Health Bill (Tenth sitting)
Clause 43 is particularly long: it runs to almost two pages of text. Essentially, clause 43 transfers the responsibility for funding ICBs, and deciding how they use the resources, from NHS England to the Secretary of State. In many cases, that is consistent with the Government’s plan to abolish NHS England, take decisions and responsibility in-house, and get some more control. One thing that does not make sense to me is that the Government are talking about devolving control and decision making, yet this clause gives the Secretary of State powers to control spending, direct how ICBs spend money in different areas, and penalise them if they do not do what they are told. The Minister has also talked in this Committee about a vision for the future in which ICBs are consistent with mayoral authority areas, and mayors sitting on ICBs to provide some sort of democratic accountability. But how can mayors be held democratically accountable if they are, or might be, overruled by the Secretary of State? How does the Minister see that working? Also, greater financial intervention powers for the Secretary of State, if used, could expose ICB budgets to short-term political pressure, such as funding for a specific health area that has received celebrity or media attention. How would the Minister guard against that? If the Secretary of State is able to contest financial decisions taken by ICBs, will that slow down decision making and make things more “sticky”? Essentially, the changes seem to go against the Government’s stated aim of a more devolved and autonomous operating model for the health service. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that. Clause 44 is a little shorter. It essentially makes changes to the joint duties of ICBs and providers. Some of those changes are again necessitated by the abolition of NHS England; keeping some of the sections would result in overlapping systems, so those make more sense. But the duties requiring ICBs and their partner trusts to achieve overall system balance are repealed. That goes against the collaborative principle behind the creation of integrated care systems, and makes it more difficult to manage financial pressures across a geographical footprint. If, in a particular year, there is financial pressure in one area of an ICB but less so in another, it is not able to transfer things so easily between those areas. How does the Minister expect that to work? Clause 44 also allows the Secretary of State to set objectives for “one or more” partners. Is that discretionary or are there criteria for it? If it is discretionary, what would prevent the Secretary of State from selectively choosing which trusts are bound by joint objectives and which are not? How will that decision be made? How will trusts know whether it is likely to be made, or in what circumstances it could be made? This could undermine consistency of treatment across different ICBs and trusts. I will be interested in the Minister’s comments on those points.