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Showing every spoken contribution, including 12,832 under 12 words. Hide short remarks
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, we know that things ebb and flow in the immigration system, and it is important that the Home Secretary has a system that commands the confidence of the general public, does not operate in a vacuum and considers the wider public interest. For the reasons that I have outlined, the Government cannot accept the amendments, and I invite hon. Members to withdraw them.
A lot of these issues will be addressed during the course of the day’s discussion, so I look forward to responding to the hon. Gentleman further on those points.
Amendments 65 and 85 concern the routes through which decisions of the authority may be challenged. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who tabled the amendments. Amendment 65 would allow individuals to bring judicial review proceedings against the decisions made by the authority. As we have heard, the Bill already provides clear routes for correcting errors and for onward appeals. The authority can review its own decisions under clause 6 and decisions can be appealed to the upper tribunal on a point of law under clause 7 where permission is granted.
The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further. Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law. Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.
My hon. Friend makes an important point. The hon. Member for Stockton West suggests that any unsuccessful appellant could appeal to the upper tribunal and that it will just create another tier, but that is not the case. An appeal may be brought only on a point of law and permission must be granted first, so those safeguards are in place. Permission acts as an appropriate filter so that only cases raising an arguable legal error can proceed. The upper tribunal’s role is not to rehear the appeal simply because a party disagrees with the outcome. It is important to determine whether the law was applied correctly. Another point about an error of law has been flagged, and I would like to clarify what that means. An error of law is a mistake about the law or its application, rather than a simple disagreement with the outcome or an administrative error. It may arise, for example, where the wrong legal test has been applied, relevant matters have not been considered, the process has been unfair or the reasons given are legally inadequate. The purpose of the review and appeal framework is to ensure that those legal errors can be identified and corrected. It is important that we allow the process to be clear, legally fair and balanced so that, where there is an error of law, that can be referred onwards. Taken together, the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance. They support the finality and efficient disposal of cases while ensuring that errors can be corrected through clear and appropriate routes. The Government cannot accept these amendments, and I invite the hon. Members not to press them. Question proposed, That the amendment be made.
I would like to speak to clause 1 in more detail. As we have discussed, clause 1 will establish the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill towards overhauling the current immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for a determination to be reached. The clause details the primary function of the authority, which will be to determine immigration and asylum appeals as well as applications for immigration bail. It will give the IIAA the authority to determine the same case types determined by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber today. Access to justice is a fundamental common-law principle and a core requirement of the rule of law. Clause 1 will place a statutory duty on the IIAA to uphold that through a statutory objective to be accessible, fair and independent. As set out in the clause, the authority must also aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and have regard to the public interest in the performance of its functions. The clause makes robustly clear that Ministers must uphold the independence of the authority and not influence decisions through any special access to its adjudicators. The clause also states that a decision of the authority in relation to its primary function may be challenged in legal proceedings only in line with the review and appeal framework. Such challenges will be directed to the authority’s review process and onward appeal route to the upper tribunal. Schedule 1 makes a number of consequential amendments needed to transfer specified immigration and asylum appeal and immigration bail functions from the first-tier tribunal to the authority. Government amendments 22 and 24 make further consequential amendments to the schedule, which I will be detailing in due course. The schedule updates the relevant legislation so that references to the first-tier tribunal, the tribunal and tribunal procedure rules are replaced, where appropriate, with references to the IIAA and its procedure rules. Those amendments apply across the categories of cases that will form the IIAA’s primary function, as set out in clause 1. They are necessary and largely technical amendments, required so that the wider legislative framework operates coherently once the authority begins determining those cases. I commend Government amendments 22 and 24, clause 1 and schedule 1 to the Committee.
I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in. I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.
We have put in substantial investment. I mentioned at the beginning that we have increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, with 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges starting between January and March this year, but we cannot continue to increase the judicial workforce at the rate that we need to deal with the ever-burgeoning appeals process—it is simply not sustainable. We need a system in which we can recruit people far more quickly and flexibly to make important decisions. I will come on to this later in our discussions, but we trust all sorts of people with important decisions, whether magistrates or planning inspectorates. We are building a workforce that will be making serious and consequential decisions, and we are doing so in a way that is not reliant on a slow process to increase the judicial workforce, which simply cannot cope with the increase in volumes of appeals.
I think we have been clear, and the Bill is clear, about the safeguards—not least the statutory requirement for Ministers to respect the independence of the authority. Those important safeguards are on the face of the Bill, and we are very clear about that. To continue responding to the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, we are establishing the authority to offer increased and more flexible capacity and an enhanced ability to prioritise cases in the public interest. We expect a significant period of dual running, where the first-tier tribunal will continue to hear the existing appeals. That will run in parallel to the new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, and will ensure continuity and that backlogs are addressed as quickly as possible. On costs, implementations and benefits, as I mentioned earlier, we will bring forward detailed plans for the new authority, which will include the costs. Work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine those costs and establish comparable current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. Those are not yet agreed or publishable for either comparison, but throughout the business case we will develop the full programme costs, affordability and benefits. In terms of when we will start to make decisions, the authority will be introduced through a phased transition. The first-tier tribunal will continue to hear existing appeals in parallel, as I said, while the new authority begins to take on specific cohorts of new cases. We know that the new system will be quicker. The current system is taking too long to deliver decisions. The Bill creates a scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness on individual decision making. I have hopefully answered most of the questions that have been raised so far, so I will conclude by summarising the Government amendments in this group. Although technical, they will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when it begins its important work of determining cases. Therefore, I commend them to the Committee. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for introducing her amendments. I will address amendments 66 and 67 and respond to some of the points she raised, but I will first give an overview of the measures grouped for consideration, including the Government amendments. Clause 2 introduces the IIAA’s non-executive and executive members and deals with their recruitment. Those are fundamental roles, needed to enable the authority to recruit more widely and to begin operating, and with the leave of the Committee, I will explain some of them now. The chair and the professional standards officer are non-executive members. The Secretary of State will be responsible for their appointment in accordance with the existing public appointments process; there is clear guidance from the Cabinet Office for setting up new bodies. The chief executive and chief appeals officer are executive members. The Secretary of State will appoint the first holders of those roles on merit through fair and open recruitment. Subsequent appointments will be made by the chair in consultation with the professional standards officer. Ministers will have no role in subsequent appointments of the executive roles. The IIAA adjudicators will also be executive members and each will be appointed by the chief executive as an executive adjudicator or senior adjudicator. All IIAA executive members will be employees, meaning they will be subject to the terms and conditions of their role, have employment law protections and could be subject to employment proceedings as appropriate. Such proceedings could be in respect of poor performance, and may even lead to dismissal, enabling the IIAA to take the action it considers necessary. The IIAA will incorporate experience and expertise as much as possible and certain roles will have statutory appointment criteria. The professional standards officer and chief appeals officer must have practised as legal professionals, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least five years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. Government amendments 25 to 27 will make a small change to that arrangement, in that the chair, rather than the chief executive, will be the individual who decides whether the professional standards officer possesses that suitable experience. Senior adjudicators must also meet appointment criteria. They will need to have practised as a legal professional, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least two years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. The IIAA will thereby be able to recruit from a much wider pool of potential candidates. Enabling those who have suitable experience in law-related activities to become a senior adjudicator will make the authority better able to retain talent and knowledge, as it will allow executive adjudicators with no prior legal background to be appointed as senior adjudicators. Being able to retain a strong pipeline of talent with clear opportunities for career progression will be key to our success.
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s challenge, but I am not sure how that is lowering standards. Just because they are not legally qualified does not necessarily demean the professional standards by which people will be making these decisions. I will explain more about our expectations of people in those roles.
My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. We have to be really careful to say that having legal qualifications is not a prerequisite for having good judgment. We see all sorts of good judgment by professionals; it is demonstrated every day by magistrates, ombudsman and planning inspectors, for example.
My hon. Friend is right to pay tribute to our incredible army of magistrates, who are volunteers. We are talking about professionals who will have a whole process of support, qualification and assessment. It is wrong to say that legal qualifications should be the only prerequisite for that kind of judgment.
I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The decisions that we ask our magistrates to take, which may result in restrictions on liberty, are life-changing. I think they are just as important as the decisions that we are discussing.
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. As I have set out, there will be senior appointees within the organisation who have legal qualifications, so any concerns on any aspect of law can be immediately referred to seniors. We do not have to have people with those incredibly costly and time-consuming qualifications to enable people to make these decisions. That is a really important point of principle. Schedule 2 introduces important protections that will enable the authority to operate independently and autonomously. It makes it clear that the IIAA is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the Crown. The disqualification of IIAA members from serving simultaneously as members of any UK legislatures underlines the expectation that authority members will be impartial in the performance of their functions. To further protect the IIAA from undue influence, all IIAA members, inclusive of senior officers and adjudicators, must be appointed on merit and based on fair and open competition. The schedule limits the grounds for removal of non-executive members to serious misconduct, conflict of interest or being unable, unwilling or unfit to carry out their functions. Those in these important roles cannot be removed through the involvement of the Secretary of State. Executive members of the IIAA, the chief executive, the chief appeals officer and the adjudicators will be employees. The terms of their employment are to be set by either the Secretary of State, in the case of the first chief appeals officer and chief executive, or the IIAA, in the case of future appointments of senior officers and adjudicators. The IIAA will be accountable to Parliament as a public body. Schedule 2 places a duty on the IIAA to report annually, providing Parliament with a means to scrutinise the authority on the performance of its functions. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule strikes the right balance between operational autonomy and parliamentary accountability. Let me move on to the amendments tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Amendment 66 would give the Judicial Appointments Commission a role in appointing not only adjudicators, but the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members. These are completely different statutory roles from judicial offices, with their own employee arrangements and distinct governance, leadership and adjudicative responsibilities, and it would not be appropriate to apply the single judicial appointments model to them. That is designed for people who are legally trained to be candidates for judicial office. That is not what the adjudicators will be. They are not legal appointments—professionals who will be highly trained, yes, but not legal appointments. The Bill establishes clear and transparent appointment arrangements appropriate to each role. The non-executive members and the first chief executive and chief appeals officer will be appointed by the Secretary of State. Subsequent appointments of the chief executive and chief appeals officer will be made by the chair, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive. Those appointments must be made following fair and open competition, as set out in paragraph 2 of schedule 2. Ministers will also be under an express duty on the face of the Bill to uphold the independence of the IIAA. To be clear, there will be no direct involvement of Ministers in the recruitment processes for adjudicators. I therefore do not consider that involving the Judicial Appointments Commission in appointments is necessary or appropriate.
The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands. Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker. The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern. Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct. The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised. We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself. I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established. I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.
I again thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for her amendments. We are having numerous Divisions today, but it keeps us all on our toes. I will take her amendments in turn. Clause 4 sets out that the authority will operate under a set of procedure rules determined by the IIAA procedure rules board. I will set out the details about the establishment of the board when we discuss clause 5, but that board is the body that will determine the procedure rules. In reference to some of the requests for more information on the rules, or for draft rules, those are not for us to determine. The procedure rules board will be set up through a proper establishment process as it is a statutory body, and it is important that it leads on the drafting of the procedure rules. Those rules will be made by statutory instrument so we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them at that point. Making the IIAA procedure rules that way provides an important safeguard to the independence of the authority by placing control of its procedural framework—set out in schedule 3—in the hands of the IIAA procedure rules board. That is broadly similar to the process for the current tribunal rules, which sees the Tribunal Procedure Committee draft rule changes following consultations with relevant stakeholders. The IIAA procedure rules board, like the Tribunal Procedure Committee, will make its own procedure rules as if it were a Minister of the Crown. Amendment 63, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seeks to amend clause 4 so that the authority’s procedure rules board must draft the procedural rules “with a view to” securing the statutory objectives in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). It would replace the current requirement for the board to draft the rules with “regard to the desirability of” meeting those objectives. The amendment mirrors the wording of the duty placed on the Tribunal Procedure Committee in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act. The Bill sets out that in the exercise of its primary function, the IIAA must “aim to be accessible, fair and independent…aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and…have regard to the public interest, and…to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.” The procedure rules board is internal to the authority and therefore members of the board would be expected to comply with the statutory duty set out in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). Amendment 63 would therefore have no practical impact on the way the authority’s procedure rules board develops its rules.
We simply do not believe that is necessary. The procedure rules board does not require that change to the wording about its objectives, because that already forms part of the authority. As I have specified, the authority is under a duty, which is made explicit on the first page of the Bill, towards those objectives in the performance of its functions—it has to undertake them. It has a statutory objective to aim to be “accessible, fair and independent” in the performance of its functions, so we do not agree that this is any sort of watering down. The way that the procedure rules are made will be independent of the Government and it is crucial that we maintain these safeguards. Schedule 3 establishes the framework within which the procedure rules of the authority will operate and ensures that the IIAA has the powers necessary to manage proceedings fairly, efficiently and transparently. The schedule provides for rules-governing matters such as hearings, evidence, representation, reviews of decisions, appeals to the upper tribunal, costs and the publication of decisions. It also enables the IIAA to make effective use of modern case management practices, including remote hearings and measures to support vulnerable participants. The schedule promotes the timely and effective resolution of cases. It allows the procedure rules to address the treatment of evidence provided late, while preserving appropriate safeguards where there are good reasons for delay. It also reinforces transparency and accountability by providing for the publication of decisions, subject to safeguards, to protect the interest of justice and the anonymity of those who should not be identified. Taken together, these provisions will enable the authority to develop a clear and comprehensive procedural framework, supporting it to discharge its functions fairly, consistently and without unnecessary delay. I turn to amendment 68, which would require the authority procedure rules to provide that an adjudicator involved in making the original decision cannot take part in a review of that decision. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that these reviews are conducted fairly and impartially. Again, the Bill already provides appropriate safeguards around the exercise of the review power. Clause 6 will require a review to be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator, while schedule 3 will enable the procedure rules to set out the circumstances in which and the procedure by which the power under clause 6 may be exercised. Clause 3 also makes the chief appeals officer responsible for allocating cases to adjudicators and for developing a quality assurance mechanism. These are important safeguards to enable the fair and impartial allocation of reviews. The Government therefore consider that the allocation of reviews is more appropriately addressed through the authority procedure rules and case allocation arrangements, rather than being prescribed in the Bill. Clause 5 sets out which of the IIAA members will sit on the IIAA procedure rules board and how appointments of standing members to the board can be made. The procedure rules board will consist of “the Chief Executive…the Chief Appeals Officer…the Professional Standards Officer, and…any standing members appointed by the Chair.” The statutory make-up of the board will ensure that it has adequate expertise to draft rules that are fit for purpose, including the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. The option to appoint further standing members will enable the chair to ensure that the board can make rules in areas requiring specialist expertise, where relevant; that might include social worker expertise for rules related to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, for example. Beyond that, as clause 4 sets out, the board must consult such persons as it considers appropriate. Again, that will support the IIAA to incorporate a range of views, expertise and experience into its rules. The Government amendments in this group seek to achieve several aims. I will cover expedited appeal proceedings in more detail when we debate groups 8, 9 and 11 on the selection list. In this group, amendments 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 will ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. These amendments simply make equivalent provision where proceedings before the IIAA relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9, which we will come to later and which will apply where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under the expedited process be treated consistently with cases subject to the late claims process. These amendments will simply ensure that both categories are reflected in the matters to which regard must be had when determining whether to grant immigration bail. Crucially, however, they will not alter the legal test for immigration bail. The amendments will also remove applicants for immigration bail from the paragraph 11 credibility provisions in schedule 3, with the effect that those provisions apply only in relation to appellants. Taken together, these are technical and consequential amendments that will ensure that part 1 of the Bill operates as intended. Government new clause 2 will give the Secretary of State a power to take such steps as they consider appropriate to increase the supply and capacity of qualified immigration advisers to appellants in the IIAA—that is, people who are qualified within the meaning of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide immigration advice and services. Provision has already been made in schedule 3, which requires appellants to indicate whether they have obtained advice or representation. This power is intended to complement that provision by expressly empowering the Secretary of State to invest in increasing the availability of advice and representation for appellants and bail applicants in the IIAA. I am glad to hear it welcomed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, because it is intended to support access to justice by encouraging growth in the advice and representation sector and by increasing availability and access to advisers and representatives. It creates a clear legal basis on which to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and representation through financial and other assistance. For example, investment may be in training, accreditation, workforce development and support for service providers. Early legal advice helps to avoid delays and late claims, leads to better decisions and, crucially, ensures that individuals get the advice and support that they need at an appropriate time. Government amendment 29 will amend schedule 3 to ensure that the IIAA procedure rules require the IIAA to provide all appellants and bail applicants with information on how to access advice and representation, reinforcing our intention that all appellants should have the opportunity to obtain it. Government amendment 28 is a small technical change to enable amendment 36, which we will come to in the next group. Finally, Government amendment 32 will limit the application of paragraph 11(3) of schedule 3, so that IIAA procedure rules are not required to make the same provision as is made in new clause 3, which we will come to later.
The ultimate decisions on how this will be set up are for the procedure rules board. I am sure that its members will be watching and listening to these proceedings, and I am sure that they will be very careful to ensure, when they set up the procedures, that there can be no accusations of any duplication or of people marking their own homework in the process. I hope that the safeguards I have set out will ensure that, but it is not for us to propose that in the Bill; it is for the board to do so as it undertakes the whole assessment and development of the procedure rules.
We are putting a huge amount into ensuring the quality and the expertise on the board that is setting up these rules. As I say, we have the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. They will be reporting to Parliament in a whole range of ways, so we will be able to monitor the process throughout. The amendment would simply tie the hands of the procedure rules board. It is not for us to dictate how it undertakes the review process. It is important that it be independent of Government and be able to establish its own process, which will ultimately be accountable to Parliament. It is also important to flag the equality and impartiality. There will be training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onwards appeal rights, so there are a whole range of factors to ensure that the quality of adjudicators’ decisions is high. The chief appeals officer will oversee that. They will have to develop a quality assurance mechanism as well, and the professional standards officer will be setting and maintaining professional standards. We are putting a range of things in place to ensure the highest standards in the decision-making process. On new clause 2, the shadow Minister asked about costs, about access and about when people will be able to have advice and representation during the process. We will ensure that all those who lodge an appeal to be heard in the new IIAA can access advice and representation, with access to legal aid where the eligibility tests are met. On the bail process, we are also ensuring that when we ask people to state whether they have advice and arrangements in place for representation, we encourage the uptake of suitably regulated advice and representation. That will help us to reduce delays, avoid disruption and provide fairness throughout the process. I think I have answered most of the questions that hon. Members have raised, but if there are any further points that I have missed, I will come back to the Committee.
I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but as I say, it is not feasible for the Home Office or the Government to dictate in that way. I cannot give her that assurance, because we are setting up the body so that it can be independent and can set up its own rules, processes and procedures. It is really important that we allow it to undertake that, so I cannot put her recommendation explicitly in the Bill. Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 6, page 5, line 12, at end insert— “(1A) The IIAA may undertake a review of a decision under this section only for the purposes of determining whether the decision contains an error of law.” This amendment would mean that reviews under clause 6 may only be undertaken on the grounds of an error of law. Errors of fact may be dealt with under IIAA Procedure Rules made under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3.
Clause 6 provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions. This is an important safeguard in the new appeals system. It enables the IIAA, among other things, to identify and correct errors in its decisions without requiring parties to pursue an onward appeal to the upper tribunal. The review power supports the efficient administration of justice. It provides a mechanism for correcting errors at an earlier stage, which can reduce unnecessary litigation and ensure that cases are resolved more quickly where appropriate. The clause reflects a common practice of decision-making bodies implementing a mechanism to review their own decisions. By enabling the IIAA to review its own decisions, the clause helps to promote fairness, accuracy and public confidence in the appeals system. The review power sits alongside the onward right of appeal to the upper tribunal provided by clause 7. Together, the provisions create a coherent framework through which decisions may be scrutinised and, where necessary, corrected. Clause 7 provides an important safeguard within the new appeals system by preserving a right of appeal from the IIAA to the upper tribunal on a point of law. A party will need permission from either the IIAA or the upper tribunal before an appeal can proceed, which should prevent the onward appeal route from becoming an opportunity to rehear the full case. That broadly mirrors the existing route from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal, therefore maintaining continuity and legal accountability as cases transfer to the new authority. Where the upper tribunal finds an error of law, it will be able to remake the decision itself or remit the case to the IIAA for a fresh decision. The clause is necessary to ensure that the decisions of the new IIAA remain subject to judicial scrutiny at upper tribunal level. The upper tribunal will provide independent oversight of whether the law has been applied correctly.
I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill. I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill. On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated. Amendment 36 agreed to. Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I thank Members again for their amendments in this group. I will turn to those amendments after explaining the drafting of clause 8. Clause 8 enables the Secretary of State, following consultation with the authority—I have been using the word “authority” for brevity, so I hope that colleagues know I am referring to the IIAA—to set time limits for certain appeals, bail applications and procedural steps. The cohorts of appeals that may be expedited under clause 8 will be set out following consultation between the Home Secretary and the authority, but potential cohorts could include removable foreign national offenders, for whom the swift resolution of appeals and enforcement of deportation where appropriate is a long-standing Home Secretary priority, as set out in the Government’s “Restoring Order and Control” statement. The purpose is simple: to support the timely resolution of cases. The clause will help to ensure that the appeals system is efficient, responsive and capable of delivering justice without unnecessary delay. Let me be absolutely clear: this clause does not affect the authority’s independence in deciding cases. It concerns the management of proceedings, not their outcome. The Secretary of State must consult the authority before making regulations, and the authority retains the flexibility to allow additional time where the interests of justice or the practicalities of a case require it. This is a balanced and proportionate measure. It will improve efficiency and accountability while preserving fairness and access to justice. This clause is about timely justice—which, as other hon. Members have mentioned, is just as important for those undergoing the process as it is for the wider public—not rushed justice, and efficient case management, not ministerial control. Amendment 89 would impose an arbitrary deadline for making the first regulations under clause 8. The clause is deliberately flexible, allowing time periods to be introduced where the evidence shows that particular cases should be prioritised. I appreciate the entreaties of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, but it is really important that we do not pre-empt the evidence, particularly during the authority’s early development. Further reporting requirements are also unnecessary. Clause 8 already requires the authority’s annual report to cover cases where time periods have been extended. Amendment 83 would unnecessarily broaden the statutory consultation requirement. Stakeholder engagement is of course important, and it is something I believe in very strongly, but prescribing a lengthy list of consultees in the Bill could delay our ability to respond quickly where particular cases need to be prioritised. Clause 8 already requires the Secretary of State to consult the authority and, crucially, does not restrict wider engagement if needed, so there is an opportunity for that. I would also like to make this point: for me, Parliament is the ultimate stakeholder, and the public are ultimately the people this Bill is for. Our constituents have lived experience of this process, so it is important that they have the ultimate say, and that is why the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament in this process. It is Members of Parliament, who represent their constituents, who can ultimately represent that stakeholder, and it is crucial to remember that. More broadly, the Bill already places clear duties on the authority, which must exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done. It must aim to be accessible, fair and independent, and it must aim to handle its cases quickly and effectively. It is in everyone’s interests that cases are resolved swiftly. Before I finish, I would like to respond to a couple more of the points that were made. On the point of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about lived experience, we recognise the value of wider stakeholder engagement, but prescribing this lengthy list could delay action where particular cases need to be prioritised. We do not want to restrict the flexibility around that. As I have said, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult with the authority before making regulations and, crucially, it does not restrict that wider engagement, which is so important. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for details on the timeframes and the kinds of cases that the authority will prioritise, which will be set out in regulations in due course. The Government are clear that appeals may be prioritised where there is a strong public interest or compelling operational reason to do so. As I have already mentioned, that could include the cases of foreign national offenders, where we have a genuine need to protect the public, or individuals who are in detention. Any prioritisation will support the efficient operation of the appeals system while ensuring that we maintain fairness and justice. For those reasons, I respectfully ask for the amendments not to be pressed to a vote.
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert— “(7) In Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (immigration bail), in paragraph 3 (exercise of power to grant immigration bail), in sub-paragraph (2), after paragraph (e) insert— ‘(eza) whether any proceedings before the IIAA relating to the person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under section 9 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026,’.” This amendment would mean that, in considering whether to grant immigration bail, the decision-maker must have regard to whether the applicant’s proceedings were being expedited pursuant to clause 9 of the Bill (as well as whether the late claims process applies: see clause 12(3)).
The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment. Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides. Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.
I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism. That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.
I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.
It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.
My hon. Friend puts that perfectly, succinctly and clearly. I appreciate him saying that. This Government are absolutely clear that foreign national offenders with no right to remain should be removed as swiftly as the law allows. I have every anticipation—the Home Secretary has been clear—that in restoring order and control, they are exactly the kind of cohort that we have in mind. It is important, however, that clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism for setting those time periods for groups of cases, clause 9 allows for individual cases to be expedited, and we continue to allow the Secretary of State to have that flexibility to respond to the public interest, rather than narrowing the measure to one specific cohort in the Bill. Amendment 37 agreed to. Amendment proposed: 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert— “(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who— (a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and (b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”—(Blake Stephenson.) This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary. Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules. Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund. Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be. The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced. The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance. On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified. Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs. Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure. Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.
The clause sets out the extension of the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration so that they may inspect and report on the authority’s performance. That will allow them to examine the authority’s efficiency, effectiveness and consistency, as well as wider operational matters. Independent scrutiny is an important safeguard. It will support transparency and accountability and help maintain public confidence in the new appeals system. The clause preserves the authority’s independence. The inspector will not be able to reconsider, overturn or otherwise interfere with the outcome of any individual appeal. The inspector’s role will be to identify systemic issues and opportunities for improvement, rather than to provide an additional route of challenge for individual appellants. Inspection reports will be handled through the existing statutory framework, including the provision for reports to be sent to the authority and the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State to lay them before Parliament. The clause therefore strikes the right balance between robust independent oversight and the protection of independent decision making. Amendment 92 would require the independent chief inspector’s report on the IIAA to include the proportion of authority decisions set aside by the upper tribunal and the number of people removed following the dismissal of an appeal. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling it. The Government agree that the authority must be subject to effective and transparent scrutiny, which is precisely why clause 13 extends the remit of the independent chief inspector to cover the authority’s performance. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe those particular measures on the face of the Bill. The chief inspector will already be able to examine the authority’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its processes. Their role is to monitor the processes, not the outcomes. The number of decisions set aside by the upper tribunal cannot by itself provide a complete assessment of the overall quality of the authority’s decision making, and nor will the number of removals following dismissed appeals provide a direct measure of the authority’s performance. The amendment would therefore risk holding the independent chief inspector, and indirectly the authority, to account for outcomes not wholly within the authority’s control. The chief inspector already has an established role in inspecting the immigration system, and clause 13 enables them to assess, as they consider appropriate, the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and how it is delivering against its objectives. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it. New clause 28 relates to publishing information on the operation and performance of the authority. The Bill already contains a comprehensive framework for accountability and transparency of the authority. First, paragraph 11 of schedule 2 requires the authority to prepare an annual report on the exercise of its functions, which must be laid before Parliament. That will ensure regular parliamentary scrutiny of the performance and operation of the new body. Secondly, the clause provides independent inspection of the performance of the authority’s functions. The purpose of that is to provide additional external reporting on the IIAA’s efficiency and effectiveness. It is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics in the Bill.
The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established. As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28. More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.
Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority. Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed. The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies. Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session. Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition. The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do. Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise. More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required. Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure. In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case. The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.
Could the hon. Gentleman say where he got that figure from?