others? The peculiar circumstances of Northern Ireland made this sort of operation necessary. How is that? The IRA knew how to frustrate justice. They would murder or intimidate not just anybody who thought that they might be a witness, but their families. If I were in that circumstance in Northern Ireland, I would baulk at giving evidence if I felt that my family might be murdered as a result of doing so, and I would baulk at serving on a jury for the same reason. That is why we ended up with Diplock trials, which had judges without juries, because that was simply not viable. When Diplock recommended those trials, he gave the example of a man who was executed in front of his young son the day before he was due to give evidence in a terrorist trial. That is the background and the circumstances. However, the IRA did not stop there. They understood that, as well as witnesses, the other thing that matters in court cases is forensics. That is why they wore a strange uniform of boiler suits, rubber gloves, shoe coverings or wellingtons and balaclavas, because they knew that they had to deny the evidence, but that was not all. When they had carried out their crime, the cars used were frequently abandoned and burned to destroy the evidence. There are plenty of examples—I think Clonoe was one of them—where a crowd prevented the authorities from getting close to a car until it had burned out, for the very simple reason that it destroyed the evidence. Even in the case of the murder of a previous Speaker at Stormont, Norman Stronge, and his son, the IRA set fire to the house, with the same aim.
The hon. Gentleman is exactly right. That serves to focus our minds on the fact that this was a very deliberate strategy. This did not happen by accident, and the IRA did not just take to wearing boiler suits as uniforms; this was a deliberate strategy. The IRA’s strategy faced the state with a conundrum. Doing nothing and sitting back does not work—if the jury processes and other judicial processes do not work, that is not an option. Why do I say that? Let me go back and take the East Tyrone brigade as an example. It killed 250 people before Loughgall. During the late ’80s, it was killing people at a rate of 10 or 15 a year. Doing nothing meant that 10 or 15 innocent people would die every year because the state was not fulfilling its duty, so the only way to stop it was to catch the East Tyrone brigade in flagrante—in the act of carrying out a crime—and try to arrest them. Of course, the first aim of the state is always to act with minimum force if possible, but the circumstances did not always allow that. This was an armed set of terrorists, probably in the process of trying to kill somebody, who might then turn to kill you, and you had to stand up and say, “Excuse me, you’re under arrest.” We saw from many of these events how dangerous that was. At Coagh—the case that went through all those judicial reviews—an SAS soldier effectively had to dress up as a UDR man to be the target, and they had to wait until he had been shot at before they moved. At Clonoe, which my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar mentioned, there was another problem: the intelligence was wrong, which made it even more difficult. There they were facing a double-barrelled dushka machine gun, .50 calibre and capable of bringing down light armour or aircraft. A three-second burst of fire from that and the whole patrol would have been dead. That was the sort of thing we were asking our soldiers to do. I will come back to the Loughgall example, which is even worse in many ways. That was the sort of thing that we said to our soldiers, “You must do this to attempt to achieve an arrest, or at least a stop if you have to.” This is not theoretical; in the specific context of the special forces, which is what these three cases relate to, hundreds of soldiers died in Northern Ireland. If Members want to look into this, I recommend that they look up the example of Lance Corporal David Jones, who was shot at the moment of challenge, or that of Captain Westmacott. There are others, but those cases give the Committee clear examples of the sorts of risks that had to be taken—and were taken—by our brave, honourable, decent and law-abiding soldiers.
I agree with David Johnstone—by the way, I think he is a very brave commissioner. His predecessor was effectively fired for standing up, and he is still standing up. He is right, and to go off on a slight tangent, our other enemies learn from this, as we are seeing elsewhere in the world today. If we are not very careful, we will end up without one of the best parts of our armed forces, because we ourselves will have destroyed it. Let me come back to Loughgall. The aim at Loughgall was to destroy the police station and kill the police officers who would be coming off shift at 7 pm—the attack was timed for 7 pm. It was not the first such operation, but the third; it came after Ballygawley, where the IRA shot and killed two police officers before blowing up the station, and the Birches, where they machine-gunned the station—fortunately, they missed people—before blowing it up. At Loughgall, the IRA team attacked the police station in two units. One unit was in a van, carrying a team armed with automatic weapons with the intention of killing the three police officers as they came off duty, and the other unit—of three men, I think—was in a JCB-style digger that was carrying in its bucket a 300 lb to 400 lb bomb. The attack happened at 7 pm, when the police officers were due to come off shift. Inside the station at the time, because of intelligence that was known, there were three police officers and three SAS soldiers. To be frank, I find it hard to imagine the level of courage it takes to sit in a building, waiting for it to be blown up by a 300 lb or 400 lb bomb. It is beyond my imagination, but that is what they did. The attack started when the van screeched to a halt, and a number of the unit debussed and opened fire on the police station. They fired a total of 78 rounds; I do not know whether all of them were fired at the police station, but I imagine most of them were. Inside the station, people reported being hit by fragments of bullets as they hit the steel frames of the windows and disintegrated. The digger then crashed through the perimeter fence and the bomb exploded, destroying half the building and injuring the occupants. “Injuring” is too mild a term, frankly—one occupant had a fractured skull, while others had broken bones, and two of the soldiers fell about 10 feet on to rubble. Others sustained hearing injuries.
I was about to come to that point, and I will probably come back to it again. That is the real tragedy of that day—he was the real victim, as was his son, I think, who was wounded as well. I know that the hon. Gentleman will not agree with this, but one of the things about the British state is that we take our judicial responsibilities in these matters seriously, and we have prosecuted our own soldiers. The name Clegg jumps to mind, but there are others who were prosecuted and sent to prison even for acting irresponsibly, let alone malevolently. Of course that is the worst tragedy of that day—that is literally in my next paragraph. I will give the hon. Gentleman my notes after this debate, so that he can see for himself. Incidentally, that is one of the reasons why I say that this case should go to the legacy commission. It is a really important thing to investigate, but it should be investigated in a cool, analytical manner, not in the theatre of the court. Why do the IRA want to have a coroner’s inquest rather than a legacy commission investigation? Because they were humiliated at Loughgall, and they want to rewrite history with themselves as the heroes and British soldiers as the villains. Let me give the Committee an early sign of the sort of thing they will try to claim. We have been hearing recently that these IRA people were only aiming to destroy the building—they were not aiming to kill anybody. That would have been completely different from the first operation, where they murdered people in cold blood before blowing up the station. That also does not explain why the IRA fired 78 rounds at the building—bullets kill people, not buildings. It does not explain why they were there at the shift change, when the RUC men were about to come out of the building. It is plainly nonsense, but it is the sort of nonsense that they want to perpetuate in a court. That is another reason why I would rather see the dispassionate actions of the commission than the activities of IRA lawyers in the courts.
I am very close to the end, Madam Chairman. The hon. Lady is exactly right, and that is the entire thrust of amendment 51. If I had had my way, I would have said that amendment 49 was better, because it would have stopped all these inquests. The amendments would not get rid of the investigations, but would put them into a better process, which the Government have designed. I will finish on coroners courts. I have listened to a number of soldiers who have appeared in these courts, and the Committee can guess who I am talking about, but they are tough, intelligent soldiers. However, the court is not their environment, when they are being harassed by a lawyer not to get to the truth, but to get a story out of them. I spoke this morning to one of them who has been through more of these court cases than most, both inquests and judicial reviews. He told me that IRA lawyers are, in his words, “more interested in drama than justice”.
No, not on this point. I am nearly at the end. I have already been rebuked by the Chairman for going on. What that soldier said is, I am afraid, consistent with what I saw. I have never appeared in an inquest, but I have appeared in a Diplock court in Northern Ireland. [Interruption.] Sorry, am I being heckled? I saw the same: the lawyers were interested in rewriting history. The IRA would welcome the restarting of the Loughgall inquest. They would view that as a victory in its own right, because it would allow them yet another attempt to rewrite the history of the troubles. I will make an aside, which in a way goes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood), although it is the converse of it. One of the soldiers at Loughgall got the military medal. In my view, many of them should have done, but he got it for putting himself at extra risk to save civilians and to prevent the death of civilians. That tells us what we are dealing with in relation to British soldiers in Northern Ireland. My last point is that this operation was approved in detail by the general officer commanding, Northern Ireland. I believe that it was approved in detail by the Secretary of State. It was reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions, with all of the information to hand—forensics, witnesses, the lot. We should remember that RUC people would not have been involved directly, but would have given witness statements. Do we want to run that through a circumstance where the evidence is degraded, where people’s memories have gone and where some have died? One of the individuals involved has dementia. Is that what we want to do, or do we want to do it properly, by dispassionate method, using an instrument that is designed for the process and that those on both sides of the House agree will work?
With a waiting list of more than 7 million, the NHS needs the sharpest focus on patient care and delivery, but Ministers have created disruption and distraction. I have some sympathy for the Secretary of State, because the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting) had said no to a top-down reorganisation and then abruptly changed his mind without, it seems, thinking it through much. Within an hour of the First Reading of the Health Bill, he had hopped it, and now it falls to the present Secretary of State. Does she believe in the right hon. Gentleman’s plan, and does she still believe that NHS England will be dissolved by 1 April?
I did not hear the greatest statement of belief that the deadline for that quango would be hit. Since the original plan, we know that costs are up, that transfer functions out of integrated care boards have been delayed, even though 8,000 people have gone, and that multiple mergers are on hold. NHS England may be the mother of all quangos, but it seems instead we are to get the sister of the mother of all quangos. The special health authority is a new, regional management tier, so does the Secretary of State still expect a net benefit of £1 billion a year in this Parliament? If not, what does that do to frontline health funding on top of the pressures we know about on pay and medicines? Is not the real cost here to patient care?
Another group of people who need to be considered are those with diabetes—particularly type 1 diabetes—who have medical equipment on them that cannot go through the scanner. That sometimes creates a problem at airports and other terminals. It would be really helpful to hear about any awareness-raising the Government intend to do.
Given the time constraints in the programme order, Mr Turner, what is the best way to proceed?
Order. I will not tolerate allegations of misleading, even from a sedentary position. Members must observe the courtesies of the House.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving notice of his point of order. He will know that the Chair is not responsible for Ministers’ remarks in the Chamber, but I am sure that Members on the Treasury Bench will have heard his comments and that if a correction is needed, one will be made. Petition
It can take far too long for patients to receive a diagnosis of Lyme disease. My constituent Gill, who is a nurse, gave her life to the NHS, but it failed to diagnose her and she had to seek treatment from abroad. Will the Minister meet me and Gill to discuss what went wrong?
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely. I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects. First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is “likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support” and is not “reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”. Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and “are otherwise of good character.” Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a “private or family life established by a person” who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be “a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect” on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable “to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)” one of three conditions is met. On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave “had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.] and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report. On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is “increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”. I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us: “No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”. Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement? There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society, “the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27” acknowledges that the new criteria are “likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”. The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that? On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office “a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”. The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation. There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is. On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change “appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”, and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to “act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”
I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?
In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?
I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert— “(3A) Where a person has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years— (a) the first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply, and (b) the third set of exceptional circumstances applies only where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in subsections (4) and (5).” This amendment would restore the current rule that a foreign national sentenced to four years or more cannot resist deportation by relying on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” exceptions and must show very compelling circumstances over and above them.
On Thursday 15 October, the Government were kind enough to accept Opposition amendment 96 to clause 17; I hope the Minister will look at these amendments with the same open mind, because of all the clauses in part 2, this is the one that the public care the most deeply about. People expect that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes in this country will be deported, and they do not understand why family life—often family life formed while the offender was here—so frequently stands in the way. It is frankly unacceptable. Our reasoned amendment on Second Reading made the point that this Bill “does not ensure all foreign criminals and illegal immigrants will be deported”.—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 679.]. Clause 20 is where that concern is tested. My case is that, although the clause contains real improvements, which we support, it also makes the position easier for the most serious offenders. Either way, it leaves the final word where it is today: with the judge’s assessment of proportionality. The clause does four things. First, it extends the deportation rules in section 117C of the 2002 Act from foreign criminals to everyone liable to deportation, including those deported because it is conducive to the public good. Secondly, it replaces the current structure of a single rule, that deportation is required unless its effect on the person or their family would be disproportionate. Thirdly, it replaces the sentence length threshold of 12 months and four years with a sliding scale: the more serious the offending and its impact on society, the greater the public interest in deportation. Fourthly, it provides that deportation will be disproportionate if, and only if, one of three sets of exceptional circumstances applies: long residence and integration, an unduly harsh effect on a partner or child, or other very compelling circumstances, and the interference cannot be justified by the public interest. I turn first to what the clause gets right, because I want to be fair to the Government in this Committee. Extending the rules to all deportation cases is a genuine tightening, and for that reason the Opposition support it. There is a reasonable legal argument that the new structure restores the balance test that the courts took away. Dr Chris Rowe of Swansea University argues that after the Supreme Court’s decision in KO (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the unduly harsh exception came to operate as an unqualified right, which we heard about in earlier Committee sittings. If the effect on the family was harsh enough, the strength of the public interest did not matter. He argued that clause 20(3) would be effective in restoring a balance against the public interest. If that is correct, it is a real improvement for so-called medium offenders. Once again, however, I cannot help but notice what kind of improvement this is. On Dr Rowe’s own analysis, clause 20 brings domestic law back to what the Strasbourg case law requires, but does not go beyond it, and for the most serious offenders, the clause appears to move in the wrong direction. Under the current law, someone sentenced to four years or more cannot rely on the long residence or unduly harsh exceptions on their own; they must show very compelling circumstances over and above them. Clause 20 removes the sentence thresholds altogether. Justice, which, I should say, supports the change for very different reasons, describes the effect precisely in its evidence, stating that the Bill “flattens out the application of the exceptions, so that all three apply, regardless of the length of a person’s sentence.” The House of Commons Library briefing says that it is “not clear” how the new rules are stricter for people sentenced to more than four years.. Does the Minister accept that under clause 20, the most serious offenders gain access to exceptions one and two? If so, why? What reasons could the Government have for loosening the rules for the worst-offending foreign criminals? Presumably, the Government are trying to achieve the opposite.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for supporting the general thrust of what we are trying to achieve with the amendments, and I accept his point. By having a narrow list, we may constrain future opportunities and changes, and we need to be flexible. However, it is important that the Committee expresses its view that these crimes are abhorrent. Although it is a narrow list, this place can of course legislate further in the future, as life changes. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his general support and I understand his point, but given the gravity of these crimes, it is important that this Committee is very clear that they are totally unacceptable.
We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond. The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today? As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive. The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.
I thank the Minister for her recent confirmation that the renal dialysis service would remain at Hinchingbrooke hospital in my constituency during the build under the new hospital programme, but I am conscious that it is not in the scope of the actual new hospital and may not be there in the longer term. Can she offer me some assurances that this vital service for constituents will remain at Hinchingbrooke? If not, is any provision being made to ensure that this local resource stays available?
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert— “(1A) When making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to promoting economic growth. (1B) In complying with subsection (1A), the Secretary of State must in particular consider the impact of the regulations on— (a) the competitiveness of air transport service providers and airport operators, (b) investment in the United Kingdom aviation sector, and (c) the burdens imposed on air transport service providers and airport operators in complying with the regulations.” This amendment requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth before making regulations under clause 1, with particular reference to the competitiveness of the aviation sector, investment, and the regulatory burden on businesses.
Taken together, amendments 5 and 6 and new clause 2 address a single question: what is the Bill intended to achieve for British aviation? Amendment 5 would require Ministers to consider economic growth, competitiveness, investment and the regulatory burdens imposed on the sector. Amendment 6 would hold the Government to their own target for reducing the administrative cost of regulation. New clause 2 would place the Bill’s overarching purpose at its forefront: supporting a competitive, growing aviation sector while protecting consumers. Economic growth, competitiveness and investment must be at the heart of this Bill. That is why amendment 5 is so important. It would ensure that, when Ministers exercise their considerable powers contained in this Bill, they are required to consider the consequences for growth, competitiveness and investment—I know that that is a rarity for them, but they may as well start today. How on earth can businesses be expected to make long-term investment decisions when the Government cannot even provide them with clear and consistent direction? Above all, the industry needs the confidence to expand and the certainty to invest, and a Government who are useful and whose policies are conducive to that goal, rather than being all over the place with myriad positions. Amendment 5 would clearly fulfil that goal, ensuring that Ministers consider the consequences for growth. I hope that the Minister will support it. It is bizarre that we have to debate amendment 6 at all. The Opposition have not pulled the target in it out of thin air; it is the Government’s own target. They set it, not us. The Minister cannot ramble on in the usual way that his colleagues do about a poor inheritance; his Government made this commitment themselves. Yet bizarrely, when this matter was raised in the other place, the Minister there refused to back it—shameful, really. Do Ministers simply not care about the costs they are piling on to British businesses? Of course not. When we examine their record—regulation upon regulation; standard upon standard; requirement upon requirement—it is clear for all to see, especially the businesses that have suffered and been forced to curtail plans to grow, expand, hire and succeed. That is why we have tabled amendment 6: we are simply asking Ministers to stick to the target they set themselves. Finally, new clause 2 would place an overarching purpose in the Bill. As we have argued throughout the consideration of this legislation, growth must be our north star in aviation policy. We want Britain to have a thriving and internationally competitive aviation sector, with airports and airlines able to invest, expand and succeed. That ambition is entirely compatible with protecting the rights and interests of passengers. Indeed, a successful aviation sector depends on passengers having confidence in the services they receive. New clause 2 would therefore make it clear that the purposes of the Bill are to promote the international competitiveness of the United Kingdom aviation sector, to support economic growth and to protect consumers. I struggle to see why the Government would object to putting those balanced and reasonable aims in the Bill. Amendments 5 and 6 and new clause 2 form a coherent package. They would establish a clear, pro-growth purpose, require Ministers to consider the effect of regulation on investment and competitiveness, and hold the Government to their own target for reducing administrative costs. I hope that the Minister will support them.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, but I do not think he has sufficiently addressed the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston and the points made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I think a north star is critical for the Bill. It is all very well to have a Bill, but without a purpose, what is it there for? That is an important point that we need to take into account. On the flexibility that the Minister referenced, my right hon. Friend has already made the point that he would not be removing any flexibility in agreeing to our amendments. I also point to our new clause 2. The Minister appears to think that it negates safety at the expense of competitiveness and growth. I reiterate that its purpose is to “protect the rights and interests of consumers of air transport and airport services.” I cannot see how that could be construed as downplaying safety. With your permission, Mr Turner, I will press all three provisions to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.
I will speak to amendments 24 to 26, amendment 7, which stands in my name, and new clause 14, which have all been grouped together. Amendment 24 sets out an eminently sensible ambition, namely to ensure that any future regulations do not water down the passenger and consumer protections currently in force. That is an important principle and one that we recognise. Of course, as hon. Members know, the Opposition support a thriving, competitive aviation sector, but passengers must also have confidence that, when they travel, they will be treated fairly and the protections that they rely upon will be upheld. That is particularly important for disabled passengers and those with reduced mobility. Far too many people still face unnecessary difficulties when travelling by air, whether regarding the provision of assistance, the handling of mobility equipment or simply being able to travel independently and with dignity. Those matters deserve serious attention. As we—and particularly my Conservative colleagues in the other place—have consistently argued, accessibility should be considered from the outset rather than treated as an afterthought. However, I have some reservations about binding ourselves to every existing regulation, particularly where certain requirements may create perverse incentives, impose disproportionate burdens or simply fail to deliver the outcomes that they were intended to achieve. We should always be in the business of retaining the flexibility to revisit and improve regulations where necessary, while ensuring that passengers remain properly protected. We welcome the overarching objective of the amendment, but given those concerns, we will abstain.
We would like to press amendment 7 to a vote. I do not consider the Minister to have sufficiently addressed our concerns around the reasons and impact of the provisions in the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 1, page 2, line 42, leave out “that include provision of the kind mentioned in subsection (3)(e) or (f)”. This amendment would ensure that all regulations made under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure, rather than only regulations containing provision of the kind mentioned in subsection (3)(e) or (f).
I shall also speak to amendments 9 and 10, and I will finish by briefly addressing clauses 1 to 3 stand part. The amendments concern a very straightforward principle: that Parliament ought to have a proper opportunity to scrutinise the regulations made under this legislation. The proposals would ensure that the relevant regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure, thereby requiring the approval of both Houses of Parliament, so they would preserve scrutiny, accountability and fair process for all concerned. Given the breadth of powers in the Bill, that is an entirely sensible safeguard. Who knows who the next Secretary of State might be? The regulations will have important and wide-reaching consequences for airlines, airports, passengers and the sector as a whole. Surely the Minister agrees that it is right for Parliament to have a meaningful opportunity to examine such decisions before they take effect. It was disappointing that when similar amendments were debated in the other place, the Government declined to accept that basic principle. I turn briefly to clauses 1 to 3. We support the objective of strengthening passenger protections, particularly for disabled passengers and those with reduced mobility. Clause 2 provides for consultation on several important issues, including assistance for disabled passengers, protections for those with allergies, complaints procedures and the provision of suitable wheelchairs. We welcome these practical steps, and look forward to the consultation producing timely and effective action. Clause 3 places the welcome principles of dignity, equal access, appropriate assistance and independent travel at the heart of the new framework. The importance of those objectives makes proper parliamentary scrutiny of the regulations all the more necessary. That is precisely what amendments 8 to 10 seek to secure, and I hope the Minister will support them.
I commend the Minister for his points about accessibility and disability, and as I mentioned, that is something that the Opposition support. However, I was somewhat flummoxed, nay dumbfounded, to hear Government Members and the Minister conflate parliamentary scrutiny with agility, growth and flexibility in an entirely negative way. They seem to think that this can go forward only without sufficient parliamentary scrutiny of what will become an Act with considerable ministerial powers. The Opposition’s position is absolutely that parliamentary scrutiny is the essence of our democracy. With a Bill with such significant powers, it is entirely appropriate that there should be much greater parliamentary scrutiny. We can demonstrate that that is not at the expense of agility and growth, so we will press the amendment to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.
I will speak briefly to clause 4. A wheelchair is clearly different from other pieces of luggage. For disabled passengers, it is what gives them their independence and allows them to travel with dignity. When an airline loses or damages someone’s wheelchair, the consequences can be serious and immediate. As such, it is only right that the passenger is properly compensated rather than being subject to the limits designed for ordinary baggage. We therefore welcome this clause’s inclusion in the Bill.
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his support, and indeed the Minister for recognising that the underlying principle is absolutely the right one—that this is an important safeguard, to use his words. It is not administrative, as he argued; we should be ensuring that the CAA is not judge and jury. Clause 5 and schedule 1 give the Civil Aviation Authority new enforcement powers, while clause 6 brings the existing rules on banned air carriers and informing passengers which airline will operate their flight within the consumer protection enforcement framework. We support those provisions and the principle of effective enforcement, but we believe that the process needs an additional safeguard for those affected by the CAA's decisions. As such, we have tabled amendment 11, which stands in my name. The Opposition have tabled the amendment to ensure that there is a more sensible and balanced process for reviewing enforcement notices issued by the Civil Aviation Authority. As the Bill is currently drafted, the route for challenging these decisions is through an appeal to the High Court or Court of Session. I must say I think that that is quite unreasonable. Surely there should be an opportunity for an independent review of the decision before businesses are expected to embark on potentially costly and lengthy court proceedings. That is precisely what our amendment seeks to achieve. We are simply suggesting that an additional check should be available, allowing an independent reviewer to consider whether a notice could be confirmed, varied or withdrawn before the matter proceeds to court. That would provide greater certainty and clarity for those affected, while helping to ensure that the process was fair and proportionate. Importantly, it would not prevent anyone from pursuing an appeal through the courts if they remained dissatisfied. It is an entirely sensible safeguard; I hope the Minister will now recognise the merits of the amendment and support it.