Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,731 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   Amendment 254 is good in so far as it goes in relation to rail freight, but other rail operators also provide public benefit and should receive a similar level of protection. The Opposition are happy to support the amendment, but we do not think it goes nearly far enough. Amendment 255 would give the ORR the power to order GBR to revise a charging scheme if it found, on appeal, that GBR had not dealt fairly with the appellant. With the current constraint on appeals, the amendment would make no practical difference. The Government need to go much further by providing a genuine appeals process to assess appeals on their merits, with an independent body, not a direct competitor, taking the key charging decisions.

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2. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 85, in clause 65, page 37, line 15, leave out subsection (3)(b). This amendment would enable GBR to have to pay penalties or compensation.

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3. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   Clause 65 requires GBR to provide and publish a performance scheme that is designed to incentivise GBR, its subsidiaries or other train operators to minimise disruption or delay to other train services or the network. Train operators may be required to pay penalties if they cause disruption, may receive compensation where disruption is caused by a different operator’s operations and may receive bonuses to reward better than planned performance. So far, so good, you might say. However, it does not permit payments by GBR that relate to disruption outside its control.

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4. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   Does the hon. Member not think our amendments could actually improve the system for GBR? We have talked, in this Committee and in the Select Committee sessions on the Bill, about the real gap in terms of the incentives for GBR to improve its services and improve itself. There is no reason why adding GBR as a body that would have to pay penalties and compensation would not introduce an incentive, in the same way we expect for operators, to ensure that the service provided on the taxpayers’ behalf and using taxpayers’ money is improved. At the end of the day, GBR is paying itself, but our amendments would at least give it an incentive to make sure that it does not need to pay compensation in the first place.

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5. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   To build on the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston made, clause 65(3)(b) says that compensation may not be paid by Great British Railways “in relation to any disruption that is outside its control.” It strikes me that that relates to what the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield said happens already: people have to decide what constitutes significant disruption, and what is inside its control. If I were an outside operator looking at this, I would be thinking, “Hang on a minute. Where’s the definition of what is inside GBR’s control?” There is a whole long list of options that I will not even begin to bore the Committee with for what could be said to be outside its control, but where is that conversation? It strikes me that it might be like trying to claim for a bag that was stolen on holiday on insurance—you have to literally prove that you were mugged to get reimbursed. I would be interested in a bit more information on how “outside its control” will be defined.

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6. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   Clause 66 sets out who GBR must consult before issuing, revising or replacing the access and use policy under clause 59. The ORR and the Scottish and Welsh Ministers must be consulted as well as other persons GBR considers appropriate. Subsection (2) requires GBR to consult the persons it considers appropriate before issuing the infrastructure capacity planning document under clause 60, including any revisions and replacements; before issuing a working timetable under clause 61; and before making, altering or replacing a charging scheme under clause 64 or a performance scheme under clause 65. Subsection (3) provides that a requirement in this clause for consultation may be satisfied by a consultation before or after the commencement of the clause. There is currently no express requirement to consult existing open access operators. Clause 67, on appeals against access, charging and performance decisions, provides that a person who is aggrieved may appeal to the ORR against a GBR decision as to their train operations’ access to and use of the infrastructure, or a decision under the charging scheme or performance scheme. That sounds okay, until we realise that it is on judicial review terms, so there is no actual right of appeal at all. Clause 68, on the appeals procedure, sets out that the ORR, when determining appeals under this chapter, must apply the principles that the High Court would apply on an application for a judicial review, or the principles that the Court of Session would apply in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for appeals in Scotland. Subsections (2) and (3) provide for the ORR to allow an appeal or dismiss it, and, if it allows an appeal, to use the following remedies. For appeals made against the GBR policies, plans, and schemes themselves—under clause 59(6), on access and use; clause 60(6), on infra-structure capacity; clause 64(8), on charging; or clause 65(7), on the performance scheme—the ORR can only require GBR to reconsider the decision. For appeals made against a specific decision under clause 61(5) or clause 62(7), on the working timetable, or under clause 67, on GBR’s policies, plans and schemes, the ORR can quash the decision that is appealed against. Then, however, all it can do is to send it back to GBR to reconsider, or it may substitute the decision with its own if quashing the decision is on the basis of an error of law and without the error there is only one decision that GBR could have reached. Clause 68(1) means that because appeals must be assessed using judicial review principles, operators can challenge GBR decisions only on procedural grounds and not on the substance or commercial merits. That means that GBR will be judge and jury in its decisions affecting its direct competition, which is obviously wildly unfair. Clause 68(3)(a) sets out that even where an appeal succeeds, the ORR can only remit the matter back to GBR for reconsideration, which means that GBR can often reach the same outcome again without revising its reasoning. That offers little to no real corrective power. Clause 68(4)(b) says that the ORR may substitute its own decision only where there is an error of law and where only one lawful outcome was possible. That is a very high bar and as a result this remedy will be rare. These concerns have been echoed by the industry. During one of the oral evidence sessions for the Transport Committee, Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group said: “There are a number of problems with that appeal function. First, it will be incredibly hard to ever get to it. We are told that the appeal will have to meet the standards of a judicial review—illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness—so there will be a very high bar to meet to even get there. On top of that, the law allows the Secretary of State by regulation to set out some steps you would have to take in advance of going to the ORR. We do not know what those are. There is also a fee, and we do not know what that is. Even getting to the ORR will be very much more difficult than it is today. If we do get up there, in most cases, the ORR will be able to ask GBR to have another look at its decision. It has another look, and it reaches the same view—so what? Only in a minority of cases can it quash a decision and only if there was an error of law…Passengers are going to get a very powerful watchdog when, conversely, we feel that in freight, we are having those rights of access watered down.” Steve Montgomery from FirstRail said: “Considering other large public sector organisations—like GBR is going to be—you have to ask, ‘Why would you not have an independent regulator of it?’ Why is rail going to be different from other large public sector organisations where there are regulators looking at them?” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said: “A strong independent rail regulator has two roles. The ORR, by the way, is part of the European group of independent rail regulators called IRG. Ideally, those roles are to protect passengers and other parts of the sector from monopolistic behaviour, and to ensure the best use of taxpayer money. Their role is also, in other countries, to ensure competition and non-discriminatory behaviour. We are worried that that might be watered down in this country and needs to be improved still.” That prompts some questions that I hope the Minister can answer. Why is GBR being set up in such contradiction to its European neighbours? Is there anything that we could have learned? Will the Government reconsider any element of GBR as a result? These concerns were also set out in the Rail Freight Group’s written evidence to the Transport Committee: “GBR will by nature be a very powerful monopoly of track and GBR trains, and the overarching changes in the Bill reduce significantly the independent oversight of ORR, leaving the Secretary of State holding GBR to account. By comparison, the ORR currently has a duty to promote the use of the rail network and thus has a track record”— ha, ha— “of creating growth by approving new access applications previously rejected by Network Rail. Although we welcome the provisions for freight outlined above, there is still a significant risk that GBR could act in a way which favours its own trains, restricting growth for freight. As such, we believe it is essential that non-GBR operators have an independent appeals function that is powerful, easy to use and able to take action effectively.” It continued: “In essence, the provisions in the Bill mean that freight operators and customers have a very limited right of independent appeal against GBR. It is also of note that GBR may replace the current Access Disputes Committee (also independent of Network Rail) who hear lower level timetabling disputes with their own internal process, albeit we do not yet have full details of this.” I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that. FirstGroup wrote in a similar vein, saying that it was concerned “about the ORR’s responsibility for track access decisions being transferred to GBR…The Bill removes the ORR’s powers to independently adjudicate on whether applications for access best meet the needs of all railway users. Under Clause 68 the ORR is an appeals body but with no ability to uphold appeals if they are discriminatory or anticompetitive. There need to be more checks and balances to maintain confidence in fair access, independent regulatory oversight and to protect the interests of passengers…As a broader point, independent regulation is vital to all large comparable bodies—consider for example the CQC’s role in healthcare or the Civil Aviation Authority in airlines and airports.” The pushback against this grossly unfair clause is overwhelming, and the Government can surely no longer turn a deaf ear. Amendment 88 would remove the requirement that appeals may be made only under judicial review principles. We think that it is an obvious improvement. At the Transport Committee on 7 January, the Department for Transport’s official, Lucy Ryan, stated that the requirement is deliberate: “The reasoning for the JR threshold is to be absolutely clear that GBR needs to remain the directing mind, able to take decisions about optimising the use of the network.” That is an insufficient safeguard against monopolistic behaviour by GBR. Large monopolies with structural conflicts of interest need effective decision-making oversight. It cannot be done by the Secretary of State, because this is operational, so it has to be the ORR. Amendment 89 would enable the ORR to determine appeals on the facts and the law. It builds on amendment 88, and we think it is the only way to create a fair and non-discriminatory process. Amendment 90 would allow the ORR, when agreeing an appeal, either to remit to GBR for reconsideration or to quash and/or substitute its own decision for all or part of the decision appealed against. An independent appellate body applying the rules to GBR and its decisions would not challenge the role of GBR, but make sure that it was applying its rules fairly and correctly. Amendment 91, which I believe the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage supports, would allow the ORR to substitute its own decision for that of GBR when allowing appeals, without there needing to have been an error of law, resulting in only one possible outcome. It would remove a ridiculously closely drafted requirement, and it is obviously fair. It is a test to see if the Government actually want a fair and level playing field. Amendment 92 would require the Secretary of State to consult open access operators before making regulations about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought, to make provision about the procedure and to set time limits and fees for the appeals brought under this chapter. Operators clearly have skin in the game, and should be consulted by right. Amendment 93 would require the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing its document on the practice and procedure for appeals under this chapter. The argument for that is very similar to the one behind amendment 92, which I just set out. Will the Minister stand up for the open access and freight sector, and support our amendments to create a fair appeals process?

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7. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   I shall be brief. The amendments would strengthen the role of the ORR and reduce the role of the Secretary of State in considering appeals against GBR access decisions. Without further ado, I will say that we will support all three, should the Liberal Democrats press them to a vote.

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8. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to except GBR or a subsidiary of GBR from the sections outlining the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. That change would prevent the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. The clause removes GBR from the normal ORR supervised access regime, giving it a special exemption that no other operator has. Since GBR is both operator and infrastructure manager, we believe that this creates an uneven playing field and risks unfair treatment of competing operators. If the Government insist on the current drafting, they must come clean and admit that their intention is to treat competitors unfairly in comparison, and that they are not in favour of competition and reject private investment as a driver of innovation and improvement on the railway. Given the destruction of the current independently managed fair and level playing field, it is no surprise that the industry has major concerns. Eurostar’s written evidence to the Transport Committee explains: “The Railways Bill consolidates strategic and operational authority in Great British Railways. While centralising network management offers efficiency gains, it is essential that ORR’s independent regulatory function is preserved, especially for open access and international services. In future Government will have the overarching interest in the Infrastructure Concession (let to LSPH), the Maintainer Operator (Network Rail) and the largest operator on the route (SET). There needs to be an independent referee to balance these interests with those of open access operators. ORR provides impartial oversight of track access, station allocation, depot facilities, charging, and timetabling. Its independence provides transparent decision-making and safeguards competition, while giving investors confidence in the long-term stability of services. Decisions such as the allocation of depot access at Temple Mills demonstrate the importance of ORR in balancing competing demands for constrained resources. Without statutory protection, GBR could constrain competition and impede international service growth. In addition, it could reduce transparency in access allocation. Eurostar recommends that the Bill explicitly preserves the ORR’s independent role in regulating access, charges, and depot allocation for international services. This statutory protection is essential to provide fair treatment for operators and give certainty for the future of UK international rail services. In international rail terms, the ORR’s role is more important than ever before, given the recent ruling enabling a new entrant to the market to access Temple Mills depot. The regulator will need to perform a strong, independent and objective role in ruling on cost sharing, compatibility and rolling stock issues. The ORR can also play a role in track access charges – costs for accessing the London-to-Calais stretch of rail are nine times higher per kilometre than the cost of accessing equivalent infrastructure in Belgium, France or the Netherlands.” Written evidence to the Transport Committee from Lumo and Hull Trains outlines their concerns: “The ORR plays an essential role in maintaining a fair, transparent, and competitive rail network. Its independence supports confidence among passengers, freight operators, and private investors. Lumo and Hull Trains believe the Railways Bill should preserve this role to help GBR succeed. To maintain balance across the system, the ORR must retain meaningful regulatory powers to ensure decisions made by GBR on access and charging are fair, evidence-based, and consistent with the Government’s growth objectives. The current drafting of the Bill, however, limits the ORR’s capacity to intervene proactively, restricting its powers primarily to appeals after decisions have been made. Enhancing the ORR’s decision-making and enforcement capability would help ensure that GBR’s commercial and operational decisions remain aligned with the wider interests of passengers and the market. This approach would reinforce the Government’s ambition for a collaborative, competitive, and accountable rail system. A strong regulator also provides stability for investors, ensuring that GBR operates within a framework that fosters long-term confidence and fair treatment for all market participants. While the Government desires to create a ‘directing mind’ in GBR, coordinating rail with a whole network view, for private operators to have confidence in the system there must be appropriate protections guaranteeing fair access and charging. The ORR is well-positioned to perform that role as an essential backstop, but the correct framework must be built around it to enable it to operate as such.” Finally, Angel Trains also provided written evidence to the Transport Committee: “Angel Trains believes that the new access framework must provide equitable access to all parts of the railway, whether operators are GBR-led, Open Access, or freight. As a lessor of rolling stock to both GBR-led and Open Access operators we believe parity among operators is crucial and would welcome greater clarity from the Government on how access and charging decisions will be made and prioritised. As an independent regulator, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) should be responsible for ensuring a level playing field by intervening if concerns are raised that GBR could have taken a discriminatory decision, for example, around preferential access rights and charging for GBR operators over Open Access competitors. Beyond access arrangements, we would welcome further detail from the Government about how GBR will be held to account. In its current form, GBR possesses a high concentration of power in its role in setting both strategy and delivery. In order to provide adequate scrutiny and accountability, there must be sufficient checks and balances to ensure that financial, economic, and safety objectives are met. Angel Trains believes that there should be clear divisions between different parts of the rail system to ensure adequate accountability…As outlined above, it is vital that there is a fully independent regulator to hold GBR to account, for which the ORR could be best-placed. Beyond acting as an arbiter on access and charging decisions, the ORR should be empowered to report on GBR’s performance and issue performance improvements notices to GBR, in addition to other regulatory duties. The ORR must maintain a regulatory function to provide fairness and stability for the rail industry, which encourages investment and ensures financial sustainability by creating a level playing field across the sector and eliminating subjectivity from decision-making.” We therefore seek to leave out clause 69 and will vote against it. This would keep GBR under the normal access regime supervised by the ORR and ensure a fair system. We have no objections to Government amendments 175 to 183 but, as mentioned, we are less happy with clause 69 as a whole. Clause 70 amends the 2016 regulations to exempt GBR from the provisions of those regulations that would otherwise apply to its infrastructure. The 2016 regulations will continue to apply to other infrastructure managers. We do not object to the clause.

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9. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

   I will speak to clauses 72 and 73, and the grouped amendments. Clause 72 is another controversial clause. It sets out that the Secretary of State may make regulations about the management and operation of non-GBR infrastructure, which means any network, station or track not operated by or on behalf of GBR; about the rights to operate trains that use non-GBR infrastructure; and about competition in the market for the provision and supply of such operations. Subsection (2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to set access terms and charges for non-GBR infrastructure, overriding commercial negotiation and bypassing the ORR. That cuts directly against the stated principle that the publicly owned operator must not regulate its competitors. It is an extraordinary clause that cuts up contract law and throws it out of the window. The Rail Freight Group is concerned. It states: “Clause 72 enables the Secretary of State by regulation to intervene in privately owned rail freight terminals, setting conditions of access and charges amongst other matters. Again, we understand that this is not the intention of the clause (which exists to enable GBR to take over other infrastructure such as HS1, Heathrow Branch or the Core Valley Lines) but nonetheless it is an extant risk to rail freight as presently worded, and we believe freight terminals should be explicitly out of scope for this clause.”

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10. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest. Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.

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11. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    The Minister just said that the amendments are completely unnecessary, because the stated concerns are not real, effectively. That does not answer the very real concerns put forward time and again in the Transport Select Committee and in this Committee’s evidence session—the written and oral evidence—by businesses that are experts in the field. They are not reassured by the Bill as it stands. How can the Minister go back and say, “No, we’re right and you’re wrong,” to those experts in the industry?

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12. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 74, page 42, line 24, after “monitor” insert “and audit”. This amendment would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.

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13. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 74 amends the Railways Act 1993. It gives the ORR a new function to monitor GBR’s delivery of its statutory functions and carry out investigations where appropriate to fulfil that monitoring. In particular, the ORR must consider how and whether GBR is carrying out the activities listed in its approved business plan, how the cost of carrying out those activities compares with the estimates in the business plan, and whether GBR is carrying out railway activities in a way that furthers railway safety. The ORR may advise the Secretary of State in relation to that monitoring function and publish its advice. Amendments 99 to 101 “would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.” The amendments address the relationship between GBR and the ORR, making it clear that the ORR remains an independent regulator with powers associated with audit, for example in relation to the release of documents. None of that applies to a woolly duty to monitor. Legally, the term “monitoring” is weak. It does not imply an ability to take action to demand improvement. That is particularly concerning when combined with clause 75, which removes the ORR’s ability to impose a financial penalty in the event of poor performance. Amendment 97 “ensures that Great British Railways in furtherance of railway safety actively engages with the industry bodies such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board and implements where reasonably practicable, the cross-sector recommendations of safety improvements and standards emerging from any cross-sector work.” That provides the Office of Rail and Road a clear mechanism to hold Great British Railways to account in safety matters. It also highlights an expectation of relevant industry bodies to recommend improvements to Great British Railways. We will not divide the Committee on amendment 97, but we ask the Government to think about what we are proposing in it. We all want the Bill to make the railways safer, and anything we can do to ensure that that happens will be for the good. I think we have already debated amendment 98, but I want to put it in context we will vote on it at this point, so I want to mention why it is relevant. It “would require the ORR to consider whether GBR procuring services from the private sector would be a more efficient use of public funds.” That echoes previous amendments that we tabled, but we will be dividing on amendment 98 as part of this group, I believe. Amendment 222 “requires the Office of Rail and Road to consider Great British Railways’ performance against its KPIs, as set out in” new clause 2. As amendment 222 is consequential on new clause 2, we will not press it to a Division, given that the new clause is likely to be rejected. It is a probing amendment that we wanted on record. We also have amendment 236, which is not part of the group, but my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham told me not to forget it because we will have a vote on it. Are we debating group 73?

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14. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    That is fine. I knew as soon as I opened my mouth.

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15. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I have indicated that we want to press amendment 99 to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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16. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 75 prevents the ORR from issuing directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities. It also prevents the ORR from imposing a fine on GBR for licence breaches. We think those are both terrible ideas. The Transport Committee asked Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group: “What is your view on the ORR’s downgraded power merely to ‘advise’ the Secretary of State on GBR’s performance, rather than having actual powers of enforcement?” She said: “I am quite worried about this.” To the same question, Steve Montgomery from First Rail said: “Following on from that, the independence element of it—marking your own homework—is a big concern for us. How do we ensure that we do not see a perverse behaviour where GBR looks after its own operations to the detriment of others?” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said: “I can only echo that. With GBR writing the rules, controlling capacity and being linked to the main operator in the country, there is a structural conflict of interest, unless there is a clear duty of fairness and non-discrimination. I do not know of other European countries that do not have a strong independent rail regulator, across the EU and beyond. To be the judge and the jury at the same time is somewhat worrying.” Emma Vogelmann, the co-chief executive of Transport for All, told the Transport Committee: “Our recommendation on the role of the ORR is to retain its independent authority. We are definitely interested to see how that transition of powers, as Ben mentioned, plays out, and how enforceability plays into that.” For once, the Government need to stop and listen. The sector is speaking with one voice and telling them that this is the wrong approach. The clause needs to be removed in its entirety. It is common for regulators to be able to issue financial penalties to private utility companies that are in breach of their statutory duties. Why should that consumer protection not also be applied to a public body like GBR? Removing clause 75 would restore the ORR as a strong, independent economic regulator. Government amendment 271 “would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.” The Conservatives are against the whole clause, but, to save time, we will not seek a Division specifically on this amendment—I am sure that everybody will be pleased to hear that. However, as somebody who serves on the Transport Committee and sat through a lot of those evidence sessions, one of the key things that concerned me and some other members of the Committee was the breakdown of the relationship between the ORR and GBR and the weakening of the ORR’s powers. When I heard that evidence, I certainly felt that it was a compelling argument. Liberal Democrat amendment 212 would remove the restriction on the ORR to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches. That is okay as far as it goes, and we will support the amendment, but we think that it does not quite go far enough. As I am sure Members expect on the basis of what I have just said, we will vote against clause 75 as a whole.

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17. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clauses 76 to 79 change the current duties on the ORR, the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to maintain a register, in sections 72 to 73B of the Railways Act 1993, and put them under duties to publish certain information. The ORR must publish documentation relating to licences; access agreements; access contracts, other than those using GBR infrastructure, for which GBR will be responsible; experimental passenger services; closures; and railway administration orders, except where that would affect individual public or commercial interests. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers must publish determinations that a closure is a minor modification, and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. Each clause contains restrictions about publishing information that would affect individual, public or commercial interests. Each clause also allows for the publication of documentation that was previously contained in the registers. Clause 77, which is very similar to clause 76 and, indeed, clauses 78 and 79 on the devolved Ministers, amends section 73 of the 1993 Act, on the publication of a register by the Secretary of State, so that they are under duties to publish information—in particular, determinations that a closure is a minor modification and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. However, proposed new section 73(5) of the 1993 Act is interesting. It states: “The Secretary of State may not publish particular information or documents under this section if it appears to the Secretary of State that publication of that information or those documents would be against the public interest or the commercial interests of any person.” Can the Minister outline under what circumstances not being transparent is not in the public interest? What determines public interest? I would be grateful to hear the methodology in this instance. Further, the only person with commercial interests in the railway will be the guiding hand of the Secretary of State herself, as it is all public money. I am sure that proposed new subsection (5) is standard practice in statute, but it raises an interesting point about transparency that I ask the Government to spend some time thinking about. Public trust is low—perhaps it is even lower today than it was when my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham wrote this speech—and any part of any Bill that allows the Secretary of State to get away with not publishing information under a perceived public good would look most suspicious indeed. I do think that, in the light of yesterday’s events, my hon. Friend will see the irony in the words that he wrote there. Clause 77(2) allows publication of anything that was in the register before the Bill’s commencement. What is the timeline for publication, and will the Minister commit to publication? Those queries aside, Members will be pleased to hear that we have tabled no amendments at this time. Clause 78, which relates to publication of information by Scottish Ministers, mirrors clause 77. As I mentioned, it amends the 1993 Act, and aside from my query about the ability that it provides to not publish information against a perceived public good, we have no objections to the clause—unless it falls outside the devolution settlement, but presumably the Minister can reassure the Committee that it does not. Clause 79 relates to the powers of Welsh Ministers, which are similar to those enjoyed by Scottish Ministers. The rationale behind allowing Ministers to not publish information over a perceived public good remains interesting to me, but I see no need to revise the clause.

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18. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Priti Patel

    Sudan

    The situation in Sudan is serious and deadly, and Members across the Chamber want this awful, barbaric war to end. Millions are suffering, displaced and malnourished, and an estimated 150,000 people have been killed, including in massacres such as El Fasher. War crimes are being committed, and appalling acts of sexual violence are being perpetrated against women and girls. UK leadership is needed to make a difference to the humanitarian situation on the ground, and to support every international diplomatic effort to end this awful and deadly conflict. I must ask the Foreign Secretary, however, how she can come to the House to talk about such barbaric sexual violence against women and girls, when the Prime Minister knowingly let his friend, Peter Mandelson, a friend of one of the world’s most notorious paedophiles, into the heart of Government and her Department. Is she not ashamed and concerned that our country’s credibility and record on this issue has been damaged because of the Government’s poor judgment, and the Prime Minister’s judgment in appointing Mandelson, knowing his links to Epstein? With Mandelson putting his interests first, has she assessed the damage that his actions have caused to the UK’s international and reputational interests, including our essential work to address the situation in Sudan? To her knowledge, did he at any stage mislead our US ally on national security and foreign affairs on key decisions such as Chagos, which impact our security partnership? This morning I am sure the Foreign Secretary will have seen reports that Secretary Rubio warned the Labour Government over the appointment of Lord Mandelson. Can she confirm whether she or her predecessor were aware of that? The UK’s credibility has been damaged by the Prime Minister and her Government’s appalling judgment. That is why answers are needed. This week, the UK assumed the presidency of the UN Security Council. Will the Foreign Secretary tell the House how we will use that position rightly to advance efforts to negotiate to end this conflict? US-led peace efforts are reportedly building momentum, with a text being prepared of a plan to try to stop the fighting. Has she seen and inputted into that text, and what are her views on it? Has she set parameters to decide whether the proposals are the right ones, and has she spoken to other Sudan Quad countries about it? If acceptable, what pressures will be put on the warring parties to agree it? What is her assessment of any progress made since the statement at last April’s Sudan conference in London, and who will participate in the conference in Germany? We welcome the new sanctions of the RSF and the SAF, but can we expect further action against the leaders of those barbaric groups, their key operators and enforcers, who were all responsible for administering vile brutality on innocent people in different parts of the country? We all back the sanctions announced in December, but we need stronger action with robust consequences that deter the entities, individuals and businesses whose support continues to sustain this awful war. Will the Foreign Secretary update the House on how the UK is using international courts to pursue those responsible for these atrocities being committed, and to gather evidence? We note the £20 million of humanitarian funding announced by the Government for women and girls, so will she confirm whether that is drawn from money already pledged, or whether it is additional new funding? Which organisations are providing the programmes funded by that money, and what are the mechanisms for how the support service will work? As well as supporting women and girls affected by sexual violence and the stigma attached to children born from rape, is the Foreign Secretary working to help male victims, where there is also stigma that prevents them coming forward? More broadly, can she update us on the volume of British aid that has managed to get over the border since the escalation of this awful conflict towards the end of last year? What information has she received about what aid is getting through, and whether it is getting into the right hands? The war in Sudan is a stain on the world’s conscience, and Britain must exert every ounce of its influence and leverage to get the warring parties to lay down their weapons immediately and to secure a lasting peace.

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19. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Road Safety

    I call the Minister, who I am told is aware of how much pressure there is on timing.

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20. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    I call Brendan O’Hara, who will speak for up to 15 minutes.

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21. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. Because I want to get everyone in before we finish at 5 pm, all Members are on a three-minute speaking limit.

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22. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. I call Andy McDonald.

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23. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order.

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24. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. If interventions are made, not all colleagues will get in. Please consider that.

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25. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. I call John McDonnell.

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26. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    I call Andrew George to speak for two minutes.

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27. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Thank you very much. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson to speak for just a few minutes.

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28. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    I call the shadow Minister.

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29. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. No doubt, the record is now clarified. We cannot continue the debate. It is now 5.1 pm, and the debate is now over.

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30. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    NHS Dentists

    Order. Not “you”, Mr Easton—it was not me that you were referring to. You have lots of time, so enjoy it.

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31. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    Business of the House

    Hundreds of my constituents work at the Scunthorpe steelworks, which, as the Leader of the House will know, is under Chinese ownership. When the Prime Minister reported back earlier this week, I asked him whether he had engaged in related negotiations during his visit to China. It is disappointing to note that he did not respond to that question. Clearly, the long-term future of the plant is important to thousands of people. Could the Leader of the House arrange for a statement to update us on how things are progressing?

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32. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    National Cancer Plan

    Further to the exchanges about radiotherapy, I understand that the national figure for access to radiotherapy is 53%, which itself does not seem particularly high. However, the figure for my Brigg and Immingham constituency, which falls in the Yorkshire and the Humber region, is only 35%. Could the Minister give some assurance to my constituents about progress on increasing that figure, and when does she think we can reach the national average?

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33. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting)

    Members on both sides of the Committee have referred frequently to the fact that the incident that took Jaguar Land Rover down would not have been covered by the Bill. JLR employs a digital service provider, in the form of Tata Consultancy Services. Would that provider not be covered, meaning that JLR is in scope?

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34. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting)

    Given the scenario we just discussed, it is possible that a digital service provider would have an obligation to report under the Bill, but the parent company employing its services would not. Given the requirements for confidentiality that a client company may put upon a digital managed service provider, how can that conflict be managed?

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35. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)

    It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McVey. Small and medium-sized enterprises are defined by the headcount of full-time employees, yet in the world of IT, particularly for managed service providers, data centres and digital service providers, that is not a helpful metric to understand size and scale. Did the Department consider reevaluating the size of digital and managed service providers based on the through-flow of transactions or data rather than headcount? When I worked in the world of tech, there was a ratio for headcount that was totally different from other sorts of businesses.

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36. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Having read the Bill, does my hon. Friend understand that if a managed service provider provides services to, say, a hospital—so it would be covered by the regulations—and a reportable event happens to the managed service provider, there is any obligation for the hospital trust to report it as well, or is it just the managed service provider that has the responsibility? If he is not clear on that, would he ask the Minister?

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37. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I thank the shadow Minister for his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton. Is he as surprised as I am to read in the impact assessment that the hourly rate for a contract lawyer is to be £34 an hour rather than £300 to £500 an hour, which in my experience is the market rate?

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38. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Will the Minister give way?

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39. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)

    Will the Minister please clarify whether he thinks that, as page 102 of the impact assessment states, the hourly rate for a lawyer changing a contract is £34?

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40. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Lincoln Jopp

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)

    I am sorry, but that is nonsense. The footnote on the page that cites £34 an hour for a contract lawyer directs us back to the Office for National Statistics. I hope that the Minister lives in the real world—he has clearly worked in the business world—so he knows that that is nonsense. Does he agree that that pretty well undermines that section of the impact assessment?

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