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1. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   Something that the Minister said reflects back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said on Tuesday. Not putting private operators, open access and freight on this mandatory list is making us nervous that it is not the Government’s intention to keep involving them in the future. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about them being consulted at the moment, but this amendment is important because it would keep them as a fixture of the future of GBR, rather than as an optional extra, where they can be useful, but if they are not considered to add any value to the railway, they will not be there any more. As we have already alluded to, industry certainty and assuredness needs to be there for private investment to come forward, some of which I know the Government will welcome. It is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: if we do not have them in the framework at the beginning, they are not being encouraged to stay involved and have that confidence. Does the Minister agree?

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2. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   I think I have said everything I want to say, but we would like to press amendment 79 and then amendment 217 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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3. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 78, in clause 60, page 34, line 14, at end insert— “(4A) When preparing, revising or replacing the document or documents Great British Railways must consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services and services for the carriage of goods by railway.” This amendment would ensure that GBR had to consult and have regard to the views of open access and freight providers when preparing, revising or replacing the capacity plan.

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4. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   The Government Whip referred to this as the “meaty” group, so we may be here for a while. That is fine; we have plenty of time. Clause 60 requires GBR to set out how, in its view, best use can be made of its infrastructure over a specified period. Subsection (3) allows GBR to replace or amend the document or documents that set that out at any time, and subsection (5) requires any plan or revisions to be published. Subsection (4) requires GBR to have “regard to the need to accommodate” its own passenger services, other passenger services—including open access services—freight services, and the maintenance and improvement of its infrastructure when preparing the document or documents. Subsection (6) gives a right to appeal to the ORR, but only on limited judicial review grounds, in line with clause 68; there is no right of appeal on the decision of GBR. The Bill contains a duty to consult the ORR and Scottish and Welsh Ministers, but no express duty to consult other rail operators, despite their activities being two of the four considerations for GBR under subsection (4). The Opposition believe that that is an extraordinary omission; only the ability for GBR to consult “such other persons as it considers appropriate” is included, in clause 66(1). Clause 60 gives GBR broad freedom to set and change the capacity plan at will, with no explicit duty to consult operators or freight interests when doing so. Subsection (3) allows revisions “at any time”, and the “have regard” duty in subsection (4) is weak and does not stop GBR prioritising its own services. In fact, the capacity duty in clause 63 actively requires GBR to prioritise its own services, irrespective of passengers’ interest. Clause 60 lacks the transparency and safeguards signalled in the consultation. Our amendment 78 would ensure that GBR must consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services and freight when preparing, revising or replacing the capacity plan. That is the very least GBR should be required to do. Clause 63 provides for GBR to retain sufficient network capacity for the passenger services it is required to operate, and for engineering access. When granting access under the clause—that is, when issuing any capacity commitment or access contract—and when preparing, issuing and revising the timetable under clause 62, GBR must ensure that it retains sufficient capacity on its infrastructure to operate its own passenger services and to carry out works to maintain and improve its structures. It is required to retain sufficient capacity for services it already operates and for those it expects to operate in the future—for example, as set out in a business plan or public service obligations in transport specification not yet awarded. GBR will continue to follow general and wider legislative duties when taking access decisions, and the explanatory notes to the Bill assure us that “it must take decisions fairly on the genuine best use of the network.” The infrastructure capacity plan at clause 60 will indicate the capacity available to different market sectors—that is, how much capacity is best used for freight, for open access and for GBR passenger services. Clause 63 ensures that where GBR has decided what constitutes best use, and where the Secretary of State or Scottish or Welsh Ministers have funded it to operate passenger services, consistent with their allocated section of the infrastructure capacity plan issued under clause 60, GBR must ensure that sufficient network capacity is available for those services to operate, while ensuring sufficient capacity for engineering works. The explanatory notes assert: “The duty does not enable GBR to secure more capacity for its own services than it thinks would equate to best use.” However, clause 63 is not designed to achieve a level playing field; it does not even try to. The clause is not interested in maximising passenger choice or services, or in allowing competition to maximise use of capacity for the benefit of passengers. The express obligation in the clause is that GBR prioritise its own planned growth, because it must ensure capacity for all current and expected GBR services. That obligation sits ahead of any consideration of open access bids, or whether the service provided by open access would be better for passengers and therefore in the public interest.

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5. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   I agree with my hon. Friend. I alluded to that issue earlier in my comments, and my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham raised it on Tuesday. That is why we are concerned on behalf of not only open access, but first of all passengers, who are not going to get the best possible service because of the inbuilt assertion that open access can ultimately be discarded if the Government do not see it as palatable. The written evidence from Lumo and Hull Trains also says: “As the Government and GBR seek to deliver a thriving, growing railway, it is vital that the Railways Bill recognises and protects the contribution that Open Access makes to these shared goals. This will ensure that it will continue to deliver these benefits to the millions of passengers who rely on them, now and into the future…As the Government looks to modernise and centralise rail through GBR, it will be important that competition remains an embedded principle within this framework. Open Access provides a proven model of innovation and efficiency, which can help GBR achieve its statutory objectives. Recognising the role of competition as a driver of value and growth will ensure that passengers, the network, and the public purse all continue to benefit.” FirstGroup’s written submission to the Transport Committee tells a similar story, saying that open access operators “receive no government funding, take on full risk, and generate their own revenue— giving them very strong incentives to deliver a service which is endorsed by passengers…The way in which GBR structures its timetable will be critical. It should be obliged to carry out its functions fairly and without discrimination, so that if an open access train service can provide passenger benefit monopoly interests do not prevent that train from running.” FirstGroup also says: “Clause 63 must ensure that un-funded services which GBR ‘expects’ are not given train paths in advance of funded open access services, which will provide passenger benefit sooner.” The Rail Freight Group is also concerned by the clause, telling the Transport Committee: “We understand that the basis of the new approach will be via Infrastructure Capacity Plans (Clause 61) and, for GBR’s own trains, via the Capacity Duty (Clause 63). It is very difficult from these clauses to have a clear understanding of how the new process will operate, and how rail freight and rail freight growth will be facilitated, including in contractual rights for operators…For example, we understand from our discussions that there could be numerous infrastructure capacity plans across the network which a new freight service will have to navigate. We also understand that when an infrastructure capacity plan is reviewed, existing freight services could be stopped from operating if other services are considered to be higher value, as contractual commitments are expected to expire in line with the capacity plans.” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL told the Transport Committee: “I think we would look for clarification, regarding clause 63, that GBR cannot reserve capacity for hypothetical future GBR long-distance services at the expense of privately funded open-access proposals or existing services that provide immediate benefits—and extra infrastructure income, of course, because open-access operators are paying track access fees too. For that, I think you need to prioritise funded open access over speculative GBR services ‘someday in the future.’” It is very clear what the sector thinks: clause 63 needs substantial clarification. That is why, along with the Lib Dems, we have tabled a number of amendments, which I will briefly speak to. Amendment 81 would make it clear that capacity allocation should be based on a level playing field, without priority given to any particular operator. That would allow the best outcome for the passenger, and allows the public interest bit in clause 18 to take the lead. Proceeding on any other basis will leave us with a monopoly that is allowed to abuse its position. Amendment 80 puts forward an alternative approach, based on key performance indicators, but it is clear the Government are not interested, so in the interests of time I will not pursue that further today—that will be one fewer Division, the Government will be pleased to hear. Amendment 253, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, requires GBR “to retain sufficient capacity” to ensure that the rail freight target is met. To progress, there would need to be a mechanism to reach a decision if that conflicted with any planned GBR service. Amendment 211 would require GBR “to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.” For an appeals process to have any meaning at all, that would need to be a pre-requisite. Amendment 229 would ensure that “capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions” and would require “GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.” The amendment would give a better balance to capacity considerations than the current wholly one-sided drafting. That is incredibly important because, ultimately, the Government are seeking to reduce climate change and achieve net zero. Freight plays a huge part in that, and if we do not have strategic freight corridors to ensure that we can make use of the freight system, we will fall short of what could be achieved. Finally, new clause 56, in the name of the Libs Dems, “requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.” That is an interesting concept and could have significant benefits for passengers and taxpayers by driving competitive pricing for certain routes, while avoiding the abstraction arguments in relation to competing open access applications.

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6. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   I have listened to the Minister’s comments. As I said earlier, we will not press amendment 80 to a vote, but I wish to press the others to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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7. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   Clause 61(1) sets out that GBR must issue one or more timetables covering all train movements on GBR infrastructure for the period that GBR intends the timetable to cover, to be known as a working timetable. Subsection (3) allows GBR to alter a working timetable, for example to add new train movements, change a planned train movement, allow for maintenance works, deal with disruption, or change the duration of the timetable. Subsection (4) allows GBR to alter a planned train movement of an operator other than GBR only with that operator’s permission. Subsection (5) provides a right of appeal to the ORR for an operator who applied for a train movement to be included in the working timetable by GBR but was refused, or where the inclusion was made subject to conditions. The duty to consult and appeals provisions in clauses 66 to 68 also apply to the working timetable, but not to alterations of the working timetable.

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8. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   Amendment is 211 is mine, and we would like to press it to a vote. [Interruption.] Oh, no, that is also a Liberal Democrat amendment—that says “Opp” as well.

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9. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

   Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 242, in clause 64, page 36, line 6, leave out subsection (1)(b). This amendment would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains which are planned to use GBR infrastructure but do not operate, or do not operate in full.

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10. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    Clause 64(1) requires GBR to develop a charging scheme setting out the charges to be paid for access to and use of GBR’s infrastructure, and the extent to which charges may by payable in relation to trains that do not operate, or do not operate in full, despite their use being planned in. The base assumption is that charges will be set at the costs directly incurred—for example, the wear and tear caused by the service—but subsection (3) provides for a higher charge to be demanded in particular circumstances, “provided that it does not exceed the amount that Great British Railways considers is the amount that an efficient operator would be able to pay in those circumstances.” Subsection (4) confirms that GBR can also set a lower charge where it considers that appropriate, for various purposes, including but not limited to encouraging the use of spare capacity and promoting new services. The Subsidy Control Act 2022 would apply to any decision to lower charges under that provision. GBR will not charge itself for use of infrastructure, despite being an operator as well as the infrastructure manager, but must include in its charging scheme sufficient information on the charges for its passenger services’ access to and use of its infrastructure to explain how charges in the scheme have been calculated. GBR will be able to make changes to its charging framework at any time. The Opposition believe that the clause is simply terrible. It confirms the worst fears of other rail users, and gives no certainty for business planning. Subsection (3) allows for a higher amount than the actual cost to GBR to be charged in particular circumstances, but those are not defined or explained. If GBR thinks that the operator has the money to pay it, then it is expected to pay—no rationale for the increase is given. The clause allows GBR to set charges above direct cost based on what it considers an efficient operator could afford, which remains a subjective judgment made by a body that is itself a major operator. Even with the ORR able to substitute its own decision on appeal, the initial charging decision sits entirely with GBR. That creates scope for charges that disadvantage open access operators, unless and until challenged, which is not the level of neutrality expected for an industry-wide charging regime. Subsection (4)(a) is an oxymoron. Charges could not be assessed unless there were sufficient capacity to run a service, which by definition would mean that there is assessed to be spare capacity. Subsection (5) does not provide open access operators sufficient information to properly assess the fairness of the proposed charges. Subsection (6) allows for a change at any time, and without notice. It is clearly impossible to run a service without confidence of track-access charges. A devolved, concession, freight, open access or heritage and tour operator could, at the stroke of GBR’s pen, suddenly find its cost base increase significantly. That is not conducive to long-term business planning, and must harm private sector investment in rail services.

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11. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

    I can appreciate where the hon. Member is coming from. It sounds like a good idea; however, it could still be in the legislation directly, and the illustration he gave still leaves a huge number of questions about what happens if there is more than one user of that bit of infrastructure. Why should the private operator be the one that has to pay for the infrastructure? If anything, there is an issue, which I may come to, about the impact on fares, because ultimately, by the sound of it, GBR is going to have far fewer costs than other operators. In principle, I can see why the hon. Member made that point, but I think it is not clear enough at this stage. Clause 64(8) allows a right of appeal, but only under judicial review-type provisions, which is no right at all. Any of us who has worked with anyone who ever wanted to get a judicial review knows that it is incredibly difficult. It is also incredibly expensive, so it is certainly not a level playing field. The industry has rightly been outspoken on clause 64. In evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Freight Group stated: “The Bill sets out the future framework for access charges for freight. In headline terms the charges will be calculated in a similar way to today (costs directly incurred by running the train) which we welcome. However, the Bill provides for extra costs to be levied on freight services a. Through a mandatory reservation charge for capacity which is booked and then not used (for example, if a customer cancels a train due to poor weather) (Clause 64) b. Through a general clause 64(3) which allows GBR discretion to charge more if ‘an efficient operator can pay it’. This is a very broad test and far wider than the test in current law ‘if the market can bear it’. This raises the prospect of far higher, and potentially uncapped charges being levied. Increasing the costs of rail freight will simply make using rail too expensive for customers when compared to road freight, and will reverse modal shift and undermine growth. It is essential that the powers to charge more than the standard charge are strictly limited for GBR.” The key point there is about reversing modal shift. On the one hand, the Government want to promote modal shift. Indeed, there is a scheme coming in— I mentioned it on Tuesday, but now I cannot remember its name—that will look at different types of transport, and one of the plans is to ensure modal shift. Anything that undermines that is potentially contradictory and a backwards step. The Transport Committee also heard evidence from Nick Brooks of ALLRAIL, who said: “I was just going to say something about privately owned investors and privately owned operators, specifically privately owned investors that want to invest in our sector rather than in other sectors—aviation, the road sector, or even completely different sectors. There is a certain risk. There is a commercial risk, of course, and ultimately they are looking for lower fixed costs and higher variable costs. The worry with GBR is this: who determines what the market can bear? Is GBR an independent entity, or not? I think the Bill says it should be GBR itself that determines that, if I am not mistaken. It is a little bit like another conflict, or potential problem, with track access fees. Who decides the size of the track access fees? If you are a privately owned operator, is it your competitor—GBR—that decides your track access fees? That is a potential cause of worry.” Lumo and Hull Trains also had similar concerns, which they raised in their written evidence to the Transport Committee: “A transparent and proportionate charging regime will be critical to ensuring the financial sustainability and competitiveness of the railway. If GBR were able to set and revise access charges without independent oversight (as suggested by clause 64), it could create uncertainty and deter private investment. Independent regulation of charging is therefore vital to maintain investor confidence and ensure fairness between different operators. Open Access operators already make a substantial contribution to the upkeep of the network while receiving no public subsidy. The charges paid by Open Access are calculated independently by ORR to encourage investment, sweat the railway asset and deliver connectivity and the associated economic benefits. It also acts as an additional income stream to Network Rail. These arrangements demonstrate the sector’s willingness to invest and its commitment to supporting the network’s long-term health. Ensuring that access charges remain proportionate and independently regulated will help reinforce the Government’s objective of crowding in private capital to support network growth. Confidence in a fair charging regime is essential for the continued profitability of private operators. Reinforcing a transparent and proportionate charging system will also help deliver the Government’s wider fiscal priorities by attracting and retaining private investment. By giving investors certainty that network costs are predictable and fairly allocated, the Bill can ensure that private operators continue to play a central role in funding innovation and expanding passenger capacity across the UK.” Lumo and Hull Trains recommend: “The updated charging regime must be developed in consultation with private stakeholders, appropriate for the markets being served and regulated with independent oversight from the ORR. This will sustain confidence in a fair and transparent access regime and ensure that private investment continues to play a central role in delivering a successful railway.” Amendment 83 would prevent GBR from charging any sum it liked without notice. Instead, it would be required to follow the standard pricing structure set out in clause 64(2), based on actual costs incurred as a result of the activity. Does the Minister agree that any serious business case for private investment in our railways will need to have the certainty of fixed costs? How does the clause achieve anything other than the opposite? Amendment 82 would remove the right of GBR to charge its competitors costs, basically at any time and without notice, on grounds that they have access to more money that they could pay. Instead, it would impose a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum of 12 months’ notice of changes to the charging scheme, so at least they can react to the change and seek any appeal before the event rather than after it. Speaking to amendments 82 and 83, the Rail Forum has said: “We strongly support these amendment, access and other charges should be reasonable and operators should have sufficient warning of changes to be able to plan accordingly.” The amendments are not just a nice idea being suggested from the Opposition Benches, but something that the industry would like to see as well. Amendment 84 would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways can take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months. Once again, that would put accountability and transparency back into the system—something the Government seem hellbent on ignoring. The second impact would be to allow affected organisations time to prepare an appeal. Judicial review requires a very short application process of just 12 weeks. This amended clause would help aggrieved parties to prepare a complex challenge in time for a JR timetable. Amendment 84 is more a probing one, so it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. The reflection on the judicial review process is particularly important, because we do not want to crowd people out of the opportunity to appeal. Anything he can offer in response would be appreciated. Amendment 230 would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions—a case of natural justice. Does the Minister accept that the existing wording of the clause would allow GBR to profit from a cancellation of services caused by GBR’s failure to provide infra-structure? If so, will he explain how that could be a fair result? Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains that are planned to use GBR infrastructure, but do not operate or do not operate in full. Again, that is in effect a probing amendment, or a making-a-point amendment, as it were. With that, I shall sit down.

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12. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. There is not much to say, except that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage raised a question about our amendments and what he called phantom paths. I think he may have been referring to ghost trains, as opposed to phantom trains—if you google “phantom trains”, all sorts of weird films come up, and they are far too scary for me to watch. He is not here to disagree with me, but I think he was alluding to the issue of trains running entirely empty through stations where people would have quite liked to get on them. The point I think we are making with our amendments is more about where issues that it is within Great British Railways’ responsibility to fix mean that services cannot run, and about not believing that the operators, which have no responsibility for the infrastructure, should still be expected to pay a fee if they are not able to run their services. I think we would have been alluding to that, rather than where they are running empty trains. There may well be empty trains as well, but I think we were talking specifically about where GBR had the responsibility—

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13. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I thank the Minister for that. Yes, absolutely; I believe our amendments are much more about the infrastructure that GBR has responsibility for and about operators not having to pay if they are un able to operate their services. A natural disaster is probably a bit too extreme, but if, for example, a train is running through to Dawlish and the line gets closed, I think it is fair to suggest that the operator should not have to pay the fees for that train. We will press some of these amendments to a vote for that reason, but I just wanted to clarify that point. Without further ado, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed: 230, in clause 64, page 36, line 7, at end insert “, except where the services cannot operate due to a failure of the GBR infrastructure or the need for GBR to take capacity for work on the network.”—(Rebecca Smith.) This amendment would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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14. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Amendment 254 is good in so far as it goes in relation to rail freight, but other rail operators also provide public benefit and should receive a similar level of protection. The Opposition are happy to support the amendment, but we do not think it goes nearly far enough. Amendment 255 would give the ORR the power to order GBR to revise a charging scheme if it found, on appeal, that GBR had not dealt fairly with the appellant. With the current constraint on appeals, the amendment would make no practical difference. The Government need to go much further by providing a genuine appeals process to assess appeals on their merits, with an independent body, not a direct competitor, taking the key charging decisions.

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15. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I beg to move amendment 85, in clause 65, page 37, line 15, leave out subsection (3)(b). This amendment would enable GBR to have to pay penalties or compensation.

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16. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 65 requires GBR to provide and publish a performance scheme that is designed to incentivise GBR, its subsidiaries or other train operators to minimise disruption or delay to other train services or the network. Train operators may be required to pay penalties if they cause disruption, may receive compensation where disruption is caused by a different operator’s operations and may receive bonuses to reward better than planned performance. So far, so good, you might say. However, it does not permit payments by GBR that relate to disruption outside its control.

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17. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Does the hon. Member not think our amendments could actually improve the system for GBR? We have talked, in this Committee and in the Select Committee sessions on the Bill, about the real gap in terms of the incentives for GBR to improve its services and improve itself. There is no reason why adding GBR as a body that would have to pay penalties and compensation would not introduce an incentive, in the same way we expect for operators, to ensure that the service provided on the taxpayers’ behalf and using taxpayers’ money is improved. At the end of the day, GBR is paying itself, but our amendments would at least give it an incentive to make sure that it does not need to pay compensation in the first place.

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18. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    To build on the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston made, clause 65(3)(b) says that compensation may not be paid by Great British Railways “in relation to any disruption that is outside its control.” It strikes me that that relates to what the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield said happens already: people have to decide what constitutes significant disruption, and what is inside its control. If I were an outside operator looking at this, I would be thinking, “Hang on a minute. Where’s the definition of what is inside GBR’s control?” There is a whole long list of options that I will not even begin to bore the Committee with for what could be said to be outside its control, but where is that conversation? It strikes me that it might be like trying to claim for a bag that was stolen on holiday on insurance—you have to literally prove that you were mugged to get reimbursed. I would be interested in a bit more information on how “outside its control” will be defined.

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19. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 66 sets out who GBR must consult before issuing, revising or replacing the access and use policy under clause 59. The ORR and the Scottish and Welsh Ministers must be consulted as well as other persons GBR considers appropriate. Subsection (2) requires GBR to consult the persons it considers appropriate before issuing the infrastructure capacity planning document under clause 60, including any revisions and replacements; before issuing a working timetable under clause 61; and before making, altering or replacing a charging scheme under clause 64 or a performance scheme under clause 65. Subsection (3) provides that a requirement in this clause for consultation may be satisfied by a consultation before or after the commencement of the clause. There is currently no express requirement to consult existing open access operators. Clause 67, on appeals against access, charging and performance decisions, provides that a person who is aggrieved may appeal to the ORR against a GBR decision as to their train operations’ access to and use of the infrastructure, or a decision under the charging scheme or performance scheme. That sounds okay, until we realise that it is on judicial review terms, so there is no actual right of appeal at all. Clause 68, on the appeals procedure, sets out that the ORR, when determining appeals under this chapter, must apply the principles that the High Court would apply on an application for a judicial review, or the principles that the Court of Session would apply in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for appeals in Scotland. Subsections (2) and (3) provide for the ORR to allow an appeal or dismiss it, and, if it allows an appeal, to use the following remedies. For appeals made against the GBR policies, plans, and schemes themselves—under clause 59(6), on access and use; clause 60(6), on infra-structure capacity; clause 64(8), on charging; or clause 65(7), on the performance scheme—the ORR can only require GBR to reconsider the decision. For appeals made against a specific decision under clause 61(5) or clause 62(7), on the working timetable, or under clause 67, on GBR’s policies, plans and schemes, the ORR can quash the decision that is appealed against. Then, however, all it can do is to send it back to GBR to reconsider, or it may substitute the decision with its own if quashing the decision is on the basis of an error of law and without the error there is only one decision that GBR could have reached. Clause 68(1) means that because appeals must be assessed using judicial review principles, operators can challenge GBR decisions only on procedural grounds and not on the substance or commercial merits. That means that GBR will be judge and jury in its decisions affecting its direct competition, which is obviously wildly unfair. Clause 68(3)(a) sets out that even where an appeal succeeds, the ORR can only remit the matter back to GBR for reconsideration, which means that GBR can often reach the same outcome again without revising its reasoning. That offers little to no real corrective power. Clause 68(4)(b) says that the ORR may substitute its own decision only where there is an error of law and where only one lawful outcome was possible. That is a very high bar and as a result this remedy will be rare. These concerns have been echoed by the industry. During one of the oral evidence sessions for the Transport Committee, Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group said: “There are a number of problems with that appeal function. First, it will be incredibly hard to ever get to it. We are told that the appeal will have to meet the standards of a judicial review—illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness—so there will be a very high bar to meet to even get there. On top of that, the law allows the Secretary of State by regulation to set out some steps you would have to take in advance of going to the ORR. We do not know what those are. There is also a fee, and we do not know what that is. Even getting to the ORR will be very much more difficult than it is today. If we do get up there, in most cases, the ORR will be able to ask GBR to have another look at its decision. It has another look, and it reaches the same view—so what? Only in a minority of cases can it quash a decision and only if there was an error of law…Passengers are going to get a very powerful watchdog when, conversely, we feel that in freight, we are having those rights of access watered down.” Steve Montgomery from FirstRail said: “Considering other large public sector organisations—like GBR is going to be—you have to ask, ‘Why would you not have an independent regulator of it?’ Why is rail going to be different from other large public sector organisations where there are regulators looking at them?” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said: “A strong independent rail regulator has two roles. The ORR, by the way, is part of the European group of independent rail regulators called IRG. Ideally, those roles are to protect passengers and other parts of the sector from monopolistic behaviour, and to ensure the best use of taxpayer money. Their role is also, in other countries, to ensure competition and non-discriminatory behaviour. We are worried that that might be watered down in this country and needs to be improved still.” That prompts some questions that I hope the Minister can answer. Why is GBR being set up in such contradiction to its European neighbours? Is there anything that we could have learned? Will the Government reconsider any element of GBR as a result? These concerns were also set out in the Rail Freight Group’s written evidence to the Transport Committee: “GBR will by nature be a very powerful monopoly of track and GBR trains, and the overarching changes in the Bill reduce significantly the independent oversight of ORR, leaving the Secretary of State holding GBR to account. By comparison, the ORR currently has a duty to promote the use of the rail network and thus has a track record”— ha, ha— “of creating growth by approving new access applications previously rejected by Network Rail. Although we welcome the provisions for freight outlined above, there is still a significant risk that GBR could act in a way which favours its own trains, restricting growth for freight. As such, we believe it is essential that non-GBR operators have an independent appeals function that is powerful, easy to use and able to take action effectively.” It continued: “In essence, the provisions in the Bill mean that freight operators and customers have a very limited right of independent appeal against GBR. It is also of note that GBR may replace the current Access Disputes Committee (also independent of Network Rail) who hear lower level timetabling disputes with their own internal process, albeit we do not yet have full details of this.” I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that. FirstGroup wrote in a similar vein, saying that it was concerned “about the ORR’s responsibility for track access decisions being transferred to GBR…The Bill removes the ORR’s powers to independently adjudicate on whether applications for access best meet the needs of all railway users. Under Clause 68 the ORR is an appeals body but with no ability to uphold appeals if they are discriminatory or anticompetitive. There need to be more checks and balances to maintain confidence in fair access, independent regulatory oversight and to protect the interests of passengers…As a broader point, independent regulation is vital to all large comparable bodies—consider for example the CQC’s role in healthcare or the Civil Aviation Authority in airlines and airports.” The pushback against this grossly unfair clause is overwhelming, and the Government can surely no longer turn a deaf ear. Amendment 88 would remove the requirement that appeals may be made only under judicial review principles. We think that it is an obvious improvement. At the Transport Committee on 7 January, the Department for Transport’s official, Lucy Ryan, stated that the requirement is deliberate: “The reasoning for the JR threshold is to be absolutely clear that GBR needs to remain the directing mind, able to take decisions about optimising the use of the network.” That is an insufficient safeguard against monopolistic behaviour by GBR. Large monopolies with structural conflicts of interest need effective decision-making oversight. It cannot be done by the Secretary of State, because this is operational, so it has to be the ORR. Amendment 89 would enable the ORR to determine appeals on the facts and the law. It builds on amendment 88, and we think it is the only way to create a fair and non-discriminatory process. Amendment 90 would allow the ORR, when agreeing an appeal, either to remit to GBR for reconsideration or to quash and/or substitute its own decision for all or part of the decision appealed against. An independent appellate body applying the rules to GBR and its decisions would not challenge the role of GBR, but make sure that it was applying its rules fairly and correctly. Amendment 91, which I believe the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage supports, would allow the ORR to substitute its own decision for that of GBR when allowing appeals, without there needing to have been an error of law, resulting in only one possible outcome. It would remove a ridiculously closely drafted requirement, and it is obviously fair. It is a test to see if the Government actually want a fair and level playing field. Amendment 92 would require the Secretary of State to consult open access operators before making regulations about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought, to make provision about the procedure and to set time limits and fees for the appeals brought under this chapter. Operators clearly have skin in the game, and should be consulted by right. Amendment 93 would require the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing its document on the practice and procedure for appeals under this chapter. The argument for that is very similar to the one behind amendment 92, which I just set out. Will the Minister stand up for the open access and freight sector, and support our amendments to create a fair appeals process?

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20. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I shall be brief. The amendments would strengthen the role of the ORR and reduce the role of the Secretary of State in considering appeals against GBR access decisions. Without further ado, I will say that we will support all three, should the Liberal Democrats press them to a vote.

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21. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to except GBR or a subsidiary of GBR from the sections outlining the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. That change would prevent the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. The clause removes GBR from the normal ORR supervised access regime, giving it a special exemption that no other operator has. Since GBR is both operator and infrastructure manager, we believe that this creates an uneven playing field and risks unfair treatment of competing operators. If the Government insist on the current drafting, they must come clean and admit that their intention is to treat competitors unfairly in comparison, and that they are not in favour of competition and reject private investment as a driver of innovation and improvement on the railway. Given the destruction of the current independently managed fair and level playing field, it is no surprise that the industry has major concerns. Eurostar’s written evidence to the Transport Committee explains: “The Railways Bill consolidates strategic and operational authority in Great British Railways. While centralising network management offers efficiency gains, it is essential that ORR’s independent regulatory function is preserved, especially for open access and international services. In future Government will have the overarching interest in the Infrastructure Concession (let to LSPH), the Maintainer Operator (Network Rail) and the largest operator on the route (SET). There needs to be an independent referee to balance these interests with those of open access operators. ORR provides impartial oversight of track access, station allocation, depot facilities, charging, and timetabling. Its independence provides transparent decision-making and safeguards competition, while giving investors confidence in the long-term stability of services. Decisions such as the allocation of depot access at Temple Mills demonstrate the importance of ORR in balancing competing demands for constrained resources. Without statutory protection, GBR could constrain competition and impede international service growth. In addition, it could reduce transparency in access allocation. Eurostar recommends that the Bill explicitly preserves the ORR’s independent role in regulating access, charges, and depot allocation for international services. This statutory protection is essential to provide fair treatment for operators and give certainty for the future of UK international rail services. In international rail terms, the ORR’s role is more important than ever before, given the recent ruling enabling a new entrant to the market to access Temple Mills depot. The regulator will need to perform a strong, independent and objective role in ruling on cost sharing, compatibility and rolling stock issues. The ORR can also play a role in track access charges – costs for accessing the London-to-Calais stretch of rail are nine times higher per kilometre than the cost of accessing equivalent infrastructure in Belgium, France or the Netherlands.” Written evidence to the Transport Committee from Lumo and Hull Trains outlines their concerns: “The ORR plays an essential role in maintaining a fair, transparent, and competitive rail network. Its independence supports confidence among passengers, freight operators, and private investors. Lumo and Hull Trains believe the Railways Bill should preserve this role to help GBR succeed. To maintain balance across the system, the ORR must retain meaningful regulatory powers to ensure decisions made by GBR on access and charging are fair, evidence-based, and consistent with the Government’s growth objectives. The current drafting of the Bill, however, limits the ORR’s capacity to intervene proactively, restricting its powers primarily to appeals after decisions have been made. Enhancing the ORR’s decision-making and enforcement capability would help ensure that GBR’s commercial and operational decisions remain aligned with the wider interests of passengers and the market. This approach would reinforce the Government’s ambition for a collaborative, competitive, and accountable rail system. A strong regulator also provides stability for investors, ensuring that GBR operates within a framework that fosters long-term confidence and fair treatment for all market participants. While the Government desires to create a ‘directing mind’ in GBR, coordinating rail with a whole network view, for private operators to have confidence in the system there must be appropriate protections guaranteeing fair access and charging. The ORR is well-positioned to perform that role as an essential backstop, but the correct framework must be built around it to enable it to operate as such.” Finally, Angel Trains also provided written evidence to the Transport Committee: “Angel Trains believes that the new access framework must provide equitable access to all parts of the railway, whether operators are GBR-led, Open Access, or freight. As a lessor of rolling stock to both GBR-led and Open Access operators we believe parity among operators is crucial and would welcome greater clarity from the Government on how access and charging decisions will be made and prioritised. As an independent regulator, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) should be responsible for ensuring a level playing field by intervening if concerns are raised that GBR could have taken a discriminatory decision, for example, around preferential access rights and charging for GBR operators over Open Access competitors. Beyond access arrangements, we would welcome further detail from the Government about how GBR will be held to account. In its current form, GBR possesses a high concentration of power in its role in setting both strategy and delivery. In order to provide adequate scrutiny and accountability, there must be sufficient checks and balances to ensure that financial, economic, and safety objectives are met. Angel Trains believes that there should be clear divisions between different parts of the rail system to ensure adequate accountability…As outlined above, it is vital that there is a fully independent regulator to hold GBR to account, for which the ORR could be best-placed. Beyond acting as an arbiter on access and charging decisions, the ORR should be empowered to report on GBR’s performance and issue performance improvements notices to GBR, in addition to other regulatory duties. The ORR must maintain a regulatory function to provide fairness and stability for the rail industry, which encourages investment and ensures financial sustainability by creating a level playing field across the sector and eliminating subjectivity from decision-making.” We therefore seek to leave out clause 69 and will vote against it. This would keep GBR under the normal access regime supervised by the ORR and ensure a fair system. We have no objections to Government amendments 175 to 183 but, as mentioned, we are less happy with clause 69 as a whole. Clause 70 amends the 2016 regulations to exempt GBR from the provisions of those regulations that would otherwise apply to its infrastructure. The 2016 regulations will continue to apply to other infrastructure managers. We do not object to the clause.

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22. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I will speak to clauses 72 and 73, and the grouped amendments. Clause 72 is another controversial clause. It sets out that the Secretary of State may make regulations about the management and operation of non-GBR infrastructure, which means any network, station or track not operated by or on behalf of GBR; about the rights to operate trains that use non-GBR infrastructure; and about competition in the market for the provision and supply of such operations. Subsection (2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to set access terms and charges for non-GBR infrastructure, overriding commercial negotiation and bypassing the ORR. That cuts directly against the stated principle that the publicly owned operator must not regulate its competitors. It is an extraordinary clause that cuts up contract law and throws it out of the window. The Rail Freight Group is concerned. It states: “Clause 72 enables the Secretary of State by regulation to intervene in privately owned rail freight terminals, setting conditions of access and charges amongst other matters. Again, we understand that this is not the intention of the clause (which exists to enable GBR to take over other infrastructure such as HS1, Heathrow Branch or the Core Valley Lines) but nonetheless it is an extant risk to rail freight as presently worded, and we believe freight terminals should be explicitly out of scope for this clause.”

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23. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest. Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.

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24. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    The Minister just said that the amendments are completely unnecessary, because the stated concerns are not real, effectively. That does not answer the very real concerns put forward time and again in the Transport Select Committee and in this Committee’s evidence session—the written and oral evidence—by businesses that are experts in the field. They are not reassured by the Bill as it stands. How can the Minister go back and say, “No, we’re right and you’re wrong,” to those experts in the industry?

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25. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 74, page 42, line 24, after “monitor” insert “and audit”. This amendment would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.

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26. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 74 amends the Railways Act 1993. It gives the ORR a new function to monitor GBR’s delivery of its statutory functions and carry out investigations where appropriate to fulfil that monitoring. In particular, the ORR must consider how and whether GBR is carrying out the activities listed in its approved business plan, how the cost of carrying out those activities compares with the estimates in the business plan, and whether GBR is carrying out railway activities in a way that furthers railway safety. The ORR may advise the Secretary of State in relation to that monitoring function and publish its advice. Amendments 99 to 101 “would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.” The amendments address the relationship between GBR and the ORR, making it clear that the ORR remains an independent regulator with powers associated with audit, for example in relation to the release of documents. None of that applies to a woolly duty to monitor. Legally, the term “monitoring” is weak. It does not imply an ability to take action to demand improvement. That is particularly concerning when combined with clause 75, which removes the ORR’s ability to impose a financial penalty in the event of poor performance. Amendment 97 “ensures that Great British Railways in furtherance of railway safety actively engages with the industry bodies such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board and implements where reasonably practicable, the cross-sector recommendations of safety improvements and standards emerging from any cross-sector work.” That provides the Office of Rail and Road a clear mechanism to hold Great British Railways to account in safety matters. It also highlights an expectation of relevant industry bodies to recommend improvements to Great British Railways. We will not divide the Committee on amendment 97, but we ask the Government to think about what we are proposing in it. We all want the Bill to make the railways safer, and anything we can do to ensure that that happens will be for the good. I think we have already debated amendment 98, but I want to put it in context we will vote on it at this point, so I want to mention why it is relevant. It “would require the ORR to consider whether GBR procuring services from the private sector would be a more efficient use of public funds.” That echoes previous amendments that we tabled, but we will be dividing on amendment 98 as part of this group, I believe. Amendment 222 “requires the Office of Rail and Road to consider Great British Railways’ performance against its KPIs, as set out in” new clause 2. As amendment 222 is consequential on new clause 2, we will not press it to a Division, given that the new clause is likely to be rejected. It is a probing amendment that we wanted on record. We also have amendment 236, which is not part of the group, but my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham told me not to forget it because we will have a vote on it. Are we debating group 73?

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27. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    That is fine. I knew as soon as I opened my mouth.

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28. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    I have indicated that we want to press amendment 99 to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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29. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clause 75 prevents the ORR from issuing directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities. It also prevents the ORR from imposing a fine on GBR for licence breaches. We think those are both terrible ideas. The Transport Committee asked Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group: “What is your view on the ORR’s downgraded power merely to ‘advise’ the Secretary of State on GBR’s performance, rather than having actual powers of enforcement?” She said: “I am quite worried about this.” To the same question, Steve Montgomery from First Rail said: “Following on from that, the independence element of it—marking your own homework—is a big concern for us. How do we ensure that we do not see a perverse behaviour where GBR looks after its own operations to the detriment of others?” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said: “I can only echo that. With GBR writing the rules, controlling capacity and being linked to the main operator in the country, there is a structural conflict of interest, unless there is a clear duty of fairness and non-discrimination. I do not know of other European countries that do not have a strong independent rail regulator, across the EU and beyond. To be the judge and the jury at the same time is somewhat worrying.” Emma Vogelmann, the co-chief executive of Transport for All, told the Transport Committee: “Our recommendation on the role of the ORR is to retain its independent authority. We are definitely interested to see how that transition of powers, as Ben mentioned, plays out, and how enforceability plays into that.” For once, the Government need to stop and listen. The sector is speaking with one voice and telling them that this is the wrong approach. The clause needs to be removed in its entirety. It is common for regulators to be able to issue financial penalties to private utility companies that are in breach of their statutory duties. Why should that consumer protection not also be applied to a public body like GBR? Removing clause 75 would restore the ORR as a strong, independent economic regulator. Government amendment 271 “would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.” The Conservatives are against the whole clause, but, to save time, we will not seek a Division specifically on this amendment—I am sure that everybody will be pleased to hear that. However, as somebody who serves on the Transport Committee and sat through a lot of those evidence sessions, one of the key things that concerned me and some other members of the Committee was the breakdown of the relationship between the ORR and GBR and the weakening of the ORR’s powers. When I heard that evidence, I certainly felt that it was a compelling argument. Liberal Democrat amendment 212 would remove the restriction on the ORR to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches. That is okay as far as it goes, and we will support the amendment, but we think that it does not quite go far enough. As I am sure Members expect on the basis of what I have just said, we will vote against clause 75 as a whole.

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30. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Rebecca Smith

    Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)

    Clauses 76 to 79 change the current duties on the ORR, the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to maintain a register, in sections 72 to 73B of the Railways Act 1993, and put them under duties to publish certain information. The ORR must publish documentation relating to licences; access agreements; access contracts, other than those using GBR infrastructure, for which GBR will be responsible; experimental passenger services; closures; and railway administration orders, except where that would affect individual public or commercial interests. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers must publish determinations that a closure is a minor modification, and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. Each clause contains restrictions about publishing information that would affect individual, public or commercial interests. Each clause also allows for the publication of documentation that was previously contained in the registers. Clause 77, which is very similar to clause 76 and, indeed, clauses 78 and 79 on the devolved Ministers, amends section 73 of the 1993 Act, on the publication of a register by the Secretary of State, so that they are under duties to publish information—in particular, determinations that a closure is a minor modification and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. However, proposed new section 73(5) of the 1993 Act is interesting. It states: “The Secretary of State may not publish particular information or documents under this section if it appears to the Secretary of State that publication of that information or those documents would be against the public interest or the commercial interests of any person.” Can the Minister outline under what circumstances not being transparent is not in the public interest? What determines public interest? I would be grateful to hear the methodology in this instance. Further, the only person with commercial interests in the railway will be the guiding hand of the Secretary of State herself, as it is all public money. I am sure that proposed new subsection (5) is standard practice in statute, but it raises an interesting point about transparency that I ask the Government to spend some time thinking about. Public trust is low—perhaps it is even lower today than it was when my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham wrote this speech—and any part of any Bill that allows the Secretary of State to get away with not publishing information under a perceived public good would look most suspicious indeed. I do think that, in the light of yesterday’s events, my hon. Friend will see the irony in the words that he wrote there. Clause 77(2) allows publication of anything that was in the register before the Bill’s commencement. What is the timeline for publication, and will the Minister commit to publication? Those queries aside, Members will be pleased to hear that we have tabled no amendments at this time. Clause 78, which relates to publication of information by Scottish Ministers, mirrors clause 77. As I mentioned, it amends the 1993 Act, and aside from my query about the ability that it provides to not publish information against a perceived public good, we have no objections to the clause—unless it falls outside the devolution settlement, but presumably the Minister can reassure the Committee that it does not. Clause 79 relates to the powers of Welsh Ministers, which are similar to those enjoyed by Scottish Ministers. The rationale behind allowing Ministers to not publish information over a perceived public good remains interesting to me, but I see no need to revise the clause.

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31. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Priti Patel

    Sudan

    The situation in Sudan is serious and deadly, and Members across the Chamber want this awful, barbaric war to end. Millions are suffering, displaced and malnourished, and an estimated 150,000 people have been killed, including in massacres such as El Fasher. War crimes are being committed, and appalling acts of sexual violence are being perpetrated against women and girls. UK leadership is needed to make a difference to the humanitarian situation on the ground, and to support every international diplomatic effort to end this awful and deadly conflict. I must ask the Foreign Secretary, however, how she can come to the House to talk about such barbaric sexual violence against women and girls, when the Prime Minister knowingly let his friend, Peter Mandelson, a friend of one of the world’s most notorious paedophiles, into the heart of Government and her Department. Is she not ashamed and concerned that our country’s credibility and record on this issue has been damaged because of the Government’s poor judgment, and the Prime Minister’s judgment in appointing Mandelson, knowing his links to Epstein? With Mandelson putting his interests first, has she assessed the damage that his actions have caused to the UK’s international and reputational interests, including our essential work to address the situation in Sudan? To her knowledge, did he at any stage mislead our US ally on national security and foreign affairs on key decisions such as Chagos, which impact our security partnership? This morning I am sure the Foreign Secretary will have seen reports that Secretary Rubio warned the Labour Government over the appointment of Lord Mandelson. Can she confirm whether she or her predecessor were aware of that? The UK’s credibility has been damaged by the Prime Minister and her Government’s appalling judgment. That is why answers are needed. This week, the UK assumed the presidency of the UN Security Council. Will the Foreign Secretary tell the House how we will use that position rightly to advance efforts to negotiate to end this conflict? US-led peace efforts are reportedly building momentum, with a text being prepared of a plan to try to stop the fighting. Has she seen and inputted into that text, and what are her views on it? Has she set parameters to decide whether the proposals are the right ones, and has she spoken to other Sudan Quad countries about it? If acceptable, what pressures will be put on the warring parties to agree it? What is her assessment of any progress made since the statement at last April’s Sudan conference in London, and who will participate in the conference in Germany? We welcome the new sanctions of the RSF and the SAF, but can we expect further action against the leaders of those barbaric groups, their key operators and enforcers, who were all responsible for administering vile brutality on innocent people in different parts of the country? We all back the sanctions announced in December, but we need stronger action with robust consequences that deter the entities, individuals and businesses whose support continues to sustain this awful war. Will the Foreign Secretary update the House on how the UK is using international courts to pursue those responsible for these atrocities being committed, and to gather evidence? We note the £20 million of humanitarian funding announced by the Government for women and girls, so will she confirm whether that is drawn from money already pledged, or whether it is additional new funding? Which organisations are providing the programmes funded by that money, and what are the mechanisms for how the support service will work? As well as supporting women and girls affected by sexual violence and the stigma attached to children born from rape, is the Foreign Secretary working to help male victims, where there is also stigma that prevents them coming forward? More broadly, can she update us on the volume of British aid that has managed to get over the border since the escalation of this awful conflict towards the end of last year? What information has she received about what aid is getting through, and whether it is getting into the right hands? The war in Sudan is a stain on the world’s conscience, and Britain must exert every ounce of its influence and leverage to get the warring parties to lay down their weapons immediately and to secure a lasting peace.

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32. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Road Safety

    I call the Minister, who I am told is aware of how much pressure there is on timing.

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33. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    I call Brendan O’Hara, who will speak for up to 15 minutes.

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34. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. Because I want to get everyone in before we finish at 5 pm, all Members are on a three-minute speaking limit.

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35. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. If interventions are made, not all colleagues will get in. Please consider that.

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36. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Thank you very much. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson to speak for just a few minutes.

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37. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    Occupied Palestinian Territories: Genocide Risk Assessment

    Order. No doubt, the record is now clarified. We cannot continue the debate. It is now 5.1 pm, and the debate is now over.

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38. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Ms Nusrat Ghani

    NHS Dentists

    Order. Not “you”, Mr Easton—it was not me that you were referring to. You have lots of time, so enjoy it.

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39. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    Business of the House

    Hundreds of my constituents work at the Scunthorpe steelworks, which, as the Leader of the House will know, is under Chinese ownership. When the Prime Minister reported back earlier this week, I asked him whether he had engaged in related negotiations during his visit to China. It is disappointing to note that he did not respond to that question. Clearly, the long-term future of the plant is important to thousands of people. Could the Leader of the House arrange for a statement to update us on how things are progressing?

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40. 5 Feb 2026·Parliament·Martin Vickers

    National Cancer Plan

    Further to the exchanges about radiotherapy, I understand that the national figure for access to radiotherapy is 53%, which itself does not seem particularly high. However, the figure for my Brigg and Immingham constituency, which falls in the Yorkshire and the Humber region, is only 35%. Could the Minister give some assurance to my constituents about progress on increasing that figure, and when does she think we can reach the national average?

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