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1. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   I absolutely agree. We will go on to discuss reallocation, and the hon. Member anticipates the points I was going to make. The reallocation decision is even more of a minefield, with all sorts of subjectivity and challengeable elements. I look forward to discussing that. The PPS muttered earlier that I am patronising the Minister, but I think the Opposition are being patronised. We are being asked to vote on something where we have not had absolute clarity.

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2. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   Does the PPS want to intervene? No, I did not think so. As we have agreed, judicial review exists for an allocation decision by the magistrates. The Minister has quite rightly set out that that is a very high bar and is not a right of appeal. In that regard, the Minister is fair to say that our amendment is not directly comparable. I put it to the Minister, and I made this point earlier, that it would be the Crown court making an allocation decision. It is not allowed, as it is in a magistrates court, to use judicial review to challenge a decision made, like at the PTPH, on allocation. That is an incredibly important point that all Members must understand. If the Minister is going to say that people are not allowed a general right of appeal—we do not agree with that, but it is a legitimate argument—that is one thing. But if the Minister is saying that people are going to lose the high bar of challenge that exists at the magistrates court, that is incredibly important. We need to understand that because, as I have said, it is a high bar, but it exists for a reason.

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3. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   We went through this at the start. A triable either-way decision becomes a trial on indictment, but I have been told by a leading KC that in pre-trial hearings—the sort of matters we are considering today—people will not have that same right.

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4. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   Again, this is why the Minister needs to clearly articulate whether or not we can—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Amber Valley is saying that the Minister said that we can. But what will the Minister do if we all vote tonight on the basis that the allocation decision can be judicially reviewed? The Minister is asking us not to have a view on it, not to consider it, but to vote on the question of appeal in relation to allocation decisions on the basis that she has told us that they can be judicially reviewed. Will the Minister think that that is in any way satisfactory if what she has told us proves wrong? I do not see how she could possibly think that that would be satisfactory.

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5. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   I think that wanting defendants to have the ability to challenge allocation decisions as they stand under a new court is pretty intellectually coherent. I am arguing that these are potentially significant, consequential decisions for defendants, and at the moment, as the Minister has explained, we all agree that there is a high bar for judicial review. I am not confident, and the Minister has not given me confidence, that the judicial review element absolutely exists. The Minister has talked about appeal; she is right that there is no right of appeal for the allocation decision at the magistrates court, but there is a right to judicial review and I am not sure that there is in this clause. It is unsatisfactory that we may have to vote on it.

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6. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   If the Minister wants to intervene on me and say, “I am absolutely certain that there would be a right to judicially review the allocation decision by a Crown court,” I will be satisfied. I am asking for the Minister to stand up and say that she is absolutely certain.

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7. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   I welcome that clarity; it will be interesting to see what happens as a result of that. I take what the Minister has said in good faith, and assume that she would not say that unless she was certain. That point is about the question of judicial review. The Opposition believe that there should be a right of appeal separate to that, for two reasons. First, it is fair to the individual, and, secondly, if we do not have an initial right to appeal, and these matters are then considered in appeal at point of conviction, we will create more issues, backlogs and legal uncertainty and defeat the point. Our amendment would make the system more, not less, streamlined. It would help the Government meet their objective, not hamper them. On that basis, I will push it to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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8. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 3, page 5, line 38, at end insert— “(7) Where a court has determined in accordance with this section that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the defendant may request a different judge to preside over the trial than the judge who made the determination that the case was suitable to be tried without a jury.” This amendment enables the defendant to request a different judge to try the case than the judge who determined that the case was eligible for trial without a jury. The amendment draws into acute focus the challenges with public confidence and the risk of clouding judicial decision making that the proposals of a new judge-only court bench division will create. It is important to set out the distinctions between different types of allocation decisions both now and in the future, if the proposals are passed. It is important to restate that we have summary-only cases based on the offence type rather than anything subjective, and then we have the indictable-only offences, again based on the offence type. In our previous debate on allocation, I pointed the Minister to grey cases, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, that are triable either way. At the moment, if it is about three of those offences, they have to go to the Crown court. I ask the Minister for clarity at some point about how they will operate. Presently, we have what I sometimes call a clear and distinct separation of powers—a separation between those anticipating sentencing outcomes and those deciding sentencing outcomes, and a powerful safeguard for where that is not the case. Under the Bill, those lines will be blurred in a new and novel way, because the judge anticipating sentence length in the Crown court can then determine guilt and sentence length, and potentially issue a longer sentence of more than three years. That is important for the defendant and, in certain scenarios, for the victims and bereaved. The hon. Member for Amber Valley, with her expertise, earlier described the fact that allocation and sentencing take place in the magistrates court, but importantly, the defendant can elect, and say no to their being involved in that process. They can say, “I want a jury trial; I want the judge who passes the sentence to be separate from the people involved in allocation.” Of course, the scenario is one in which a defendant is unlikely to have a reasonable claim of bias against their interests in relation to the sentence. We discussed why someone may prefer a jury trial, even if the sentence might be higher. However, if we are talking about the defendant’s ultimate view about the judge, it is unlikely that someone in the magistrates court—if the case stays in the magistrates court—will say, “You chose to keep me here because of a shorter sentence, so I think you are biased in giving me a longer sentence.” They already have a positive disposition about the view of the sentencing. More importantly, there are strict limits on the sentence length if a case stays in the magistrates court. It cannot go beyond what the initial judgment was. If the court decides, during or at the conclusion of the trial, that the sentence should be higher, it is up to someone else to pass that sentence. It goes to the Crown court for sentencing.

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9. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

   Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

   That was not the point I was seeking to make, so I thank the hon. Lady for clarifying. I sometimes wonder what victims think. Do they sometimes follow a case, hear the evidence and then think it should be getting more than the magistrates’ limits? Do they question whether the magistrates, who have a preliminary view about whether the case will hit a certain maximum at the outset, have come to the trial with some degree of bias about what outcome might be? Do they think the magistrates would therefore have some reluctance, even having heard the evidence in full, to pass a sentence that is beyond their powers and send the case up? Of course, magistrates do reallocate sentencing. As we have said, just because I feel there is a risk of a perception of bias does not mean I think we should scrap the whole lot and never let magistrates pass a sentence, but seeing that things are not perfect on balance does not mean that we accept them. These proposals will add a degree of seriousness because of the potentially significant differences between possible sentence lengths. The sentencing guidelines for the offences are narrower than we will perhaps see with triable either-way cases, which have already been curtailed at a certain level of seriousness and might go up to an even greater level of seriousness. If the clause passes unamended, the scenario could be as follows. A Crown court judge will receive an outline of the case, and make an initial judgment on the likely sentence outcome. They will decide, for a triable either-way offence, whether a sentence is likely to be more than three years. That same judge could then hear that case. That is the same judge whom a victim or bereaved family member could reasonably—perhaps not correctly, but reasonably—perceive on some level had already made a decision about the case, because of course they have: they have taken an initial view of the case and on what the outcome was likely to be. Importantly, that is not something that happens in any way shape or form with the jury trial system, where the two things are separate. We all agree that perception as well as reality is important in our justice system. It is possible that some victims or bereaved family members might question whether the judge, who formed a view, is not best placed to then objectively and fairly decide what the actual sentence should be, if it should be longer than three years. They might even be concerned that passing a sentence of more than three years would suggest that they had got it wrong in their initial view. Again, we do not have to form a view about how likely or unlikely that is; we should form a view on what the perception of that will be. As politicians, we are very used to the concept that perception is important. Even if someone has not necessarily done something wrong, whether the public perceive that they might have done something wrong is important. All that can be readily and simply avoided through our amendment, which would introduce a separation of powers, as I have described it. This is a modest and narrow amendment. It will provide a greater degree of confidence in the new system; even if the Minister is happy to proceed with the system, I am sure she would accept that it has generated questions and debates about rights and impartiality. This amendment is a very simple and modest way in which the Minister can minimise that. I know she wants maximum possible confidence in the new system, so I hope our amendment achieves that and that she can support it. As we are still discussing allocations and who will or will not be allocated to different parts of the court, I would also be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on triable either-way offences, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, where multiple versions go into the Crown court at the moment. What will happen to those cases in relation to allocation as part of the new division?

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10. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    We are still no further forward on understanding the three-strikes cases that I talked about.

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11. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    Again, there is no pressure on the Minister to answer immediately, but I presume the same is true for the other cases.

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12. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    To return to the heart of the matter, I will pick up on the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East on an issue that I had not talked about. I talked about how one forms a view of the sentence and how one gives a sentence, and about the ways in which the interaction is unhelpful, but my hon. Friend helpfully points out that other things will happen at the pre-sentence hearing, including the submission of evidence that is then ruled out of order, that might lead to a certain perception. The Minister rightly referred to precedents relating to judges’ capability, but I do not think that she really engaged with the Opposition’s concern about perceptions that the system is unfair. The Minister highlighted examples in which that might be a risk already. There might already be times when people argue that the perception is wrong. We accept that. I had anticipated that point, which is why I made it clear that the fact that the existing system is not ideal or has undesirable features does not mean that when we get to design a new system from scratch and from the ground up, we should say, “Yes, this is undesirable in these areas, but it exists and we are not going to get rid of it.” When we are designing a new system, we should design out the less desirable elements. Our amendment puts forward the best possible approach. I suspect that it would make it less likely that either defendants who have been convicted and sentenced or victims will be concerned.

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13. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    I welcome the opportunity to speak to amendment 19, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East pointed out, this one of those challenging situations; we will not vote for the amendment, because it would indicate that we support or endorse a judge trial with two magistrates as opposed to a jury trial, which is not the case. But it is an extremely helpful probing amendment to point out the broader challenges and weaknesses with the Government’s proposal and the differences we would have seen had they followed the proposal by Sir Brian Leveson. The amendment also draws close attention to a matter that I have spoken about frequently: the Government’s willingness both to say that great credibility should be placed on the reforms that they are proposing because they have come about as a result of the work of the independent review by Sir Brian Leveson, and at the same time to reject proposals by Sir Brian. When we discussed this matter before, the Minister argued that our concern was not valid because Sir Brian had said in his report that the Government could go further. In my view, it is quite the leap to say of our criticisms that specific proposals lack the authority that Ministers claim because they were not recommended by Sir Brian that the proposals would in fact, in some way, be recommended by him anyway. While I think it is a weak point, it is probably stronger in relation to the decision by the Government to set the test for removing the jury from a Crown court trial at a sentence length of three years rather than Sir Brian’s recommendation of two years. I do not know whether he would support that—one might think he would have said so if he did—but there are what we might call matters on the continuum, where the prospect of Sir Brian’s suggestion of going further on a continuum of sentence length as the test is somewhat understandable. I do not think that argument is at all viable in relation to the measures relating to amendment 19. There is a distinct, what we might call, category difference between the recommendation to have a judge sit alone and to have a judge sit with two magistrates. We have discussed a number of the drawbacks of a judge sitting alone compared with having a jury. I will take them in turn. First, there is the question of bias—of concerns raised in relation to different outcomes, for example for women or ethnic minorities. We have discussed this before, but I want to draw attention again to the comments of Geoffrey Robertson KC. He said: “The determination, by 12 citizens of evidence tested by prosecution and defence, is a surer guide to the right result, reflecting common sense and common values, than the personal view of a judge”. He also said: “A diverse jury, usually with a few representatives of ethnic communities, serves as some guarantee of fairness and non-discrimination in dispensing justice.” We have been leaning very heavily on the Bar, but the Criminal Law Solicitors Association says: “Jurors, drawn from all elements of society, take jury service very seriously. Our Vice-Chair sat on a jury last year and saw his fellow jurors, without exception, treat the process with the gravity and respect that it deserves. Limiting jury trials reduces public engagement in the process and weakens democratic participation in criminal justice.” Sir Brian was not the only person tasked to consider in detail proposals for a reform of the courts who has settled on similar views about the decision to reduce jury trials, which, as I have said, we do not support. They have also agreed that a judge with two magistrates is the way to do it. Lord Justice Auld’s 2001 independent review of the criminal courts in England and Wales recommended the creation of a new district division, with a unified criminal court structure designed to handle either-way cases that were too serious for the magistrates but did not require, in his view, a full jury trial. He proposed that the court would consist of a professional judge sitting with two experienced magistrates. He said in his report that there is a “middle-range of cases that do not warrant the cumbersome and expensive fact-finding exercise of a trial by judge and jury, but which are sufficiently serious or difficult, or their outcome is of such consequence to the public or defendant, to merit a combination of professional and lay judges”. That was a specific choice to say that there was merit in lay as well as professional judges taking part.

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14. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    I rise to speak in support of my amendment 44 and related amendments, which brings us to consider the issue of reallocation in more detail for the first time. It was touched on briefly this morning in the discussion about allocation, but there are distinct differences in the processes. We must remind ourselves what the allocation process will be initially through proposed new sections 74A to D of the Senior Courts Act 1981. My understanding is that the reallocation provisions are intended to operate in the following way. First: “The court must, at the prescribed time or times, determine” in accordance with proposed new section 74A “whether the trial is to be conducted with or without a jury.” It is important to note that “prescribed time” is not defined in the Bill, but would be covered by the existing provisions in sections 84 to 87 of the Senior Courts Act, which refer to prescribed matters being specified in the criminal procedure rules. The explanatory note does not appear to provide any further detail on what the criminal procedure rules are likely to prescribe in terms of timing, so it would be helpful if the Minister could tell us what she expects that to be. Whatever the prescribed time is defined to be, the court must say that the trial is to be conducted with a jury if either the offence, or any of the offences, is triable only on indictment or if the court considers that the defendant, if convicted of the offence for which they are to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years. In any other case, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. We have covered this initial decision at some length, but the proposed legislation also says that if a trial is to be conducted without a jury but there is a relevant change of circumstances, the court may—and in some cases must—reallocate the case to a jury trial. A relevant change of circumstances is defined in proposed new section 74B(8), and will occur if either the defendants to be tried, or the offences for which they are to be tried, have changed since the court’s last determination on allocation, or it appears to the court that there is new evidence that would or might affect whether the condition in proposed new section 74A is met, and that condition relates to a likely sentence of imprisonment of more than three years. This is something to which we must give close consideration. The Bill does not define the term “new evidence”, and I am not aware of it being defined elsewhere in legislation. We can look to the explanatory notes to try to better understand what is meant here. In paragraph 206, the notes say: “This is intended to capture significant new material indicating that the offending is more serious, or less serious, than originally understood. It is not intended to require the court to redo the full allocation exercise each time new evidence emerges, but simply to note where new material might alter the earlier likely-sentence assessment so as to justify reconsideration under section 74B.” The explanatory notes are helpful, but we must remember that they are not legislation and that the courts are more likely to seek to interpret differently what may or may not be said in an explanatory note from something that is given clear direction in legislation. The explanatory notes actually leave us with not just one but two new terms. Again, as far as I am aware, “significant new material” is not defined in legislation; there is certainly no case law for it in these specific circumstances, as these courts have never operated before. I do not think we can know in practice how it would be obvious that something amounted to new evidence for the purposes of proposed new section 74B(8); the Bill, as I have said, is silent on this point. Do we have to assume that that will become a matter of judicial interpretation or discretion? I think we do. It might be evidence that was not already set out in the initial details of the prosecution case or in a defence statement. While the explanatory notes say they do not expect this process to be done on a rolling basis, I assume that the prosecution and defence would be able to invite the judge to consider whether evidence amounts to “new evidence” whenever it was brought to the attention of the court as part of the general conduct of the trial. Again, this is not specified in the Bill, but it is certainly not ruled out. If there has been a relevant change of circumstances meaning that the case involves an indictable-only offence—for example, if new evidence emerges that results in a charge of theft being recharged as robbery, or a charge of sexual assault recharged as rape—the judge must reallocate it to a jury trial. To be clear, that is in relation to offence-based things. If there has been a relevant change of circumstances, but the aforementioned process does not apply—for example, if there is new evidence that means a custodial sentence of more than three years is likely—the judge may reallocate that to a jury trial. The use of “may” is important, because may is not must. I draw Members’ attention to the wording of the initial process of allocation. Perhaps to the frustration of some, I took the time to read it, because it is important. The initial wording on allocation with regard to sentence times is “must”—if the court thinks a sentence of more than three years is likely, it must allocate a jury trial—but as I pointed out, on reallocation the court simply “may” reallocate. I hope it is immediately obvious to Government Members that that is a less stringent test, which creates an inherent unfairness. At the outset, if a judge thinks that a defendant or accused is likely to receive three years, that jury trial is guaranteed. Let us remind ourselves that the Government accept that that is a benefit or a right—although they do not accept it is an absolute right—if the outcome is potentially a sentence of more than three years, yet some people will not get that benefit, even though the Government accept that it is desirable, because the Bill states that the judge has discretion to continue conducting the trial without a jury despite the relevant change of circumstances. The judge has that discretion if any of the following applies. First, they have that discretion if the condition in proposed new section 74A—a likely custodial sentence of more than three years—is not met in relation to the defendant. Secondly, and this is the important bit, in proposed new section 74B(3)(b), they have that discretion if “the court considers that it would not be appropriate to reallocate the trial”, taking into account the matters set out in proposed new section 74C(6) and (7). Those include representations by the prosecution and defence; the extent to which the new likely sentence differs from the three-year threshold sentence; the interests of the alleged victim; the desirability of avoiding the need for witnesses to give evidence again; any delay to proceedings; any actual or potential wasted costs; the effect of reallocation on other court business; and any other prescribed matter set out in the criminal procedure rules. Thirdly, the judge has that discretion if, as proposed new section 74B(3)(c) states, “the prosecution and the defendant or defendants each consent to the trial being conducted without a jury.” Therefore, if the defendant is happy to carry on without a jury, even though they risk the higher sentence, the trial can continue—and similarly for the prosecution. Some of those examples set out in proposed new section 74C(6) and (7) could legitimately deny a defendant a right that they would otherwise have had if the evidence had been available at the start of a trial. It could be something that has nothing to do with them—for example, a witness might not give the same evidence in their statement as they do at trial. Another example is the effect of reallocation on other court business—so simply because it would be challenging for the court to allocate or reallocate the case, a right that the Government deliberately set out to preserve for those people at initial allocation could not be exercised at that point. Again, in essence, those are all new legal tests. We have a whole range of factors, many of them subjective matters that must be weighed, rather than objective ones. They may all be factors that we might reasonably agree should be given weight, such as—to go back to some of the factors—the interests of the alleged victim. If an alleged victim has had a traumatic experience of giving evidence, it is not unreasonable for people to consider that. That does not mean, however, that it will not lead to circumstances in which a defendant is substantially disadvantaged. Let us take, for example, a case related to injury. In a case of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the sentencing range for this offence, triable either way, can include a sentence of up to four years. That is a good example of where we might see a change in circumstances, based on the evolving medical consequences of an alleged assault. A more concrete and simple example than a medical injury that might evolve from an assault, which is complex, is a person who is originally on trial for grievous bodily harm or attempted murder, but the victim dies during the trial or at a much later date, which can happen, and the person can be retried for a further offence. We know that the medical consequences can take time to materialise and can make a material difference to the charge. There are other borderline cases where the likely sentence at the point of the initial allocation decision was considered to be just under three years. To give another example, the sentencing guidelines for the most serious harm or culpability form of theft suggest a starting point sentence of three years and six months, with a suggested range of two years and six months to six years. That is absolutely within the scope of not being allocated a jury trial, but if the medical consequences were to evolve, that would change and push it to a sentence of up to six years, which would require a jury trial. As the hon. Member for Amber Valley, with her expertise and experience of the CPS, pointed out in relation to things that already happen in a magistrates court, we know that magistrates have to undertake this sort of intellectual exercise. They must be mindful that if the circumstances change, the trial must move to the Crown court. I understand that is quite unusual, however, and as we have talked about before, the stakes are likely—not always—to be lower when we are talking about a potentially much wider gap in possible sentence length. Strangely, this may be an example of something that magistrates do but, as I understand it, Crown court judges do not normally do; Crown court judges do not have to have it constantly in their mind throughout a trial whether their view has changed on the likely sentencing outcome. As I have alluded to, the legislation therefore risks creating a whole raft of legal challenges over potentially many years until there is a settled common law understanding of how all the different measures interact, and until higher courts set out the methodical tests and boundaries that are absent from it. The obvious test will arise when someone does actually end up receiving a longer sentence, and the obvious challenge will be that the judge should have realised and reallocated the case because of something considered materially new. That will be highly arguable. Let us say, for example, a complainant, when giving evidence, identifies a more profound psychological impact of a crime on them that was apparent from the initial statements disclosed—something that is to some extent subjective. The judge might listen to the evidence being given and not consider it to be materially different from the statements on which they based their initial summation, but I can absolutely imagine a defendant and their legal representatives feeling that a witness did say something that indicated something materially different. That is another more complex decision than the one made by the magistrates courts in a different way. As we have heard again and again, although magistrates court trials can be long, they are often shorter. Weighing up the impact of restarting that trial, of discounting the work that had been done and of re-sending it to another court, is very different from making that decision after weeks and weeks of a Crown court trial. There is also another risk in terms of public confidence in the process. As we have touched on before in relation to the initial allocation and sentencing, the judge will have already made a decision and given a view on initial allocation. There would be a risk that a defendant feels that their right to a jury trial, if the circumstances are such that they would have been concerned that the sentence would be greater than three years, might inhibit a judge from reallocating in the way that they would have ordinarily wanted to. As we have covered, the judge will be able to pass that higher sentence, which is another important difference with the magistrates, who, as I have talked about before, are constrained in their ability to go beyond that initial judgment. There will be no constraints, so it would be perfectly possible for a judge who had an initial view to end up passing a sentence much higher than they had anticipated and much higher than the defendant was advised would be the likely outcome. Again, that would give serious impetus for a defendant and their legal representatives to make the point that the judge had erred in their reallocation. It is not just a question of the fair thing to do. I explained earlier in relation to other allocations that I do not think it is the fair thing to do, but again it is a matter of efficiency and process. If we end up with repeated appeals over, as I have said, many different factors that will all individually need to be clarified in case law, that will again take up the time and energy of court staff, and particularly legal representatives, who work between all the different courts in a way that judges do not. Amendment 44 would help to balance that by opening up the widest possible interpretation of whether a reallocation is the right thing to do. We think talking about it in the interests of justice will give the maximum possible room to defendants to be sure that the trial they receive without a jury, and the decision taken to deny them a jury, are as fair as they possibly could be.

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15. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    I talked about how the medical picture can evolve in a worsening situation. We can also get that situation in reverse. For example, in A&E, the A&E consultant’s interpretation of an X-ray, to determine whether someone has broken a bone, can be a key fact in deciding the classification. But when that goes to a radiologist, sometimes two or three weeks later, they have that more expert view. This happens quite regularly: they review the X-ray, CT scan or whatever it might be and say, “Actually, no, there isn’t a fracture here.” That would then drop down the injury to a different category. In that intervening period, which could be a matter of weeks, there would be a change to the nature of the charge.

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16. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 3, page 9, line 23, leave out subsection (4) and insert— “(4) Where a court has determined in accordance with section 74A that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the court cannot pass a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years on a person convicted of an offence. (4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence and the court considers that the appropriate sentence is more than three years’ imprisonment or detention, the court must refer the case for retrial by jury.” This amendment prevents a judge sitting alone from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that if this is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial by jury. It is my pleasure to speak in support of amendment 42, tabled in my name, which really drives at the heart of the question of fairness in relation to this new system. It would prevent a judge, sitting alone, from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that, if that is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial. Again, related to the important points I made earlier, it also introduces the element of “must”. Again, we have to revisit the process of allocation; triable either-way offences will be allocated on the basis of sentence length. That is the important part for us to consider here. The Government have agreed that the suitable manner in which to allocate offences to trial with or without a jury is based on sentence length. We can only conclude, therefore, that the Minister accepts that the possible consequence—the possible time in prison—is intrinsically linked to the fairness, reasonableness, desirability or however the Minister might want to describe it of remaining with a jury trial. In this case, if criminals—because they will have been convicted at this point, we can say criminals rather than defendants—ended up with a sentence of more than three years, they would have a reasonable basis on which to say that their treatment was not in keeping with the Government’s own decisions about what would be preferable in relation to fairness. Let us be clear: I spend a lot of time working with victims and campaigning for longer sentences for offenders, and I think that, across the board and for many decades, our sentencing regime for convicted criminals has been insufficiently punitive and has given insufficiently long sentences. But that does not mean that I do not think that there is a fair and proper way of going about that. I agree with the Government that sentence length is inherently related to fairness in regard to whether someone gets a Crown court trial with or without a jury—although, in my view, it should always be a jury trial—but a convicted criminal now will look at this and say that he has a sentence greater than he otherwise should have expected to get, and that, if the judge had anticipated correctly that sentence at the outset, he would have had a jury trial. That would be his reasonable conclusion.

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17. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    That goes straight to the point we discussed earlier about why it is important to separate the two, because in this scenario it is the same person all the way through. Ultimately, the sentencing process ends up being separate to the people who decide whether or not someone is guilty, and they will have decided the mode of trial, as well.

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18. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    This is a great opportunity for me to learn and understand an element of the system that I did not understand—I know about it, rather than understand it. I will go back to the point that we have made repeatedly. We are designing a system from scratch here. We have the opportunity to do things exactly as we want to. We do not have to be forced into replicating other elements of the wider system; we can design this system as we best think it should operate. I think that the best thing in this scenario, in which we are starting from scratch, would be to say to somebody that they should be able to derive the benefit of having a jury trial if the case is of a nature that the Government themselves agree would typically enjoy the benefits of a jury trial. This is just inherently a fairness question. That is why we have replicated the process—in a positive way—in a magistrates court. The decision is the decision that has been made; the court cannot go above it. That is because we say that in a magistrates court, if someone seeks to go above that court, that is not the right place to do that; it would not be fair and reasonable. We are making a similar point here in relation to mode of trial, for jury trial. We think that the amendment is sensible, reasonable, balanced and does not prevent the Government from undertaking their reforms; it is not what could possibly be described as a wrecking amendment. I hope that the Government will reflect on that and accept the amendment.

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19. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    I want to pick out a couple of points. The Minister has criticised the risk of retrials, and we have made several points about how other elements in the Bill will increase that risk through successful appeals and so on. I accept the Minister’s point that it is unlikely that these things will happen, but this is not so much about whether someone was expecting three years and ends up with three years and two months, for example, as the fact that there is no control of it at all. The Minister is right that there is a reallocation process. We have debated the flaws in that, which are pertinent, but clearly the Government do not think that the reallocation process is perfect, otherwise they would not mind a cap. If they thought that the reallocation approach would manage all these scenarios, they would not oppose a cap. They want to oppose it because they accept that the reallocation process will not be perfect. Someone might be expecting a three-year sentence—I gave an example earlier, I think of theft—but could end up with a six-year sentence, double what they expected to receive. That is many years above what the Government have recognised as a suitable and acceptable threshold on which to make these decisions. It would be inherently unjust, and those sorts of situations would warrant retrial.

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20. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Kieran Mullan

    Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

    Yes, but the question is not whether the six-year sentence is reasonable, it is whether the mode of trial in reaching that sentence was fair. The Government agree that the preferable mode of trial in all other scenarios that could lead to a sentence of six years is a trial with a jury. Yet we could have people expecting a three-year sentence and ending up with a six-year one, which is far from the Government’s test of reasonableness for the mode of trial. I understand the point about weighing probabilities with the smaller gap, but we are faced with the question of allowing either no gaps or very big gaps. If we are forced to choose, I will continue to say that we support amendment 42, because it is important that people do not end up in that situation. I do not know the limit; I have given an example of three to six years, but there could be even wider gaps among the offences that we are considering. That would not be reasonable, and, therefore this safeguard is important. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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21. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·Dr Caroline Johnson

    Women’s Health Strategy

    I am glad to see that the much-delayed women’s health strategy is finally here, and I thank the Minister for her work on that and for advance sight of her statement. I am particularly pleased that Ministers have pledged to prioritise medical health conditions such as endometriosis and to continue the roll-out of the HPV testing that we piloted. Today it is one year since the For Women Scotland judgment in the Supreme Court confirmed that sex is biological sex. At the time the Secretary of State told the public: “We will be issuing guidance in the coming weeks before the summer”. To be fair to him, he did not say which summer. This week, a Minister told the House that the guidance on single-sex spaces could not be published under purdah rules until after the local elections. Will the Minister explain why it is okay to announce policy on other aspects of women’s health but not on single-sex provision in the NHS? I find it remarkable that the Minister has the audacity to talk about women harmed by pelvic mesh when, after almost two years in office, the Government have still not responded to the Hughes report. When do they intend to do so? I was disappointed not to find a commitment in the strategy to the lobular breast cancer moon shot project. Will the Minister give us a timeline for what I understand is a commitment to that project by the Government? The Minister talked about waiting lists. While it is welcome that gynaecology waiting lists have fallen in the past year by 1.9%, for those requiring some sort of procedure or admission, waiting lists are 4.5% higher than they were a year ago. One way to make waiting lists shorter is to not start counting until someone has been waiting for a few days already—more targets can certainly be hit that way—so will the Minister clear something up for me? The Government have decided to prevent GPs from directly referring patients to consultants, insisting that they request advice from consultant-led teams instead. If the consultant then decides to offer an appointment, the clock starts, but that will be a few days after the original request is received, making the waiting time a few days shorter. This is where it gets really confusing: the Minister for Care said that the rules are going to change so that the clock will start when the advice request is received, so that patient waiting times are accurately reflected, but the Minister for Secondary Care has said that that will only happen from October. Who is right? Do the Government intend to try and fiddle the figures by making people’s waits look shorter between now and the autumn? Given that we have heard different answers from two different Ministers, do they not know what is going on? Or can they confirm that with their new process and with immediate effect waiting times will be calculated from the moment that the advice and guidance request is received, in the same way as happens with referrals now? The first chapter of the strategy is about acting on women’s voices and listening to women, which of course is welcome, but the Government plan to abolish Healthwatch in favour of listening to organisations. Why are the views of organisations that may or may not accurately represent the voices of women more generally being prioritised, and the voices of women themselves being somewhat deprioritised? In the strategy, the Government commit to increasing capacity for surgical—in other words, later—abortions. They commit to making the morning after pill available free from pharmacies; they have made the oral contraceptive pill available from pharmacies too, and they have said that they will improve workforce capacity to provide long-acting reversible contraception. At a time when sexually transmitted infections are on the rise, with potential significant short-term and long-term consequences for women, there is no mention of condoms in the strategy. Given that some men can be reluctant to use condoms and there is discussion of eliminating misogyny throughout the document, will the Minister explain the choice not to include those too? Another issue I want to raise is that of fracture liaison services. On entering Government, the Secretary of State said that one of his first jobs would be to establish universal fracture liaison services by 2030, yet that is moving at such a slow pace that he will not meet his target. Will the Minister set out how many of the dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry—DEXA—scanners are new, how many are replacements and how many will be used to set up new fracture liaison services? There are many more questions that I can ask, but I understand that I have run out of time. In summary, while there are a few good points, it has taken a long time to produce a strategy that is rather disappointing. Women deserve much better.

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22. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting)

    I am sympathetic to the point that the hon. Member is trying to make. I have listened carefully to what she said about new clauses 2 and 3. With respect to new clause 3, it would be helpful to consider the treatment of those who may have been opponents of an oppressive foreign political regime who have been convicted in this country of an offence that might be a proscribed offence under mutual recognition arrangements, but where they perhaps sought asylum in the UK. We have seen examples of people who were vocal opponents of the Putin regime in Russia coming to the UK and joining a political party. Those are people who we recognise as good citizens. How would they be treated should that offence be on that proscribed list? In respect to new clause 2, again, I have sympathy, but I raise the issue of business people undertaking consular roles in other countries. It is quite common, for example, for a British business person who may be the British consul in a particular town to then be appointed by a series of other Governments to act for them as an agent in that respect. Subsequently, on returning to the UK that business person would be caught by the rules in new clause 2, even though those restrictions are in no way intended to target those types of activities. Has the hon. Member given some thought to how those types of roles would be captured and how they might be excluded?

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23. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    I appreciate that the main focus of these amendments has been around disability. However, I was proud of the work that my party did in Government to try to improve the diversity of candidates, particularly in local elections. Has the hon. Member given any consideration to the broader concept of diversity in terms of candidates? We know that disability can present some specific challenges, but one of the issues for political parties is about engaging those much wider communities, from which sometimes very few people feel willing to put themselves forward as candidates. Does she have a view about that that she would like to share with the Committee?

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24. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    One of the issues that this proposal creates is that if we are seeking to assess the accessibility of politics for candidates from a range of backgrounds, we need to know not only about those who make it through and are nominated as candidates, but about the broader range of the public from whom those candidates are drawn. It is fairly standard, in terms of equalities impact, to understand from that data who is not making it through that process. Has the Minister given any consideration to how that concern might be addressed, beyond simply gathering the data? That may not tell us who was simply not able to make it through the process and get to the point of being nominated as a candidate in the elections covered by section 106.

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25. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    Does my hon. Friend note, as I do, that the international gold standard for the conduct of elections is set by the Venice Commission: a group of academics and people with political experience from countries across the democratic world who meet to consider measures including voter identification, the conduct of polls, the transparency of electoral material—all those different matters. When I asked the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government whether the Government had considered the input and latest reports of the Venice Commission, it was clear that the Secretary of State had not even heard of the Venice Commission. That is an example of something that would, to a degree, undermine trust and confidence in elections. As my hon. Friend is setting out, the outcome of any poll depends very much on who asks the question, how they ask it and of whom they ask it. Given that the new clause simply cannot set that out in statute, it does not add value to the Bill.

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26. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. A consistent theme that has emerged from his points, and from the evidence and debate in this Committee is that we can have all the rules we like, but enforcement is a major challenge. In particular, it highlights inconsistency. Because there is an element of vagueness in the law, it is sometimes left to the individual clerk of a polling station, with or without good advice from a returning officer or electoral officer, to try to determine the appropriate course of action. Hence, people breaching the law would be kicked out in some places, but not in others. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is essential that we get the detail correct in the Bill in order to ensure greater consistency, and therefore trust and confidence, in the practice of elections across the country?

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27. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    To bring my hon. Friend back to where he started, what is so striking about what he is saying is that the moment when the voter goes to the polling station is the key interaction that most people have with our democracy. The debates that we as politicians are interested in, about the sources of electoral finance and the eligibility of different people to come and vote, while important, are not as salient as what is going on in the mind of the voter at the point they cast their ballot. Their ability to do that with complete faith in the integrity of that process is critical. Does he agree that it is even more saliant to make the point that this review and update are necessary, because for the voter that represents the front door or the window on politics, and that then influences all the other issues that have been brought up by Members?

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28. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    This is one of the most important parts of the debate we will have on this Bill. Most of us, as politicians, will have experienced a voter telling us on the doorstep that they would be willing to vote for our party but that they lack confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, because they know that the ballot paper issued has a serial number on it that could in theory be tracked down later to establish how they voted. Does my hon. Friend agree that when we look at electoral behaviour, the turnout in, for example, local elections, has been consistent for 100 years, and that debates around trust have not been as material to people’s willingness to vote as trust in politics in general, because confidence in the ballot, and the sense of what is at stake in those elections, really matters? That is really a question of politics, rather than, as earlier amendments suggested, a question of trust. Does he agree that the significance of this is about ensuring the integrity of the process by which democracy happens, as opposed to a wider debate that reflects our political views about that process?

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29. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    There is a crucial distinction that I am interested in with the hon. Member’s reflection on—

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30. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    My apologies, Sir Desmond. I was seeking the hon. Member’s views on what happens at the point of casting a vote, which is where all of us exercise our equal democratic freedom. We have a vote each, and we cast it in the same way in a process that needs to have integrity. There is no guarantee that any amount of expenditure will influence a voter in a particular way if they feel that that is wrong, and each of us as voters exercises that judgment equally and freely under the law. The amendments we have been so keen to spend some time on are about the integrity of and confidence in that process, under which every single voter is equal in the power they exercise in a democracy.

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31. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    I am keen to avoid being accused of being repetitious in any circumstances. Does my hon. Friend agree that the key strength he is advocating for is the integrity of the ballot as the guardian against all these issues? If we have a secret ballot that we can trust, all the issues of corruption, undue influence, family voting or whatever they may be are managed appropriately. If we fail to ensure the integrity of the ballot, things become irresponsible.

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32. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    My hon. Friend has spoken eloquently about the Green party’s shocking behaviour in the Gorton and Denton by-election, but does he recall the evidence that we heard on our first day in Committee from Tower Hamlets? That gave us all cause to reflect that this is not simply about a shocking recent issue involving the Green party; it has been a long-standing concern in our politics. If we want to ensure that everybody has equality of access to our democracy, we need to make sure that we get this right. Using the established languages of our nation is a key part of that.

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33. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    For the benefit of the Committee, will the hon. Lady briefly set out who—it could be a body or an individual—would be the appropriate judge of factual accuracy? I am sure all political parties have been on the receiving end of the famous Lib Dem bar chart, which says, in tiny letters underneath, “Survey of 10 people we asked in the pub last night.” It could be argued that it was factually accurate, based on that very dubious source. How will we ensure that, where there is some dispute about the facts, there is a sufficient degree of independence in arbitrating that question?

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34. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Simmonds

    Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)

    On a point of order, Sir Desmond, may I seek your guidance? I know that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire said earlier that, for reasons of time, she did not wish to go into sufficient detail. Can you just confirm to the Committee that we have two further full days of consideration, which are already in everybody’s diaries? I know that the Government Whip declined my suggestion of an adjournment earlier; however, Members should not feel constrained in fully setting out the concerns that they have or the issues that they wish to raise about the Bill, given that—as I understand it and as I have just said—we still have a further two days of consideration available to us.

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35. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting)

    Thank you, Mr Efford; I appreciate that. I think new clause 3 is very sensible. I know from personal experience that life in the military is fast. A person may deploy somewhere and get a number of different inoculations, and they do not necessarily think about what they were getting before being deployed. When people come out of the armed forces—I have definitely found this myself—and go travelling, knowing what they have had is really important. For someone to have to go back to the Ministry of Defence to try to get their medical records and pass them to their GPs is, as anyone who has tried to move information through GPs or NHS trusts will know, extremely difficult. As the Minister has said, moving that information between the MOD and the NHS is an even bigger burden. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford made a number of points about mental health, but there are smaller, practical points that the new clause would address. Having a physical copy of our military records within one month would be really valuable, so I look forward to supporting the hon. Member for North Devon on the new clause.

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36. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting)

    I declare an interest: I am also a proud holder of a veterans railcard, as are many of my constituents. The new clause is modest in scope. It does not create new schemes. Both HM forces railcards and the veterans railcard are already in place. The purpose of the new clause is simply to give a clear statutory basis to ensure that they continue to operate on a national footing with transparent eligibility criteria and proper parliamentary oversight before any future changes are made. That is not an onerous demand on the Government, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford has already laid out. It is a straightforward safeguard for those who the schemes are intended to support. The Minister suggested that legislation is unnecessary because there is no intention to withdraw these railcards. However, having spoken to colleagues who were on the recent transport Bill, I know that similar questions were put to Ministers in that Committee. We have had no support, and this issue has ended up in my casework. Having spoken to other Members of Parliament who have veteran populations in their constituencies—

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37. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting)

    The hon. Member has a Royal Marines base and a large veteran community in his constituency. This has been an issue, and I want it to be quashed as quickly as possible. If Ministers in the Department for Transport have not been able to confirm it, I really hope that the Minister in this Committee can stand up and say that there is no issue around these points and that the veterans railcard will continue to be in play. Hopefully, we can give it more support through the passage of this Bill so that it has a statutory footing. Without a statutory foundation, Parliament would have no formal role in protecting the veterans railcard; that is the point I am raising. The position is hard to justify when set alongside other concessions in the rail system: discounts for younger passengers, older people and disabled travellers are already underpinned by legislation. The reasoning for that approach is clear and sensible. It is therefore difficult to see why the same principle should not apply to those who are serving, or have served, in the armed forces. If the argument rests on trusted Ministers—I look across at the Minister and he is extremely trustful—that is not a standard applied consistently elsewhere, nor is it one that we should be asked to rely on. The new clause is carefully framed and constitutionally sound. It ensures that any future changes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, which is exactly where decisions belong.

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38. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting)

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

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39. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting)

    New clause 9 would provide a clear framework for an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation, training and capability development. The Committee has already considered the counter-drone provisions in the Bill, and we have had a good debate on that. The powers to detect, deter and, where necessary, disable unmanned aircraft that threaten defence sites are welcome and they have our support, but there is an obvious counterpart that has not yet been addressed. If our forces are to counter hostile drone activity effectively, they must also be able to train with, test and refine their own systems without legal uncertainty. That is the gap that the new clause would fill, and it would do so in a proportionate and practical way. It would establish a delegated authorisation process. The Secretary of State could designate authorised individuals within both the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence civilian workforce. Those individuals could then approve drone use for defined defence purposes, namely testing, evaluation, training and capability development. Authorisations would have to be set out in writing, except in urgent situations where verbal approval would have to be confirmed in writing as soon as possible. Authorisations would be time limited to a maximum of six months and would be granted in line with the established principles of necessity and proportionality. That is a balanced approach. It would ensure accountability through a clear chain of authority and defined limits, without creating unnecessary bureaucracy or introducing sweeping new powers. It would provide a structured basis for activities that are, in reality, already a routine and essential part of modern defence. As we all know, drone capability is no longer a niche area; we see it all around us. It sits at the centre of contemporary warfare. Recent operations in Ukraine have demonstrated how uncrewed systems now shape reconnaissance, strike capability, logistics and force protection. Our armed forces must be able to train continuously with those systems, adapt their tactics and develop their doctrine in step with rapid technological change. At present, the legal footing for such activity lacks clarity, but the new clause would address that. There is also an important industrial dimension. On Second Reading, concerns were raised about limited access to testing environments for small and medium-sized defence enterprises operating in the field. Many of those firms are producing highly effective systems and are contributing directly to allied capability, yet some are questioning whether the United Kingdom offers the right environment to grow and scale. I have seen Members from across the House of Commons raise that issue—namely the hon. Member for Plymouth Moor View (Fred Thomas) and my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), whose constituencies cover the national centre for maritime autonomy. They work hard on these issues because they have engaged with cutting-edge companies that want to go to tests and want to provide for UK defence, our allies and the export market, but are being hampered by regulation on the ability to train their devices. I have experienced that myself in the air. As a former wingsuit skydiver who has seen things from an aerial perspective, I realise how constrained our aerial environment is and how difficult it is to test aerial drones. There needs to be a clearer statutory framework for authorised drone use, which would support closer collaboration between industry and the armed forces. It would signal that the United Kingdom is serious about creating a regulatory environment that keeps pace with innovation and supports the development of advanced defence technologies. The new clause is deliberately focused. It would apply to routine activities such as training and testing. It does not extend to wider operational use, nor does it seek to. There is an interesting point to add here about working with the Home Office and police departments, if the Ministry of Defence is not already. Having gone out recently with the Exeter drone units in Devon and Cornwall police, I see that they are going through the same operational issues we are trying to tackle in the defence space. The purpose of new clause 9 is to ensure that the essential groundwork for capability development takes place on a clear and secure legal basis. There is a wider point: legislation must evolve alongside capability. The Bill recognises the changing nature of the threat, and the new clause recognises that our response must also adapt. Effective defence requires practice, experimentation and confidence, built through regular and lawful training. Without that foundation, operational effectiveness cannot be sustained. New clause 10 would introduce a practical and long overdue measure. It would enable authorised defence personnel, whether members of the armed forces or civilian Ministry of Defence staff, designated by the Secretary of State, to designate areas of sea and associated airspace as defence drone offshore areas for authorised unmanned aircraft operations. It would also require that, before any such designation is made, the authorised person must consult the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and any other relevant maritime authority. In addition, it would allow conditions to be imposed on unmanned aircraft operations in those areas. That matters because the context is clear. The Bill already addresses the threat posed by rogue drones to onshore defence sites, and that is welcome. We have seen the facts and figures throughout this Committee: reported incidents near military bases more than doubled last year, rising from 126 incidents in 2024 to 266 in 2025, which is a significant jump. That is a concerning trend, and the provisions in the Bill to allow authorised personnel to respond without waiting for police assistance are both sensible and necessary. However, the threat does not end at the shoreline. Defence activity at sea faces growing exposure. Naval exercises, offshore patrols, protection of undersea infrastructure, amphibious operations and a wide range of authorised unmanned aircraft activities all take place in the maritime environment, where there is currently no equivalent legal mechanism for Defence to designate and manage operational airspace. That gap represents a real vulnerability. Legal uncertainty slows decision making, and delay in the operational environment carries risk. Commanders should not be left in any doubt about their authority to protect personnel and missions when operating offshore. New clause 10 would provide that clarity. It is also important to be clear about safeguards. These are not broad or unchecked powers. Only individuals formally authorised by the Secretary of State may designate such areas. There is a clear requirement for consultation with the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and other relevant maritime bodies before any designation is made. I have spoken to a few of those agencies throughout the passage of this Bill, and they are fully aware that regulation needs to be tightened up. On a separate matter, it does not seem to be applied evenly across the space. I have done a small amount of paramotoring before coming into Parliament, and doing it in British airspace is almost unregulated, yet we seem to be in a really contested environment for drones, which definitely needs to be opened up. To raise an extra point, I understand the limitations. We are bringing in autonomous systems, and we are not always completely sure how they will behave in the airspace. The current regulation deals with aircraft or maritime devices that are human-operated, so dealing with automation adds extra layers of complication, but it is one of those knotty problems we need to work out. New clause 10 would ensure proper co-ordination and protect both aviation and maritime safety. The ability to impose conditions on operations in designated areas would add a further layer of control. It may be argued that existing maritime or airspace regulations already offer sufficient flexibility, but that is not the case—I refer back to my point about automation. The current framework was not designed with defence unmanned aircraft operations in mind, and the absence of a clear statutory basis creates a gap that could offer areas to be exploited. The Government have taken important steps to strengthen counter-drone capability and protect onshore sites through this Bill. New clause 10 is the logical offshore extension of that work. I now move to new clause 11. The regulatory barriers facing uncrewed systems across the maritime and land domains are significant. They are already harming British industry and slowing the adoption of technologies that our armed forces urgently require. I recently travelled down to Plymouth to meet representatives of a company called MSubs. They have working for them really innovative people—very smart people. They are able to raise funding to grow their company, yet they cannot actually test the equipment that they are trying to build, so they are looking for opportunities to move abroad. I have now heard it said repeatedly that if you want to grow, you have to go. We should not be in that position. We have some of the smartest people in this country. We have brilliant research universities. We should be in a position to offer our defence industry access to those people and give them the opportunity to grow in that space. This new clause is straightforward. It would simply require an annual review of the regulatory framework, with findings reported to Parliament. Given the speed at which the technology is advancing and the rate at which both our allies and potential adversaries are deploying it, that would be a reasonable and proportionate step. The need for such a review is clear. At present, regulation in this area is fragmented. Responsibility is spread across several Departments, including the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Transport and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Oversight is further divided among bodies such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Military Aviation Authority and Ofcom. Each operates within its own remit, but no single authority is responsible for ensuring that the overall framework supports the development and testing of systems required for defence. In practice, that creates a patchwork that acts as a brake on progress. This issue has already been acknowledged by Ministers. For smaller firms, it is not a minor inconvenience. If a company cannot test its system, it cannot demonstrate its capability, and without that, it cannot secure contracts. The consequence is a loss of both innovation and industrial capacity. Small and medium-sized enterprises are at the forefront of innovation in this sector. They are agile, willing to take risks and often responsible for the most promising developments. However, they are also the most vulnerable to regulatory delay. Unlike larger firms, they do not have the extensive legal resources or the financial resilience to withstand prolonged uncertainty. When delays erode limited funding, companies fail. New clause 11 would recognise that reality by requiring any review to assess the impact on SMEs directly. There is also a clear international dimension. Key allies are moving very quickly. The United States is integrating uncrewed systems across its armed forces at scale, supported by a regulatory environment that enables rather than restricts innovation. If we look at the geography and topology of the United States, it has much more airspace and access to a larger maritime area, and I understand that it would be an easier process for the United States to be able to designate an area and do testing. We need to find a similar way to do that here in the UK. NATO partners are developing standards that will shape future interoperability. The United Kingdom has strong advantages, including a world-class defence technology base and a long maritime tradition, but those strengths will translate into success only if our regulatory framework keeps pace. If it does not, companies will either fall behind or choose to develop their technologies elsewhere. We refer back to the point that if you want to grow, you have to go. We need to get out of that mindset as quickly as possible and improve things in this country. For that reason, a requirement to assess developments in allied regulatory frameworks would be particularly important. It would ensure transparency and enable meaningful comparison. Parliament would be able to see clearly whether the United Kingdom was keeping up with its partners, rather than relying on general assurances of progress. The Government have recognised the importance of this agenda, and the creation of a new uncrewed systems centre of excellence is a positive step. However, co-ordination alone is not sufficient. There must also be accountability. New clause 11 would provide that by ensuring regular reporting to Parliament. If the current framework is effective, the review would confirm that. If it is not, Parliament would be informed and the Government would be expected to respond. That would be a realistic expectation and one that supported both our defence capability and our industrial base. New clause 14 would give the Secretary of State the power to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships under domestic law. This is a necessary and forward-looking measure, and one that reflects the pace of technological change and the realities of modern defence. The Royal Navy has long been defined by its ability to adapt. From the wooden walls of a sailing ship to the silent deterrent of nuclear submarines, each generation has embraced innovation to protect our shores and project stability beyond them. We now stand at the threshold of another transformation. Being so close to Plymouth, with the history of that dockyard which has been there for more than 500 years, this new wave of automation coming in and bringing back that cultural heritage is fascinating to see.

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40. 16 Apr 2026·Parliament·David Reed

    Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting)

    The Minister has a great deal of experience in this space, and defence is working hard to unblock some of these issues. The point I raised in my speech was that it is almost impossible to work through the split responsibilities across so many different Departments and regulatory bodies. As we have had regulations built on top of one another, we end up in a quagmire. Across all these different Departments and agencies, who is the accountable head who co-ordinates to make sure that regulation is fit for purpose?

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