Showing every spoken contribution, including 5,731 under 12 words. Hide short remarks

1. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

   Preventing Ill Health

   I declare an interest as a consultant paediatrician in the NHS. Prevention of ill health is crucial. It is particularly important in children, perhaps most especially when one is trying to prevent ill health in children caused by doctors. I have expressed concerns previously about the puberty blockers trial, as have many in both Houses. The trial has now been paused due to a Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency letter. When were Ministers first aware of that letter and when were they first aware of the concerns described within it?

   Hansard source
2. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

   Preventing Ill Health

   That is a very interesting answer. Before Christmas, the Secretary of State had confidence in an allegedly vigorous and rigorous process. Fertility preservation techniques have not deteriorated over the last few months. The ages at which children reach the Tanner stages of puberty have not changed over the last few months, but the MHRA’s view has. Why? Given that this is such a scrutinised trial, does that not call into question the MHRA’s wider competence and due diligence? Will the Minister publish the MHRA’s letter from November referred to in the more recent correspondence published on Friday?

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3. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   On a point of order, Ms McVey. I seek your advice with reference to the debate on clause 43, on 10 February. I draw Members’ attention to my question to the Minister in Hansard about parliamentary scrutiny of directions: “Even where they are redacted because of national security concerns, somebody, or some mechanism of Parliament, will be able to scrutinise them. Can the Minister confirm that?”––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 10 February 2026; c. 212.] The Minister responded: “Yes.” We received a letter over the recess dated 19 February—we are very grateful to the Minister for writing to us—which states something slightly different: “The Government’s default position is that copies of directions will be laid in Parliament, to enable all parliamentarians to scrutinise the Government’s use of…powers. Where this is not possible for national security reasons, alternative options for scrutiny could be used, such as allowing for directions to be read in private reading rooms or briefing individual shadow ministers. As such, we are confident that alternative options are available for scrutiny when directions cannot be laid in Parliament for national security reasons.” “Will” is different from “could” and “are available”. Given that we have moved beyond the debate on clause 43, what options are there for the Minister to either clarify those remarks or correct the record?

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4. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but we have seen over the past six months, especially with the alleged spying incidents in Parliament, the Government’s resistance to recognising the Chinese Communist party as a threat. When it comes to our new clause 3 and concerns over transparency, we have also seen, in the last few weeks, that there are mechanisms—for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee—to ensure the disclosure of documents, while preserving national security. I would therefore like to press new clauses 2 and 3 to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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5. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the effect of existing information sharing and analysis centres, with a view to determining whether further such centres should be established. The financial services industry has successful voluntary schemes—the Cyber Defence Alliance, and the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre—which act as hubs for collaboration on all matters relating to the prevention, detection, mitigation and investigation of cyber-threats and criminality impacting members. These organisations provide an essential alerting and co-ordinating role for their members, including providing intelligence and technical support during ongoing incidents. They can assist in building partnerships contextualised to particular sector risks. According to Richard Starnes of the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists, companies “may be competing with one another in their chosen businesses, but they are all in the same boat with regard to being attacked by whatever entities are attacking them.” And he said that if the FS-ISAC were replicated “on an industry-by-industry basis, particularly ones in CNI, that would be helpful. It would also help with information sharing with entities like NCSC and GCHQ.”––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2026; c. 64, Q75-76.]

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6. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   That information is concerning. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend that information sharing is important when dealing with evolving threats.

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7. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, which is more for the Minister and the Government Whip’s benefit than mine. Properly established ISACs will not only increase real-time awareness of cyber-risks and mitigations, but could also alleviate some of the burden on regulators in terms of sector-specific intelligence analysis. Industry feedback and experience from the adoption of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 indicate that sectoral regulators are unlikely to have the capacity to assist with intelligence sharing in relation to real-time cyber-risks. We know from the sectoral regulators’ oral evidence that building sufficient capacity for effective regulatory oversight is a challenge. Where we have models for sector-led and market-led good practice in hardening cyber-resilience, we should look at how it can be rolled out further. Seeing more of these organisations emerge could even lead to broader adoption beyond NIS-regulated areas to other industries. ISACs have the potential to become integral nodes in improving whole-of-society cyber-resilience, and it is an approach called for by many cyber industry stakeholders. I therefore commend new clause 4.

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8. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   In response to the Minister’s comments, clause 40 is about a review; it does not provide any direction, other than for the Secretary of State to do their job in reviewing this area. I will press new clause 4 to a vote. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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9. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

   Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

   I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The National Audit Office’s 2025 report on cyber-resilience highlighted that Government Departments and agencies are among the weakest links in the UK’s cyber-security ecosystem and lack a credible plan to become cyber-resilient in the short to medium term. The Government play a key role in the management of certain critical national industries, but the continuing cyber-security vulnerabilities in the IT systems used to operate CNI expose the UK to the threat of serious attacks that could undermine national security and the economy. That is not to mention the risk to enormous amounts of highly sensitive data held on Government systems. Dr Sanjana Mehta of ISC2 said in her oral evidence that the Department for Work and Pensions administered £288 billion of benefits over the past year, with more than 23 million people claiming benefits of some kind. That activity involves processing vast amounts of personal, medical and financial data, which presents rich pickings for malicious actors. The feedback from industry stakeholders, many of whom are being asked by the Government to take on onerous security and reporting obligations under this Bill, echoes those concerns regarding Government cyber-immaturity. There is a strong sentiment that the Government should be leading by example, as Chris Anley of the NCC Group commented in the Committee’s oral evidence sessions. In view of the growing risk posed to UK cyber-security by hostile state actors, by their affiliates and by criminal gangs, improving Government cyber-security is urgent. It is clear from the NAO’s findings and other recent reports that Government Departments have lacked the clear goals and necessary accountability to incentivise tackling this significant challenge. In his letter of 19 February to members of the Committee, the Minister said: “Government will be held to equivalent cyber security requirements that we expect of the essential and digital services in scope of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill.” But as matters stand, there are no effective legal mechanisms for accountability to Parliament on increasing Government cyber-resilience to the standards necessary to meet the intensifying threats facing our Government Departments and agencies. New clause 5 would compel the Secretary of State to make yearly reports to Parliament setting out the Government’s progress towards meeting the recommendations of the National Audit Office’s 2025 report on Government cyber-resilience and towards meeting the standards they set themselves in their recent cyber action plan. Where necessary, the Secretary of State would have to account for failures to meet deadlines for implementation and issue a new plan to achieve compliance. In moving this new clause, I am aware of the challenges that successive Governments have faced in driving up cyber-resilience standards. There are serious practical and budgetary obstacles that can impede progress, such as the vast amount of legacy IT equipment that remains in use, which is inherently more vulnerable to attack. Moreover, there is the ongoing problem of recruiting highly skilled cyber-security professionals to work in these roles, given the competition in the recruitment market and constraints on public sector salaries. Illustrative of that challenge is the worrying statistic, cited by Chris Anley of the NCC Group, that “almost a third of cyber-security posts in Government are presently unfilled”.––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2026; c. 24, Q29.] None the less, the Government have now put in place a plan that they consider achievable, and they should be held to account for it. The new clause creates a mechanism for that much-needed accountability.

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10. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    My hon. Friend is absolutely right.

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11. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    I agree about the importance of putting things on the record. Since the hon. Member obviously has not been listening to my speech, he can check it out on the record. I acknowledged the challenges in this area—[Interruption.] Does the Government Whip want to intervene, or was she just chuntering? I will continue. Given that the Bill puts quite a burden on the private sector, as we discussed over several sittings before the parliamentary recess, I think it is important that the Government recognise, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it would be pretty shameless not to vote for accountability for themselves while putting it on other people. Let us see how the vote goes. I commend new clause 5 to the Committee.

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12. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    This new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, would require the Secretary of State to consult and report within one year on whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have sufficient resources and capabilities to meet their statutory obligations. Historical levels of regulatory oversight and enforcement in relation to the NIS regulations 2018 have fallen short of what is necessary to achieve meaningful cyber-resilience across regulated sectors. The second post-implementation review of the NIS regs 2018, conducted in 2022, found that incident reporting on the part of regulated entities was very low, with only 13, 12 and 22 NIS incidents reported in 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively. A review conducted by the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists identified a near total absence of formal financial sanctions under the NIS regulations, with zero confirmed major penalties from 2021 to 2024. The model has not been conducive to effective discharge of regulatory responsibilities, with knock-on effects for cyber-resilience and regulated industries, yet regulators will be expected to oversee a far larger pool of regulated bodies and process a far larger number of incident reports under the Bill’s provisions. It is therefore right for us to scrutinise carefully whether regulators are in a position to meet these obligations. In the evidence sessions, many of my questions to witnesses, including those from Ofgem, Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s Office, focused on their preparations to meet the demands of their expanded roles. It was clear from feedback that although regulators understand what they need to do to prepare, the practical challenges associated with securing sufficient resource are far from resolved. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could clarify his plans to review regulators’ progress and what the key milestones will be to ensure that regulators can discharge their new duties alongside their existing ones when these provisions come into effect.

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13. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    New clause 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, addresses concerns regarding the capacity of SMEs to comply with their regulatory obligations, should they be brought within the scope of the Bill. That matter has been discussed on several occasions by the Committee. That is only right given that, according to figures provided by NCC Group, SMEs make up over 99% of businesses in the UK but too often lack the skills and budgets to implement proportionate cyber-protections, leaving them particularly exposed. SME cyber assistance schemes akin to the one proposed by the new clause have been rolled out in Scotland on a limited basis and in Australia, where the Government are investing 8 million Australian dollars over three years to provide free person-to-person support for small businesses during and after a cyber-attack. Those schemes have enjoyed some success in hardening cyber-resilience among SMEs that have been able to access them. That can only be welcomed. There is a case for looking more closely at whether regulation is the appropriate first step to address the cyber-resilience of the smallest organisations that might be brought within the scope of regulation, as legal compliance efforts could detract from already pressured operational defence budgets. In giving evidence to the Committee, Jill Broom of techUK called for strategies “such as financial incentives, or…tax credits”––[Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee, 3 February 2026; c. 18, Q20.] to help SMEs improve their cyber-resilience, and techUK has suggested that funding or relief could be applied on a priority basis, with those working within the critical national infrastructure supply chain looked at first. In the light of those considerations, what analysis has the Minister’s Department conducted of the likely return on investment, in terms of sustainability and growth among smaller companies, of a cyber support service for UK SMEs?

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14. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    New clause 16 would require active board oversight of security and resilience measures and accountability for board members where they fail in those oversight duties, whereas new clause 17 would require regulated entities to carry out proportionate, periodic testing of the security and resilience of their network and information systems, and provide the results to regulatory bodies upon request. On board accountability, as we have already discussed in this Committee, the existing regulatory model under NIS regulations has not been sufficiently effective in driving up cyber-resilience standards to meet emerging threats. Board engagement is a key part of that, but the stat I quoted previously in this Committee indicates that engagement is going in the wrong direction. What assessment has the Minister made of the potential advantages and disadvantages of direct accountability in the adoption of effective cyber-resilience measures, based on a roll-out of the NIS2 regulations? Proportionate testing of systems may be a useful tool in detecting and managing cyber-security risk. What consideration has the Minister’s Department given to how that topic should be approached in the Secretary of State’s code of practice?

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15. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    I will speak to new clause 19, tabled in my name on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition. The new clause would compel the Secretary of State, within 12 months of Royal Assent, to review the need for a statutory defence, encompassing legitimate cyber-research activities, to criminal offences under clause 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which is about unauthorised access to computer programs. The campaign for reform in this area, CyberUp, has argued that, in its current form, the CMA inadvertently criminalises critical activity such as vulnerability research and threat intelligence, both of which are essential for defending the nation’s digital systems. The new clause would also require the Secretary of State’s review to evaluate whether the creation of such a defence would enable regulated bodies to improve the resilience of their network and information systems via enhanced vulnerability testing and research. New clause 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, relates to the same important topic and would require the Secretary of State to review, and report to Parliament within 12 months of the Bill’s entering into law, whether amending the Computer Misuse Act could improve the resilience of network and information systems. Hon. Members will recall the insightful oral evidence of Professor John Child of the University of Birmingham. Professor Child made a clear and compelling case for the need to amend the Computer Misuse Act to provide statutory defences for legitimate cyber-research—sometimes called ethical hacking activities. Likewise, campaign groups, industry specialists and parliamentarians have all argued that the Computer Misuse Act, which was written before the modern internet, is no longer fit for purpose. At present, the Act fails to distinguish between malicious attackers and cyber professionals acting in the public interest, inadvertently criminalising a large proportion of research that UK cyber-security professionals can carry out to protect UK critical infrastructure and the UK’s technological ecosystem. This means that cyber-security professionals working to defend UK organisations from real-world threats risk prosecution. That has created a chilling effect—talent is being lost, investment is stifled and security gaps are going unidentified. If we are to have true UK cyber-resilience—not just among regulated sectors, but across businesses of all types and throughout society—we need a multifaceted approach. Industry and private sector-led initiatives will play a strong role in that. Professor Child made clear that countries that have implemented more favourable regimes, such as the US and Israel, are benefiting from increased cyber-resilience as a result of cyber-research activity. The Government have acknowledged that reform of the CMA is a pressing issue. Indeed, the Home Office has been reviewing that question for some time. Further, the Minister for Security, the hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), highlighted the urgent need for changes to the law in this area in a recent speech, stating that Government have “heard the criticisms about the Computer Misuse Act, and how it can leave many cyber security experts feeling constrained in the activity that they can undertake.” He went on to say: “These researchers play an important role in increasing the resilience of UK systems, and securing them from…vulnerabilities. We shouldn’t be shutting these people out, we should be welcoming them and their work.” Yet the Home Office has brought forward no specific proposals for reform. Parliament is unlikely to legislate again in the cyber-security domain for some considerable time; we cannot afford to kick the can down the road on this vital issue any longer if we are to have a credible plan for whole-of-society cyber-resilience.

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16. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    I am a bit unclear about the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The point I was making was that there is legitimate concern that people doing research into this area and doing threat assessments risk prosecution, so, across the whole of our society, that work is not being done. We have heard quite a lot of evidence from cyber campaigns about the benefits that changes to this law would make to the system, which is why we tabled the new clause. I commend new clause 19 to the Committee. I hope the Minister agrees that now is the time to address the issue. I suspect that this will be my last, or penultimate, time speaking to the Committee, so I would like to finish by thanking Members on both sides of the Committee for a fun and, at times, robust debate over the past month. I thank the Chairs, the Clerks and all the teams working on the Bill—and Sophie Thorley from my office, who has done incredible research on the Bill.

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17. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    We are a responsible Opposition and we are pleased to hear about the work that the Minister and his Department have been doing and about the shared purpose in getting this done and getting it right. Would he give us a bit more detail of the timescales and plans for public consultation? I understand that he has been doing some personal consultation in private, but will there be a public consultation? Given that the reform crosses two Departments, which Department will be taking it forward? What I am really looking for from him is a confirmation at the Dispatch Box that he is personally committed to getting this piece of work over the line during this parliamentary term.

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18. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. This is a procedural question. Given that the long title of the Bill is not in the motion, does that mean that the Bill can effectively cover any subject or theme if the Order Paper is seized on that day?

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19. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Dr Ben Spencer

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Thank you for that clarification, but my understanding is that that is the short title, not the long title. Is it the case that the long title can be used to tag in any related subjects to expand the scope from the narrow one here?

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20. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    What is clear is that there is a motion on the Order Paper on which Members will presumably be asked to divide in due course. That does not give any detail of the proposed Bill, but the motion on the Order Paper is orderly and it will be up to Members to decide how they wish to vote on that.

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21. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    I thank the hon. Member for his point of order. The motion on the Order Paper is perfectly orderly, so Members will be invited to vote on that, not on the substance of any Bill that might come on 9 March. I think it is important that the House is clear on that.

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22. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    The motion is to give consideration to a Bill on the specific matter which has been outlined clearly on the Order Paper: “Protections for children from online harms”. I reassure the hon. Lady that any contribution she chooses to make on that matter would be in order.

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23. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point of order, which I anticipated might come at some point. If he checks the Order Paper, he will see that paragraph (1)(d) says very specifically that it has to be a Bill on online services age restrictions that is brought forward on 9 March.

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24. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    I thank the hon. Gentleman for his further point of order. Clarification on that point had best be sought from the Public Bill Office. It is my understanding that any Bill brought forward will have to cover online services age restriction, but I appreciate the distinction that he makes between the long and the short titles.

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25. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    I thank the hon. Member for his very long point of order—[Interruption.] Yes, he has made the point that he is trying to be helpful. To clarify, first, it is the House’s time not Government time, but the powers given as set out in the motion are as he has outlined them. May I further highlight that it is not without precedent to hold a debate on a motion taking over the Order Paper on a Bill, without the Bill having been published? It last occurred on 6 February 2024 when an Opposition motion was tabled to take over the Order Paper to discuss ministerial severance reform, and that Bill had not yet been published. So it is not without precedent, but the hon. Member is correct in his understanding of what the motion would do were it to be passed by the House. I call the Minister.

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26. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    Order. The hon. Lady has repeatedly made very long interventions. It was always open to her to attend the opening of the debate and to speak in it.

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27. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    I call the shadow Secretary of State.

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28. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    Order. Does “she” think.

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29. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    She.

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30. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    Order. Could I just be helpful? A lot of help has been needed this afternoon. The Minister has not asked to intervene, and the hon. Lady cannot force him to intervene on her.

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31. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Caroline Nokes

    Online Harm: Child Protection

    As Members will know, the debate has to conclude by 7 o’clock. There are slightly more than 10 people bobbing. I plan to move to the wind-ups at 6.40 pm, which should leave everyone plenty of time.

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32. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Bradley Thomas

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    On the point about information sharing with a view to bolstering resilience, Marks and Spencer reported to me that it was surprised to have received more information from the FBI on the origin and impact of the cyber-attack that it suffered than it received from UK authorities. That should adequately demonstrate why sufficient data sharing is required to underpin our resilience and bolster our strength.

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33. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Bradley Thomas

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    Given that the threshold for a significant impact event will likely be much lower for an SME than for a larger corporation, and while acknowledging and agreeing that SMEs are the backbone of the economy and make up the vast majority of companies that employ people in this country, how does the hon. Gentleman propose to strike the relevant balance between ensuring that SMEs are supported, and at the same time that they are not inundated and overwhelmed as a result of that significant impact threshold likely being much lower for SMEs?

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34. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Bradley Thomas

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    While I agree with the hon. Member, and acknowledge witnesses’ evidence suggesting that cyber-security should be a board-level responsibility, does he share my concern that, given the complexity and technical nature of cyber-security, there is perhaps a risk of, for want of a better phrase, window dressing? It may be that non-competent people without the relevant technical expertise could be reliant on reports issued by other technical staff who do not sit at board level. We have to strike the right balance. Does the hon. Member share that concern, and how does he propose we address that?

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35. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Bradley Thomas

    Topical Questions

    Several weeks ago, I received a jaw-dropping email from a local Bromsgrove GP, who told me that a 10-month-old child nearly died after ambulance delays. Worse, the same day, another patient—a 66-year-old driving instructor—suffered a cardiac arrest during a driving lesson and died while being driven to the hospital by his wife. My constituents demand a better service and better response times. What are the Government going to do about this, and will the Secretary of State meet me and the concerned GP who wrote to me to address this issue?

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36. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    New clause 5 simply asks the Government to commit to reporting back on meeting the milestones they have set themselves for increasing cyber-security standards. Is the Minister confident in the Government’s ability to deliver on their cyber strategy, or is the document not worth the paper it is written on?

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37. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

    Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting)

    The continued use of legacy IT equipment is a particular vulnerability across the Government estate. That will take some time to address entirely, but is there a strategy in place to prioritise the upgrading of this legacy equipment, given that it is one of the greatest areas of exposure?

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38. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

    Care in the Community

    15. What steps he is taking to increase access to care in the community.

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39. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Alison Griffiths

    Care in the Community

    I am delighted to hear the Minister’s response. Zachary Merton hospital in Rustington was closed temporarily, but that closure became permanent and the site is being progressed for disposal. More than half of residents in Rustington are elderly, and rely on intermediate and step-down care. They have not been consulted on the permanent closure, despite assurances from Sussex community NHS foundation trust and NHS Sussex integrated care board. Will the Minister confirm whether he considers that a substantial variation in NHS services? Will he consider exercising his call-in powers before the site is irreversibly sold?

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40. 24 Feb 2026·Parliament·Alicia Kearns

    Draft Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (Amendment) Order 2026

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks. Fees for migration and border products and services play a vital role in our country’s ability to run a sustainable immigration system. Just like any other public service, it is right that those who use and benefit from the UK’s immigration system should contribute to it. The proposed changes set out in the draft order will not only reduce the financial burden on the taxpayer but generate a significant amount of much needed income for the Home Office. However, we must be mindful of how any increase to the electronic travel authorisation fee could impact the number of visitors to the UK, so I would be grateful if the Minister could outline what assessments have been made of the impact of increasing the ETA, and explain why £20 is considered the appropriate level of increase. The real focus needs to be on how the funding will be used, because it will generate significant fees. The Government have repeatedly stated that immigration must be significantly reduced, yet in 2025 more than 41,000 people crossed the English channel in small boats and entered the country illegally. As of June 2025, we have 32,000 illegal immigrants residing in hotels. How will the funding be used? Will it primarily fund the cost of dealing with illegal migration, or is some other enhancement planned in the immigration system? I acknowledge that responsibility for this matter lies with a number of members of the Home Office team, but given these concerning figures, it is important to know where the funding will go. Does the Minister anticipate that the cost to the Home Office will remain as high? Does he anticipate that the maxima fee will have to be increased again in the near future? For how long can he commit to that increase? Does he guarantee that the additional income will deliver a more efficient border system, or will the increased income simply subsidise a system that is still not working?

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